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The book focusses on questions of individual and collective action, the emergence and dynamics of social norms and the feedback between individual behaviour and social phenomena. It discusses traditional modelling approaches to social norms and shows the usefulness of agent-based modelling for the study of these micro-macro interactions. Existing agent-based models of social norms are discussed and it is shown that so far too much priority has been given to parsimonious models and questions of the emergence of norms, with many aspects of social norms, such as norm-change, not being modelled.

The book focusses on questions of individual and collective action, the emergence and dynamics of social norms and the feedback between individual behaviour and social phenomena. It discusses traditional modelling approaches to social norms and shows the usefulness of agent-based modelling for the study of these micro-macro interactions. Existing agent-based models of social norms are discussed and it is shown that so far too much priority has been given to parsimonious models and questions of the emergence of norms, with many aspects of social norms, such as norm-change, not being modelled.

Enthält: DIN 8062:2009 ; DIN 8063-1:1986 ; DIN 8063-12:1987 ; DIN 8074:1999 ; DIN 16450:1994 ; DIN 16868-1:1994 ; DIN 16869-1:1995 ; DIN 16893:2000 ; DIN 16893:2001 [Berichtigung 1] ; DIN 16895:1996 ; DIN 16963-1:1980 ; DIN 16963-11:1999 ; DIN 16963-13:1980 ; DIN 16963-14:1983 ; DIN 16963-15:1987 ; DIN 16963-2:1983 ; DIN 16963-3:1980 ; DIN 16963-4:1988 ; DIN 16963-6:1989 ; DIN 16963-7:1989 ; DIN 16963-8:1980 ; DIN 16963-9:1980 ; DIN CEN TS 14578:2003 [Vornorm] ; DIN EN 681-1:2006 ; DIN EN 764-1:2004 ; DIN EN 764-2:2002 ; DIN EN 1452-1:1999 ; DIN EN 1452-2:1999 ; DIN EN 1452-3:1999 ;

Abstract:Finnemore and Sikkink's norms life cycle model (NLCM) is a powerful heuristic device that continues to be a mandatory point of reference for theoretical and empirical scholarship on norm change. Yet the internalisation stage as conceptualised in the NLCM is problematic. Drawing from Wiener's Theory of Contestation, this article proposes to reconceptualise the norm internalisation stage as the phase at the extreme of the norm cascade in which inherently contested norms simultaneously enjoy formal validity, social recognition, and cultural validation among stakeholders. Unlike Finnemore and Sikkink's, this conceptualisation focuses solely on norm validity and does not assume 'almost automatic' compliance. While Finnemore and Sikkink emphasise habit and institutionalisation as mechanisms of internalisation, the proposed conceptualisation highlights the role of applicatory contestation under conditions of high contestedness. Furthermore, I argue that internalised norms continue to be contested. Finally, my conceptualisation explicitly incorporates norm regression as the fourth stage of the NLCM. Norms might regress because they become obsolete, they change, or they are replaced. To assess the descriptive power of the proposed conceptualisation vis-à-vis Finnemore and Sikkink's, the article applies them to the analysis of the norm that prohibits torture.

Enthält: DIN 55350-11:2008 ; DIN 55350-12:1989 ; DIN 55350-13:1987 ; DIN 55350-14:1985 ; DIN 55350-15:1986 ; DIN 55350-17:1988 ; DIN 55350-18:1987 ; DIN 55350-21:1982 ; DIN 55350-22:1987 ; DIN 55350-23:1983 ; DIN 55350-24:1982 ; DIN 55350-31:1985 ; DIN 55350-33:1993 ; DIN EN ISO 9000:2005 ; DIN ISO 3534-1:2009 ; DIN ISO 11843-1:2004

Introduction --Theorising Norms --Theorising Crime --Agent-Based Modelling --The Environment and Social Norms --Punishment and Social Norms --Imitation and Social Norms --Socially Situated Social Norms --Internalisation and Social Norms --Modelling Norms --Delinquent Networks --Social Construction of Knowledge --Morality --We-Intentionality --Conclusion.

"Values are the driving force of every normalisation; the norm is value solidified into obligation." This work analyses the relation between values and norms in a width and depth not previously seen. Fundamental issues of legal theory and legal philosophy are answered using a general theory on values and moral concepts, value thinking and value language, and combined into a closed edifice of ideas. The author consistently positions himself as a subjectivist and relativist by first rejecting absolute and objective value theories as unprovable and subsequently postulates a provability of legal and moral norms that is exclusively relative. The result is a moderately legal positive approach which does not regard justice as a necessary conceptual component of law, but which views it as a target value of legislation and legal practice.