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In the United States, housing policies focused on assisting low-income families toward homeownership have resulted in the creation of publicly subsidized affordable mortgage programs. Private lenders and their employees (loan originators) are often the key point of contact to connect low-income borrowers to public programs. But why would loan originators offer borrowers public loan programs, particularly when such programs provide no additional (and sometimes reduced) direct financial compensation to the private lenders and potentially increased workloads? One possible rationale, and the one investigated here, is that loan originators may be diversely motivated toward the advancement of the public interest. Situating the analysis within the theoretical insights of public service motivation in the public sector and corporate social responsibility in the private sector, we propose and test a "Model of Public Service in the Private Sector." We draw from surveys of private lenders to test hypotheses about how private lenders' associations, perceptions, and values are related to voluntary participation in a government program. Our analysis highlights the importance of public associations, perceptions of government, and public values in explaining the behavior of private sector employees. Our findings contribute to the literature on public service and public values and our understanding of how private organizations access government programs to advance the public good. Adapted from the source document.

Private organizations are increasingly relied on, explicitly and implicitly, to carry out public objectives. But given that profit and public motives are not always aligned, why do private firms behave in publicly responsible ways? Specifically, how do diverse regulative, economic, normative, and cultural influences combine to enable or constrain publicly responsible behavior? This analysis focuses on a specific group of private actors: mortgage lenders. Through semi‐structured interviews with private lending agents participating in a public mortgage program, this analysis investigates influences that contribute to publicly responsible behavior. From the interviews, four different publicness dispositions are identified: pecuniary (sensitive to economic and regulative constraints), traditional (sensitive to regulative and isomorphic constraints), altruistic (sensitive to isomorphic and cultural‐cognitive influences), and opportunistic (sensitive to multiple influences). Even for organizations (and their actors) operating within the same policy context and the same public program, responses to political authority likely are contingent on varying publicness dispositions.

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB, or "the Bureau") in December 2013 released preliminary results of a study called for in the 2010 Dodd -- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act on financial services businesses' use of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. Such terms, or forced arbitration, call for disputes to be settled before a private arbitrator instead of in a court of law, and usually prohibit consumers from pursuing cases as a class. The data from the first report covered several aspects of forced arbitration. For example, it confirmed a high prevalence of arbitration clauses in the terms of service of credit cards, checking accounts, and prepaid cards. Additionally, according to the report, nearly all of the arbitration clauses contained terms denying their customers the ability to participate in class actions.Based on an examination of the data from the American Arbitration Association (AAA), the chief provider of consumer arbitrations, the Bureau determined that few consumers go to arbitration to resolve disputes with financial institutions.In making these and other determinations, the Bureau examined information involving four major financial services and products: credit cards, checking accounts, prepaid cards and payday loans. Other consumer financial services sectors under the CFPB's jurisdiction similarly use forced arbitration clauses and prohibit class actions. Notably, the debt settlement and auto loan sectors recently have fallen under considerable scrutiny by the Bureau and other state and federal officials for engaging in questionable practices. A review of materials involving these sectors shows that businesses within them have used forced arbitration to avoid having to respond to allegations and, in many instances, escaped accountability for actual wrongdoing. Meanwhile, users of their products and services who have suffered financial injuries from predatory and deceptive practices have been denied adequate legal remedies. Another sector that makes widespread use of forced arbitration clauses is the private student loan industry. The agency recently released findings from its investigation into the private student loan market, which documented the impact of the high-cost loans. In 2012, Public Citizen also issued a report on the industry. It concluded that unsavory conduct by the private student loan industry combined with restrictive terms in borrowers' promissory notes that require disputes to be resolved in private arbitration were not conducive to fair lending.The Bureau can make these industry sectors answerable for some of their shady practices by restoring consumers' ability to enforce their rights on their own. The Bureau has the authority to write a rule to require the regulated consumer financial services industry to eliminate predispute binding mandatory (or forced) arbitration from consumer transactions involving all products under its jurisdiction.

