Suchergebnisse

Cette thèse constitue une analyse de contenu des critiques contre l'Union européenne exprimées par plusieurs acteurs politiques et sociaux de gauche en France et en Allemagne, au cours des débats sur le projet de Constitution européenne. Elle s'intéresse plus particulièrement aux idéologies sous-jacentes à ces critiques. Pour comprendre le sens de ces arguments, les comparer entre eux et les classer, certains idéaux-types ont été élaborés sur quatre dimensions (politique, socio-économique, identitaire et stratégique). Cette recherche a permis de combler une lacune importante dans l'analyse des acteurs dits "eurosceptiques", à savoir, l'étude des idéologies animant ces courants. L'essentiel de la littérature se concentre en effet surtout sur l'explication de l'euroscepticisme et, lorsqu'elle aborde leur idéologie, c'est pour construire des taxinomies excessivement globales. La thèse explore aussi en conclusion certaines pistes d'explications de ces résistances à l'UE en essayant d'aller au-delà des visions stratégiques, culturalistes et institutionnalistes, dominantes dans ce domaine, et en insistant davantage sur les dimensions idéelles et structurelles. // This doctoral dissertation analyses the content of the critiques made by some left-wing social and political actors in France and Germany against the current EU. The study focuses on the debates that surrounded the project of European Constitution and more specifically on the more general ideologies underlying these arguments. In order to understand, compare and classify these critiques, idealtypes have been elaborated on four dimensions (socio-economic, political, identity-related and strategic). This research fills a gap in the literature analysing so-called "eurosceptic" actors by concentrating on the ideas conveyed by these currents. Indeed, most of this literature mostly tries to explain this phenomenon. And when it addresses the issue of ideology, it is only to build too far-reaching categories. The conclusion also aims at exploring possible ...

This article shows that instruments of resistance to the European Union (EU), far from constantly contradicting European integration, can define transitional components of this process, which may change and alter the content of a given Community policy. This contribution is based on two possible forms of resistance to the EU — active opposition and flexible re-ownership — in order to highlight their role in the CAP reform process, which is now growing in the agri-environmental component, by tracing the origins of the agri-environmental measures of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and their implementation processes in various countries (England, France and Hungary). ; This article demonstrates that the instruments of resistance to the European Union (EU), far from constantly thwart European integration can define transient components of this process may change and modify the contents of a given Community policy . By retracing the origins of agri-environmental measures of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and processes of implementation in different countries (England, France, Hungary), this contribution is based on two possible forms of resistance EU -active opposition and reappropriation flexible to highlight their role in the process of CAP reform, the agri-environmental component is now growing. ; This article shows that instruments of resistance to the European Union (EU), far from constantly contradicting European integration, can define transitional components of this process, which may change and alter the content of a given Community policy. This contribution is based on two possible forms of resistance to the EU — active opposition and flexible re-ownership — in order to highlight their role in the CAP reform process, which is now growing in the agri-environmental component, by tracing the origins of the agri-environmental measures of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and their implementation processes in various countries (England, France and Hungary). ; Cet article montre que les instruments ...

This article demonstrates that the instruments of resistance to the European Union (EU), far from constantly thwart European integration can define transient components of this process may change and modify the contents of a given Community policy . By retracing the origins of agri-environmental measures of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and processes of implementation in different countries (England, France, Hungary), this contribution is based on two possible forms of resistance EU -active opposition and reappropriation flexible to highlight their role in the process of CAP reform, the agri-environmental component is now growing. ; Cet article montre que les instruments de résistance à l'Union Européenne (UE), loin de constamment contrarier l'intégration européenne, peuvent définir des composants transitoires de ce processus, susceptibles d'évoluer et de modifier le contenu d'une politique communautaire donnée. En retraçant la genèse des Mesures agro-environnementales de la Politique Agricole Commune (PAC) et leurs processus de mise en œuvre dans différents pays (Angleterre, France, Hongrie), cette contribution, s'appuie sur deux formes possibles de résistance à l'UE – l'opposition active et la réappropriation souple, pour souligner leur rôle dans le processus de réforme de la PAC, dont la composante agro-environnementale est aujourd'hui grandissante.

