In: Christiansen , F J & Klemmensen , R 2015 , Danish Experiences with Coalition Governments and Coalition Governance . i H L Madsen (red.) , Coalition Building : Finding Solutions Together . Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy - DIPD , København , s. 26-43 .
In this chapter we outline the Danish and Scandinavian experiences with coalition governments and coalition governance. We do so by first briefly describing the historical path that has led to the political system we see working today in these countries. Then we tell about the political culture and institutional factors that lead to coalition governments. In the third section, we look at the nature of political agreements. We discuss the preconditions for coalition governments or coalition governance and its pros and cons. We focus on the trade-offs between including different interests into legislative coalitions and the possible lack of clarity of responsibility or of party identity that this inclusion entails. ; In this chapter we outline the Danish and Scandinavian experiences with coalition governments and coalition governance. We do so by first briefly describing the historical path that has led to the political system we see working today in these countries. Then we tell about the political culture and institutional factors that lead to coalition governments. In the third section, we look at the nature of political agreements. We discuss the preconditions for coalition governments or coalition governance and its pros and cons. We focus on the trade-offs between including different interests into legislative coalitions and the possible lack of clarity of responsibility or of party identity that this inclusion entails.
A current ambition in welfare states across Europe and in the US is for political decision-making to be based on rigorous research (Bason 2010; Cartwright et al 2009; Mulgan 2009; Nilsson et al. 2008). Promoted as 'evidence-based policy-making', 'good analysis, or 'better governance' (Nilsson et.al. 2008) the aspiration finds its roots in the governance paradigm generally referred to as 'new public management' (Hartley 2005) and the central concern for developing a cost-effective and agile public sector (Rod 2010). . Sound as this ambition may seem, it has nevertheless been problematized from within the civil services and from the research community (e.g. Boden & Epstein 2006; Cartwright et al. 2009; Elliott & Popay 2000; House of Commons 2006; Nilsson et al. 2008; Whitty 2006; Rod 2010, Vohnsen 2011). Some warn that the term 'evidence-based' is used too lightly, and often in cases where 'evidence' has not fed into the policy processes but rather has been invoked after the fact to support already agreed upon policy (House of Commons 2006; Nilsson et al. 2008); others warn that politics and science are – if not incompatible – then at odds with one another (e.g. Boden & Epstein 2006; Whitty 2006). The article pin-points the friction points between science and policy-making and discuss why it is that evidence rarely feeds into policy-making and how the evidence-based paradigm effectively challenges the traditional craftsmanship of the civil service.
The region of Southeast Asia is faced with a complex set of challenges stemming from political, economic and religious developments at the national, regional and global level. This paper sets out to examine trade-, foreign- and security policy implications of the issues confronting the region. In ASEAN, the Southeast Asian countries are continuing their ambitious attempts at further integration. Plans outlining deeper security and economic communities have been adopted. However, huge differences in political systems, economic development and ethnic/religious structures are hampering prospects of closer cooperation. The highly controversial conflict case of Burma/Myanmar is testing the much adhered-to principle of non-interference and at the same time complicating relations with external powers. Among these, the United States and China are dramatically strengthening their interests in the region. American influence is not least manifesting itself in light of the war against terrorism, which the region is adapting to in different ways and at different speeds. By contrast, the European Union does not seem to answer Southeast Asian calls for further engagement. A flurry of bilateral and regional trade agreements is another prominent feature of the economic landscape of the region. This is to a certain degree a reflex ion of impatience with trade liberalization in the WTO and within ASEAN itself. Structures of economic cooperation are under rapid alteration in Southeast Asia. The paper analyses the above-mentioned developments with a view to assessing the prospects of future stability, economic development and integration in and among ASEAN countries. It is concluded that although the scope for increased economic benefit and political harmonization through ASEAN integration alone is limited, the organization could still prove useful as a common regional point of reference in tackling more important policy determinants at national and global level.
In: Mandrup , T 2009 , ' South Africa and the SADC Stand-by Force ' , Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies , bind 37 , nr. 2 , s. 1-24 .
The regional powerhouse, South Africa, has since the introduction of the nonracial democratic dispensation in 1994, played a central and important role in the formation of both the regional and continental security architecture. With the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, one of the central areas of collaboration for the community was envisioned to be security, understood within a broadened human security framework. Security was therefore from the outset one of the cornerstones of integration in the SADC. It was believed that the formation of a security community would help dismantle the enmities that had plagued regional relations during the apartheid era. For some parties, institutionalisation of relations pointed to a means of stabilising and disseminating a particular order. Such institutions depict the power relations prevailing at the time of their establishment, which, however, can change over time (Cox 1981:136). The integration ambition surrounding security correlated with the ambitions of South Africa, the new democratic government in the regional powerhouse. South Africa and its overall foreign policy ambitions desired the pursuit of peace, democracy and stability for economic growth and development in the region and within South Africa itself. Since South Africa's acceptance into the SADC in 1994, the organisation has attempted to set up the required institutional framework to enable co-operation on security, both in terms of narrow military co-operation and regarding designated 2 softer security issues, such as migration and cross-border crime. The military cooperation moved forward in the early years after 1994 with the 1996 decision of creating an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC)1 and later the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) in 2003, and eventually the creation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) in 2004, which operationalised the OPDSC (SADC 2004). However, the actual military cooperation, e.g. military exercises, came close to a standstill. Several developments obstructed military co-operation of which the evolving crisis in Zimbabwe and the subsequent withdrawal of donor support to, for instance, the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare are but two examples. The RPTC constituted the backbone of the co-operation, but political differences between member states illustrated during the Zimbabwean crisis and following the mandate of the interventions in especially the DR Congo and partly Lesotho in 1998 all contributed to regional tensions.2 Despite the crisis, SADC members, and in particular South Africa, declared that the organisation would be able to form a regional stand-by brigade for the use of the African Union (AU) as part of its wider security architecture. On 17 August 2007, the SADC declared its stand-by-force operational at a large parade in Lusaka, Zambia and at the same occasion signed a memorandum of understanding on the SADCBRIG (SADC 2007). According to the timeline provided by the AU, the brigade should be fully operational by June 2010. Former South African deputy foreign minister Aziz Pahad stated after the launch that this was an important step, but that now there was much to be done securing joint levels and types of training, interoperability, etc. (Pahad 2007). The question that continues to linger is to what extent this brigade is operational and for what purpose. Is this new regional military formation in its present form just a paper tiger, or is it "real progress" and an example of "successful" regional cooperation and integration? This article scrutinises the security co-operation and integration in SADC and asks whether an apparent lack of common values between SADC member states are blocking the security integration process, the creation of a security community, and thereby the establishment of an effective stand-by brigade, the so-called SADCBRIG. The article furthermore attempts to scrutinise the role played by South Africa in establishing the SADCBRIG.