Suchergebnisse

The Gnassingbé clan has ruled the country since 1967. The demand for political alternance, constituted the major contentious issue between the government and the challengers of the Gnassingbé regime throughout the survey period. The first local elections since more than 30 years took finally place on 30 June 2019 and resulted in the victory of the ruling party. Shortly afterwards, in February 2020, the President won also the disputed presidential elections and thus consolidated his power, assisted by the loyal army and security services. The outbreak of the Corona epidemic in Togo in April 2020 and the subsequent economic recession may have contributed to limit popular protest against the Gnassingbé regime. The human rights record of the government has improved but remains poor. Despite undeniable improvements to the framework and appearance of the regime's key institutions during the review period, democracy remains far from complete. However, the international community, notably Togo's African peers, the AU and ECOWAS, followed a 'laissez-faire' approach in the interests of regional stability and their national interests in dealing with Togo. Economic growth remained stable at about 5% per annum (before Corona). Public investment in infrastructure and increases in agricultural productivity, notably of export crops, had been the key drivers of economic growth. However, growth remains vulnerable to external shocks and the climate and has not been inclusive. Moreover, it was overshadowed by increasing inter-personal and regional inequality as well as an increase in extreme poverty. Money-laundering, illegal money transfers and trafficking grew alarmingly. Nevertheless, the business climate improved considerably.

Discusses Baruch Spinoza's apparent endorsement of tolerance in his Theologico-Political Treatise (TPT). Despite its appearance of impiety, the real objective of the TPT was to demonstrate that true philosophy is both compatible with & conducive to piety, to present no threat for peace. It is argued that the knowledge of truth is a sufficient & necessary condition for peace; & the knowledge of truth is in harmony with & indispensable to "pietas," the constant willingness to execute the will of God (vs atheism). Indeed, the TPT focuses on peace more than on tolerance, peace that can only be realized based on true knowledge, even if such knowledge leads to conclusions generally considered impious. J. Sadler

Discusses Baruch Spinoza's apparent endorsement of tolerance in his Theologico-Political Treatise (TPT). Despite its appearance of impiety, the real objective of the TPT was to demonstrate that true philosophy is both compatible with & conducive to piety, to present no threat for peace. It is argued that the knowledge of truth is a sufficient & necessary condition for peace; & the knowledge of truth is in harmony with & indispensable to "pietas," the constant willingness to execute the will of God (vs atheism). Indeed, the TPT focuses on peace more than on tolerance, peace that can only be realized based on true knowledge, even if such knowledge leads to conclusions generally considered impious. J. Sadler

"Cruelty is a specific kind of human behaviour and has a clearly cultural dimension. It is often the result of passions and drives, accompanied by the breaking of taboos and a crossing of boundaries that cultures have raised to prevent the moral regression of mankind. Cruelty is also a "rational" way to acquire and stabilize political power. Both the atrocities themselves and the accusations of cruelty are instruments of power. The political efficiency of cruelty depends on the fear and awe, which it produces. Seneca regarded cruelty as the main attribute of tyranny. Through its imagery (like the bull of Phalaris) it breaks possible resistance and establishes despotism permanently. In the Middle Ages and Early Modern Times cruelty was considered a necessary evil in order to realize superior positive goals. So did the inquisitors, and so did Machiavelli who regarded cruelty not only as a means to the acquisition and preservation of power. The prince should also use cruelty to unify Italy and to build a stable and peaceful political order. Later, the understanding that cruelties are necessary to achieve good ends did not fall into oblivion, in spite of all criticism of Machiavelli's thought. In totalitarianism the aim of cruelty was not primarily the infliction of pain, but the abolition of individualism and the enforcement of the belief in a general law, which rules mankind. This could be either the law of history like during the French Revolution and in socialist states, or the 'natural law' of social Darwinism in the National Socialist and Fascist regimes. After the breakdown of totalitarianism and the triumph of liberal democracy the question arises, if cruelties are necessary components of all politics. Although we can still find cruel policies in liberal democracies (see Guantanamo Bay), at the same time the struggle against cruelty is vital in these systems and explains the dominance of the discourse on human rights." (author's abstract)

L'objectif de cette contribution est d'analyser à travers des exemples de programmes politiques de partis d'extrême d'droite d'Allemagne (Afd et NPD), de l'Autriche (FPÖ), de la Belgique (Vlaams Belang), du Danmark (Dans Folkeparti), de la France (FN), des Pays-Bas (PVV) et de la Suède (Sverigedemokraterna) des années 2010 à 2017, comment ces partis se servent de l'implicite dans leurs programmes politiques pour soutenir la stratégie de "normalisation" sans renoncer à leur noyau idéologique d'extrême droite qui est essentiel pour leur électorat traditionnel. Dans cette perspective, il importe aussi d'examiner quelles sont les valeurs et les messages subjacents transportés par l'implicite au service de leurs stratégies. Nous en analyserons deux types de stratégies: les stratégies centrées sur une analyse de la réalité définie par le présupposé et les stratégies centrées sur le sous-entendu. Il est montré comment ces stratégies contribuent à une resémantisation des concepts clés des sociétés démocratiques et sont à même de mettre en péril le consensus démocratique de nos sociétés.

Controversial constitutional and institutional reforms voted in May 2019 in parliament opened the way for President Gnassingbé to stand for a fourth and fifth term because the law does not apply retroactively. In February 2020, the President won again the disputed presidential elections and thus consolidated his power, assisted by the loyal army and security services. The outbreak of the Corona epidemic in Togo in March and the subsequent economic recession may have contributed to limit popular protest against the Gnassingbé regime. The human rights record of the government has improved, but remains poor. Yet, the international community followed a 'laissez faire' approach in the interests of regional stability. The economy dropped into recession due to the worldwide economic negative effects of the corona-crisis. The democracy index of the Economic Intelligence Unit, London, still rated Togo as an 'authoritarian regime'.

