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The rehabilitation of the concept of authority is one of the more contentious positions advocated by Gadamer in Truth and Method (1960). Habermas in particular challenged the universality of Gadamer's hermeneutic project by presenting this rehabilitation as a conservative legitimation of prevailing prejudices which truncates the role of critical reflection. Given that Gadamer's primary focus is upon the ramifications of the Enlightenment dichotomy between reason and authority for historical hermeneutics, however, and that his examples are drawn primarily from educational domains, the extent to which his account of authority sustains a political interpretation is far from self-evident. In this article I argue that Gadamer's account can nonetheless make at least two important contributions to contemporary philosophical debates on political authority. Following a brief exposition of Gadamer's account of authority in Truth and Method, I examine his suggestion that the basis of legitimate political authority is to be found in the normative status of the right to be authoritative, rather than in the factual status of being in a position of authority. This account, I suggest, places in question the abstract dichotomy between theoretical and practical authority which informs much contemporary debate on political authority. I then demonstrate how Gadamer's emphasis upon the historicity of tradition offers important insights for discussions of the relation between political authority and moral autonomy.

The rehabilitation of the concept of authority is one of the more contentious positions advocated by Gadamer in Truth and Method (1960). Habermas in particular challenged the universality of Gadamer's hermeneutic project by presenting this rehabilitation as a conservative legitimation of prevailing prejudices which truncates the role of critical reflection. Given that Gadamer's primary focus is upon the ramifications of the Enlightenment dichotomy between reason and authority for historical hermeneutics, however, and that his examples are drawn primarily from educational domains, the extent to which his account of authority sustains a political interpretation is far from self-evident. In this article I argue that Gadamer's account can nonetheless make at least two important contributions to contemporary philosophical debates on political authority. Following a brief exposition of Gadamer's account of authority in Truth and Method, I examine his suggestion that the basis of legitimate political authority is to be found in the normative status of the right to be authoritative, rather than in the factual status of being in a position of authority. This account, I suggest, places in question the abstract dichotomy between theoretical and practical authority which informs much contemporary debate on political authority. I then demonstrate how Gadamer's emphasis upon the historicity of tradition offers important insights for discussions of the relation between political authority and moral autonomy. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

Political authority is the right to exercise the power of the polis, the political community, over and on behalf of the members of the community. It implies the obligation of the members to obey those who exercise power by right when they act within the limits set by the criteria of authorization. Every political society this side of the eschaton must embody viable relationships of authority and obedience. If not, the society must either be sustained by tyranny, which is arbitrary force and not authoritative power, or else dissolve into anarchy, which surely then will lead to tyranny.

KANT'S MORALIZED VERSION OF THE LIBERAL ARGUMENT AVOIDS THE TRADITIONAL LIBERAL TENSION BETWEEN A COMMITMENT TO INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM ON THE ONE HAND AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY ON THE OTHER. YET THE RECONCILIATION ACHIEVED BY THE DOUBLE-NEGATION ARGUMENT DEPENDS UPON THE LEGITIMACY OF THE KANTIAN NOTION OF MORAL FREEDOM; AND THERE MAY BE REASONS TO ENTERTAIN PHILOSOPHICAL DOUBTS ABOUT THE COHERENCE AND PERSUASIVENESS OF THIS NOTION. THE AUTHOR EXPLAINS HOW THIS CONCEPT ENABLES US TO CONSTRUCT A THEORY OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY BASED UPON MORAL RATHER THAN PRUDENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS.

Just war theory is currently dominated by two positions. According to the orthodox view (Walzer), provided that jus in bello principles are respected, combatants have an equal right to fight, regardless of the justice of the cause pursued by their state. According to "revisionists" (McMahan, Fabre) whenever combatants lack reasons to believe that the war they are ordered to fight is just, their duty is to disobey. I argue that when members of a legitimate state acting in good faith are ordered to fight, they acquire a pro‐tanto obligation to obey which does not depend for its validity on the justice of the cause being pursued. However, when the war is unjust, this obligation may be overridden, under certain conditions, by the obligation not to contribute to the unjustified killing of innocents. This is because (contra Raz) the pro‐tanto force of the duty to obey the law is best understood in terms of "presumptive", rather than "exclusionary" reasons for action. This approach captures the insights of both the orthodox and the revisionist view, while avoiding the problems that afflict each of them.

This article examines the impact of the growth of multilateral and transnational governance on sovereignty and the diffusion of political authority. It begins by exploring the legacy of World War II and the building of the UN system. The rise of intergovernmentalism and transnational governance arrangements is examined followed by an assessment of some of the leading changes in the postwar global politics landscape. These issues are explored in greater depth across two cases: security and the environment. The article then examines a set of trends which can be characterized as a gridlock in leading institutions, and highlights the political uncertainty ahead at the global level.

Discusses establishment of an internationally-mandated political authority as a means of linking strategic direction from the UN Security Council, General Assembly, and Secretariat with effective operations in the field.