The author tries to prove the significance of including the factor of power in building theories of elites. It turns out that in many approaches the elite has been defined mostly and exclusively in terms of political power (Pareto, Mosca, Lasswell, Mills). Such an attitude followed from the adoption of "a priori" assumptions about the universality of dividing societies into those who govern and those governed (Italian scholars) and from empirical studies (especially Mills). Also the sociologists who stressed a highly diversified character of contemporary societies point to a great role of factors of a political character (Mannheim, Keller). Political power is not only an important criterion of stratifying the society but also of distinguishing the elite. Defining power appears to be very difficult. At present, with more and more diversified social structures, it is more difficult than several decades ago to indicate persons or groups who really (not nominally) are in authority. ; Digitalizacja i deponowanie archiwalnych zeszytów RPEiS sfinansowane przez MNiSW w ramach realizacji umowy nr 541/P-DUN/2016
The Movement of a Hundred (Polish: Ruch Stu) was to become an alternative for the political class that emerged after 1989. The whole political class was supposed to be substituted in a democratic manner by new people entering the political arena. The minimum political platform was to unite the activists of diversified political provenience. The Movement of a Hundred was to provide a new way of functioning for the political parties. The very naming of the party as the "movement", that is a common activity of new people, was of significant importance itself. They were to introduce a new quality of politics and a new model of a politician. Current political events in- volved the Movement of a Hundred in a never-ending spiral of political elections. The two most important events were supporting Lech Wa³êsa before the presidential elec- tions and the decision to join the structures of the AWS (Solidarity Election Action). The Movement of a Hundred was to be an alternative and novelty on the Polish political arena. However, it became a tiny, hardly observable, component of the right wing of the former political class. It was commonly known to have been incorporated by the old elite. The Movement of a Hundred adopted behavioral models that were typical of a former political class (including the conflicts between the leaders), as well as the heavily criticized faults (struggle for gaining influence in the AWS) that resulted in the collapse of the whole right wing in the next parliamentary elections.
Reprivatization is one of the problems Polish politicians have failed to solve for 15 years. They developed nearly a score of drafts of reprivatization acts, none of which has been implemented. Election campaigns and government changes most frequently obstructed them. This happened to the draft developed by Hanna Suchocka's government, later withheld by the next government of Waldemar Pawlak and the coalition of SLD-PSL (Democratic Left Alliance – Polish People's Party). The coalition AWS-UW (Solidarity Election Action – Freedom Union) was very likely to launch reprivatization. Although it had the required majority in the Parliament, the political disputes inside the Solidarity Election Action prevented reprivatization. For the Solidarity Election Action with Marian Krzaklewski, general endowment was to ensure the victory to the party and himself in the next parliamentary and presidential elections respectively. As a result of the internal disputes, the reprivatization act was vetoed by President Kwaśniewski and the elections marked the AWS's collapse. After Poland's accession to the European Union former property owners have increasingly been demanding to restore the seized property, yet the issue does not seem likely to be solved soon and the very idea of reprivatization dissolves in political and ideological controversies.
Although the Solidarity Election Action (AWS) had been the first impressive attempt to unite right-wing groupings after 1989 which was effected in practice, it failed to develop a united, coherent image for the purpose of contacts with the media throughout the whole period it was in power. Reality showed that right-wing politi- cians failed to take advantage of the assets of the new grouping. Incompetence of its leaders and absence of a coherent policy quickly overshadowed the success of the Soli- darity Election Action. As a consequence, Solidarity Election Action has wasted an enormous chance and failed to become a united group of the Polish right wing. Leaders of individual organizations composing the AWS did not give up their leaders' ambitions, which became particularly significant towards the end of the AWS-UW (Solidarity Election Action – Liberty Union) coalition, when the right-wing block was eroding rapidly.
