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Qingwang and Junxue present the findings of the ""Study of the Optimal Size and Structure of China's Regional Governments"" conducted by the National Natural Science Foundation of China. In an innovative theoretical analysis, it builds a framework upon the theories of intergovernmental fiscal relations and government administration to examine the endogenous determinants of the size, structure, and evolution of regional governments and the influence they have on China's socio-economic development. It also takes a more microscopic perspective, looking at county-level governments to examine the e

本研究發現一個地區的經濟發展水平與當地居民對中央政府的信任程度負相關。 ; 本研究包括定量和定性兩個部份。定量部份,普通最小二乘線性回歸(OLS)分析和雙層回歸分析的結果顯示:區域經濟發展水平與人們對中央政府的信任存在顯著的負相關關係。控制了個人因素變量,上述相關關係仍然顯著。定性分析部份討論了傳統文化與信息流通在發達地區和欠發達地區如何影響政府信任。這部份分析發現文化因素和信息因素是導致某一地區的民眾比另一地區民眾更不相信中央政府的重要因素,但必須與經濟發展因素相結合才能發揮顯著作用。文化與信息受當地的經濟發展水平影響:一個地區的經濟發展水平越高,傳統文化的影響力越弱,信息化程度越高;反之,經濟發展水平越低,傳統文化的影響力越強,信息化程度越低。定量分析與定性分析都支持研究假設。 ; 把上述靜態觀察納入動態視角,從長遠看,區域經濟發展將削弱公眾對中央政府的信任。具體來說,假定目前的局勢延續,隨著中國越來越多的地區經濟得到發展,當地民眾對中央政府的信任會相應降低。據此推測,中國人的政府信任可能會經歷一個由"中央高、地方低再變為"中央低、地方更低的過程。 ; This research shows that the level of economic development in a region has a negative correlation with local residents' trust in the central government. ; This study draws on both quantitative and qualitative analyses. In the quantitative section, both OLS regression and hierarchical linear modeling show that the level of regional economic development has a significant negative correlation with public trust in the central government, controlling for individual factors. Qualitative analysis suggests that traditional culture and the flow of political information affect people's trust in government when they interact with economic development. In places where economy is underdeveloped, traditional culture has a larger impact and the flow of political information is less free. By contrast, in places where economy is more developed, traditional culture has a weaker effect and the flow of political information is freer. ; Putting the finding of the cross-sectional analysis into a dynamic perspective, it is suggested that the development of local economy may in the long run weaken local residents' trust in the central government. More specifically, assuming that the present situation continues, as more and more regions experience economic growth, local residents may develop weaker confidence in the central government. The pattern of trust in government may then evolve from the current "high trust in the central government and lower trust in local government into "low trust in the central government and even lower trust in local government. ...

In Managing Frontiers in Qing China , historians and anthropologists explore China's imperial expansion in Inner Asia, focusing on early Qing empire-building in Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, and beyond - Central Asian perspectives and comparisons to Russia's Asian empire are included. Taking an institutional-historical and historical-anthropological approach, the essays engage with two Qing agencies well-known for their governance of non-Han groups: the Lifanyuan and Libu . This volume offers a comprehensive overview of the Lifanyuan and Libu , revising and assessing the state of affairs in the under-researched field of these two institutions. The contributors explore the imperial policies towards and the shifting classifications of minority groups in the Qing Empire, explicitly pairing and comparing the Lifanyuan and Libu as in some sense cognate agencies. This text offers insight into how China's past has continued to inform its modern policies, as well as the geopolitical make-up of East Asia and beyond. Contributors include: Uradyn E. Bulag, Chia Ning, Pamela Kyle Crossley, Nicola DiCosmo, Dorothea Heuschert-Laage, Laura Hostetler, Fabienne Jagou, Mei-hua Lan, Dittmar Schorkowitz, Song Tong, Michael Weiers,Ye Baichuan, Yuan Jian, Zhang Yongjiang

