Suchergebnisse

Trotz ihrer vergleichsweise starken Repräsentanz im Parlament hat sich die in interne Auseinandersetzungen verstrickte politische Opposition in der Tschechischen Republik entgegen den ursprünglichen Erwartungen bislang als wenig schlagkräftig erwiesen. Der Autor analysiert die Ursachen für die Ineffizienz der Opposition und geht in diesem Zusammenhang näher auf die Fraktionsbildungen innerhalb der einzelnen Oppositionsparteien ein. Abschließend diskutiert er die Gründe für das Fehlen einer liberalen Partei in der Tschechischen Republik und informiert über Bestrebungen zur Schaffung eines "realistischen Blocks". (BIOst-Srt)

Die drei größten ungarischen Oppositionsparteien haben Probleme, ihre Rolle zu definieren und effektiven Einfluß auf den Gesetzgebungsprozeß zu nehmen. Sie führen Klage darüber, daß ihre Vorschläge im Parlament entweder ignoriert oder niedergestimmt werden. Aber auch auf seiten der Oppositionsparteien ist eine gewisse politische Unentschiedenheit und Unfähigkeit zur Kooperation zu verzeichnen. (BIOst-Srt)

Opposition responsibility is a neglected field, and if at all noticed, opposition parties are often placed in the irresponsibility frame. The purpose of our paper is to examine to what extent, under which conditions, and in which ways opposition parties can be considered to act responsibly. This article will develop the concept of opposition responsibility and test the expectations in the behaviour of opposition parties in three countries: Hungary, Italy and Spain. The analysis highlights that opposition responsibility exceeds—although does not exclude—policy making and scrutiny activities as it has broader implications. We shall regard the opposition's general performance and their political system-related behaviour as components of responsibility.

Parliamentary regimes offer the unique opportunity for opposition parties to react to foreign policy by proposing no-confidence motions (NCMs). The threat of an NCM bringing down the government may be enough to induce pacific behavior by the executive. Yet, this simplistic characterization neglects the possible electoral motivations of opportunistic opposition parties. I develop a theory that opposition parties respond to involvement in international conflict by proposing NCMs as a tool to influence voters' opinions with an eye toward the next election. I develop two expectations based on policy disagreement and issue ownership that I use to explain the electorally motivated decision to propose NCMs following conflict. I test these expectations with a dataset of 14 European parliamentary democracies from 1970 to 2001. The empirical evidence suggests that the partisanship of both the government and opposition parties interact to create varying electoral incentives to propose NCMs based on issue ownership. Right-wing opposition parties are more likely to challenge than left-wing parties, and this effect is exacerbated when facing left-wing governments. This study has important implications that underpin a number of theories of the domestic causes of international conflict as well as implications for the study of party strategy. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

Parliamentary regimes offer the unique opportunity for opposition parties to react to foreign policy by proposing no-confidence motions (NCMs). The threat of an NCM bringing down the government may be enough to induce pacific behavior by the executive. Yet, this simplistic characterization neglects the possible electoral motivations of opportunistic opposition parties. I develop a theory that opposition parties respond to involvement in international conflict by proposing NCMs as a tool to influence voters' opinions with an eye toward the next election. I develop two expectations based on policy disagreement and issue ownership that I use to explain the electorally motivated decision to propose NCMs following conflict. I test these expectations with a dataset of 14 European parliamentary democracies from 1970 to 2001. The empirical evidence suggests that the partisanship of both the government and opposition parties interact to create varying electoral incentives to propose NCMs based on issue ownership. Right-wing opposition parties are more likely to challenge than left-wing parties, and this effect is exacerbated when facing left-wing governments. This study has important implications that underpin a number of theories of the domestic causes of international conflict as well as implications for the study of party strategy.