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Includes bibliographical references (p. [63]) and index ; This book deals mainly with the law of agency and partnership and also touches on the basic principles of company law with special reference to the law of Hong Kong ; published_or_final_version ; General Editor's Foreword pvii ; Preface to the second edition / Clement Shum pix ; Bibliography p63 ; Abbreviations p65 ; Table of Cases p67 ; Index and Glossary p71 ; 1 Agency p1 ; 2.Partnership ; 3 Companies p51 ; 1.1 Introduction p1 ; 1.2 Creation of Agency p3 ; 1.3 Authority of Agents p7 ; 1.4 Warranty of Authority p12 ; 1.5 Relations Between Principals and Third Parties p13 ; 1.6 Relations Between Agents and Third Parties p16 ; 1.7 Duties of Agents p19 ; 1.8 Rights of Agents p22 ; 1.9 Termination of Agency p23 ; 2.1 Introduction p27 ; 2.2 Definition and Nature of Partnership p27 ; 2.3 Rules For Determining the Existence of Partnership p29 ; 2.4 Limit On the Number of Partners p30 ; 2.5 The Firm Name p30 ; 2.6 Registration of Busines p30 ; 2.7 Legal Actions By and Against Firms p31 ; 2.8 Formation of Partnership p31 ; 2.9 Types of Partners p35 ; 2.10 Partners and Third Parties p35 ; 2.11 Relations of Partners to One Another p38 ; 2.12 Partnership Property p31 ; 2.13 Dissolution of Partnership p43 ; 2.14 Consequences of Dissolution p44 ; 2.15 Setting Accounts p47 ; 3.1 Introduction p51 ; 3.2 Sole Trader p51 ; 3.3 Partnership p51 ; 3.4 Body Corporate p52 ; 3.5 The Concept of Legal Personality p53 ; 3.6 The Concept of Limited Liability p55 ; 3.7 Advantages of Incorporation p57 ; 3.8 Disadvantages of Incorporation p57 ; 3.9 Private and Public Companies p58 ; 3.10 Procedure to Obtain Registration of a Limited Company p59 ; 3.11 The Doctrine of Ultra Vires p61 ; 3.12 Directors p61

Institutions that potentially have a positive impact on economic performance rarely exist outside of a system of institutions; rather they are embedded in the economic order of a country. It is thus imperative to investigate bundles of performance-enhancing institutions, particularly those bundles that form the basis for economic orders. This paper is based on bundles of institutions that have empirically proven to be prosperity enhancing. It proposes a measurement of this bundle of institutions in the form of a composite index, which is based on 12 different data series. Index data is available for 163 countries between 2005 and 2010 and it allows for comparative analyses using the overall index as well as its three sub-indices, measuring political, economic and societal institutional quality. The index is a step towards a more systematic international comparison of institutional settings. In future research, it can contribute to identifying prosperity enhancing bundles of institutions through regression analysis.

Cet ouvrage constitue une contribution originale à la littérature sur les systèmes institutionnels ainsi qu'à celle sur les « variétés de capitalisme ». Fondé sur la comparison d'un échantillon de pays émergents et de pays en développement, il contribue également à la littérature sur le « capitalisme comparatif ». L'une de ses principales conclusions est de montrer la diversité des options institutionnelles qui peuvent conduire au développement. Classification JEL : O11; O57; P51

This multilevel meta-analytic study, based on 176 studies from 36 countries, examines the impact of political characteristics on the performance of family firms when comparing them to non-family firms (k=311, N=1,598,964). Our findings support the expectation that family firm characteristics are positively related to firm performance. We trace the variance between the studies to differences in certain political characteristics of the firms' countries of origin: government stability, regime stability, regime type and special periods of factionalism. In terms of government and regime stability, we find positive moderating effects on the focal relationship. We further show that periods of factionalism even reverse the superior performance of family firms. While the focal relationship becomes stronger in democracies, the relationship turns negative when looking at anocracies and becomes stronger and positive again considering autocracies. Finally, we reveal that government stability partly mediates the influence of the regime type. Therefore, government stability is a crucial condition for family firms to prosper in any political environment. Our study has several implications for the interplay between family firms and politics: First, the comparative advantage of family firms depends on specific political characteristics. Second, the ability of institutions to provide stability is more important for family firms than the actual institutional setting itself. Third, the impact of a political environment on economic success differs between family firms and nonfamily firms and therefore depends on the structure of the given economy. ; Die vorliegende mehrstufige Metaanalyse, die auf 176 Studien aus 36 Ländern basiert, untersucht die Auswirkungen politischer Einflussfaktoren auf den Erfolg von Familienunternehmen im Vergleich zu Nicht-Familienunternehmen (k=311, N=1.598.964). Unsere Ergebnisse bestätigen die Erwartung, dass die Eigenarten von Familienunternehmen positiv mit deren Unternehmensleistung verbunden sind. Die verbleibende Varianz zwischen den Studien führen wir auf Unterschiede bestimmter politischer Faktoren in den Herkunftsländern der Unternehmen zurück: Regierungsstabilität, Staatsformstabilität, Staatsform und Perioden der Fraktionalisierung. Im Hinblick auf die Stabilität von Regierung und Staatsform finden wir einen positiven moderierenden Einfluss auf die Fokusbeziehung. Darüber hinaus zeigen wir, dass Perioden der Fraktionalisierung den sonst überlegenen Erfolg von Familienunternehmen sogar umkehren. Während die fokale Beziehung in Demokratien stärker wird, wird diese in Anokratien negativ und in Autokratien wieder positiv und stärker. Schließlich zeigen wir, dass die Regierungsstabilität teilweise den Einfluss der Staatsform mediiert. Daher ist die Stabilität der Regierung eine entscheidende Voraussetzung dafür, dass Familienunternehmen in einem politischen Umfeld erfolgreich sein können. Unsere Ergebnisse bringen eine Reihe von Implikationen für das Interaktionsverhalten von Familienunternehmen und Politik mit sich.