submitted by Li Jiehui. ; Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998. ; Includes bibliographical references (leaves 119-126). ; Abstract also in Chinese. ; Acknowledgements --- p.v ; Abstract --- p.vi ; Abbreviations --- p.viii ; Tables and figures --- p.ix ; Chapter Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 ; Chapter 1.1 --- The research question --- p.1 ; Chapter 1.2 --- The research method --- p.3 ; Chapter 1.2.1 --- The legal and political scales --- p.3 ; Chapter 1.2.2 --- The adaptation of Page's method in China --- p.5 ; Chapter 1.2.3 --- The utilities of the two scales --- p.6 ; Chapter 1.3 --- The research plan --- p.8 ; Chapter Chapter 2 --- Central-local relations in China: an overview --- p.10 ; Chapter 2.1 --- Major reforms in central-local relations --- p.10 ; Chapter 2.2 --- Provinces under the economic cycle --- p.13 ; Chapter 2.3 --- The case of Guangdong --- p.14 ; Chapter Chapter 3 --- Legal assessment I: China --- p.16 ; Chapter 3.1 --- The general legal framework --- p.17 ; Chapter 3.1.1 --- Omni-competence --- p.17 ; Chapter 3.1.2 --- Dual subordination --- p.18 ; Chapter 3.1.3 --- The role of the Party --- p.20 ; Chapter 3.2 --- Legal documents and opportunities --- p.21 ; Chapter 3.2.1 --- National laws --- p.21 ; Chapter 3.2.2 --- Administrative regulations --- p.22 ; Chapter 3.2.3 --- Government/Party documents --- p.24 ; Chapter 3.2.4 --- Local legislation --- p.27 ; Chapter 3.3 --- Assessing legal localism --- p.28 ; Chapter Chapter 4 --- Legal assessment II: Guangdong --- p.30 ; Chapter 4.1 --- Build up a legal framework: 1979-1988 --- p.31 ; Chapter 4.2 --- Recession: 1989-1990 --- p.34 ; Chapter 4.3 --- Legislation of interests: 1991 -now --- p.34 ; Chapter 4.3.1 --- The case of the regulation for property registration --- p.37 ; Chapter 4.4 --- Development of other provinces: a comparison --- p.40 ; Chapter 4.5 --- Major findings --- p.43 ; Chapter Chapter 5 --- Political assessment I: China --- p.44 ; Chapter 5.1 --- Page's methodology --- p.44 ; Chapter 5.2 --- The ...

Qin, Shuang. ; Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. ; Abstracts also in Chinese.

本研究从超常规色彩强烈的重大灾害危机处置入手,分析当代中国动员体制在改革时代的变化特征,以此为切入点来考察动员这项"革命制度遗产对当代中国政治的影响。本研究以中国政府在地震领域的危机动员实践作为实证案例,从1949年以后的不同时期选取四场震例进行纵向比较,以此来把握中国政府在危机条件下启动的政治动员在不同的政治发展阶段会呈现出什么样的整体特点。中国在地震领域的危机动员实践能够证明,中国的政治动员体制比传统动员政治研究假定的要更具动态性。兴起于革命时代的政治动员在进入改革时代以后依然能够延续,并没有随着乌托邦意识形态、计划经济乃至全能主义体制的整体瓦解而走向直线衰落。至少作为中国政府独特的公共危机处置手段,政治动员在改革时代呈现出的变化轨迹是复杂的,成形于全能主义时期的动员政治元素在改革时代不仅没有直接衰败,在某些阶段还重新获得了发展动力,能够与改革时代出现和或者强化的动员模式并存。本研究通过观察中国政府跨越不同政治经济发展阶段的地震危机动员实践发现,中国政府涉灾财政能力和行政能力的发展均衡程度,以及中国政治精英对国家在灾害治理领域角色定位的认知变化,能够对中国政府的地震危机动员模式产生重要影响;既包括s新模式兴起和旧模式衰落,也包括新旧模式的共存。而且,尽管国家能力和国家意愿之间没有必然关联,可是一旦两个因素出现比较同步的增强,还能够为这种"革命制度遗产在改革提供新的制度化动力,促成动员模式更进一步的变化。本研究的结论是,只要作为关键动员主体的中共政权在规范和结构上保持相对稳定,政治动员仍将会是中国政府重要的危机管理工具。而且随着中国政府有更强的意愿和能力来承担公共服务供给职责,政治动员形式和内涵都会有所改变。曾经具有很强非正式和应急色彩的政治动员不仅会变得越来越常态化,而且还会成为正规、任务内容更加广泛的中国涉灾公共治理体系的重要组成部分。 ; This research investigates the dynamics and resilience of China's politlical moblization by making hsitrocial comparison of Chinese government's management of earthquake disasters across four decades. The author selects four major earthquake catastrophesTangshan, Lancang-Gengma, Lijiang, and Wenchuanfrom different historical periods to examine how Chinese government mobilized different types of subjects to contain and control crises under different political, social, and economic conditions. Based upon participatory and non-participatory observation, interviews, and extensive document analyses, this research reveals that China's political mobilization, at least in the issue area of catastrophe management, has demonstrated a more complicated trajectory of change than predicted by most mainstream politilcal theories, espeically in the post-revolutionary era featured by increasing socio-economic pluralization and political liberalization. Insitutional elements promoting mass particpation and self-sufficience thriving in the revolutionary stage not only continue to function in the reform era, but also coexist with newly emerged mobilizational elements featured by increased state dominance, formal legal procedures, and professional expertise. ...

