This article aims to draw the attention to a field that has been widely acknowledged worldwide but can be considered as rather new in Lithuania -- to the methods of foresighting & future studies. Foresighting can serve as a supplement to analytic research & can be applied as a significant methodological instrument in numerous fields of political science. Authors state that foresighting is particularly relevant to the research of international relations. As actors of the international system are competing for power & attempting to formulate strategies to expand their power, foresighting & construction of future scenarios becomes an inherent part of the strategic processes. A scenario constructing process & examples are presented in the article. Adapted from the source document.
Straipsnyje apzvelgiami Apsvietos epochos tyrimai Lietuvoje, bandant perteikti pagrindinius Lietuvos tyreju atradimus, keliamus klausimus ir idejas, besisiejaneias su politiniu to laikotarpio mastymu. Pirmiausia, analizuojant XVIII amziaus Lietuva, aptariama bendroji Lietuvos istoriografija ir istoriniu tyrimu issukiai. Antra, pristatomas Vilniaus universiteto, kaip regioninio to meto Apsvietos centro, vaidmuo. Galiausiai pereinama prie konkreeiu istorijos, literaturos istorijos ir filosofines minties tyrimu. Sioje apzvalginio pobudzio analizeje daugiausia demesio skiriama tyreju monografijoms ir paeioms tyrimu kryptims, bandant sutraukti atskiru tyrimu indeli i vientisos lietuviskosios politines minties tradicija, kurioje XVIII amziaus politinis mastymas dar tik iesko savosios vietos ir reiksmes The article presents the research into the historic period of Enlightenment done in Lithuania, describing the main findings, questions and ideas, which have a connection with the political thinking of the period. First, the general Lithuanian historiography as well as main issues and problematics of the research into Lithuania's XVIII century are presented. Second, the role of Vilnius University as the peripheral centre of Enlightenment is discussed. Finally, main studies dealing with the period in the fields of history, history of literature and philosophy are analysed. In this overview article the main attention is devoted to research studies (monographs) and to particular research directions taken by Lithuanian scholars with an attempt to connect different research contributions into singular tradition of Lithuanian political thought, in which political ideas of the XVIII century are still lacking the assessment of their importance. Adapted from the source document.
This article is an attempt to overview the recent state of European studies in Lithuania & some problems arising in this field of research. Because of the 'constructivist' essence of contemporary science, the social sciences, including European studies, are exposed to a threat of losing 'a sense of reality.' If this ever growing tendency gets stronger & becomes irreversible, the knowledge acquired in the course of those studies would become only 'doxical' knowledge reflecting daily realities & needs of short-term political conjuncture. One of possible ways to solve the problem of a loss of 'a sense of reality' in the field of European studies is to expand the research horizons by paying more attention to European history & especially to its religious & philosophical heritage. Adapted from the source document.
By employing formerly in Lithuanian political science unexploited concept of cognitive schema, the formation of the people's attitudes towards political issues is explained in this article. The first results of the empirical research on the latent structures, forming the Lithuanian residents' thinking on political issues, are presented. Semi structured interviews on two political issues introducing the progressive taxes and abolition of the abortion -- were analyzed and eight schemas, forming the informants' attitudes on these issues, were found. In this article the main components, internal structures and interrelationships among these schemas are presented and the broader implications on the knowledge about Lithuanians political thinking is discussed. Adapted from the source document.
John Paul II and Benedict XVI have brought Catholic Church back to international arena after the shock of Enlightenment in XVII century. They had an important impact on reemergence of united Europe by the end of XX century. Unfortunately in the beginning of XXI century modern functionalist European Union symbolically rejected any reference to its Christian roots, unveiling deep moral drama of current establishment of the European Union. The European Union has lost its meta-political level, its spiritual vision, its mission, at the same time it has lost the link to human dignity, to the spiritual mission of its own citizen and their nations. By rejecting the reference to Christian roots the European Union has rejected its own future. Adapted from the source document.
The paper discusses women's images & women related themes as they were presented in the Lithuanian national mass-media in the EP elections (May-June, 2004). Monitoring of the two largest Lithuanian dailies demonstrated that the EP elections had a second-rate status, which was enhanced by the first-round of the nation-wide Presidential elections, taking place on the very same day (May 14, 2004). Newspapers provided superficial references to women & did not produce any articulated discourse about women's representation in the EP. The result -- the Lithuanian delegation to the EP has 5 women among its 13 members -- is to be attributed to national political culture, appearance of the new populist party & individual candidates' electoral strategies, but not to women-friendly public discourse & political communication. Adapted from the source document.
