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Some advocacy groups are becoming more willing to engage in political activism. One is the Ontario Lung Association, which has been calling attention to government inaction on air-pollution issues such as controlling smog and improving indoor air quality. These lobbying efforts are supported by some physicians, who believe that environmental factors are behind the increased incidence of respiratory illness.

Report written by Byrnes and delivered at the 1989 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

The low level of representative power and political parties in Lithuanian public opinion inspired this analysisof political parties, as organizations using basic knowledge of management science. Understanding that voters areconsumers of political party's activities result, programs for election campaigns are considered as a main product ofpolitical parties' activity basing on the most popular contemporary understanding of political party. Basing on thefundamentals of management science a strategy of state development and persons prepared to implement thatstrategy in representative and governmental institutions are considered as a more valuable product of party activitiesin the article. Acquiring the power to govern a state for long enough period, when more than half of citizensparticipating in elections are oriented towards short term goals is considered as a paradox of democracy. Creationand popularizing a philosophy of political party, forming a field of main values in the state's life, serving as a basisfor strategy and short time election programs is considered as a mission of political parties in contemporaryLithuania enabling to overcome the paradox of democracy.

Kept up to date by the office's L.C. classification--additions and changes, and by two publications issued by Gale Research Company entitled: Library of Congress classification schedules--a cumulation of additions and changes, and Library of Congress classification schedules combined with additions and changes. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Some issues have title: Administration report on the Persian Gulf Political Residency and Maskat Political Agency for . ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Reprint. Originally published annually: Calcutta : Printed by the Supt. of Govt. Print., India, 1888-1909. (1887-88-1906-07: Selections from the records of the Government of India, Foreign Department) (1887-88-1906-07: Foreign Department serial). With issue for 1909, continued by: Persian Gulf Political Residency. Administration report of the Persian Gulf Political Residency for the year .

Includes index. ; Rev. ed. of: Classification. Class J. Political science / Office for Subject Cataloging Policy, Collections Services, Library of Congress. 2nd ed., 1991 revision. 1991. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Die Regulierung eines Marktes ist das Ergebnis eines komplexen Prozesses, der sowohl von politischen als auch wirtschaftlichen Kräften beeinflusst wird. In drei sich ergänzenden Essays wird die Frage ökonometrisch untersucht, wie die Wirkungen und die Leistungsfähigkeit von Regulierungen neu zu bewerten sind, wenn die betroffenen Unternehmen ihrerseits die Regulierung beeinflussen können. Der erste Teil behandelt die Liberalisierung des Markteintritts im Mobilfunkmarkt in OECD Ländern in den neunziger Jahren. Insbesondere wird analysiert, wie politische und bürokratische Institutionen und die politische Umgebung im Deregulierungsprozess gewirkt haben. Hier werden relevante, "stilisierte Fakten" herausgearbeitet: Länder mit Mehrheitswahlsystemen, rechenschaftspflichtigen Regulierungsbehörden und rechtsorientierten Regierungen haben den Liberalisierungsprozess stärker vorangetrieben, während Länder mit einer Consensus-Demokratie, einem Präsidialregime, einer Koalitionsregierung und einem starken ex-monopolistischen Anbieter eher weniger oder langsamer dereguliert haben. Der zweite Teil der Arbeit konzentriert sich auf das strategische Verhalten der Unternehmen und auf die Frage, inwieweit dieses Verhalten von der politischen und bürokratischen Umgebung beeinflusst wird, in der die Unternehmen operieren. Diese Problematik wird anhand des US-amerikanischen Mobilfunkmarkts am Ende der achtziger Jahre empirisch untersucht, wobei die Beziehung zwischen der Entscheidung über das Regulierungssystem und die Preisentscheidungen der Unternehmen im Mittelpunkt der Betrachtung steht. Es wird gezeigt, dass es den Unternehmen durch Ihre Lobbyingaktivitäten gelang, die Wahl des Regulierungssystems zu beeinflussen. Überprüft man die so getroffene Selektion, dann zeigt es sich, dass die Regulierung zwar im allgemeinen in die gewünschte Richtung gearbeitet hat, aber nicht sehr signifikant wirkte. Das Lobbying mancher Unternehmen war hierbei so erfolgreich, dass gerade solche Märkte nicht reguliert wurden, in denen es am effektivsten gewesen wäre. Im dritten Essay zusammen mit Astrid Jung wird die Beziehung zwischen dem Marktverhalten von Unternehmen und ihren Spenden an politische Parteien untersucht. Die empirische Analyse findet eine signifikante, starke und negative Verbindung zwischen Lobbyingausgaben und der Fähigkeit der Unternehmen Marktabsprachen abzuschließen. Das Ergebnis ist ein Hinweis darauf, dass geheime Absprachen auf dem Produktmarkt eine stärkere Gleichschaltung der politischen Ziele unter den Unternehmen fördert und damit weniger Lobbying nötig ist, um die so koordinierte Ziele zu erreichen. ; Regulation, like many other policy decisions, results out of a complex process that is shaped by political as well as economic forces. Therefore, regulatory decisions must be endogenized when studying their impact on the market outcome. This thesis offers various econometric approaches to study this issue. In the first contribution, I analyze how a country's political and bureaucratic institutions, as well as its political environment, affect the entry liberalization of the mobile telecommunications industry in OECD states during the 1990s. I found that majoritarian countries, countries with more accountable regulators, and countries with right-wing governments liberalized more intensely, whereas countries with consensus-type of democracies, a presidential regime, coalition rather than one-party governments, and a strong incumbent firm liberalized less. Next, I focus on the firms' strategic behavior and analyze how this is influenced by the political and regulatory environment. I use data from the U.S. mobile telecommunications industry in the late 1980's, which can be seen as a natural experiment because of its particular market and regulatory structure. The second essay studies the relation between the choice of a regulatory design and firms' pricing behavior. I show that, through their lobbying activities, firms endogenously influence the price-regulatory regime under which they operate. Accounting for this endogenous selection, price regulation is observed to decrease cellular tariffs. However, regulation is not particularly effective in reducing prices because firms prevent it from occurring where it would be mostly successful. In the final contribution together with Astrid Jung, we investigate the link between firms' political decision, i.e. their lobbying expenditures, and their product market conduct. The relationship between collusion and the industry's lobbying expenditures is strongly significant and negative: Higher lobbying expenditures foster a more competitive industry and collusive conduct reduces firms' contributions to the political system. The interpretation is that, if firms' political goals are not perfectly aligned, collusion in the product market reduces industry's total campaign contributions by enhancing firms' coordination in lobbying.