Lo Suet-yee. ; Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2002. ; Includes bibliographical references (leaves 143-153). ; Abstracts in English and Chinese. ; Abstracts --- p.i-iii ; Acknowledgements --- p.iv ; Chapter Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 ; Chapter 1. 1 --- Emergence of Primary Science Education and the General Development of Science Curriculum in the World ; Chapter 1.2 --- Literature Review of Development of Primary Science Curriculumin Hong Kong ; Chapter 1.3 --- The Organization of This Study ; Chapter Chapter 2 --- Historical Review of the Hong Kong Primary School System and Major Research Concerns of This Study --- p.8 ; Chapter 2.1 --- "Historical Review of Primary Schooling and its Political, Social, and Economic Context" ; Chapter 2.2 --- Curriculum Decision-Making in Hong Kong Primary Schooling ; Chapter 2.3 --- Concluding Remarks ; Chapter 2.4 --- Major Research Concerns of This Study ; Chapter Chapter 3 --- Literature Review --- p.29 ; Chapter 3.1 --- Functionalist Theory ; Chapter 3.2 --- Conflict Theory ; Chapter 3.3 --- Institutionalist Theory ; Chapter Chapter 4 --- Methodological Approach --- p.56 ; Chapter 4.1 --- Official Syllabi of Primary Science Curriculum ; Chapter 4.2 --- Government Document on Educational and Curricular Policies ; Chapter 4.3 --- Documentary Analysis ; Chapter 4.4 --- Limitations of My Study ; Chapter Chapter 5 --- Historical Analysis of Primary Science Curriculum in Hong Kong --- p.63 ; Chapter 5.1 --- Historical Review of Primary Science Curriculum in Hong Kong ; Chapter 5.2 --- Analysis of Educational Aims ; Chapter 5.3 --- Analysis of Pedagogy ; Chapter 5.4 --- Analysis of Educational Content ; Chapter 5.5 --- "Summary of the Evolving Pattern of Primary Science Curriculum: Aims, Pedagogy, and Educational Content" ; Chapter 5.6 --- Historical Changes of the Primary Science Curriculum and Assessment of Major Sociological Perspectives ; Chapter 5.7 --- Some Concluding Remarks ; Chapter Chapter 6 --- The Role of Government in the Development of ...

