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This paper rejects the notion that onsite inspection provisions, such as the 'historic' terms of the INF treaty, necessarily insure verification. The principles and processes of verification are examined, as are two failed post- World War I arms control measures that featured intrusive inspection. The Treaty of Versailles was ignored by the Germans, while its replacement, the Anglo- American Naval Treaty, fared no better; both were marked by Allied wishful thinking. A review of post World-War II agreements relative to charges of Soviet noncompliance reveal more ambiguities than actual violations, although the in famous radar near Krasnovarsk fails to be explained away. Discussion of the INF Treaty centers on on-site inspection provisions, that are described as being too costly and too complex to properly implement, as well as offering the Soviet Union unreasonable opportunities for collateral intelligence collection. The author suggests the United States rebuild its counterintelligence assets, attempt to resolve compliance issues through such forums as the Standing Consulting Committee, and form arms control policy in the contest of a comprehensive international security policy--one driven only peripherally by the political requirements of the moment. (SDW) ; This work was sponsored by the Defense Nuclear Agency. ; http://archive.org/details/onsiteinspection00braf ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This book describes the problems encountered by UN inspection teams assigned to find and destroy Iraq's nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile capabilities following Desert Storm. Kathleen C. Bailey focuses on the initial inspections--the period in which Iraq was struggling to camouflage and conceal its weapons and production equipment as inspectors were trying to define their role in the process. Working from interviews with these initial inspectors, Bailey extracts important lessons for future verification efforts. On-site arms control inspectors in Iraq found information to be carefully controlled by the government. Pertinent documentation was destroyed, only selected people were allowed to interact with inspectors, and officials refused to make full, complete declarations. Buildings were tom down, equipment was moved, and un-exploded ordnance was placed in the way. These and other techniques helped Iraq to hide its past activities and to preserve some of its weapons capabilities. In the future, arms control inspectors will need to develop strategies for dealing more effectively with recalcitrant inspectees and for creating the best possible procedures and processes. Bailey concludes with concrete suggestions for overcoming some of these obstacles with more effective inspection practices.

In April 1991, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 687, which established the terms and conditions for a formal cease-fire between Iraq and the coalition of Member States. Resolution 687 states that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless—under international supervision—of all chemical and biological weapons; all stocks of agents, and all related subsystems and components; and all related research, development, support, and manufacturing facilities. The resolution further states that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct, or acquire any of the items mentioned above, and it calls for the development of a plan for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance. To accomplish these objectives, Resolution 687 provided for the establishment of a Special Commission to carry out immediate on-site inspections of Iraq's capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) itself. Soon after it was established, the commission initiated a series of unprecedented inspections to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.