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Typed speech with handwritten annotations and strikethroughs given by Brooks Hays at his testimonial dinner ; -3- There are procedural standards to be rigidly defended in attaining government by consent of the governed. I have cheerfully accepted several defeats because I acknowledge the principle of majority rule. That rule will be frustrated, however, unless the people are given an opportunity to secure and deliberate upon the facts and the issues. That is the reason we have filing dates that give candidates time to defend themselves and legal restric¬tions regarding use of money and libelous material in campaigns. And through¬out the structure of popular government there must be such respect for the minority that public policy is built on wisdom and justice in representative functions, not on the sophistry that the majority's judgment is always wise and best for the people. Congressional rules devised long ago have protected minority rights of every kind. I might add that if we moderates are a minority we are still conforming to our region's cherished tradition in asking that majorities not be indifferent to this principle. In the 1958 campaigning I was not trying to ride a popular idea – I was trying to popularize an idea that had become so much a part of me I could not rid myself of it if I had tried. The third imperative is disciplined freedom. This embraces the right' to maintain private schools at private expense, not as a substitute for public,education but as a privilege in American life that not only adds to our cultural enrichment but helps to preserve the independence of viewpoint that makes freedom possible. This principle grants to both the proponents and opponents of proposed changes the right to organize, and their rights are not forfeited by methods and manners that are not admirable so long as they are illegal. Finally there must be a due concern for the generation of our common faith, the faith which sustains our position of world leadership. If there were not other and higher motivations we would still be inspired to bind up the nation's wounds by the knowledge that a ruthless force is loose in the world and that our failures at this point would be exploited. The door that religion alone can open leads to a sure passageway of peace and justice.

When a great and demanding need exists in any field of endeavor, it is a historical fact that men of intelligence, integrity and goodwill will find a way to fill that need. Like a rudderless ship, in 1954, the American humane movement was drifting without course or compass in a sea of indifference to animal welfare and outright cruelty for man's personal gain. National animal welfare work had languished for years; there was little direction to humane work at the state and local levels. The humane movement had become, in the eyes of an apathetic public, synonymous with cat and dog rescue work. There was a great, basic need--a crying need--for leadership. An organization was needed to consolidate the myriad but scattered efforts of a thousand local humane societies. It had to be a national society with selfless dedication, courage, and a singleness of purpose that would bring order, direction and inspiration to struggling humanitarians. In particular, it had to be a society that would combine realistic planning with maximum potential for success while, at the same time, establishing bold objectives towards which all could work. The HSUS was organized to fill this challenging role. From the very beginning, the new society justified the faith which so many people bestowed upon it. It quickly set forth the fundamental principle of working to oppose and seek to prevent all uses or exploitation of animals that cause pain, suffering or fear. Within this framework of policy and purpose, it set out to improve conditions for all kinds of animals under all circumstances. Abstract ideology was recognized but concrete measures for the relief of animal suffering that had been too long delayed were immediately put into practice.

The Contemporary "Great Debate" over the future of Canadian Confederation, whatever else it may have done, has at least shattered a number of comfortable old maxims as to the inevitable course and development of federal constitutions. "Bryce's law" — or the asserted axiom that federalism is simply a transitory step on the way to political unity — has been exposed for what it really is, a generalization based too easily upon the experience of the essentially "Anglo-Saxon," English-speaking federal systems with which Lord Bryce happened to be acquainted at the time he was writing. Even Dicey's triadic critique long accepted as a truism in Empire and Commonwealth legal circles — that federalism inevitably means weak government, conservatism, and legalism — may be seriously doubted, as to its first two points at least, in the light of the strongly centripetal governmental trends in the main federal systems in modern times, and the concomitant association of that centralizing trend with political concepts of social and economic planning and community determination and direction of financial policy. It may be, as a French-Canadian jurist contended at a conference on Federalism held in Toronto in November 1964, that those English-speaking Canadian jurists who, in the 1930's and the 1940's, preached both the desirability and also the inexorability of the march to Ottawa were "plucking the Socialist fruit from the tree before it was fully ripe." We are, in any case, indebted to French Canada for reminding us that theories of historical inevitability, when applied to social phenomena, must inevitably tend to break down if they ignore the crucial variable of the human factor. For while complex political-legal relationships and interactions often seem to be shaped and conditioned by intractable social and economic forces, in the end the dynamic element in the community power process must still be the free will of the main actors or participants in it. This is in essence William James's point that truth is not an abstract quality inherent in an idea but something that happens to it in the unfolding of events. In constitutional law, what may have seemed right and proper and, if you wish,truefor Canada in the 1930's and the 1940's may not necessarily be so today.