In Durban wurde im Dezember 1998 ein staatlich-privates Partnerschaftsprojekt ins Leben gerufen, das sich mit der Aufbereitung von Abwasser befasst, um dieses dann an industrielle Abnehmer zu verkaufen, die anderenfalls in ihrem Produktionsprozess teures Trinkwasser verwenden müssten. Dieses komplexe Projekt mit zahlreichen begleitenden Verträgen und Vereinbarungen, Garantien und einer komplizierten Eignerstruktur bleibt für die Kapitalgeber ein Risiko; deshalb die hier vorgelegte detaillierte Analyse des Vorhabens. Trotz oder gerade wegen seiner Komplexität hat dieses Projekt jedoch einen sehr innovativen und entwicklungsorientierten Charakter, und es kann aus südafrikanischer Sicht als ein Durchbruch auf dem Gebiet staatlich-privater Partnerschaften angesehen werden. (DÜI-Hlb)

AbstractHousing figures prominently during economic crises, a notable example being the Great Depression. Because housing is immobile, its market is very localized. In each city, the main agents are closely interconnected. Lenders depend on mortgaged homeowners and landlords to maintain payments; landlords rely on tenants; municipalities need all property owners to pay taxes. The Depression experiences of tenants, homeowners, and federal housing programs are well-appreciated; those of landlords and private lenders much less so. Considering the role of all agents, this case study of Hamilton, Ontario, focuses on owners and private lenders and asks who lost property, to whom, and how. Drawing on land registry and property tax records, city directories, and newspaper accounts, it documents the pattern and trajectory of defaults experienced by homeowners, landlords, and private lenders. Contemporaries and historians have used foreclosures as a measure of distress, but many borrowers defaulted voluntarily. The experience of Hamilton's homeowners was similar to those in U.S. cities. Local landlords experienced higher rates of defaults than homeowners; private lenders foreclosed less often than lending institutions. Along with municipalities, both learned to be flexible in demanding payments. The high incidence of private mortgages, the stability of lending institutions, and the marginal role of the federal government were distinctively Canadian, but in general Hamilton's experience is more broadly indicative.

Private student loan borrowers arguably have the fewest protections of any users of credit in the United States. In a scarcely debated amendment to federal bankruptcy law in 2005, private student lenders gained the same protections against discharge previously afforded to federal student lenders. Yet private student loan borrowers received none of the rights available to federal student loan borrowers. These include income-driven repayment, relief from repayment on disability, loan discharge for fraud or closed schools, and public service loan forgiveness. Private student loan borrowers thus have neither the bankruptcy protections afforded to nonstudent loan debtors nor the repayment and debt relief rights of student borrowers under the federal loan program. This lack of consumer protection has particular consequence when considering the plight of for-profit school students saddled with private student loans. Some of the worst abuses in the proliferation of higher education debt have been perpetrated against for-profit school attendees. The vast majority of private student loans are cosigned, typically by older family members. This combination of private student loans and for-profit school attendance impacts a much broader range of consumers than would a comparable number of federal student loans. We suggest two types of state legislation to protect these debtors. For prospective for-profit school private borrowers, we propose incorporating some of the protections of federal student loans through the use of a state equivalent to the Federal Trade Commission "Holder Rule." For all private student loans, we propose a requirement that private lenders engage in a mandatory settlement process, similar to those used by states during the recent foreclosure crisis, as a prerequisite to using state courts for debt collection.

Are multiple‐lender loans rescheduled more or less often than single‐lender loans? Do multiple lenders react efficiently to new information? Our analysis emphasizes the role of the precision of information: lenders trade off benefits from immediate foreclosure against expected benefits of waiting for other lenders to act, given the likelihood that other lenders' information is more precise. We analyse a Bayesian game where signals distributed to lenders may differ in precision and content. Equilibria display excessive liquidation or excessive rescheduling, depending on the likelihood of information. Outcomes are nevertheless second‐best, given the constraint that private information cannot be merged.