Suchergebnisse

One—Introduction -- 1. Classicists and Critics -- 2. Neoclassical Trade Models -- 3. Recent Work on Economic Growth -- Two—The Single Country Model -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Neoclassical Production -- 3. Demand -- 4. Short-Run Equilibrium -- 5. Long-Run Equilibrium -- 6. Comparative Dynamics in the Closed Model -- Three—A Model of the Terms of Trade and Economic Growth -- 1. A Model of Trading Economies -- 2. The Reciprocal Demand Function and Short-Run Equilibrium in an Open Economy -- 3. Comparative Statics Analysis -- 4. Patterns of Incomplete Specialization and Capital Accumulation -- 5. Complete Specialization -- 6. Long-Run Dynamic Problems -- 7. A Model of the Terms of Trade Assuming Agriculture is More Capital-intensive than Manufactures -- 8. The Case of Factor Intensity Reversal -- Four—The Small Country in a Large World -- 1. A Small Country Trading at World Prices -- 2. Countries with Different Natural Rates of Growth -- Five—Summary and Conclusions -- 1. A Summary of the Closed Model -- 2. A Summary of the Open Model.

We examine antitrust rules in a two county general equilibrium trade model, contrasting national and multilateral (cooperative) determination of competition policy, exploring the properties of the policy equilibrium. It is not imperfect competition, but variation in competitive stance between sectors that matters for trading partners. Beggar-thy-neighbor competition policies relate to countries' comparative advantages, and hurt the factor intensively used, or specific to, the imperfectly competitive sector. They also create a competitive advantage for export firms. FDI can be pro-competitive in this context, reducing the scope for beggar-thy-neighbor policies and reducing the gains from a multilateral competition agreement.

I propose a model of income redistribution in an open-economy environment. The world consists of a finite number of countries whose governments seek to maximize the welfare of their low-skilled populations by taxing skilled workers' labor income. While tax competition limits the extent to which redistribution is possible—as compared to the closed-economy outcome—when skilled people are internationally mobile, I argue that race to the bottom does not necessarily occur, even if the number of countries becomes arbitrarily large. The asymptotic sustainability of the welfare state crucially depends on the statistical properties of the probability distribution of skilled people's location preferences.