This article demonstrates that the instruments of resistance to the European Union (EU), far from constantly thwart European integration can define transient components of this process may change and modify the contents of a given Community policy . By retracing the origins of agri-environmental measures of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and processes of implementation in different countries (England, France, Hungary), this contribution is based on two possible forms of resistance EU -active opposition and reappropriation flexible to highlight their role in the process of CAP reform, the agri-environmental component is now growing. ; Cet article montre que les instruments de résistance à l'Union Européenne (UE), loin de constamment contrarier l'intégration européenne, peuvent définir des composants transitoires de ce processus, susceptibles d'évoluer et de modifier le contenu d'une politique communautaire donnée. En retraçant la genèse des Mesures agro-environnementales de la Politique Agricole Commune (PAC) et leurs processus de mise en œuvre dans différents pays (Angleterre, France, Hongrie), cette contribution, s'appuie sur deux formes possibles de résistance à l'UE – l'opposition active et la réappropriation souple, pour souligner leur rôle dans le processus de réforme de la PAC, dont la composante agro-environnementale est aujourd'hui grandissante.

Turkey Hosting Syrian Refugees. Between Humanitarian Commitment and Political Instrumentalisation While the issue of Syrian refugees has led an increasing number of countries to work on curbing arrivals,one country, Turkey, hosts almost half of these refugees. Yet, far from imposing restrictions, Turkeyhas distinguished itself for its open border policy and large-scale humanitarian contribution. Turkey'sgenerosity alone is not sufficient to understand this asylum policy put in place specifically for Syrians.There are indeed a number of political factors that indicate a certain level of instrumentalisation ofthis issue. In particular, Turkey's benevolent attitude can be explained by Turkey's early opposition toAssad in the Syrian conflict and its wish to play a role in the post-conflict reconstruction of Syria, aswell as by its willingness to extract material and symbolic benefits from the European Union. But therefugee crisis also matters at the level of domestic politics, where different political parties (in poweror in the opposition) seem to have used the refugee issue opportunistically, at the expense of a climatefavorable to Syrians' healthy integration in Turkey. ; Alors que la question des réfugiés syriens a poussé un nombre croissant de pays à imposer des restrictions à leur entrée sur leur sol, près de la moitié des réfugiés syriens se trouvent dans un seul pays : la Turquie. Or celle-ci, loin de fermer sa frontière, se singularise par sa politique de porte ouverte et son engagement humanitaire de grande ampleur. L'élan de générosité ne peut seul expliquer cette politique d'asile mise en place spécialement pour les Syriens. Un certain nombre de considérations politiques indiquent une instrumentalisation de la question. L'attitude bienveillante de la Turquie peut s'expliquer par son opposition à Assad dans la crise syrienne et son souhait de jouer un rôle dans la construction d'une future Syrie, ainsi que par sa volonté de tirer des bénéfices matériels et symboliques auprès de l'Union européenne. Mais la ...

Turkey Hosting Syrian Refugees. Between Humanitarian Commitment and Political Instrumentalisation While the issue of Syrian refugees has led an increasing number of countries to work on curbing arrivals,one country, Turkey, hosts almost half of these refugees. Yet, far from imposing restrictions, Turkeyhas distinguished itself for its open border policy and large-scale humanitarian contribution. Turkey'sgenerosity alone is not sufficient to understand this asylum policy put in place specifically for Syrians.There are indeed a number of political factors that indicate a certain level of instrumentalisation ofthis issue. In particular, Turkey's benevolent attitude can be explained by Turkey's early opposition toAssad in the Syrian conflict and its wish to play a role in the post-conflict reconstruction of Syria, aswell as by its willingness to extract material and symbolic benefits from the European Union. But therefugee crisis also matters at the level of domestic politics, where different political parties (in poweror in the opposition) seem to have used the refugee issue opportunistically, at the expense of a climatefavorable to Syrians' healthy integration in Turkey. ; Alors que la question des réfugiés syriens a poussé un nombre croissant de pays à imposer des restrictions à leur entrée sur leur sol, près de la moitié des réfugiés syriens se trouvent dans un seul pays : la Turquie. Or celle-ci, loin de fermer sa frontière, se singularise par sa politique de porte ouverte et son engagement humanitaire de grande ampleur. L'élan de générosité ne peut seul expliquer cette politique d'asile mise en place spécialement pour les Syriens. Un certain nombre de considérations politiques indiquent une instrumentalisation de la question. L'attitude bienveillante de la Turquie peut s'expliquer par son opposition à Assad dans la crise syrienne et son souhait de jouer un rôle dans la construction d'une future Syrie, ainsi que par sa volonté de tirer des bénéfices matériels et symboliques auprès de l'Union européenne. Mais la ...