This article describes why the Polish government has pushed for an invocation to Christian traditions in the European Union Constitution. It is ar- gued that this is a rather 'unfortunate' outcome of the political alliance between the Catholic Church and the Polish left, especially between President Alek- sander Kwas ́niewski and the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). This alliance al- lowed the SLD to legitimize their rule in the post-socialist Poland, and it was a result of a political competition between them and the post-Solidarnos ́c ́ elites. As a result, John Paul II became the central integrative metaphor for the Polish society at large, which brought back in the marginalized as well as allowed the transition establishment to win the EU accession referendum in 2003. The arti- cle (which was written when Leszek Miller was still Prime Minister) demon- strates how this alliance crystallized and presents various elements of the cult of the Pope in Poland that followed. Finally, it argues that the worship of the Pope is not an example of nationalism, but of populism, understood not as a peripheral but as a central political force, and advocates for more research on the 'politics of emotions' at work in the centers and not in peripheries.
The Movement of a Hundred (Polish: Ruch Stu) was to become an alternative for the political class that emerged after 1989. The whole political class was supposed to be substituted in a democratic manner by new people entering the political arena. The minimum political platform was to unite the activists of diversified political provenience. The Movement of a Hundred was to provide a new way of functioning for the political parties. The very naming of the party as the "movement", that is a common activity of new people, was of significant importance itself. They were to introduce a new quality of politics and a new model of a politician. Current political events involved the Movement of a Hundred in a never-ending spiral of political elections. The two most important events were supporting Lech Wa³êsa before the presidential elections and the decision to join the structures of the AWS (Solidarity Election Action). The Movement of a Hundred was to be an alternative and novelty on the Polish political arena. However, it became a tiny, hardly observable, component of the right wing of the former political class. It was commonly known to have been incorporated by the old elite. The Movement of a Hundred adopted behavioral models that were typical of a former political class (including the conflicts between the leaders), as well as the heavily criticized faults (struggle for gaining influence in the AWS) that resulted in the collapse of the whole right wing in the next parliamentary elections.
Monografia zawiera liczne ryciny. ; The end of the 80-ties and the beginning of 90-ties years is the period when new trends occur in the wandering movements of the population in Poland, including considerably higher inflow of foreigners than up to now. For the first time in the post war history of our country we have to do with a considerable selected temporary as well as permanent immigration. Thus Poland has emerged as an attractive country to live and to manage business activity and is able to draw more and more immigrants. While examining the phenomenon of permanent immigration to Poland since 1946 (Fig. l), few phases can be shown. The first is 1946-1960, the second one lasts until 1990 and the third immigration phase is beyond 1990. The subject of our analysis is the third immigration phase after 1990, because from that time markedly increased the inflow of foreigners to Poland. Jointly during the period 1990-1995 over 35.1 thousand persons have settled in Poland (Fig. 1). Analysing the inflow of population from abroad we can say about the permanent escalation of this process. It is indicated by the comparison of the immigration magnitude in following years and by the fact that from 1989 to 1995 the yearly inflow has grown al most four times, from 2.2 thousand to 8.1 thousand persons, respectively. A characteristic feature of the immigration from abroad is the great disproportion in the scale of inflow to towns an villages. Majority of the foreigners proceed to larger centres, therefore in the country this is only a marginal phenomenon. Since 1989 over 30 thousand foreigners have settled in towns, thus this makes 83% of the inflow in this period, while in the country less then 7 thousand. In the structure of the inflow to Poland (1991-1995) al most half of the persons have secondary education (45%), 33% university education and 7%. So almost 85% of the immigrants are persons with secondary or university education (Fig. 2). Of this about 80% of the persons are at productive age, the rest makes of children up to 18 years of age and persons over 60. (Fig. 3). The proportions between the number of men and women are al most equal (55% and 45%, respectively), but according to the origin country some differentiation can be observed (Fig. 4). In the structure of inflow according to countries 65% of the immigrants come from European countries and the former Soviet Union. 3.5% from Northern America and 8.6% jointly from Asia and Africa. The highest number of immigrants come from Germany (24.1 %), from the USA (16.2%) and from the form er Soviet Union (15%). Examining the problem summarily for the last 6 years, from 1990 to 1995, we can notice that the greatest inflow of foreigners was noted in the voivodeships: Warszawa (4.9 thousand), Gdańsk (2.9 thousand), Katowice (2.5 thousand) and Wrocław (2.1 thousand). In the next five voivodeships (Szczecin, Poznań, Opole, Kraków and Łódź) the inflow was for l to 2 thousand persons. Generally these voivodeships are characterised by a high degree of social-economical development and low degree of unemployment. In the shadow of the immigration streams there are such voivodeships as Bielsko-Biała, Chełm, Piotrków Tryb., Sieradz, Leszno and Ciechanów voivodeships. The joint inflow over the period 1990-1995 was 35.1 thousand persons (Fig. 7). Reassuming, we can state, that starting from the 90-ties years the immigration to Poland is continuously growing.