The article explores positivism-postpositivism debate in social sciences that has been lasting already for many years. The author does not suppose this debate will end soon since it raises fundamental questions concerning the aims, tasks and methods of social sciences. Though representatives of these sciences differ significantly in views on these questions, the most of them and, in particular, evident majority of representatives of political science virtually holds positivist views. Such questions, which may be called conceptual, are essentially disputable, so they cannot be resolved by any empirical research. When examining positivism-postpositivism debate the author singles out, paying tribute to tradition, three aspects of debate: (1) ontological, (2) epistemological, and (3) methodological. Yet he presents the arguments to support his claim that because of its antimetaphysical character positivism can have no ontology at all. Therefore an ontological dispute between positivists and postpositivists is simply impossible. Postpositivists, in discussing epistemological questions, would be inclined to reject positivist viewpoint that our statements and theories about social life can be true (though according to modern positivists, we can never know it for sure). They also would reject the positivist distinction between facts and values, which likewise can be considered as epistemological. But the most serious dispute that is taking place in social sciences concerns methodological questions. The author, in analyzing it, pays most attention to two most influential forms of postpositivism, namely to critical theory and postmodernism. Having discussed genealogy and deconstruction which, though with serious reservations, may be considered as postpositivist methods, the author claims that postpositivism lacks the main part of methodology, i.e. rules of accepting scientific statements and theories. And that is why postpositivism cannot win the methodological debate over positivism which has such rules. Adapted from the source document.
The article deals with the analysis of the role of ideology in party activities. The empirical data show that ideology is not important part of party activities. In Lithuanian political map we can notice just one type of cleavage, ie., Communist -- anti-Communist cleavage. According to the data of empirical research, elite of party deputy dominates in institutionalized ways & sets the direction towards ideological position of the party. Interviews with the authorities of main political parties in Lithuania were conducted in 2007. The results of the interviews don't promise the long term political cleavages that could make the political life in Lithuania normal in nearest future. Though the authorities of Lithuanian parties have institutional possibilities to control party organization, however, they are not a power that may put Lithuanian parties in a clear ideological framework & foster coherence between parties & society. Adapted from the source document.
The article is based on an idea that there are four different modes of understanding reality -- practice, science, art and mysticism. Political liberalism demands separation of public and private beliefs. However, mystical understanding of reality is not a system of propositions and beliefs. This is why one can speak of a conflict between liberalism and mystical understanding of reality. Political liberalism imposes a certain understanding of reality on believers. Liberals propose to remove religious convictions from public life and not to treat them as a basis of politics. They forget that mystics have the biggest trouble namely with convictions. To turn the reality of God into words for them is always the hardest task. Mystics find God before words, concepts and discourses. Liberals reduce religion to convictions and demand from mystics to comprehend that, which in their opinion is not comprehensible. There is a tension between liberalism and people who have mystical experiences. Liberals narrow down religious experience to convictions. However, mystical experience is a much broader subject. Behind it stands an understanding of world that has its own standards of reality. Adapted from the source document.
