European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions 2020
EU-SILC 2020 contains the 2020module on over-indebtedness, consumption and wealth as well as labour.
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EU-SILC 2020 contains the 2020module on over-indebtedness, consumption and wealth as well as labour.
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SSRN
Working paper
In: Ethics & international affairs, Band 21, Heft S1, S. 1-7
ISSN: 1747-7093
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: Educación, lenguaje y sociedad: publicación del Instituto para el Estudio de la Educación, el Lenguaje y la Sociedad (UNLPam, Argentina), Band 11, Heft 11, S. 1-20
In: Science and public policy: journal of the Science Policy Foundation, Band 13, Heft 4, S. 194-195
ISSN: 1471-5430
SSRN
In: Counting the Poor, S. 363-388
In: Routledge Studies in the History of Economics
In: Consumption as an investment 1
In: Routledge Studies in the History of Economics Ser. v.71
SSRN
Working paper
In: Taxing wages 2007/08 = Ed. 2008
In: NBER working paper series 13163
There are a large number of cases where corruption has been discovered investigating levels of consumption that appear to be hard to justify. Yet, in the standard moral hazard model withholding of effort by the agent is not observable to the principal. We argue that this assumption has to be revised in applications that study corruption. The informativeness of an agent's level of consumption depends on his legal income and initial level of wealth, as conspicuous consumption by wealthy agents leads to little updating of the principal's belief about their honesty. This introduces a tendency to prefer poor agents as they are easier to monitor. More generally, we describe the basic problem of choosing agents and monitoring consumption with the aim of reducing corruption, and discuss features of the practical applications. We show that when there is consumption monitoring and wealth is observed, the effect of higher wealth on equilibrium bribes is ambiguous (and that the political class will exhibit lower variance in consumption than the general population). In settings where formal contracts matter, we show that monitoring consumption introduces a tendency towards low powered incentives (and more generally low wages). We also discuss the role of ability, the tax system, and the way to derive a measure of the value of illegal funds for the agent.
In: The journal of negro education: JNE ;a Howard University quarterly review of issues incident to the education of black people, Band 23, Heft 4, S. 496
ISSN: 2167-6437