The Paper Presents political position of the Russian Federation State Duma and its internal Structure. The power and principles of operation of the Lower House of the Russian Parliament internal bodies are discussed, Particular attention is paid to political groups represented in the Duma. The fractions and groups of deputies have a profound influence on the parliament operations, They affect the mode of operation of the House and its results. The conflict or convergence of interests causes individual groups of deputies to enter into alliances. These alliances, however, are not permanent in character and result from tactical movements. The Lower House of the Russian Federation plays a significant role in the system of State offices. Nevertheless, the state political system is constructed so that the actual authority lies in the hands of the President of the Russian Federation. Strong political Position of the head of the state results both from the stipulations in the constitution and also from a certain distribution of political power in the country. The system lacks a Strong Political group that would be able to oppose the president. Therefore central administration is beyond the control of parliament. In Russia there is no practical dependence of the government on the parliament. The Duma has little influence over the executive power.
The Polish Slavophile concepts at the time of the Second World War were part and parcel of the general tendencies and suggestions based on the assumption that Poland's future, political power, and safety will be guaranteed through the tightening of its links with other states of the East-Central and Southern Europe. The said territories were predominantly inhabited by the Slavs, who found themselves in the war time under threat of losing the very foundations of their national and political existence, so it was, in a sense, natural that many theorists and publicists representing various political orientations saw the ethnic affinity of the Slavs as an important factor in bringing together the nations of Central Europe. This did not have to imoly any deep theoretical consequences, but, as in the past, the historical affinities, and the sense of an ethnic solidarity inspired the creation of political programmes and entire historical and philosophical systems based on the utopian conviction that the blood relationship and the cultural and linguistic links will enable the Slavs to unite politically, economically, and even spiritually and to form, together with some non-Slavonic but culturally close nations, akind of Central European community (a federation, a confederacy, a union, an empire etc.), which would also give some new quality to the dvilisational development of the whole international community. Such convictions, based on the myth of the Slavonic unity, could be found in the thought of all the main ideological and political currents of Poland's independence movement, apart from the socialists and the last remnants of Pilsudski's followers, and in many circles existing on the margins of the main political formations. Various political forces had their different, depending on their ideological colouring, models of the Slavonic community and saw differently its tasks, possibilities, and character. The political and military groupings which represented the nationalistic, or national Catholic, orientation, such as the "Secession" National Party, The National Armed Forces, the Confederacy of the Nation, saw the Slavonic ethnic unity as a chance to construct a Greater Poland, and multiply the power of the nation through links with other nations seen as "close in blood and spirit", i.e. mainly the West Slavonic ones. Similar conceptions could encountered among the Christian Democratic, or rather national-Catholic circles (such as the Union, or the Party of Labour) with the difference that they put more emphasis on the reconstruction by the civilisationally still immature Slavonic nations of "the ideals of liberty and Christian ethics", and of international and interpersonal relations based on the Christian morality. For the political forces representing the peasants' movement (the "Roch" Popular Party, the "Orka" Union of the peasants' Labour) the Slavonic idea was a natural completion of the concept of the union of the Saving nations of East-Central Europe, whose population was largely composed of peasants, on the basis of agrarianism. The theories about the dvilisational backwardness of the Slavs combined here with a fascination with the peasantry; and with the belief that the peasants, representing the healthiest, morally and spiritually, part of the nation, and being intimately linked to the soil, can understand better than others the ideals of freedom and democracy. The attitude of the democratic political forces, mainly the Democratic Party, to the Slavonic idea, was, on the other hand, usually devoid of elements of mysticism and exaltation; and might be called the most rational. In this case, the Slavonic community, based naturally on the linguistic and cultural affinities, was to be ideologically founded on the Slavs' understanding of the community of interests, especially with regard to the safety of the Central European region. In the case, however, of the Polish Workers', the Union of Polish Patriots in the USSR, and later the groupings connected with the National State Council, the Slavonic idea was understood as the safeguarding of Poland's interests and those of the other states of the region by means of an alliance and close co-operation with the Soviet Union and the Slavonic nations that inhabited it. It is worth emphasising that the Polish concepts of the Slavonic co-operation from the period of the Second World War only rarely postulated that the Slavonic nations should "merge" into one biological and spiritual whole. Instead, we have to do with proposals to form a more or less integrated confederate state or a union of states.