Turkey Hosting Syrian Refugees. Between Humanitarian Commitment and Political Instrumentalisation While the issue of Syrian refugees has led an increasing number of countries to work on curbing arrivals,one country, Turkey, hosts almost half of these refugees. Yet, far from imposing restrictions, Turkeyhas distinguished itself for its open border policy and large-scale humanitarian contribution. Turkey'sgenerosity alone is not sufficient to understand this asylum policy put in place specifically for Syrians.There are indeed a number of political factors that indicate a certain level of instrumentalisation ofthis issue. In particular, Turkey's benevolent attitude can be explained by Turkey's early opposition toAssad in the Syrian conflict and its wish to play a role in the post-conflict reconstruction of Syria, aswell as by its willingness to extract material and symbolic benefits from the European Union. But therefugee crisis also matters at the level of domestic politics, where different political parties (in poweror in the opposition) seem to have used the refugee issue opportunistically, at the expense of a climatefavorable to Syrians' healthy integration in Turkey. ; Alors que la question des réfugiés syriens a poussé un nombre croissant de pays à imposer des restrictions à leur entrée sur leur sol, près de la moitié des réfugiés syriens se trouvent dans un seul pays : la Turquie. Or celle-ci, loin de fermer sa frontière, se singularise par sa politique de porte ouverte et son engagement humanitaire de grande ampleur. L'élan de générosité ne peut seul expliquer cette politique d'asile mise en place spécialement pour les Syriens. Un certain nombre de considérations politiques indiquent une instrumentalisation de la question. L'attitude bienveillante de la Turquie peut s'expliquer par son opposition à Assad dans la crise syrienne et son souhait de jouer un rôle dans la construction d'une future Syrie, ainsi que par sa volonté de tirer des bénéfices matériels et symboliques auprès de l'Union européenne. Mais la ...

In this year 2014, the Balkans and Europe are, more than ever, in a paradoxical situation well. Indeed, while Croatia joined the European Union on 1 July 2013, political and economic elites in the region communion in the same enthusiastic 'pro-European'. In Albania as in Macedonia, Kosovo and Montenegro, majorities and oppositions all share, from now on, that same strategic objective. The most spectacular Evolution occurred in Serbia or the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) Aleksandar Vucic of the Prime Minister yesterday fiercely contemptuous of the European Union, became the strongest supporter ... Yet this 'elusive shadow 'of European integration still seems out of reach of eurozone countries - not so much, from now on, because of their lack of cooperation with international justice or their unfinished reforms that due to the crisis in EU itself. Adapted from the source document.

Germany is one of those rare countries that has taken more than five years to transpose into their national law the measures against ethnic discrimination requested by the European Union directive against racism. Why precisely did the red & green federal government have such difficulties in transposing this directive? It appears that the repeated attempts by government parties have come up against opposition by Christian democrats & representatives of the business sphere. The modalities of the transposition process I study in this paper confirm the conclusions of a previous research program identifying, within EU-15 countries, three worlds or groups of countries each having its own type of transposition: the "legalist world" the "world of negligence," & the "world of the national policy," to which, precisely, Germany belongs to. Adapted from the source document.

Economic patriotism is more a political speech than a legal concept. It refers to behaviors of citizens, companies and governments. Concerning States, this concept can essentially be defined as defense of strategic companies. In practice, this notion is reflected by the institution of national systems of foreign investments control, by stabilizing the shareholding of companies through strategic investment funds, or by granting exclusive or special rights. These behaviors can antagonize the European Union law. However, this law allows exceptions that offer opportunities to States. But the flexibility of States is close. This narrowness leds them to be constantly inventive to defend their strategic companies. Business law allows such an approach. But the protection of strategic companies without the exceptions or derogations permitted by the treaty, which reflects the persistence of domestic markets partitioning, is not without showing the limits of systematic opposition to national economic patriotisms. In addition, such a power may weaken the completion of the internal market. For these reasons, it is important for the authorities of the European Union, to initiate a dynamic that can permit to take better account of the States patriotic concerns. Aggregate to a coherent concept, namely the european economic patriotism, such an approach will permit to establish a common investment policy that can combine openness to foreign investments and preservation of strategic sectors. But, the effectiveness of such a policy is relative. That's why, it's crucial to add to it an autonomous control framework for investments coming from non-member countries. ; Le patriotisme économique relève davantage du discours politique que d'un concept juridique. Il fait référence aux comportements des citoyens, des entreprises et des États. Celui des États peut en substance être défini comme la défense par ces derniers de leurs entreprises stratégiques. Ainsi précisée, cette notion se traduit en pratique par l'institution de dispositifs ...