Since the time of Adam Smith, we have more or less passively accepted the type of economy which tossed us from boom to depression and back again. The adoption by Congress of current proposals for "full employment" legislation would constitute a substantial divergence from this passive course. The representatives of the American people would declare, essentially, that they propose to do whatever is necessary to make the national economy provide employment for all men and women who wish to work. Acceptance of this policy implies simultaneous acceptance of the responsibility for devising plans for influencing the economy and creating governmental machinery for carrying them out. Hence, our purpose here is twofold: first, to suggest the tasks to be performed by the federal government in maintaining full employment; and second, to raise the foreseeable questions about the organizational arrangements within the federal government that may be required to accomplish this end. At the present stage in the evolution of the rôle of government in the maintenance of full employment, much that will be said must necessarily be speculative.But political scientists have as much right—and obligation—to speculate as do economists. The economists have speculated effectively as to the pleasant state of affairs that will obtain when there are jobs for all who want to work. They have speculated fruitfully as to ways of achieving full employment. It is high time, now, that the political scientists contribute the results of their own speculation. What, for example, are to be the responsibilities of government in the "full-employment age"? How will government discharge these responsibilities? How will the federal government formulate an annual employment and production budget and the complex integrated network of national policies essential to the achievement of full employment? The political scientists may also be expected to consider how the collaboration between the federal, state, and local governments and each sector of private enterprise essential to this objective will be obtained. They, too, are obligated to evolve a prescription for the planned, harmonious administration of these integrated policies by a considerable number of agencies of the federal government. When they essay such speculation, they will conclude that the "Full Employment Act" focuses attention on the need for effective governmental staff services as no previous legislation has done.

"Everything ready for the rally tomorrow." EL UNIVERSAL. Mexico, D.F. July 23, 1927. Pp. 1 and 5. Aarón Sáenz, B.A., says that the Obregonist candidacy does not have official support. "In political demonstrations, the 'mueras' are not allowed, only the 'alive'." EL UNIVERSAL. Mexico, D.F. July 23, 1927. Pp. 1 and 5. International policy approaches of Gen. Arnulfo R. Gómez. "Opening of the Pro-Serrano Committee's offices today." EL UNIVERSAL. Mexico, D.F. July 23, 1927. "Political meeting of the Revolutionary Party of Jalisco in Guadalajara." EL UNIVERSAL. Mexico, D.F. July 23, 1927. SANCHEZ AZCONA, Juan. "The National Anti-reelectionist Party. Fundraising for the campaign." EL UNIVERSAL. Mexico, D.F. July 23, 1927. "Sowing winds." EL UNIVERSAL Mexico, D.F. July 23, 1927. Criticism of the candidates for their political campaign speeches and their advertising tactics." ZUBARAN CAPMANY, Rafael (B.A.). "Do not do unto another." EL UNIVERSAL. Mexico, D.F> July 23, 1927. GONGORA, Pablo de. "French reflections." EL UNIVERSAL. Mexico, D.F. July 23, 1927. P.3 "The Convention organized by CROM." EL UNIVERSAL. Mexico, D.F. July 23, 1927. / "Todo quedó ya listo para la manifestación de mañana". EL UNIVERSAL. México, D.F. Julio 23, 1927. pp. 1 y 5. El Lic. Aarón Sáenz dice que la candidatura obregonista no tiene apoyo oficial. "En las manifestaciones de carácter político no se permitirán los 'mueras', solamente 'vivas'". EL UNIVERSAL. México, D.F. Julio 23, 1927. pp. 1 y 5. "La Política Internacional". EL UNIVERSAL. México, D.F. Julio 23, 1927. pp. 1 y 10. Planteamientos de política internacional del Gral. Arnulfo R. Gómez. "Hoy se inaugurarán las oficinas del Comité Pro-Serrano". EL UNIVERSAL. México, D.F. Julio 23, 1927. "Mitin político-electoral del Partido Revolucionario de Jalisco en Guadalajara". EL UNIVERSAL. México, D.F. Julio 23, 1927. SANCHEZ AZCONA, Juan. "El Partido Nacional Antirreeleccionista. Recaudación de fondos para la campaña". EL UNIVERSAL. México, D.F. Julio 23, 1927. "Sembrando Vientos". EL UNIVERSAL. México, D.F. Julio 23, 1927. Crítica a los candidatos por discursos de la campaña política y a sus actividades propagandísticas. ZUBARAN CAPMANY, Rafael (Lic.). "No hagas a otro". EL UNIVERSAL. México, D.F. Julio 23, 1927. GONGORA, Pablo de. "Reflexiones francesas". EL UNIVERSAL. México, D.F. Julio 23, 1927. p.3. "Las bases de la Convención organizada por la CROM". EL UNIVERSAL. México, D.F. Julio 23, 1927.

