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Artiklen ser nærmere på de forhold, som er blevet beskrevet i analyser af interventionen i Afghanistan, der kan forklare den udvikling, som den amerikanske præsiden, Joe Biden, forsikrede ikke ville finde sted i 2021. Tre forhold står frem i tidligere analyser af årene, der gik, i Afghanistan. For det første, at der var løbende udfordringer med kapacitetsopbygningen. Udfordringer, der ligeledes løbende var blevet påpeget internationalt af analytikere, forskere og i krigens mange evalueringsrapporter og erfaringsopsamlinger. For det andet, at formålet med krigen fra de allieredes side skiftede karakter, som tiden gik. Fra at det fælles formål var lettere at få øje på i starten af krigen, så blev interventionsindsatserne til et formålstæt delta, hvor de involverede lande med skiftende regeringer balancerede hensyn til alliancer, en hjemlig vælgerskare, nationale sikkerhedsinteresser og værdipolitiske rettighedsdagsordner. For det tredje, at Taleban gradvist – og ikke fra den ene dag til den anden – havde opbygget styrke og kontrol, og samtidig havde været involveret i en politisk proces via deres repræsentationskontor i Doha, der var med til at bane vejen for deres overtagelse.
Abstract in English20 Years in Afghanistan: What Do We Know About What We Learned?This article takes a closer look at various analyses of the international intervention in Afghanistan, which point at different reasons for the developments that took take place in August 2021. Developments that the American president Biden shortly before the Taliban takeover assured the world would not take place. Three factors stand out in previous analyses of the years that passed by in Afghanistan. First, that there were ongoing challenges with capacity-building. Challenges that had been pointed out by analysts, researchers and in the many evaluation and lessons-learned reports from the war. Secondly, that the purpose of the war on the part of the allied forces changed character as time went on. The common purpose was easier to see in the beginning of the war, but the intervention efforts turned into a purpose-dense delta, where the countries involved and their successive governments balanced considerations to alliances, domestic support, national security interests and value political agendas. Third, that the Taliban seemingly had gradually – and not overnight – built up strength and control, and at the same time been involved in a political process through their exile office in Doha that helped pave the way for their takeover.