Suchergebnisse

Models of nomination politics in the US often find "gridlock" in equilibrium because of the super-majority requirement in the Senate for the confirmation of presidential nominees. A blocking coalition often prefers to defeat any nominee. Yet empirically nominations are successful. In the present paper we explore the possibility that senators can be induced to vote contrary to their nominal (gridlock-producing) preferences through contributions from the president and/or lobbyists, thus breaking the gridlock and confirming the nominee. We model contributions by the president and lobbyists according to whether payment schedules are conditioned on the entire voting profile, the vote of a senator, or the outcome. We analyze several extensions to our baseline approach, including the possibility that lobbyists may find it more productive to offer inducements to the president in order to affect his proposal behavior, rather than trying to induce senators to vote for or against a given nominee.

Models of nomination politics in the USA often find 'gridlock' in equilibrium because of the supermajority requirement in the Senate for the confirmation of presidential nominees. A blocking coalition often prefers to defeat any nominee. Yet empirically nominations are successful. In the present article we explore the possibility that senators can be induced to vote contrary to their nominal (gridlock-producing) preferences through contributions from the president and/or lobbyists, thus breaking the gridlock and confirming the nominee. We model contributions by the president and lobbyists according to whether payment schedules are conditioned on the entire voting profile, the vote of a senator, or the outcome. We analyze several extensions to our baseline approach, including the possibility that lobbyists may find it more productive to offer inducements to the president in order to affect his proposal behavior, rather than trying to induce senators to vote for or against a given nominee. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

The APSA Nominating Committee welcomes your suggestions for candidates for 2005–2006 Council seats and offices. This year, eight Council seats, three vice-presidencies, and the offices of president-elect, treasurer and secretary are open. Please note, the office of treasurer "should be from among members of the Association who, at the time of nomination, are serving as members of the Council or have completed service during the preceding year" (APSA Constitution, Art. V Sec. 5). Council members and the treasurer serve staggered two-year terms. The president-elect, vice presidents, and secretary all serve one-year terms.

The APSA Nominating Committee welcomes your suggestions for candidates for 2009 council seats and offices. This year, eight Council seats, three vice presidencies, and the offices of president-elect and secretary are open. Council members serve staggered two-year terms. The president-elect, vice presidents, and secretary all serve one-year terms.