Throughout the year the controversial legislative elections dominated the political landscape. Huge anti-government demonstrations that called in vain for political alternance. The legislative elections of 20 December 2018, boycotted by the major opposition parties, resulted in an easy victory of the ruling party, however without the expected constitutional amendment majority. Therefore, the prime minister and his cabinet were replaced. The local elections, crucial for democratization at the grass-roots, but postponed time and again since 1987, were again postponed in December 2018 sine die. Economic growth remained stable at about 5% per annum. Public investment in infrastructure (e. g. roads, harbour) and increases in agricultural productivity, notably of export crops, had been the key drivers of economic growth. Moreover, money-laundering, illegal money transfers and trafficking grew alarmingly. Unemployment and lacking political change caused increasing migration.

This article analyses the image of the three abrahamic religions in the recent political programs of the French Front National (2012 and 2017) in a comparative perspective with other successful populist radical right-wing parties in EU-Countries of continental Western and Northern Europe. It will be shown that even if there is a common tendency of representing Islam negatively and avoiding overt antisemitism, there are differences with regard to Judaism and/or Israel as well as to the weight of Christianity for the national and/or European culture, which have interesting parallels with the national discourse traditions and the particular radical right-wing history of these parties.

The evolution of city regions and metropolises in both countries illustrates the theoretical debates on this particular geographical object. Political legitimacy, significant autonomy and a 'relevant' territorial area should form the basis of these regions. But there is a long way to go from this theoretical vision to practice. In Germany, a slow and contingent bottom-up process can be observed, whereas in France, following a long history of intermunicipality, institutional metropolises are emerging (MAPTAM law of 2014). Metropolregionen and métropoles thus differ. Germany shows incomplete and variable forms of metropolitan organisation, whereas French metropolises are satisfied with simple criteria of competences and resources. However, these 'intermunicipal' métropoles (one exception: Lyon) can also be compared with the large German cities, which are highly individualised political entities, with the city-states (e. g. Hamburg) being the most extreme cases. Two examples, Frankfurt and Lille, illustrate the comparison.

Controversial constitutional and institutional reforms voted in May in parliament opened the way for President Gnassingbé to stand for a fourth and fifth term (2020 and 2025) because the law does not apply retroactively. The first local elections since more than 30 years resulted in the victory of the ruling party. Grand expectations of the opposition which had hoped for a fundamental change at least at the grass-roots were again dashed. The human rights situation sharply deteriorated due to growing political and social tensions related to the prospects of the head of state running for a fourth term. Islamist terrorist violence spread from Mali to the northern frontier region of Togo. The autonomous deep-water port of Lomé developed as a growth pole and hub for the sub-region. China became the major partner beside the established partners the EU, France and Germany. The informal sector still dominated the economy. Economic freedom remained with the overall status 'mostly unfree'.

Chartism is considered as one of the first radical social movement of massive character in the nineteenth century Europe. Despite the fact that the movement lasted only several years it had a great influence on the political history of Great Britain, not only in the nineteenth century. The aim of this article is to present the history of the Chartist movement from the point of view of the social transformations observed in Great Britain during thirties and forties of the 19th century.

Germany and France offer two different models of political and administrative organisation: a federal state on one side of the Rhine and a unitary state on the other, albeit one that has become more decentralised over the last 40 years. Thus, the French régions have reduced capacities for action compared to the Länder. At the local level, the administrative structure was strengthened in Germany by merging municipalities, whereas France chose to use intermunicipal structures. In contrast to the political and administrative stability in Germany, local and regional organisation in France is constantly evolving, faced with a succession of laws, the pace of which has accelerated over time. The same applies to spatial planning, which has been framed from the outset by the German Grundgesetz (GG - Basic Law), but which has undergone much more evolution on the French side, even if the loi d'orientation foncière (LOF - Basic Land Act) of 1967 and the loi solidarité et renouvellement urbain (SRU - Law on Urban Solidarity and Renewal) (2000) represent two fundamental stages. In both countries, the strategic dimension of planning has been strengthene, and each side has developed its own tools for the management of urban projects.

Contrary to the positive perception of protected areas constructed by political entities as mechanisms for protecting biodiversity put under pressure by the demographic growth of populations and their needs, they have gradually revealed themeselves as areas of turbulence where insecure dynamics proliferate, ie ecosystems that escape state regulation and impact the security of surrounding localities. Protected areas in northern regions of Cameroon have thus contributed to the sustainable dissemination of vectors of crime and others forms of security threats. The question is therefore to know in what way protected areas constitute a security threat and how has the state reacted to the situation in the northern regions of Cameroun? The hypothesis defended is to show that protected areas are islands of cross-border insecurity, hence the process of state security.

Quite apart from the diversity of situations in small and medium-sized towns, stabilising their town centres is a major challenge. In both countries, town centres have been weakened by commercial changes, a decline in the supply of services and transformations in lifestyles. They are characterised by an increase in vacancy rates, which accelerates a spiralling loss of attractiveness and atmosphere of neglect. Since the beginning of the 2000s, this challenge has been central in the public debate. In both countries, urban renewal has been a key element of this revitalisation policy. However, although the context of public action is rather similar in France and Germany, the modes of governance differ. In France the administrative municipal system continues to provide a narrow and fixed framework despite recent territorial reforms that favour the intermunicipal level. In addition, cooperation, communication and participation of local actors from business and civil society are more firmly anchored in social and political practice in German small and medium-sized towns.