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Since 1945, states in the international system have cooperated heavily to reduce the threats from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, but their strategies have differed significantly. For nuclear weapons, states made use of international organizations from an early point, delegating significant authority to define, monitor, and enforce a collective bargain. In contrast, such an act of delegation occurred much later for chemical weapons and not at all for biological weapons. This dissertation argues that international cooperation on nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons issues requires states to perceive significant threats from NBCWs and share general preferences over strategies for dealing with these threats. However, delegation to an international agent is costly and therefore should occur only when an international agent is valuable for overcoming the many possible barriers to cooperation. I show international organizations can be more efficient producers of information, can be safer and more reliable as informational intermediaries, and can reduce the costs of enforcing an NBCW agreement

FY 2013-2014. Project Lead: Brian Finlay ; In East Africa, small arms trafficking, organized crime, human trafficking, terrorist activity, underdevelopment, and nuclear proliferation all share a common denominator: border insecurity. Bridging the security interests of the global North (nonproliferation) and the global South (development) could reduce WMD proliferation supply chains and increase international security. The project aims to address the challenge of porous borders by developing security regimes that formulate a _whole of government_ approach to border management. A plan for Kenya will prioritize sustainable nonproliferation cooperation in Eastern Africa, facilitate U.S. counterterrorism and nonproliferation efforts, and increase local on-the-ground capacity to promote security engagement. ; Defense Threat Reduction Agency ; NA

This report includes information regarding nuclear proliferation issues. Aspects of this report discuss international nonproliferation structures, U.S. policy, and nuclear proliferation in specific regions.

This report includes information regarding nuclear proliferation issues. Aspects of this report discuss international nonproliferation structures, U.S. policy, and nuclear proliferation in specific regions.

This report includes information regarding nuclear proliferation issues. Aspects of this report discuss international nonproliferation structures, U.S. policy, and nuclear proliferation in specific regions.

Turkey is in compliance with the global nuclear nonproliferation regime in both legal and verbal terms. It voices support for the norms of nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear technology. It adopts supplementary practices in order to strengthen the regime like export controls and the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements. It emphasizes the right to exercise peaceful use of nuclear technology based on the Article IV of Treaty of Nonproliferation of the Nuclear Weapons that is granted to Non Nuclear Weapon States in good standing with the IAEA. However, the thesis draws attention to two deviations in Turkey's behavior. Turkey advocates keeping access to proliferation-sensitive technologies such as uranium enrichment and reprocessing of the spent nuclear fuel despite lacking the current nuclear infrastructure for these technologies. Turkey also welcomes the attempts to realize a weapons of mass destruction free zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East. But also, Turkey continues to host tactical nuclear weapons at İncirlik Airbase that is located in Adana, a city in the southeastern region of the country, with abstention to call for their removal. The thesis argues that despite Turkey's commitment to the nonproliferation regime, Turkey's particular behavior in nuclear nonproliferation regime in those cases stems from its conceptualization of power pertaining to nuclear field. Thus, it is argued that Turkey's anomalies in the regime relate to its hesitance to let go off the subjective 'virtual power' it attributes to nuclear energy and NATO nuclear umbrella. ; Türkiye, Nükleer Silahların Yayılmasının Önlenmesine Yönelik Küresel Rejim'e yasal ve politik açıdan riayet etmekte, bu rejimin temelini oluşturan nükleer silahların yayılmasının engellenmesi, nükleer silahsızlanma ve nükleer enerjinin barışçıl amaçlarla kullanılması normlarını desteklemektedir. Türkiye, rejimi güçlendirmek amacıyla oluşturulan ihracat denetim mekanizmaları ve UAEA'nın Ek Protokol'ünü kabul etmiştir. Ayrıca Türkiye, Nükleer Silahların Yayılmasının Engellenmesi Anlaşması'nın 4. Maddesi uyarınca, UAEA ile uyumlu olan Nükleer Silahsız Ülkeler'in nükleer enerjiyi barışçıl amaçlarla kullanabilme hakkını savunmaktadır. Ancak, bu teknolojiler için altyapısı yoktur. Buna rağmen, uranyum zenginleştirme ve kullanılmış nükleer yakıtın yeniden işlenmesi gibi iki hassas teknolojinin kendisi gibi UAEA ile uyumlu devletler için engellenmemesini uluslararası platformlarda savunmaktadır. Türkiye'nin uluslararası rejimle ilgili tutumuyla çelişen diğer bir nokta, Türkiye'nin nükleer silahsızlanma normunu ve Ortadoğu'nun kitle imha silahsız bölgeye dönüşmesini desteklerken, İncirlik Üssü'nde taktik nükleer silahları bulundurmaya devam etmesidir. Bu tez, uluslararası rejime bağlı kalmasına rağmen Türkiye'nin nükleer teknolojiye ilişkin öznel güç kavramsallaştırması nedeniyle rejime karşı duruşuyla çelişen iki karar verdiğini savunmaktadır ve Türkiye'nin güvenlik algısı incelendiğinde, bu yaklaşımını nükleer silahlanmaya yönelik bir eğilim değil, Türkiye'nin nükleer teknolojiye ve NATO'nun nükleer şemsiyesi altında yer almaya atfettiği güçten vazgeçmekteki isteksizliği olarak yorumlamaktadır.