The political transformation in Poland at the turn of the eighties also affected the military. One of the aspects of this transformation was an attempt at creating a code of honor for the soldiers of a "renewed" Polish Army, undertaken at the beginning of the nineties. Unfortunately, the work on the Code of Honor for the Polish Army of the 3rd Republic has not been finalized. Although a few drafts of varied merit have been drawn up, there has been no sufficient political will to eventually effect this interesting and noteworthy project. Maybe some have also feared that the professional soldiers equipped with the Code of Honor will become too independent and courts of honor will practically depreciate the significance of military courts. Also, nearly all the documents devoted to this matter at that time reflect the intention to develop the code, yet they lack assuredness of what its character should be. Therefore, the main points of focus were general rules referring to morality and conduct, while definitely too little attention was paid to practical suggestions and solutions. ; The political transformation in Poland at the turn of the eighties also affected the military. One of the aspects of this transformation was an attempt at creating a code of honor for the soldiers of a "renewed" Polish Army, undertaken at the beginning of the nineties. Unfortunately, the work on the Code of Honor for the Polish Army of the 3rd Republic has not been finalized. Although a few drafts of varied merit have been drawn up, there has been no sufficient political will to eventually effect this interesting and noteworthy project. Maybe some have also feared that the professional soldiers equipped with the Code of Honor will become too independent and courts of honor will practically depreciate the significance of military courts. Also, nearly all the documents devoted to this matter at that time reflect the intention to develop the code, yet they lack assuredness of what its character should be. Therefore, the main points of focus were general rules referring to morality and conduct, while definitely too little attention was paid to practical suggestions and solutions.
Reprivatization is one of the problems Polish politicians have failed to solve for 15 years. They developed nearly a score of drafts of reprivatization acts, none of which has been implemented. Election campaigns and government changes most frequently obstructed them. This happened to the draft developed by Hanna Suchocka's government, later withheld by the next government of Waldemar Pawlak and the coalition of SLD-PSL (Democratic Left Alliance – Polish People's Party). The coalition AWS-UW (Solidarity Election Action – Freedom Union) was very likely to launch reprivatization. Although it had the required majority in the Parliament, the political disputes inside the Solidarity Election Action prevented reprivatization. For the Solidarity Election Action with Marian Krzaklewski, general endowment was to ensure the victory to the party and himself in the next parliamentary and presidential elections respectively. As a result of the internal disputes, the reprivatization act was vetoed by President Kwaśniewski and the elections marked the AWS's collapse. After Poland's accession to the European Union former property owners have increasingly been demanding to restore the seized property, yet the issue does not seem likely to be solved soon and the very idea of reprivatization dissolves in political and ideological controversies. ; Reprivatization is one of the problems Polish politicians have failed to solve for 15 years. They developed nearly a score of drafts of reprivatization acts, none of which has been implemented. Election campaigns and government changes most frequently obstructed them. This happened to the draft developed by Hanna Suchocka's government, later withheld by the next government of Waldemar Pawlak and the coalition of SLD-PSL (Democratic Left Alliance – Polish People's Party). The coalition AWS-UW (Solidarity Election Action – Freedom Union) was very likely to launch reprivatization. Although it had the required majority in the Parliament, the political disputes inside the Solidarity Election Action prevented reprivatization. For the Solidarity Election Action with Marian Krzaklewski, general endowment was to ensure the victory to the party and himself in the next parliamentary and presidential elections respectively. As a result of the internal disputes, the reprivatization act was vetoed by President Kwaśniewski and the elections marked the AWS's collapse. After Poland's accession to the European Union former property owners have increasingly been demanding to restore the seized property, yet the issue does not seem likely to be solved soon and the very idea of reprivatization dissolves in political and ideological controversies.
