Suchergebnisse

Recent research has shown that optimal monetary policy may display considerable price-level drift. Proponents of price-level targeting have argued that the costs of eliminating the price-level drift may be reduced if the central bank responds flexibly by returning the price level only gradually to the target path (Gaspar et al., 2010). We revisit this argument in two variants of the New Keynesian model. We show that in a two-sector version of the model which allows for changes in relative prices across sectors, the costs of stabilisation under price-level targeting remain much higher than under inflation targeting for all policy-relevant horizons. Our conclusion is that extending the policy horizon is not a panacea to reduce the costs of eliminating pricelevel drift.

Recent research has shown that optimal monetary policy may display considerable price-level drift. Proponents of price-level targeting have argued that the costs of eliminating the price-level drift may be reduced if the central bank responds flexibly by returning the price level only gradually to the target path (Gaspar et al., 2010). We revisit this argument in two variants of the New Keynesian model. We show that in a two-sector version of the model which allows for changes in relative prices across sectors, the costs of stabilisation under price-level targeting remain much higher than under inflation targeting for all policy-relevant horizons. Our conclusion is that extending the policy horizon is not a panacea to reduce the costs of eliminating pricelevel drift.

Various papers have suggested that Price-Level targeting is a welfare improving policy relative to Inflation targeting. From a practical standpoint, this raises an important yet unanswered question: What is the optimal price index to target? This paper derives the optimal price level targeting index defined over the eight main components of the Consumer Price Index. It finds that such an index places a heavier weight, relative to the expenditure weight, on sectors with slow price adjustments. However, using the expenditure weights instead of the optimal ones results in very small welfare cost.

Among the theoretical issues covered in this volume are the 'economic' and the 'axiomatic' or 'test' approaches to the problem of constructing and choosing among alternative cost-of-living index formulas; 'bounds' and 'econometric' alternatives for developing empirically computable approximations of theoretically desirable indexes; recommendations concerning the incorporation of leisure time in measures of the cost-of-living; and the formulation of social and group cost-of-living indexes. The Jorgenson-Slesnick paper also presents a far-reaching empirical study of price changes in the U.S. The importance of this book to those with an interest in economic theory is obvious. However, this book also holds out the opportunity and challenge to applied researchers to gain a deeper understanding of the index numbers of which they make daily use.

Abstract.  Governments determine the size of the unit of value just as they determine the length and weight of physical units of measure. What are the different ways that a government can control the size of the unit of value, that is, control the price level? In general, the government designates a resource—gold, paper currency, another country's currency—and defines its unit of value as a particular amount of that resource. An interesting variant, proposed by Irving Fisher in 1913 and implemented more recently in Chile, is to alter the resource content of the unit to stabilize the price level. Another idea is to alter the interest rate paid on reserves in a way that stabilizes the price level. This essay originally appeared as "Controlling the Price Level,"Contributions to Macroeconomics 2(1), Article 5. See http://www.bepress.com/bejm/contributions/vol2/iss1/art5. Reprinted with kind permission of the Berkeley Electronic Press.

This article challenges the conventional wisdom that price level targeting necessarily increases the volatility of inflation and economic activity. It shows that the optimal policy under commitment for a society that cares only about the variability of output and inflation involves only a limited degree of base drift. The result crucially depends on the importance of forward-looking behaviour and on the credibility of the commitments. The case for price level targeting is strengthened when the possibility of a binding lower bound on nominal interest rates is considered. This may be increasingly relevant in a low inflation environment. This justifies renewed interest on price level targets in the context of thinking through how to prevent and respond to deflationary risks.