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Last term, in Federal Communications Commission (FCC) v. Fox Television Stations, the Supreme Court expressly refused to link ordinary administrative law to constitutional concerns, insisting that whether an agency action is "arbitrary and capricious" and whether it is unconstitutional are separate questions. In this article, I argue that Fox is wrong. The Court's protestations aside, constitutional law and ordinary administrative law are inextricably linked, with the result that a fair amount of ordinary administrative law qualifies as what Henry Monaghan famously termed constitutional common law. Its doctrines and requirements are constitutionally informed but rarely constitutionally mandated, with Congress and agencies enjoying broad power to alter specific administrative mechanisms notwithstanding their constitutional aspect. Recognizing the interrelationship between constitutional law and ordinary administrative law is important both for the ongoing debate over the legitimacy of constitutional common law and for proper appreciation of the role administrative agencies can play in our constitutional order. Underlying many attacks on constitutional common law is a view of constitutional law as having a narrow and determinate scope, but the interwoven relationship between ordinary law and constitutional law in the administrative law context suggests this view of constitutional law is a false one. In addition, seeking to enforce constitutional norms through ordinary administrative law better accords with constitutional principles than efforts to segregate out the two and is likely to prove less intrusive to the policymaking prerogatives of the political branches. As a result, the better critique is not the extent to which constitutional common law surfaces in administrative contexts, but rather the lack of transparency that accompanies it.

Henry Monaghan famously argued that much of constitutional interpretation takes the form of what he termed constitutional common law, a body of doctrines and rules that are constitutionally inspired but not constitutionally required and that can be altered or reversed by Congress. This Essay argues that a fair amount of ordinary administrative law qualifies as constitutional common law: Constitutional concerns permeate core administrative law doctrines and requirements, yet Congress enjoys broad power to alter ordinary administrative law notwithstanding its constitutional aspect. Unfortunately, the constitutional common law character of much of ordinary administrative law is rarely acknowledged by courts. A striking example of this lack of acknowledgment is the 2009 decision in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., in which the Supreme Court insisted that whether an agency action is "arbitrary and capricious" and whether it is unconstitutional are separate questions. Recognizing the interrelationship between constitutional law and ordinary administrative law is important both for the ongoing debate over the legitimacy of constitutional common law and for proper appreciation of the role administrative agencies can play in our constitutional order. Underlying many attacks on constitutional common law is a view of constitutional law as having a narrow and determinate scope. Yet the interwoven relationship between ordinary law and constitutional law in the administrative law context suggests this view of constitutional law is false. In addition, seeking to enforce constitutional norms through ordinary administrative law better accords with constitutional principles than efforts to segregate out the two and is likely to prove less intrusive to the policymaking prerogatives of the political branches. The better critique is not the extent to which constitutional common law surfaces in administrative contexts, but rather the lack of transparency that accompanies it.

The article examines the affective dynamics of law in the everyday. It insists upon the importance of 'the background' for thinking about law. In the everyday cut and thrust of daily life, law tends to fade into the background. It becomes unobtrusive, functioning from the background by structuring the capacity to act. In other words, it functions affectively. Key to law's functioning is its ability to also move out from the background in certain crucial moments. In this it becomes obtrusive, taking centre stage in such a way that its former position in the background becomes imperceptible. The movements from background to foreground and back again are essential to begin to grasp the manner in which law functions with and through affect. Using the work of Kathleen Stewart, Hans Lindahl and Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos the article insists upon the importance of the affective dynamics of law. Developing the idea of nestled affects helps us to understand the movements from background to foreground.