Economic patriotism is more a political speech than a legal concept. It refers to behaviors of citizens, companies and governments. Concerning States, this concept can essentially be defined as defense of strategic companies. In practice, this notion is reflected by the institution of national systems of foreign investments control, by stabilizing the shareholding of companies through strategic investment funds, or by granting exclusive or special rights. These behaviors can antagonize the European Union law. However, this law allows exceptions that offer opportunities to States. But the flexibility of States is close. This narrowness leds them to be constantly inventive to defend their strategic companies. Business law allows such an approach. But the protection of strategic companies without the exceptions or derogations permitted by the treaty, which reflects the persistence of domestic markets partitioning, is not without showing the limits of systematic opposition to national economic patriotisms. In addition, such a power may weaken the completion of the internal market. For these reasons, it is important for the authorities of the European Union, to initiate a dynamic that can permit to take better account of the States patriotic concerns. Aggregate to a coherent concept, namely the european economic patriotism, such an approach will permit to establish a common investment policy that can combine openness to foreign investments and preservation of strategic sectors. But, the effectiveness of such a policy is relative. That's why, it's crucial to add to it an autonomous control framework for investments coming from non-member countries. ; Le patriotisme économique relève davantage du discours politique que d'un concept juridique. Il fait référence aux comportements des citoyens, des entreprises et des États. Celui des États peut en substance être défini comme la défense par ces derniers de leurs entreprises stratégiques. Ainsi précisée, cette notion se traduit en pratique par l'institution de dispositifs ...