《基本法》雖然承諾香港循序漸進達致行政和立法機關雙普選,但回歸至今,民主政制不單停滯不前,更有倒退跡象。儘管制度沒有很大變遷,北京政府多次以不同理由拖延民主改革訴求,但親政府陣營卻逐漸擴大組織力量,降低反對派的挑戰可能,使選舉制度的競爭性降低。 ; 本文旨在探討,威權政府下舉行的選舉,究竟是促進、還是阻礙民主轉型。一般威權政府下的選舉並不穩定,反對派有可能透過不斷舉行的選舉挑戰政權,推動民主轉型。香港卻恰恰相反,反對派的不但分裂,動員能力亦逐漸降低。本文希望證明,威權主義下的選舉不一定對反對派有利,只要政權能夠鞏固選舉能力,籠絡不同社會界別孤立反對勢力,足以使反對派難以透過直接選舉推動民主。重複選舉亦不一定為反對派帶來好處,長年處於選舉威權,不但使反對派的動員能力降低,也會因策略分歧而導致路線之爭,形成轉型疲勞的局面。 ; 研究分為三部分,第一部分將檢視回歸以來選舉制度的變遷及結果,說明回歸後的選舉制度,越來越不利反對派生存。第二、三部分將探討回歸後親政府陣營及反對派的發展,當親政府陣營擴張及善理主從網絡,反對派則逐漸分裂,甚至因策略分歧互相攻訐,使反對派從選舉獲得的資源和挑戰政權的機會越來越少。 ; Basic Law has stipulated that Hong Kong will have universal suffrage gradually for legislative and executive branch. Despite that, after the handover from Britain, Chinese government has deferred democratization and suppressed opposition's urge. Besides, the pro-government coalition has established hegemony in electoral arena, which is impossible for opposition to compete with. The competitiveness of the stunned electoral politics has been further decreased. ; This article aimed to discuss whether the election hold under electoral authoritarianism is beneficial to democratization. According to hybrid regime researches, continuing elections, despite partially, create opportunities for oppositions to challenge the ruling coalition and install democratic virtues. Hong Kong is suffering from another way. Decreasing mobilization power, splitting opposition forces has shadowed democratic movement. The article aimed to suggest that provided the ruling coalition has ability to increase mobilization power and co-opting political elites, opposition loses opportunity structure to implement democratic process. They have to encounter demobilization and internal struggle within transition fatigue environment. ; There are three parts in the research. Firstly, I evaluate electoral reform and the result of repeating elections after handover. It is suggested that opposition becomes difficult to survive. The second and third sections would discuss the development of ruling elite and opposition from 1997-2012. When the ruling elite ...

It is generally acknowledged that Europe will not be a super power in the sense of a political-military ensemble on an equal footing with the United States or China. Europeans reject this possibility across the board. Moreover, even if they wanted to go that route, wouldn't it expose them to reproducing on a European scale what they have struggled to combat amongst themselves: the idea of becoming a great power with all the attributes of force and supremacy that such a project implies?So if Europe will not be a super power, how can it be a power at all? Probably by reinforcing what remains its major political resource: its capacity to produce and set up at the global level a system of norms as broad-sweeping as possible that can organize the world, discipline the interplay of its actors, introduce predictability in their behavior, develop among them a sense of collective responsibility, and offer those who engage on this path, particularly the weakest, at least the partial possibility to use these norms as an argument/force* against all, including the world's most powerful.The task may seem colossal, even outrageous. It probably is, but does Europe have any other choice but to assume its responsibility as a normative power? Probably not.[publisher's website]

It is generally acknowledged that Europe will not be a super power in the sense of a political-military ensemble on an equal footing with the United States or China. Europeans reject this possibility across the board. Moreover, even if they wanted to go that route, wouldn't it expose them to reproducing on a European scale what they have struggled to combat amongst themselves: the idea of becoming a great power with all the attributes of force and supremacy that such a project implies?So if Europe will not be a super power, how can it be a power at all? Probably by reinforcing what remains its major political resource: its capacity to produce and set up at the global level a system of norms as broad-sweeping as possible that can organize the world, discipline the interplay of its actors, introduce predictability in their behavior, develop among them a sense of collective responsibility, and offer those who engage on this path, particularly the weakest, at least the partial possibility to use these norms as an argument/force* against all, including the world's most powerful.The task may seem colossal, even outrageous. It probably is, but does Europe have any other choice but to assume its responsibility as a normative power? Probably not.[publisher's website]