An unambiguous assessment of the results of changes in the post-communist political regime of Ukraine is hardly possible. The political system of this country has experienced both periods of democratic expectations & democratic setbacks during the last fifteen years. For example, in 1990-1994, before the first competitive parliamentary elections, there was a clear fragmentation among the old (communist) political elite in Ukraine; the country's first democratic constitution was adopted in 1996. However, after Leonid Kuchma was elected President in 1994, authoritarian tendencies gradually recrudesced, "oligarchic" clans took hold of the country's political system, & the elections were increasingly blatantly manipulated & rigged to the advantage of the ruling elite. This cycle of political development recurred ten years later. Manipulations of the results of the 2004 presidential election raised a massive protest among the inhabitants of Ukraine, which was symbolically dubbed the "Orange Revolution." A new influx of democratic expectations forced the ruling elite to concede to re-running the second round of Ukraine's presidential election, which was won by the opposition. However, the political crisis which struck the new government in September 2005 & the mutual accusations of corruption raised by the former "revolutionary" comrades-in-arms -- President Viktor Yushchenko & former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko -- raised new questions regarding the vitality of the democratic processes in Ukraine. The main question examined in this article is therefore whether the vacillation of Ukraine's political regime is not a regular, permanent condition. Having two main aims -- (1) to construct a theory of Ukraine's post-soviet political transformation, & (2) to disclose the possibilities of democracy consolidation in this country -- the article starts with making some "corrections" to the transitologist approach to regime change. Firstly, it is argued that political transformation theories should have a shared concept of democracy, irrespective of the number or type of the stages of democratization distinguished. The experience of post-communist countries shows that formal procedural democratic criteria are insufficient in order to characterize a political system as democratic. Secondly, traditional theories of regime change focus mostly on the analysis of the behavior of the main political actors (the political elite) & their decisions (agreements). The structural conditions (eg., the characteristics of socio-economic development) should be also included into theoretical thinking about regime change. Thirdly, the analysis of elites & their agreements is sufficiently developed to explain how & when the transition to democracy occurs. However, the democratic consolidation stage has remained somewhat mystified by 'transitologists.' The article argues that an assumption should probably be made that the behavior of political elite factions competing in the political system is always rational & self-interested, ie., democracy (or any other form of political regime) becomes "the only game in town" only if & when it is mostly advantageous for the political elite functioning in that system. Taking into account the above mentioned "corrections" to the transitologist approach, in the article, there is produced a model for analyzing post-soviet regime transformations. The model consists of three main explanatory variables: (1) the structure of political elite, (2) the 'rules of game' prevalent in the system, & (3) the strategies of political elite aiming at gaining business and/or mass support. Consequently, various interrelations of these variables may produce four possible ideal-type outcomes of regime change -- (1) democracy, (2) 'democracy with adjectives,' (3) zero-sum game (a very unstable option when political regime may be temporarily democratic but is at a huge risk of downfall), (4) authoritarianism. In post-soviet countries, it is not enough to examine the structure of political elite & the institutions in order to predict the consolidation of one or another form of political regime. 'Building politicians' "alliances" with business & (or) mobilizing mass support may negate any such predictions & produce additional (regressive, in terms of democratization) impulses to further regime change. The very possibilities of the political elite to form "alliances" with business & (or) to mobilize the masses are mostly determined by the structural characteristics of the country. Thus, the analysis of the latter may not also be omitted in examining post-soviet transitions. Political regime in Ukraine, which beginning of 1990s started evolving as a probable liberal democracy or at least 'democracy with adjectives,' after 1998 Verkhovna Rada elections moved to the situation of the zero-sum game. Such transition was conditioned by two factors. First, the changes within political elite structure -- the communist camp, which occupied an important, although not the most important place in the pluralist political elite structure in 1994-1998, became an anti-systemic political force after the adoption of the 1996 Constitution. For these reasons, only two opposing elite factions (oligarchs-"centrists" vs. national democrats) remained in the political system of Ukraine after the 1998 elections, the ideological confrontation of which was constantly increasing & became particularly acute at the outset of the "Orange Revolution" in 2004. Second, the fact that the business class in Ukraine was forming with the "assistance" of politicians allowed the political elite to build an alliance with business community already in 1994-1996 & maintain these tight clientelist relations even after the privatization period was over. When at the end of 2004 the national democrats gathered mass support & became virtually equal or even more influential than the so-called "centrists," who traditionally draw support from business structures, the zero-sum game in Ukraine became especially acute. Such it remains by now, even after the Orange revolution is over. In more than ten years of independence the business community of Ukraine has consolidated its positions in the Verkhovna Rada & accumulated control over almost all national TV channels & other media outlets, as well as separate industrial regions. Therefore even anti-oligarchically disposed government cannot ignore this power. The ruling elite that cares about its survival & political success is forced to co-ordinate its decisions with the interests of various business clans. On the other hand, since Ukraine's business class consists of several competing clans, any government decisions that seek to limit the political influence of business groups immediately affect the interests of competing business clans. The government cannot remain neutral in principal. Any attempts of the supposed "deoligarchisation" will only result in provoking sharper disagreements between business groups because the curtailment of the positions of one clan will open new prospects for the strengthening of the influence of its competitors. It may be argued that for these reasons there will always be at least one (and, most likely, the strongest one) oligarchic political camp supported by an "alliance" with business. In other words, Ukraine's political regime does not have any chance to be consolidated in the liberal democracy perspective. Another structural characteristic of Ukraine is the politically unorganized working class. At least several competing political forces claim to represent the workers' interests -- the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, & the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine. The internal competition among the left-wing forces encourages at least one of them (the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Progressive Socialist Party) to take a radical, anti-systemic position in order that potential supporters may distinguish it from other leftist parties. Therefore, it is likely that the political system of Ukraine will preserve a left-wing segment that will not wield much power but will propagate an anti-systemic ideology without "communicating" with other political forces. Due to its anti-systemic nature it will not be able to participate in the government of the state & the votes of the left-wing voters (comprising the basis for mass support) will probably be collected by the national democrats. This circumstance enables predicting that the zero-sum game will remain very intensive in Ukraine in the future as well. Thus, the permanent instability of the state & both -- democracy & authoritarianism -- in Ukraine (a zero-sum game) may actually be considered to be its consolidated political regime form. Adapted from the source document.