Since 1945, nuclear weapons have impacted world politics and the world has sought to control their spread. This has resulted in the nonproliferation regime and its centerpiece: the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Understanding nonproliferation compliance is important to determining whether the NPT is contributing to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. If the NPT is having no influence on state behavior, then the international community can decide if its efforts should be redirected from treaties to other nonproliferation efforts. There are several competing theories on why states do or do not comply with treaties. One of the most common thoughts is that states act in their own best interest at the moment. However, domestic politics and the influence of internal factors have gained recognition and popularity. Dr. Beth Simmons is one of the leading scholars in this area. Simmons has done extensive qualitative and quantitative research resulting in the proposition that in the case of human rights treaties mobilization of domestic groups, agenda setting, and litigation influence treaty compliance. Simmons argues that the neorealist focus on state interests within treaty compliance is not satisfactory. While the Simmons' theory developed from human rights treaties, it may be applicable to nonproliferation. Both issue areas deal with security: individual for human rights and national for nonproliferation. Furthermore, the human rights treaties used by Simmons and the NPT share similar timelines in world history, are widely ratified, and utilize oversight bodies. And yet they all lack direct enforcement capabilities. Like the human rights issues, nuclear weapons issues sometimes cause an emotional reaction. Finally, while it goes against accepted international norms to violate human rights and proliferate, infractions still occur in both issue areas. Perhaps, the most common reason for the violations is for the security of the ruling regime. Does the domestic politics theory on compliance with human rights treaties assist in explaining NPT compliance? Given the success of the theory in the area of human rights and the similarities of human rights treaties to the NPT, it will be meaningful to evaluate the domestic politics theory of treaty compliance and use the theory in the area of nonproliferation to gain a greater understanding of treaty compliance more generally and to test whether the issue area matters. This dissertation seeks to assess whether Simmons's domestic politics theory of compliance (i.e. mobilization of domestic groups, agenda setting, and litigation) is a useful prism for viewing the high politics issues area of national security, specifically on nuclear weapons, by exploring six Nonproliferation Treaty member states situations of compliance, noncompliance, and potential compliance concern. Ultimately, it shows that the theory is not very useful in explaining compliance (or noncompliance) because the mechanisms are not present when analyzing the NPT. Mobilization is somewhat present in two cases but not directly tied to the NPT and nonproliferation. This means that the theory should be modified to account for its shortcomings with treaties concerning high politics issues.

Existing literature examines nuclear proliferation from a regional or a national perspective but nuclear issues are inherently transnational. The literature also often focuses on single-state policies for deterrence purposes. Following tailored (single-state) policies, however, is too narrow because these policies are bilateral and based on national interest; they do not include global concerns. In response to the literature, this dissertation proposes to examine states grouped according to their state characteristics in terms of threat existence, democracy level in the nuclear field, and membership in nuclear organizations and compliance with major nuclear treaties. The focus here is to ask: "Does regional security complex theory explain nuclear behavior?" To some extent it does. Regional security complex theory groups states in relation to their geopolitical context. This grouping method is essential for the model that I call nuclear nonproliferation security complexes. Different than the former theory, I argue that nuclear issues are inherently transnational, not regional, and states' nuclear behavior is shaped by the aforementioned state characteristics. This model places states into seven different groups in terms of their characteristics. A triple Venn diagram helps to picture this conceptualization. The first three groups—called material, liberal, and norms-based security complexes—are the core parts of the Venn diagram. Security complexes four through six lie on the intersections between one, two, and three, with the seventh lying at the center. The state characteristics of Iran, Israel, Turkey and the United States are examined in order to understand how the model functions. This dissertation finds that despite having common Middle Eastern security concerns, Iran, Israel and Turkey follow different nuclear policies and their relationship with the United States is a fundamental factor in their nuclear decision-making. In conclusion, I suggest that the United States should differentiate its national interest, which is more to follow nuclear nonproliferation policies, from the global interest, which is to follow nuclear disarmament policies. From this perspective, the United States should find equal ground for both policies to work in conjunction with each other. This could lead to a more comprehensive nuclear approach that incorporates and engages with all actors.