One frequently given explanation for why autocrats maintain corrupt and inefficient institutions is that the autocrats benefit personally even though the citizens of their countries are worse off. The empirical evidence does not support this hypothesis. Autocrats in countries with low-quality institutions do tend to be wealthy, but typically, they were wealthy before they assumed power. A plausible explanation, consistent with the data, is that wealthy individuals in countries with inefficient and corrupt institutions face the threat of having their wealth appropriated by government, so have the incentive to use some of their wealth to seek political power to protect the rest of their wealth from confiscation. While autocrats may use government institutions to increase their wealth, autocrats in countries with low-quality institutions tend to be wealthy when they assume power, because wealthy individuals have the incentive to use their wealth to acquire political power to protect themselves from a potentially predatory government.

We develop a theoretical model in which ?rms are either private or state-owned. When ?rms become insolvent, the government can intervene with general measures, like subsidies, or by nationalizing ?rms. The government only intervenes when the bankruptcy of a ?rm entails social costs. In a stylized model, we analyze how government interventions a?ect allocative and productive efficiency. Nationalization of private ?rms in case unpro?table investments were made, leads to increased allocative efficiency despite private ownership. The effort level chosen by the managers working for ?rms is also affected by government intervention with an impact on productive efficiency.

The idea that modern economics is necessarily based on market capitalism continues to dominate in scientific-scholarly discourse. The objective of this article is to present institutional matrix theory, or X- and Y-theory, as an alternative systemic institutional approach to economic and political development. It puts forward some new arguments to explain "grassroots resistance" to the deep marketization in many societies and answers the question why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails everywhere else.JEL Classification: P51, B52, A13

As institutional approaches have come to dominate the mainstream of development economics, they have outgrown earlier and simpler analyses of 'property rights'. This paper focuses on the work of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, which suggests that the distribution of property rights to a 'broad cross-section of the population' is the key to growth and that property rights protection that privileges elites undermines development. The paper also uses the disastrous developmental effects of AIDS in Africa to raise the issue of how institutional approaches to development will need to be modified if GDP per capita were replaced as the predominant indicator of development by broader 'capability-centered' definitions. – development ; institutions ; comparative political economy

This article reviews three models of Democratic Economic Planning, those of Pat Devine and Fikret Adaman, Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel, and Paul Cockshott and Allin Cottrell. Part of a larger research project aiming to merge certain features of these models, this article proposes five criteria to evaluate them. Following a proposal made by David Laibman, it adopts the organization and regulation criteria and add three others to them: limitation, formalization, and scope. Finally, the article offers a brief analysis of the models from those criteria. JEL Classification: P20, P51, B51

We model the trade-off between centralized and decentralized decision making over the provision of local public goods. Centralized decisions are made in a legislature of locally elected representatives, and this creates a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions. The legislature can be self-interested or benevolent and this can result in either efficient, excessive or misallocative provision of public goods. Decisions are inuenced by spillover effects and differences in jurisdictionalsize. Furthermore, we look at the incentives for centralization.

Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman recently rendered a summary verdict on the post-Soviet Russian transition experience finding that the Federation had become a normal country with the west's assistance, and predicting that it would liberalize and develop further like other successful nations of its type.This essay demonstrates that they are mistaken.It shows factually, and on the norms elaborated by Pareto, Arrow and Bergson that Russia is an abnormal political economy unlikely to democratize, westernize or embrace free enterprise any time soon.

L'objectif de cet article est de comparer les performances macroéconomiques de développement d'un ensemble de 80 petits territoires insulaires à l'aune de leur statut politique et du degré de souveraineté atteint. Nous construisons quatre profils institutionnels (intégration complète, autonomie, souveraineté limitée et souveraineté totale) à partir d'un indice composite modifié de souveraineté proposé par Alberti et Goujon (2020). Ensuite, nous réalisons des tests de comparaison de moyenne sur 26 critères. Au final, nous trouvons que les dépendances insulaires autonomes sont plus économiquement développées, socialement avancées et matures sur le plan démographique que les autres groupes institutionnels. Classification JEL : O11, O57, P51

La gouvernance mondiale d'après 1945 s'est structurée autour des États-Unis. Les institutions spécialisées comme le FMI et la Banque mondiale sont régulièrement contestées pour la nature des programmes qu'elles instillent et pour la domination qu'y exercent les pays développés. Cette gouvernance mondiale s'essouffle. Les puissances émergentes, dont la Chine, marquent des revendications de leadership, critiquent par ailleurs le libéralisme politique et son rôle dans le développement. Ces positions, sur lesquelles s'alignent certains pays en développement, amènent à une question de fond : jusqu'où aller dans l'altération des valeurs de la démocratie tout en maintenant la prospérité collective dans le respect des droits individuels ? Classification JEL : F5, F53, P51, E02