Facing an international scene that favors the development of a dynamic and influential Foreign Policy at a global level, the University of Chile has decided to develop investigations regarding International Relations and data share on these matters. Created in 1966, the Institute of International Studies is an independent interdisciplinary center, now publishing the first issue of the Journal of International Studies. From its beginning, the Institute has had functional relationships with key international centers where these matters are analyzed. This gives access to the highest levels of world thought on economic and political relations between nations and results in a continuous flow of renewal and criticism that ensures the academic rigor on which its research will be based. ; Ante un escenario internacional que favorece el desarrollo de una política exterior dinámica e influyente en el concierto mundial, la Universidad de Chile ha decidido sumarse a la investigación de de las relaciones internacionales y la divulgación de datos sobre estos asuntos. Así nació en 1966 el Instituto de Estudios Internacionales, centro interdisciplinario de carácter independiente, y aparece ahora el primer número de la revista Estudios Internacionales. Desde sus comienzos, el Instituto ha tenido relaciones funcionales con los principales centros en que se analizan estas materias. Esto le da acceso a los más niveles del pensamiento mundial sobre las relaciones económicas y políticas entre las naciones y resulta en una corriente continua de renovación y crítica que asegura el rigor académico sobre el que se fundamentarán sus trabajos de investigación.

The literature on interest groups is, by and large, either heavily abstract and theoretical or highly concrete and descriptive. There are, on the one hand, several attempts to provide a theoretical framework for the study of interest groups, the major foci being either "the group basis of politics" or "mass society." On the other hand are numerous case-studies which describe in some detail, either for a particular policy or for a particular interest group, relevant political activities which lead to inferred conclusions about the impact that such groups have on the issue or issues. What we lack, and what is needed to raise the study of interest groups to the level of empiricallybased generalization, are studies which collect data and generalize about interest groups using multiple units of analysis.This observation is not meant to depreciate or undervalue the important theoretical and descriptive contributions which have been made in the examination of the role of interest groups in governmental systems. It is simply to state a fact about the literature and to plead for more systematic data collection and empirically-based generalization from which verified propositions about interest groups may emerge.I think there are two major reasons why the literature on interest groups lacks a comparative base. First, many of the concepts which are employed in theories about interest groups are difficult to operationalize for data collection. Such concepts as "cohesion," "access," "resources," etc., represent complex phenomena and would involve a good deal of effort to apply rigorously and empirically.