For several years now, the issue of the simplification of the law is central in the juridicaldebate. The multiplication of rules of law, of their sources (national and international), as well astheir foundations (laws, rules, codes, etc.), is harmful to the clear understanding of the law andconsequently to the juridical safety.This statement can be made particularly in the field of extra contractual civil liability where normsfrom all origins, all natures and numerous founding bases are indeed to be found. Yet thesenorms overlap and compete in their scope of application, so that several norms may apply to thesame litigation. Therefore, the issue which arises is to ascertain beforehand option, the how toarbitrate among such competing and overlapping norms.In order to structure the norms of civil liability, it has been necessary to research and findprinciples enabling to designate the norms to be applied in the litigation. Two principles stand outfrom this research. The first one, called the guiding principle, is the principle of subsidiarity, whilethe second one, called the principle of revision, is a principle of interest, which is itself based onseveral instruments, such as: option, plurality, and hierarchy. The legislator, the judge and thevictim are obviously at the core of this system of links which, if it is correctly applied, shouldenable to solve all the competitions between norms, by designating the norm which is finallyapplicable. ; Depuis plusieurs années, la question de la simplification du droit est au cœur du discours juridique. La multiplication des règles de droit, de leurs sources (nationales et internationales) comme de leurs supports (lois, codes, etc.), nuit à la lisibilité du droit et donc à la sécurité juridique.Ce constat peut être fait plus particulièrement en matière de responsabilité civile extracontractuelle où l'on trouve effectivement des normes de toutes origines, de toutes natures et sur de nombreux supports. Or, ces normes connaissent des champs d'application concurrents, de sorte ...

For several years now, the issue of the simplification of the law is central in the juridicaldebate. The multiplication of rules of law, of their sources (national and international), as well astheir foundations (laws, rules, codes, etc.), is harmful to the clear understanding of the law andconsequently to the juridical safety.This statement can be made particularly in the field of extra contractual civil liability where normsfrom all origins, all natures and numerous founding bases are indeed to be found. Yet thesenorms overlap and compete in their scope of application, so that several norms may apply to thesame litigation. Therefore, the issue which arises is to ascertain beforehand option, the how toarbitrate among such competing and overlapping norms.In order to structure the norms of civil liability, it has been necessary to research and findprinciples enabling to designate the norms to be applied in the litigation. Two principles stand outfrom this research. The first one, called the guiding principle, is the principle of subsidiarity, whilethe second one, called the principle of revision, is a principle of interest, which is itself based onseveral instruments, such as: option, plurality, and hierarchy. The legislator, the judge and thevictim are obviously at the core of this system of links which, if it is correctly applied, shouldenable to solve all the competitions between norms, by designating the norm which is finallyapplicable. ; Depuis plusieurs années, la question de la simplification du droit est au cœur du discours juridique. La multiplication des règles de droit, de leurs sources (nationales et internationales) comme de leurs supports (lois, codes, etc.), nuit à la lisibilité du droit et donc à la sécurité juridique.Ce constat peut être fait plus particulièrement en matière de responsabilité civile extracontractuelle où l'on trouve effectivement des normes de toutes origines, de toutes natures et sur de nombreux supports. Or, ces normes connaissent des champs d'application concurrents, de sorte que plusieurs d'entre elles peuvent jouer pour le même litige. Le problème qui se pose alors est de savoir à l'avance comment trancher pareil concours.Pour parvenir à articuler les normes de la responsabilité civile, il a fallu rechercher des principes permettant de désigner la norme applicable au litige. Deux principes sont alors ressortis de cette étude. Le premier, dit principe directeur, est le principe de subsidiarité, tandis que le second, dit principe correcteur, est un principe d'intérêt, qui repose lui-même sur plusieurs outils, tels que l'option, le cumul ou la hiérarchie. Le législateur, le juge et la victime sont naturellement au cœur de ce dispositif d'articulation qui, correctement appliqué, devrait permettre de résoudre tous les concours, en désignant la norme finalement applicable.

If H. L. A. Hart brings philosophy to jurisprudence, he does so through a tradition based on criticism and re-evaulation of what it means to do philosophy: ordinary language philosophy. This essay concentrates on the opening chapter of Hart's The Concept of Mind and claims that Hart's vision of jurisprudence, as found in chapter one, is a powerful adaptation of the relationship Ludwig Wittgenstein establishes between ordinary and metaphysical language. Adapted from the source document.