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La présente étude traite d'un aspect spécifique d'une question plus vaste qui est la recherche des moyens de mieux faire respecter le droitinternational humanitaire, c'est-à-dire I'exécution de l'obligation de fairerespecter ce droit, telle qu'énoncée à l'article premier commun aux Conventions de Genève de 1949 et à leur Protocole additionnel I de 1977. L'étude repose sur la prémisse qu'il n'y a pas de contestation quant à l'interprétation de cet article premier, en vertu de laquelle l'obligation de faire respecter le droit international humanitaire signifie que toute Haute Partie contractante est tenue de prendre des mesures à l'égard de toute autre Haute Partie contractante qui ne le respecterait pas. Par conséquent, l'étude ne traite pas de cette question, mais plutôt identifie et commente brièvement les différents types de mesures auxquelles peuvent recourir les Etats pour s'acquitter de cette obligation. Les exemples donnés pour les différentes mesures servent simplement à les illustrer et ne sauraient en rien être considérés comme un jugement de l'auteur sur le bien-fondé de ces mesures dans les circonstances oé elles ont été prises.

The fair-play theory of political obligation holds that citizens incur obligations to obey the law as a result of gaining important benefits from their political communities. In this essay, I argue that the fair-play theory fails in large part because it relies on a flawed understanding of the way in which free-riding is morally wrong. Starting with the assumption that those who benefit from the efforts of others have a moral reason to reciprocate, at least under some circumstances, I show that the fair-play theorists' claim that this reason is grounded in a right to reciprocation, which the providers gain, does not succeed. Therefore this theory cannot provide an adequate explanation of how citizens incur political obligations.

In recent years a number of theorists have maintained that the obligation to obey the law is best conceived and justified as an associational obligation. Not consent or utility or fair play but membership is the source of political obligation. These theorists are wrong, I argue, but they are wrong in interesting and illuminating ways. For an examination of the advantages and disadvantages of the membership account of political obligation underscores the merits of a rival account of obligation grounded in the principle of fair play.

This article investigates the relationship between distributive injustice and political obligation within the confines of the fair-play theory of political obligation. More specifically, it asks how the distribution of benefits and burdens of a cooperative scheme affects people's fair-play obligations to that scheme. It argues that neither a sufficiency-based nor a proportionality-based approach is capable of answering that question singlehandedly. However, the two approaches can be combined in a plausible way. Noting that some of the duties that go into our fair-play obligations are 'gradual' and others are 'non-gradual', the article argues that the sufficiency-based approach explains non-gradual duties such as the duty to obey the law, and that the proportionality-based approach explains gradual duties like political participation and civic responsibility. Thus, the article contends that the fair-play theory should be extended beyond the question of legal compliance and be applied to the duties of good citizenship more generally.

While much has been written on both political obligation and the justification of punishment, including numerous essays in recent years that approach one or the other topic in fair-play terms, there has been no sustained effort to link the two in a fair-play theory of political obligation and punishment. In Playing Fair, Richard Dagger aims to fill this gap and provide a unified theory of political obligation and the justification of punishment that takes its bearings from the principle of fair play. To do this, he first establishes the principle of fair play - the idea that citizens in a cooperative venture have obligations to each other to shoulder a fair share of the burdens because they receive a fair share of the benefits of cooperation - as the basis of political obligation. Dagger then argues that the members of a reasonably just polity have an obligation to obey its laws because they have an obligation of reciprocity or fair play to one another. This theory of political obligation provides answers to fundamental and still debated questions about how to justify punishment, who has the right to carry it out, and how much to punish. Playing Fair brings two long-standing concerns of political and legal philosophy together to rebuke those who deny the possibility of a general obligation to obey the law, to defend the link between political authority and obligation, and to establish the proper scope of criminal law. ; https://scholarship.richmond.edu/bookshelf/1299/thumbnail.jpg

In Playing Fair, Richard Dagger provides a unified theory of political obligation and the justification of punishment that takes its bearings from the principle of fair play. Dagger argues that members of a just polity have an obligation to obey its laws because they have an obligation of reciprocity or fair play to one another.

McDermott rejects the argument that an individual, in receiving benefits from a political community, thus incurs a 'fair-play obligation' to contribute to the provision of these benefits. While acknowledging that an individual receiving benefits without contributing is 'free riding' and that free riding may be morally wrong, McDermott denies that such moral lapses entail communities having any right to demand support. Not contributing may be morally objectionable, but individuals may still have a right not to contribute. However, both proponents and opponents of the fair-play obligation claim do not sufficiently differentiate between different forms of free riding. Arguments tend to be based on rights that may or may not be invoked when individuals free ride through consuming externalities. However, this form of free riding does not entail any reciprocal obligations. Yet it can plausibly be argued that when free riding occurs in the case of the production of public goods, then communities can demand support from individuals, and can have a right to do so.