At the heart of our research was a single basic question: What arms control and disarmament measures might be acceptable to Europeans in 1966, in 1971, and in 1976? And differently put: What would be Europe's attitude in those years either to arms competition or to arms control, and what particular policies would be most popular or least popular in Europe in this respect?This basic question implied four more detailed questions. The first, What is Europe now, in 1966, and where is it going for the 1971 to 1976 period? Is it going to be a Europe of nation-states with only marginal common functional arrangements on matters not central in importance to the concerns of its citizens? Or will it be to some extent substantially integrated, with some major policy decisions made by common institutions? Or will it be a common body politic, speaking with a single voice and developing common institutions for a wide range of decisions?Second, do Europeans in general approve or disapprove of arms control? Do they welcome the relaxation of tensions between America and Russia and between the East and West, or do they fear such relaxation?Third, what specific arms control measures are likely to be most acceptable to Europeans, and which arms control measures are likely to be least acceptable?And fourth, what are the strength, location, and time aspects of political support for specific policies, such as the policies of France and its President de Gaulle vis-à-vis the NATO Alliance and the United States?

UNTEA served the important function of buffer between contending forces and in general accomplished a remarkably smooth transfer. In this regard the United Nations operation was a major success. The smooth transfer was achieved, however, at the cost of rights specifically guaranteed in the agreement—the rights of free speech and assembly. Furthermore, the United Nations preparatory task and responsibility in the future "act of self-determination" was minimized.It may be argued that UNTEA policy in West Irian merely reflects the weakness of the United Nations in a nation-state world. Lack of UNTEA power certainly was an important aspect. The explanation, however, is more complex. It is significant to recall that the United Nations assumed its task under severe handicaps: It was given no time for adequate recruitment and preparation; from the start it was confronted with the legitimized presence of Indonesian troops; the status of the "Papuan flag" was never mentioned in the agreement; and general Papuan primitivity along with political naïveté and schisms among the small and newly created Papuan élite influenced UNTEA's approach.UNTEA also met continuous Indonesian pressure aimed at shortening the period of its administration and weakening its authority in general. Statements by Indonesian officials cast doubt on Indonesia's willingness to adhere to the wording of the agreement. In trying to interpret Indonesian feelings it might be conceded that most Dutch-Indonesian agreements have imposed conditions which could be considered obnoxious to Indonesia. The rights of self-determination for the Papuan inhabitants—stipulated in the August 15 agreement—fall into this category.

Rapid unification of Europe is apparent in the economic sphere, but the European community lacks the neces sary spiritual quality for unification which would be demon strated in the merging of political or cultural national goals. Europe has undergone in one generation a transformation from which it has not altogether recovered. Formerly, Europe was at the center of world power. This was upset, and Europe became largely dependent on American policy and American power to take over the responsibilities it could no longer meet. The 1950 decade brought European leaders to the recognition that no European nation alone was able to guarantee either its own prosperity or its own security. Only by accepting the difficult condition of dependency were European leaders able to move beyond nationalism toward new forms of transna tional responsibility. This entailed the quest for merged national goals and for ways of expressing them in institutions and in practices. There has been a steady growth of commit ment to the European idea and of readiness to sacrifice national interests and controls in order to maintain and strengthen the European community. There is a commitment to NATO and to United States leadership, but this is not as strong in France as elsewhere. De Gaulle's successes have influenced European elite opinion, and, for the period immediately ahead, the national goals of European leaders appear to be diverging rather than merging. The burden of European union obvi ously is on the European leaders, but it must be shared intellectually, morally, and politically by the United States. —Ed.