Seven drafts of the constitution submitted to the Polish Sejm by political parties have been analyzed and compared within the scope of regulations concerning the economic organization of the society: property rights, freedom of economic activity and its limitations, social security, state budget and debt, etc. Though advanced by groups of different or even (seemingly) opposite political orientations, the drafts do not differ much, all of them presenting a vision of a rather liberal state with the possibility of state intervention, in case it is necessary to protect "the public good". Most important differences may be noticed in the area of social insurance, education and health service. It is, however, often difficult to state decisively what the differences between the drafts consist in. All the drafts have been written in a very general language. It is only the future legislation which will determine the shape of the economic system of the state, and will interpret the still vague regulations of the constitution, the final version of which will certainly be a compromise between the submitted drafts. ; Digitalizacja i deponowanie archiwalnych zeszytów RPEiS sfinansowane przez MNiSW w ramach realizacji umowy nr 541/P-DUN/2016
The political relationship between the United States of America and the USSR determined the international relations during the period of the "cold war". The election of Mikhail Gorbachev to general secretary of the Communist Party was a turning point in international relations. Boris Yeltsin signed the agreement to disband the Soviet Union, which according to legal regulations was then transformed into Russia. B. Clinton, who accepted all of the decisions of Russian president, and also supported financially a number of new initiatives from B. Yeltsin, continued the good relationship between Russia and the USA instigated by G. Bush. The election of W. Putin to the Russian presidency was followed by a new strategy from Russia towards western countries, particularly towards the USA. Instead of following the strategy of partnership Putin tried to limit the influence of the USA on Russian policy. The situation changed after the terrorist attack on 11th Sept. when W. Putin, President of Russia, was one of the first world leaders to assure G. Bush in an official phone call that Russia intended to support all military action taken by the USAagainst the perpetrators. If Russia intends to have a great influence on the international political relations and take part in international policy it should change its position towards USA into one of partnership and co-operation.
Internal identity of a region is a factor that promotes political stability.Western Europe is a particular example here. The significance of regions, which is clearly emphasised in Europe, may become a prerequisite for their mutual assimilation. This causes numerous problems but also contributes to increased interdependence between nations and regions. The potential of regional identity may be treated as a factor that reduces the consequences of the revival of national or nationalistic tendencies on the one hand, and those of intensified globalisation on the other. Adecade of contradictory experience in the formation of regional identity in Central Europe confirms this hypothesis. The emergence of clear regional structures as well the reinforcement of a new regional identity of Central European countries in politics and then in economics may diminish the level of various hazards ranging from political ones to environmental. ; Tożsamość wewnątrz regionalna jest czynnikiem sprzyjającym stabilności. Szczególnie znaczący jest tutaj przykład Europy Zachodniej.Wyraźnie zarysowana pozycja regionów w Europie może służyć jako przesłanka do ich wzajemnego upodabniania się, co powoduje wiele problemów, ale zarazem zwiększa współzależność nie tylko między państwami, ale i między regionami. W takim przypadku procesy globalizacji nie musza mieć charakteru "bezadresowgo". Potencjał regionalnej tozsamości można traktować jako fenomen, który redukuje skutki odrodzenia narodowych i nacjonalistycznych tendencji z jednej strony oraz intensyfikacji globalizacji – z drugiej. Dziesięcioletnie i skrajnie sprzeczne doświadczenia formowania regionalnych tożsamości w Centralnej Europie potwierdzają słuszność tej hipotezy. Krystalizacja regionalnych struktur i umocnienie nowej regionalnej identyczności państw Europy Centralnej – najpierw w polityce, a potem i w ekonomii – może obniżyć poziom różnorakich niebezpieczeństw, zaczynajac od politycznych, a kończąc na ekologicznych.