Suchergebnisse

Cannizzaro, Enzo ; Bonafé, Beatrice: Fragmenting international law through compromissory clauses? Some remarks on the decision of the ICJ in the Oil Platforms case. - S. 481-497 Ochoa-Ruiz, Natalia ; Salamanca-Aguado, Esther: Exploring the limits of international law relating to the use of force in self-defence. - S. 499-524

The judgment in the Oil Platforms case between Iran & the United States is the third decision by the International Court of Justice in a series that restrictively interprets the international law on the use of force. The article provides an overview of the case & comments in detail on the parties' arguments & the Court's findings on the right to self-defense, essential security interests & related evidentiary issues. The case is seen as a remarkable statement of the world court emphasizing the limits of the use of force & the role of the UN Charter at a time when the traditional law on self-defense is challenged by political events & legal writing. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThe recent judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning the Oil Platforms ('Oil Platforms') is a fascinating and confusing mix of formal consensus and substantive dissensus. By fourteen votes to two, the Court dismissed both the United States defence and Iran's substantive claim in the case. Yet the Court's nearly complete unanimity is belied by a considerable substantive disagreement on the reasoning leading to this outcome, as reflected in the numerous separate and dissenting opinions appended to the judgment. An analysis of these opinions reveals that the disagreement within the Court cannot be considered simply a reflection of varying judicial appreciations of law and fact; it reveals a fundamental, even philosophical disagreement relating to the very function of the Court: Is the principal function of the Court the adjudication of claims brought by States, or the settlement of disputes between States? The fundamental disagreement among the Judges on this issue seems a reflection of their training and background – between Judges trained in the common law tradition and those hailing from the civil law or similar more policy-oriented backgrounds. Apart from the jurisprudential disagreement relating to the function of the Court, the judgment also raises important issues of substantive international law, in particular those relating to the relationship between the law of peace and the law of armed conflict. The judgment testifies to the continuing validity of this distinction, despite the many attempts of international legal scholarship to move beyond this distinction to a more enlightened era of international relations.