It would not, I think, be entirely misleading to suggest that doctrines of laissez faire and attacks upon reasoned state intervention in political and social life have tended to emanate from two extremes in social philosophy—ultra individualism and an extreme organicism. In the first case, and we may take Locke as an example, society is made up of a heap of individuals who came together to form the state for the limited purpose of the protection of property. Man is not seen as a part of a larger whole, influenced by the structure of that whole, but as an isolated individual; thus any state interference beyond the protection of property is viewed as a restriction of individual liberty. On the other hand are thinkers who regard society as such a complicated and delicate organism that they can only—and governments should only—sit back and gasp at the complexity of it all. Any attempt to improve one aspect will affect the balance of the whole in ways impossible to predict. It is difficult to point to a pure instance of this opinion, but this is the impression left with the reader after perusing such works as Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Bradley's Ethical Studies and the works of some more modern conservatives. All that governments can be expected to do is to prevent the worst collisions and any attempt to pursue a positive policy is doomed to failure.

A summary of the philosophy and technique of government officials responsible for information services in the Belgian Congo, British East Africa, Zanzibar and the two Rhodesias. Economic and political changes are slowly transforming this area into a 'new' Africa. The mass media of communication are being utilized to accelerate acculturation. Information service functions are summarized under 5 generalizations with a full discussion of each. These are (1) the information services implement official government policy; (2) audience preference are carefully considered by the information services; (3) every available mass medium of communication is utilized (radio, newspapers, magazines, pamphlets and leaflets, books, motion pictures and film strips); (4) all types of audience research are primitive; & (5) Africans tend to have access to other communication media beside those offered by the information services. In motion pictures, the government has a complete monopoly of distribution and censorship. Types of excised motion picture scenes are presented and it is concluded that 'when the Central Africans now allegedly being trained in the Soviet Union return home [and] begin functioning on a large scale, a very different conceptualization of events will [become] available to large masses of the pop.' It is concluded that 'the information services dare not continue too long to bring to Africans only a manipulated version of Africa, the West, and the rest of the world. Since European officials genuinely wish to develop some form of democracy... they must... devise means whereby those media can be utilized more democratically.' L. P. Chall.

It has been remarked that the Government of the United States "seldom loses an opportunity to profess its loyalty to international arbitration in the abstract. … The expression of this sentiment has become so conventional that a popular impression prevails that it accords with the actual policy of the United States." This ambivalent attitude is nowhere more clearly illustrated than in a memorandum addressed by Mr. John Foster Dulles on July 10, 1946, to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. "The United States, since its formation," Mr. Dulles states, "has led in promoting a reign of law and justice as between nations. In order to continue that leadership, we should now accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. If the United States, which has the material power to impose its will widely in the world, agrees instead to submit to the impartial adjudication of its legal controversies, that will inaugurate a new and profoundly significant international advance." Although the initial step of accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court would in itself be "of profound moral significance," it would, Mr. Dulles continues, "assume greatly increased practical significance" only when "limiting factors" have been removed, for the "path is as yet so untried that it would be reckless to proceed precipitately," the Court "has yet to win the confidence of the world community," and "international law has not yet developed the scope and definiteness necessary to permit international disputes generally to be resolved by judicial rather than political tests."

With the military defeat of Germany now assured, it becomes imperative to complete plans for occupation of the country. There is apparent agreement among the United Nations that Germany must be occupied; but, although much work has been done on the subject, by both the military and political branches of the several Allied Governments, to date we have not had any general policy directives from the heads of the three great powers, namely, Russia, Great Britain, and the United States. Presumably, at the Teheran conference Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin came to a preliminary meeting of minds with reference to the various aspects of the war against Germany. At the second Quebec conference, it may reasonably be assumed that the President and Mr. Churchill, keeping in close contact with the Soviet leader, finally came to some definite agreement regarding the measures necessary to encompass the complete defeat and occupation of Germany.It has been generally agreed all around that Germany must be occupied by the troops of the Allied Nations, but many of the specific details of such an occupation have not yet been thought through. When we speak of the occupation of Germany, we must first of all define exactly what we mean by the term Germany. It is expected that "Germany" will be understood to cover only those territories included within the Republic prior to Hitler's accession to power. It might be better to agree that the boundaries shall be understood to be those of January 1, 1932.