Suchergebnisse

Abstract The politics of nuclear arms control between the United States and Russia are in a protracted state of crisis, which is in need of explanation. This article provides an overview of bilateral contractual milestones from 1972 to 2001 and analyzes instances of cooperation through the lens of three key factors that have influenced the process. It then considers the changes that these factors have undergone over twenty years of crisis in bilateral arms control from 2001 to 2021 and gauges the possible consequences of a continuation of the current situation. It concludes that during the first period, a shared willingness to shield the bilateral process from political disruption, U.S. bipartisan support, and cooperatively addressing the vertical diffusion of offensive and defensive missile capabilities were both possible and necessary for ensuring success. During the second period, these key factors underwent significant changes and ultimately had a negative effect on the bilateral process, which makes the current crisis unique compared to earlier episodes of regression. Most importantly, both sides were no longer willing to shield the bilateral process in its entirety during this period, including defensive and sub-strategic offensive elements. With a view to future consequences, these findings point to reduced arms race stability, weaker negotiated outcomes, and an erosion of the global nonproliferation regime.

AbstractThe politics of nuclear arms control between the United States and Russia are in a protracted state of crisis, which is in need of explanation. This article provides an overview of bilateral contractual milestones from 1972 to 2001 and analyzes instances of cooperation through the lens of three key factors that have influenced the process. It then considers the changes that these factors have undergone over twenty years of crisis in bilateral arms control from 2001 to 2021 and gauges the possible consequences of a continuation of the current situation. It concludes that during the first period, a shared willingness to shield the bilateral process from political disruption, U.S. bipartisan support, and cooperatively addressing the vertical diffusion of offensive and defensive missile capabilities were both possible and necessary for ensuring success. During the second period, these key factors underwent significant changes and ultimately had a negative effect on the bilateral process, which makes the current crisis unique compared to earlier episodes of regression. Most importantly, both sides were no longer willing to shield the bilateral process in its entirety during this period, including defensive and sub-strategic offensive elements. With a view to future consequences, these findings point to reduced arms race stability, weaker negotiated outcomes, and an erosion of the global nonproliferation regime.

Introduction -- Alternative nuclear regimes -- Cyberwar and nuclear crisis management -- Geography and nuclear arms control -- Nuclear abolition: holy grail or dangerous temptation? -- After the loving: new START and beyond -- Nuclear threat and North Korea: dangers and options -- Nuclear first use and European peace: a risky bargain? -- Minimum deterrence and missile defenses: congruent paths or competitive designs?

Michael D. Cohen argues that nuclear weapons acquisition often does dangerously embolden the acquiring state to undertake coercion and aggression, but that this behavior moderates over time as leaders learn the dangers and limitations of nuclear coercion

THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN NORTH KOREA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) OVER THE RIGHT TO FULLY INSPECT PYONGYANG'S NUCLEAR FACILITIES HAS CONTINUED FOR OVER A YEAR. RECENT DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES AND STATEMENTS HAVE PROMPTED A NEW LOOK AT THE ONGOING CRISIS. THIS ARTICLE DOES SO BY INTERVIEWING A PANEL OF EXPERTS ON ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY ISSUES. THEY DISCUSS CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, THE FUTURE OF NEGOTIATIONS, IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY OF THE REGION, AND THE ROLES OF SEVERAL IMPORTANT ACTORS INCLUDING SOUTH KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES.

Assesses negotiations between North Korea, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the US, over the right to fully inspect Korean nuclear facilities; panel discussion.

Nuclear govemment-oversight-agency (GOA) managers face increasing numbers of strategic decisions with fewer people to support their strategic decision processes. There is an increasing need to find new means of strategic decision support for nuclear GOA managers. This exploratory research contributes toward meeting this need by: (1) developing a set of contextual models of strategic decision making that link mental activities with information needs; (2) deriving a methodology to study the characteristics of the information needed by nuclear GOA managers when formulating strategic problems; and (3) demonstrating the methodology's use in drawing implications for designing decision tools. The literature reviewed in the areas of management. strategic management, decision making, decision tools, and information characteristics formed the foundation for the development of three contextual models of individual, strategic decision making. The most detailed model. the Elementary Mental Activities Model, links the mental activities of strategic decision making with types of information, providing a perspective for strategic information. An experiment was designed to engage nuclear GOA managers in realistic, strategic decision situations. Concurrent verbalizations yielded verbal protocols. Units of information used were identified according to the types of information-entities, attributes, values. relationships. and operators-in the Elementary Mental Activities Model. Unique units of information were identified during coding. "Frequency of use" and "use" by subject and by exercise were calculated for each unit of information. The information characteristics source. level of detail, class, internal/external, and relationship complexity were assigned to entities, relationships. or operators. Thirteen analyses of the data demonstrated the methodology's value for research in strategic decision processes, in strategic information, and in decision tools. All but one of the results were supported in the literature on strategic decision processes. The research led to the following, overall conclusions. 1. The Elementary Mental Activities Model represents the information use of nuclear GOA managers engaged in strategic decision processes and characterizes their strategic decision processes in terms of information use. 2. The methodology developed is useful in measuring the information use of nuclear GOA managers engaged in strategic decision processes for the purposes of determining information needs for designing decision tools. ; Ph. D.