Suchergebnisse

IT Policy Compliance For Dummies -- Introduction -- About This Book -- Foolish Assumptions -- How to Use This Book -- Icons Used in This Book -- Where to Go from Here -- Part I: Stepping Into the World of IT Policy Compliance -- Policy Compliance 101 -- Focusing on IT Compliance -- Proving Conformance -- Part II: Defining the Problem of IT Policy Compliance -- A Brief History of Compliance -- But Isn't SOX Section 404 Just One Paragraph? -- Regulations vs. Standards vs. Auditors -- Making Sense of It All -- Part III: Best Practices for IT Policy Compliance Management -- Best Practice #1: Remember the Big Picture -- Best Practice #2: Align IT Policy Compliance and Security with the Business -- Best Practice #3: Understand Your Technology Environment -- Best Practice #4: IT Compliance Starts with Policy -- Best Practice #5: Establish Accountability -- Best Practice #6: Conduct a Pre-Audit or Readiness Assessment -- Best Practice #7: Centralize IT Policy Program Management -- Best Practice #8: Prioritize Remediation Activities -- Best Practice #9: Understand How IT Policy Compliance Management Can Help in Other Areas -- Best Practice #10: Regularly Monitor the Whole Compliance Program -- Part IV: Looking at Automation in IT Policy Compliance -- Considering Automation -- Considering Solutions Options for Automating Policy Compliance -- Flexible Reporting Is a Key Requirement -- Looking for Interactivity with Other Systems -- Knowing that Automation Is All About Cost Savings -- Part V: Ten Tips for IT Policy Compliance -- Read This Book -- Understand the Importance of IT in Policy Compliance -- Determine the Relevant Laws and Regulations -- Ascertain What Controls Apply to the Laws and Regulations -- Align IT Policy Compliance and Security with the Business -- Understand Your IT Environment -- Establish Accountability.

STUDY EXAMINES THE PROPOSITION THAT ASYMMETRICAL TRADE VULNERABILITY COMPROMISES THE FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR OF THE MORE DEPENDENT OF 2 PARTNERS, ANALYZING TRADE AND FOREIGN POLICY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND 25 NATIONS THAT WERE TRADE DEPENDENT UPON IT BETWEEN 1950-73. SELECTED ROLL CALLS OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ARE USED AND FINDINGS, SUPPORTING THE HYPOTHESIS, ARE DISCUSSED.

Compliance with laws and regulations intended to protect common pool resources in the urban context is essential in tackling problems such as pollution and congestion. A high level of non-compliance necessitates investigation into motivations behind compliance. The long-held instrumental theory emphasising the dependence of compliance on tangible deterrence measures fails to adequately explain empirical findings. More recently established compliance models incorporate normative, instrumental and image factors as motivations for compliance. We investigate the importance of normative and image motivations for transportation policy compliance, and the influence of the hukou (China's household registration) on the composition of motivations. Through a case study of Shanghai's license auction policy to inhibit car growth, we use a structural equation model and data from a survey (n = 1389) of policy attitudes and compliance behaviour. The results show that both locals and migrants comply because of instrumental motivation. However, for locals, normative and image motivations not only influence compliance but do so to a greater degree than instrumental motivations. This stands in stark contrast with the fact that there was no statistical relationship between normative and image motivations and compliance for migrants. The significant contribution of normative and image motivations to compliance in locals bears positive implications for compliance, but the absence of that in migrants is worrying. If only instrumental motivations matter, then the government is really constrained in how it can go about keeping social order. Compliance obtained strictly through social control indicates an unsustainable state of governance. ; Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Samuel Tak Lee Real Estate Entrepreneurship Laboratory

Background: Currently, about 65% of the world's population is covered by at least one MPOWER tobacco control policy measure. The impact of such policies might rely on policy compliance. Objective: This study aims to describe and compare global trends in legislation and compliance of the following three tobacco control policies between 2009 and 2019: direct advertisement, promotion and sponsorship, and smoke-free environments. Method: Data from the six most recent WHO Tobacco Control (2009-2019) reports were used to show the development of and possible associations between legislated policies and policy compliance. Data pertaining to the three indicators direct advertisement, promotion and sponsorship, and smoke-free environments were collected and analysed per country income category, according to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. For each country, we (i) calculated the legislation describing the situation according to the law as a percentage of fulfilled MPOWER measurements and (ii) present the level of compliance (ranging from 0 to 10) for the corresponding policy. Results: Both tobacco control policy legislation and compliance for direct advertising improved worldwide - between 2009 and 2019 the median increased from 37.5% to 87.5% for policy and from 5 to 8 for compliance. In contrast, promotion and sponsorship restrictions hardly developed since 2011 and are especially weak among low- and middle-income countries. With respect to smoke-free environments, global policy legislation increased steadily over time while the relative compliance hardly increased. In 2019 data did not show significant correlations between policy legislation and compliance: direct advertising rho = -0.003, p = 0.970; promotion and sponsorship rho = 0.140, p = 0.107; smoke-free environments rho = 0.158, p = 0.070. Conclusion: There is a clear need to understand the barriers in achieving tobacco control policy compliance and to routinely collect and incorporate data on compliance in research in order to generate a more reliable basis for further improvements in tobacco control.

This paper examines the factors that determines tax policy compliance and the impediments to effective tax administration in Nigeria. The objectives are to: (a) determine if there is a relationship between knowledge of tax laws and compliance in Nigeria; and (b) if there is a positive relationship between corruption and tax compliance. The paper argues that taxpayers' knowledge of Nigerian tax laws could positively influence citizens attitude and behavior towards compliance. The primary data were derived from interviews, and questionnaires. The conceptual frameworks are based on strategic and benchmark approaches, and principal agent model. The data analysis shows that there is a strong positive relationship between lack of tax knowledge, low level of education and tax compliance in Nigeria. The findings of this study also reveal that there is a strong positive correlation between corruption and tax evasion. The inadequate use of information technology in tax administration, and lack of government incentives as well as poor working condition have negative correlation with tax collection management. There is however significant relationship between inappropriate assessment system, poor economic situation in the country, and lower tax compliance rate in the country. Some benchmark strategic policy recommendations are provided on how to better implement tax compliance laws in Nigeria in the future.

Abstract. Combining the strengths of defaults and transparency information is a potentially powerful way to induce policy compliance. Despite negative theoretical predictions, a recent line of research revealed that default nudges may become more effective if people are informed why they should exhibit the targeted behavior. Yet, it is an open empirical question whether the increase in compliance came from setting a default and consequently disclosing it, or the provided information was sufficient to deliver the effect on its own. Results from an online experiment indicate that both defaulting and transparency information exert a statistically independent effect on compliance, with highest compliance rates observed in the combined condition. Practical and theoretical implications are discussed.