This report aims at highlighting the political ideology of Hamas in a comparative approach through critical analysis and researches, based on a historical methodology. We followed this political movement through its religious ideology and Islamic references, from its position as a Palestinian opposition to the reached power itself. We tried to achieve the following objectives:Describing the emergence and evolution of the movement, the living embodiment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine, as well as the factors and circumstances that led to its decline and its rise at certain periods of the History. We also seek to know the roots of this movement before and after 1948 and until the outbreak of the intifada in 1987.Identifying the factors that influence the policies and decision making of the Movement, espacially the ideological and partisan aspect, as a matter of fact that Hamas is a fundamental element of the international movement Muslim Brotherhood, where Islam is the ideological and political reference. The report tackles the aspect of the national Palestinian actions and partisan interests who have imposed their own visions and pragmatic positions. In addition, it is necessary to analyze the division of leadership between the inside and outside group, but also the important influence of the military wing in the Policy building and decision making.Identifying the positions of Hamas movement towards the Palestinian political system into its two components – the PLO and the Palestinian Authority – towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its settlement options and therefore towards the political settlement, compared to the PLO positions and other Palestinian factions. This research seeks to determine the position of Hamas on the principle of the Palestinian liberation and towards the political PLO initiatives, the Arab States, the organizations and the friendly countries, such as the International Conference, and to bring out the political initiative of Hamas and comparing it to the other forces' positions.Identifying the relation between the Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, the degree of autonomy that Hamas has in the organization and its international framework. The research tries to study the nature of the relations of the movement with the international, regional and Arab organizations. A special attention is given to the United States, the European Union, Russia and the other regional countries in order to understand its place and position in the axis of the region. The attention is especially focused on the « axis of the resistance » and the kind of relations Hamas has with the Arab countries of Palestine, like Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and States who have an big impact on the regional policies, particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia.Exploring the experience of Hamas in the transitional period, from the opposition to the takeover and parallelly with the experience in the political aspect of Islam with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafi Jihad, Al-Qaida, Hezbollah and the Turkish Party of Justice and Development, from its inception until its accession in power. ; Cette étude vise à faire la lumière sur le discours politique du mouvement Hamas, dans le cadre d'une approche comparée critique qui s'appuie sur une méthodologie historique dans la recherche et l'analyse. Nous suivons le passage de ce Mouvement, aux références idéologiques religieuses islamistes, de l'opposition palestinienne au pouvoir. Nous essaierons d'atteindre les objectifs suivants :Décrire l'émergence et l'évolution de ce Mouvement, incarnation vivante des Frères musulmans en Palestine, ainsi que les circonstances et facteurs qui ont conduit à sa régression à certains moments de l'histoire et à sa montée en puissance à d'autres. Nous cherchons également à connaitre les racines de ce mouvement avant et après 1948 et jusqu'au déclenchement de l'Intifada en 1987.Identifier les facteurs qui influent sur les politiques et la prise de décision de ce Mouvement, notamment le facteur idéologique et partisan, étant donné qu'il fait partie intégrante du Mouvement international des Frères musulmans dont l'Islam est la référence idéologique et politique. Il existe également le facteur de l'action nationale palestinienne et les intérêts partisans qui lui ont imposé des visions et des positions pragmatiques. De plus, il convient d'analyser la division du leadership entre intérieur et extérieur et enfin l'influence extraordinaire de l'aile militaire dans la formulation des politiques et dans la prise de décision.Identifier les positions du mouvement Hamas vis-à-vis du système politique palestinien dans ses deux composantes - l'OLP et l'Autorité nationale palestinienne - mais aussi vis-à-vis du conflit israélo-palestinien et les options de règlement de celui-ci, et donc de sa position vis-à-vis du règlement politique, comparée aux positions de l'OLP et des autres factions palestiniennes. Cette étude cherche également à connaître la position du Hamas sur le principe de la libération de la Palestine et vis-à-vis des initiatives politiques de l'OLP et des Etats arabes, et celles des organisations ou des pays amis, comme la Conférence internationale, et à faire la lumière sur l'initiative politique du Hamas en comparaison avec les positions des autres forces.Identifier la relation entre le Hamas et les Frères musulmans et le degré d'autonomie dont jouit le Hamas dans le cadre de sa relation avec l'organisation mère, de caractère internationaliste. L'étude tente aussi d'étudier la nature de la relation de ce mouvement avec les organisations internationales, régionales et arabes, en particulier avec les Etats-Unis d'Amérique, l'Union européenne, la Russie, les autres pays de la région et de connaitre sa place dans les axes dans la région, notamment « l'axe de la résistance », à la lumière de ses relations avec les pays arabes voisins de la Palestine (Egypte, Jordanie, Syrie et Liban) et ceux qui influent sur les politiques régionales et arabe en général, et l'Arabie Saoudite et l'Iran en particulier.Explorer l'expérience du Hamas dans sa transition de l'opposition au pouvoir et faire un parallèle avec l'expérience l'Islam politique, en particulier le mouvement des Frères musulmans, le courant salafiste jihadiste, Al-Qaïda, le Hezbollah libanais et enfin le Parti de la Justice et du développement turc, depuis sa création jusqu'à son accession au pouvoir.

The article verifies that the French public opinion is more hostile to globalization than most of the other countries. The political cleavage between the left and the right wings is inadequate because the French conservatives inherit from a heavy mercantilist tradition. In the European Union, the international trade theory based approaches are in opposition with the fact that such hostility is prevalent in all the professional categories. The high share of public expenses is not perceived as a guarantee for the "losers" of globalization. Nevertheless, with regard to other countries, the attitude of France is relatively more opened to immigration issues. The French exception could then come from a higher aversion for the risk, itself aggravated by globalization. ; L'article vérifie que l'opinion publique française est plus hostile à la mondialisation que la plupart des autres pays. Le clivage politique gauche-droite est inadéquat car les conservateurs français héritent d'une tradition mercantiliste forte. Dans l'Union européenne, les approches d'économie politique fondées sur la théorie du commerce internationale sont contredites par le fait que cette hostilité se retrouve dans toutes les catégories professionnelles. La part élevée des dépenses publiques n'est pas non plus perçue comme le moyen de compenser les « perdants » de la mondialisation. Pourtant, par rapport aux autres pays, l'attitude de la France est relativement plus ouverte sur l'immigration. L'exception française pourrait alors venir d'une plus grande aversion pour le risque, lui-même accru par la mondialisation.