In social sciences, a law can be defined as a finding of certain regularities in the interrelationships between social facts. These regularities observed, and then validated by the experiment cited, make it possible to propose laws, even if they are not necessarily universal and permanent in nature, as in some cases in physical science. In line with this approach and applying the principles of Claude Bernard's experimental method, we propose two of the demography laws of politics, the number law and the differential law. By means of the experiment referred to, their veracity can be established. The geography of the population can therefore provide useful lessons for political science. ; International audience In social sciences, laws result from interrelationships between social facts that can be frequently observed. These laws are not universal as they can be in physical sciences. However, once observed and experimented, regular events can lead to the recognition of laws. This is what we propose to do, following the principles of Claude Bernard's experimental method, in order to deal with two demogeographic laws of politics : the law of number and the law of differential. Hence we will see how useful for political science population geography can be. ; In social sciences, a law can be defined as a finding of certain regularities in the interrelationships between social facts. These regularities observed, and then validated by the experiment cited, make it possible to propose laws, even if they are not necessarily universal and permanent in nature, as in some cases in physical science. In line with this approach and applying the principles of Claude Bernard's experimental method, we propose two of the demography laws of politics, the number law and the differential law. By means of the experiment referred to, their veracity can be established. The geography of the population can therefore provide useful lessons for political science. ; Dans les sciences sociales, une loi peut se définir comme le constat de ...

This article emphasises the nature and possible role of political literacy in the pro cess of democratisation in South Africa. The process of democratisation is analysed and secondly the concept of "political literacy" is elucidated. The need for political literacy is highlighted by focusing on the high level of political apathy especially among white school children. In conclusion it is suggested that political literacy is an essential element of constructive political and social change as incorporated in democratisation.

One of the tales told about American political parties is that Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, desiring to create an institution uniting sup-porters of their beliefs about the means and ends of government, set off from their Virginia plantations on what was described to inquisitive journalists as an expedition to gather botanical specimens. Instead of collecting specimens, however, they are alleged to have created the original specimen of the modern political party.

This article reports the results from a national survey directed to the department chairs of political science to assess the current and future state of distance learning in that discipline. The insights of this research are relevant to all social science fields and offer important insights to other academic disciplines as well. Key findings of the study include the low utilization of distance learning courses, a low degree of importance currently attributed to distance learning and modest expectations of future growth, ambivalent acceptance of a future role for distance learning, the common use of Internet-related technologies, low levels of faculty knowledge and interest about distance learning, limited institutional support, and serious doubts about the appropriateness and quality of instruction at a distance. We propose a model of the size and scope of distance learning as a function of three factors: the capacity of distance learning technologies, market demand, and faculty and university interest in distance learning. The article concludes with suggestions of critical areas for future research in this dynamic, fluid post-secondary environment.

2 páginas.-- A Commentary on Giovanni Sartori. ; In his reflections on "Where is Political Science Going?," professor Sartori brightly points out some present flaws in the discipline: too much empiricism and too little applied research. At attacking "American-type" political science, however, I think he chooses a mistaken enemy. I will hold, in contrast, that the main source of the mentioned flaws is the weakness of political theory. ; Peer reviewed

I believe that to analyze the key issues of graduate education in political science we have to begin with the basic intellectual issues of our discipline. This mini-essay begins, therefore, with a discussion of fundamental divisions in the discipline, then turns to observations about how these divisions affect graduate programs.

Digitised version produced by the EUI Library and made available online in 2020.

On-line discussion, while promising in theory, often turns out to be disappointing in application. Low levels of student participation are a particularly vexing and common problem. I argue that to overcome these chronic problems, instructors must recognize the collective action problems inherent in on-line discussion and address them, primarily through the use of selective incentives. I test this contention using on-line experiments conducted on undergraduate political science students. The results of the experiments provide evidence of an underlying free-rider problem and support for the contention that selective incentives are an effective means of overcoming this problem. In another level of analysis, the experiment also shows that even basic student-to-student on-line discussion can be an effective teaching tool, rivaling the effectiveness of more costly traditional web sites.