This article is focused on the relation between the political institutional conditions (regime properties) and collective violence. Relying on works of Charles Tilly, two most important properties of regimes (political institutional conditions) that could affect the occurrence and intensity of collective violence are discerned: regime (governmental) capacity and democracy level. Empirical-graphical analysis finds no relation between the democracy level and degree/occurrence of collective violence. However, statistically significant relationship between the governmental capacity (measured as polity fragmentation index) and degree of collective violence is found. Moreover, higher levels of collective violence are observed in the low capacity- undemocratic regimes, but the most successful in terms of containment of collective violence are high-capacity undemocratic regimes (not high capacity-democratic, as formulated in the hypothesis). Adapted from the source document.
It is widely assumed that effective functioning of democratic institutions depends on the political support & civic engagement of the public. Public support for authorities is especially important during the reform period in new democracies. Evidence from different Central & Eastern European countries including Lithuania demonstrates critically low level of political support, e.g. satisfaction with regime performance & trust in political institutions as well as comparatively low level of political engagement. However, systematic & comprehensive account of these trends & their implications for political stability & democratic performance in new democracies is lacking. Here, the results of qualitative research of political attitudes & political behavior in the Lithuanian countryside are presented, drawing on 30 in-depth interviews with ordinary citizens in Alarita & Naujasodis (district of Moletai) in July 2003. The aim of the research is to explore the dominating patterns of political support & political engagement of Lithuanian citizens. The political support was analyzed by using the theoretical framework of David Easton & Pippa Norris. Easton in his classic model distinguished among different objects of support, including support for the community, the regime & the authorities. Moreover, he made a distinction between the specific support, a quid pro quo for the fulfillment of demands, & diffuse support, unconditional attachment to political objects & a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will. This conceptual framework was recently revisited by Norris, who expanded the classification into a five-fold framework distinguishing between political support for the community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, & political actors. Political engagement is defined here to include psychological as well as actual political involvement. In more concrete terms, it comprises the following dimensions: 1) interest in politics; 2) voting & propensity to vote in elections or referenda; 3) engagement in community politics; 4) partisanship, including both the party membership & party identification; 5) participation or propensity to engage in unconventional political activity. The analysis resulted in classification of ten types of political outlook: 'prosoviet radical', 'soviet system builder', 'moderate critic', 'rural wisdom optimist', 'apathetic youth', 'rational youth', 'disappointed activist', 'civic optimist', 'right1st democrat' & 'rightist radical'. These types can be expected to represent the dominant patterns of political attitudes & political behavior in rural Lithuania. The investigation reveals that political support for democracy is highly dependent on the attitudes towards the soviet past. Moreover, it is indirectly linked with the age & former social status of the respondent. The data shows that supporters of democratic regime are usually right-oriented or young persons. Surprisingly, the satisfaction with current regime performance is not linked with the support for current authorities. Finally, the results suggest that most disappointed persons are more skeptical toward conventional forms of political engagement & are likely to support unconventional political activities. The actual political behavior, however, is not dependent on the level of political support. 2 Appendixes. Adapted from the source document.
