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The term "terrorism" is used for a lot of different terroristic organizations. Although their motives are vastly different they share common patterns of evolutionary development. At the beginning terrorist groups arise out of an extremist milieu & start to horrify the public opinion & society by planning & accomplishing their first steps of terrorist action. The achieved effect supplies the organization with more & more supporters, which allows the terrorist group to start a more professional & severe sequence of action. But this does not contain a guarantee of successful & ongoing terrorist action per se. Much to the contrary, terrorist organizations start to lose their support by acting in a more & more professional & brutalized manner & because of internal disavowals. Furthermore their power of impact is diminished, & in the end the organization splits up & proclaims its voluntary liquidation. The consequence is: Terrorist organizations aren't survivable in the long run. Adapted from the source document.

Al Qaeda & its leader Osama bin Laden reflect the concepts of multinational corporations, with the structure of a modern business based on management concepts of the early 1990's. Bin Laden consciously developed decentralized, flexible, & complex financing, not limited to state support. Its ownership is oligio-political, with production & recruiting in multiple countries & a primary administration with numerous branches. The Al Qaeda network uses modern communication technology, is free from any regulation, & can support its own organizational structure, training, & operations, preferably in a dysfunctional state. Bin Laden & his closest associates have enormous technical & economic qualifications. Operating like a joint venture, bin Laden encourages ideas & provides capital to the most creative & implementable. The organization's flexibility stems from its bipolar character as an organization & a dynamic ideology. Attempts to cut off financing are complicated by the difficulty in sanctioning organizations & individuals, the unwillingness of states to implement certain legislation, & the ability of Al Qaeda to change tactics & organization. The US cannot eliminate Al Qaeda alone, & the best that can be hoped for is to limit opportunities & minimize the sociological factors that support their ideology. L. Kehl

NATO needs a new balance. Never before, was NATO active in so many operations. The differences between member states are becoming apparent. NATO is criticized as an organization lacking objectives & being guided more by external factors than by collective interests. Given the increasing significance of transatlantic cooperation the author pleads for a new alliance, where collective security for member states, an institutionalization of transatlantic cooperation as well as the development of a common security strategy take center stage. In order to achieve these goals, NATO alone is no longer sufficient. NATO must have the ability to cooperate with other national & international actors. E. Sanchez

Although both the IGC 2000 & the EU's internal reforms have concentrated on guaranteeing the necessary efficiency of the institutions, it is still an open question whether they will enable the EU institutional framework to successfully incorporate a number of new member states. Moreover, according to the Nice declaration & especially after the failure of the Nice referendum in Ireland, the focus is increasingly on enhancing the legitimacy of the EU. As this paper takes an institutions-based approach, considering in turn the main issues concerning the European Council, the Commission, the Council of Ministers, & the European Parliament, it tackles both of these two guiding principles of current reforms -- efficiency & legitimacy. 31 References. Adapted from the source document.

Examines the growth of Amnesty International's (AI's) membership, status, & mandate since its founding in 1961, particularly in Germany. The expansion of AI activities from work on behalf of political prisoners to opposition to the death penalty & denouncing terrorist activities is described. Sources of AI's success, in particular, its neutrality, are discussed. Its role as a documentation center, news agency, supporter of citizen initiatives, international network, & lobbyist for the politically persecuted is analyzed. Questions regarding the future role of AI & concerns about finances are raised. It is concluded that what distinguishes AI from classic social movements is its ability to mobilize diffused worldwide action on behalf of nameless victims. T. Arnold

Venture Philanthropy is a new facet of philanthropy which assigns economic factors to public welfare. Non-profit-organizations and social enterprises are not only supported financially, but also with managerial aid and networking skills. In return, these "social investments" are supposed to make a social "profit" which can be assessed for by evaluating the effectiveness of the investment. In certain circumstances the social investor can even expect financial returns. This logic of investment puts traditional boundaries of the non-profit civil society and profit-oriented economy in jeopardy; it also raises questions concerning the definition of common goods and tax concessions for philanthropy. Venture Philanthropy will potentially be able to give new valuable impulses for volunteering, especially regarding efficiency and transparency. Because of some blind spots, however, it will stay only one of multiple tools in the philanthropic "tool box". Adapted from the source document.

The future of unions depends on their ability to renew themselves organizationally. Exemplifying 'organizing' Dorre and Nachtwey show advantages & disadvantages as well as difficulties of transferring approaches from countries with different general frameworks to the current situation in Germany. Adapted from the source document.

The need to reform the UN organization CEDAW (spelling unavailable), whose purpose is to monitor & eliminate the discrimination of women in member countries, is recognized. The mission & challenges of this organization are described, referring to the state of affairs reported at the special CEDAW conference in Utrecht, the Netherlands, in May of 2004. New reporting rules delegating, among others, more responsibilities to the Country Rapporteur & Country Task Forces & changing reporting procedures are described. As a special initiative to reform the CEDAW, a task group was formed in 2003 to develop guidelines for making the collection of data & reporting procedures more effective. The type of information this organization gathers, analyses, & distributes is discussed in general outline, & the type of information that member states must make available to CEDAW so that it can be included in its future general reports is specified. The need for streamlining the data gathering & reporting procedures is stressed. Budget problems that diminish the effectiveness of CEDAW are addressed in the context of financing the work of all seven UN organizations charged with overseeing human rights violations. Z. Dubiel