This paper try to explain why a country refused to join the nuclear weapons nonproliferation regime. The main argument of this article is the failure of the nuclear weapons nonproliferation regime to create a state-nuclear negara abandon their nuclear weapons because the regime does not successfully complete the core problem that triggered the decision to develop nuclear weapons. The decision will be difficult to change when it is done in order to maintain domestic power in the country that has nuclear weapons. Moreover, the perception of threat also came from rival states with nuclear weapons or non-nuclear states in alliance with the nuclear state. This article uses a case study of North Korea to prove the argument the author.Keywords : nuclear weapon, nuclear nonproliferation regime, nuclear politics, North Korea, Juche

The so-called new world order compels new modes of thinking about the sources of behavior of countries suspected to harbor nuclear de­ signs. These "fence sitters" are undecided states reluctant to com­ mit themselves fully and effectively to the global nonproliferation regime (a full formal commitment, such as ratifying the nonproliferation treaty, is different from an effective commitment to such membership; in other words, Iraq is no Costa Rica). Such states can wait to make the ultimate declaratory political stand while sitting on various types of fences (some with basements), holding different levels of nuclear capabilities. Fence-sit­ ting, in other words, refers to effective international political postures, not military status. The term can thus accommodate an array of countries to which different ranges of capabilities, intentions, and formal commitments are often attributed, including India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Pakistan, and North Korea (Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa left this group recently and are discussed below; Ukraine and Kazakhstan are particular cases, as countries that inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet empire).

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT or Treaty) faces either extinction or extension in 1995, when the NPT signatories will meet to decide its fate. Given the rapid changes in today's nuclear technology and political environment, many states have expressed reservations about extending the Treaty. This Note considers the implications of those reservations as well as arguments favoring extension. This Note reviews the birth of the atomic age and the terms of the NPT and examines the Treaty's strengths and weaknesses. The author concludes that the Treaty should remain in force and suggests strategies for maintaining the support of member states and attracting other states as the 1995 extension conference draws near.

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there have been 181 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials between 1993 and December 31, 2001. Nuclear materials can be smuggled across a country's border through a variety of means: they can be hidden in a car, train, or ship, carried in personal luggage through an airport; or walked across an unprotected border. U.S. efforts to help other countries combat nuclear smuggling are divided among six federal agencies--the Departments of Energy (DOE); State; and Defense (DOD); the U.S. Customs Service; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and the U.S. Coast Guard. From fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2001, the six agencies spent about $86 million to help 30 countries, mostly in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, combat the threat of smuggling nuclear and other materials that could be used in weapons of mass destruction. Assistance provided by six agencies includes installing radiation detection equipment, helping countries improve their ability to control the export of goods and technologies that could be used to develop nuclear weapons, and providing other equipment and training to improve countries' ability to prevent nuclear smuggling. Although an interagency group, chaired by the Department of State, exists to coordinate U.S. assistance efforts, the six agencies do not always work in unison. The most troubling consequence of the lack of coordination is that DOE, State, and DOD have pursued separate approaches to installing radiation detection equipment at countries' border crossings. While U.S. assistance helps countries combat the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials, serious problems exist with the installation, use, and maintenance of equipment which has undermined U.S. efforts. Customs relies on a three-part strategy to combat nuclear smuggling: training, targeting, and technology. Customs officials rely on radiation pagers--personal radiation detectors designed to be worn on a belt--as the primary equipment to detect nuclear material. However, DOE officials view the pagers as personal safety devices, not search instruments, and that they are not designed to detect weapons-usable nuclear material."

Efforts to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-related technology have increasingly involved economic, technological, and military forms of coercion implemented in an environment of low-level conflict. Coercive counterproliferation measures have included a range of actions, including targeted economic sanctions, industrial sabotage, cyber attacks, targeted killings, and military strikes. While the nonproliferation obligations of states are well-established under relevant treaties, state practice, and the international monitoring system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), norms relating to the enforcement of those obligations are not clearly defined in legal instruments. This Article reviews the legality of prevention and enforcement measures through the institutional framework of the global nonproliferation regime, considering the tensions between that framework and a range of cross-cutting disciplines of international law, including the law of nonforcible intervention, state responsibility, and the law of force. The Article advocates the continuing development of consistent technical criteria to determine proliferation risk at the institutional level of the IAEA monitoring system, and the prioritization of that system in the enforcement of nonproliferation obligations. It addresses the key legal issues associated with the full range of counter proliferation prevention and enforcement options, providing a comprehensive framework to facilitate the refinement of legal norms guiding global counterproliferation efforts.

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Multilateral export control regimes are consensus-based, voluntary arrangements of supplier countries that produce technologies useful in developing weapons of mass destruction or conventional weapons. The regimes aim to restrict trade in these technologies to keep them from proliferating states or terrorists. The United States seeks to improve the effectiveness of these regimes. GAO was asked to (1) assess weaknesses of the four regimes and (2) identify obstacles faced in trying to strengthen them."

This report summarizes many issues raised in Congressional debates on the future of U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance. However, it first reviews the history of these programs, describing their origins in 1991, their expansion and evolution during the 1990s, and the changes in their direction during the first two years of the Bush Administration. The report also provides a broad summary of many of the program areas and projects supported by U.S. funding.