Lithuania's referendum on the accession into the European Union was part of the so-called "domino strategy" of the fourth wave of EU enlargement, which aimed to influence the mindset of the inhabitants of the less euro-enthusiastic member states by placing the pressure of the anticipated high positive result from the more enthusiastic member states (Lithuania among them) on them. Typical trend of elites' manipulations can be observed in Lithuania, i.e. changing of the legal basis on the referendum prior to the EU accession referendum in order to facilitate positive outcome. These facilitating rules had been introduced step by step, bringing any discussions on these matters in a parliament during election campaigns of 2000 & 2002 to an end in order to escape escalation of the pro versus the anti-European cleavages within political system. Thus, a double hurdle (both turn-out & voting YES of 50 per cent of all eligible voters) existing since 1989 in referendum legislation was lowered introducing triple hurdle (turnout of 50 per cent & voting YES one third of all eligible voters but more than 50 per cent of participants) in 2002. Then, in 2003 it was facilitated once again introducing new double hurdle (turn-out 50 per cent of all eligible voters & voting YES by 50 per cent of participants). Further attempts to facilitate positive result were limited by two factors: first, a specific factor, an almost parallel initiative of referendum on the constitutional amendments (so-called "Uspaskikh referendum"), is to be taken into consideration. In addition, a general requirement that the citizens themselves decide on the issue of Lithuania's EU integration in a decisive & binding manner, i.e. a referendum, typical for other CEE countries as well as, was also important here. Finally, other settings laying ground for a positive result, though facilitated twice, were further reinforced by a two-day voting procedure. Together with an unexpected apathy of Hungarian voters in their referendum, these risky rules became a reason for dramatization & anxiety expecting proclaiming referendum as invalid due to insufficient voter turnout. An official information campaign of the Government on the EU accession started in 2000. Gradually it turned into a one-sided agitation campaign, let alone before the referendum date. Positive involvement of the institutions possessing high public confidence such as te mass media & Catholic Church, a well-established consensus of the major political parties on the EU accession, weak organization of the euro-skeptical movement all led to an absence of any substantial political competition. Finally, the advertising as such started dominating the campaign. Features of propaganda, sometimes coming very close to a violation of laws banning advertising during the voting days, could be observed here too. Different points of view should be endorsed in order to interpret the high positive result of the referendum in a sufficient manner. As regards the history of Lithuania's political system, it was the fourth successful referendum since the 90s. What was typical for all of them was that the citizens & the elites held a common position on the issue. Seen within the context of the latest internal political developments in Lithuania, it could be nevertheless equated to an exception first of all in view of electorate's positive motivation, less apathy & the lack of tangible protest features. Referendum proceeding & its results -- maximal active support for the YES statement among all countries of fourth wave of EU enlargement -- give a fresh & useful data for testing "elite-centric," "rational choice," "ideological-cultural" theories of euro-integration. 6 Lenteles. Adapted from the source document.
The May 9th issue was the main question on the Lithuanian foreign policy agenda in the first half-year 2005. The question was a trivial one: should the President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus attend the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in Moscow. However the question became a source of public discussions among politicians, businessmen, historians & political commentators. One point was common -- the issue was very delicate & needed unusual measures to find the right solution. The President agreed that he should be aware of the painful historic experience of Lithuanian nation & take the issue to the public discussions before the final decision is made. Therefore, the task of this research is to look at the May 9th issue from different theoretical perspectives: from constructivist approach (Ole Waever's theory of securitization) & from positivistic approach to security issues. The first question of exploration -- is the May 9th issue a security issue? From securitization perspective the question should be formulated like this: was the May 9th issue a securitizated threat? From positivistic perspective the question sounds so: could the discussions around the May 9th issue & the decision of the Lithuanian President cause damage to Lithuanian national security? The research has concluded that the May 9th issue was successfully securitizated, because three criteria of securitization were fulfilled: a) usual political procedures were changed with reference to the possible threat rising from the President's decision; b) objects to be secured were indicated; c) securitizing actors were identified. From positivistic perspectives the real threat of the May 9th problem could be estimated as minimal (or hypothetical) & even communication processes (proposing the hypothesis that communication security sector has an effect on threats dynamics) did not changed threats characteristics significantly. Adapted from the source document.