Suchergebnisse

Quality competition versus uninsurance in health care markets / Esther Gal-Or -- Executive compensation in oligopolies : sales, profits and pay / Marc C. Chopin -- Promises to match or beat the competition : evidence from retail tire prices / Maria Arbatskaya, Morten Hviid, Greg Shaffer -- Equilibrium price distributions in an asymmetric duopoly / Edward L. Golding, Steven Slutsky -- Welfare and political support effects of quotas in an oligopolistic market / Hans Haller, Richard Milam -- Arm's-length transfer pricing and national welfare / Thomas A. Gresik -- Financial structure in oligopoly : theory and empirical evidence from Korea / Kiwoong Cheong, Sanghack Lee -- Price dispersion in a simultaneous move salop-stiglitz search model without rationing / Edward L. Golding, Steven Slutsky -- Incentive contracts and advertising in oligopoly / Jae-Woo Lee -- Localized and non-localized competition in the presence of consumer lock-in / Bibek Banerjee, Dan Kovenock -- Customer search and market power : some laboratory evidence / Timothy Cason, Daniel Friedman -- Editor's note / Michael R. Baye

"In many intermediate goods markets buyers and sellers both have market power. Contracts are usually long-term and negotiated bilaterally, codifying many elements in addition to price. We model such bilateral oligopolies as a set of simultaneous Rubinstein-Stahl bargainings over contracts specifying price and quantity, between pairs of buyers and sellers. Equilibrium quantities are efficient regardless of concentration. The law of one price does not hold. Prices depend on concentration of capital and concentration of sales. If the quantity sold represents a small share of both the firms' sales and purchases, the price is close to the Walrasian price." (author's abstract)

In this chapter we present a selective analytic survey of some of the main results of trade under oligopoly. We concentrate on three topics: oligopoly as an independent determinant of trade, as illustrated by the reciprocal-markets model of Brander (1981); oligopoly as an independent rationale for government intervention, as illustrated by strategic trade and industrial policy in the third-market model of Spencer and Brander (1983); and the challenges and potential of embedding trade under oligopoly in general equilibrium as illustrated by the GOLE model of Neary (2002).

In this chapter we present a selective analytic survey of some of the main results of trade under oligopoly. We concentrate on three topics: oligopoly as an independent determinant of trade, as illustrated by the reciprocal-markets model of Brander (1981); oligopoly as an independent rationale for government intervention, as illustrated by strategic trade and industrial policy in the third-market model of Spencer and Brander (1983); and the challenges and potential of embedding trade under oligopoly in general equilibrium as illustrated by the GOLE model of Neary (2002).

In this paper we review various models that have been proposed for the study of mixed oligopoly, more precisely of those markets in which private and public firm compete on equal basis, that is, using only market instruments. The survey is preceded by a brief discussion of other regulatory mechanisms available to the public authority to improve social welfare in a sector.