Public Protection Panels
In: Probation journal: the journal of community and criminal justice, Band 48, Heft 3, S. 222-223
ISSN: 1741-3079
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In: Probation journal: the journal of community and criminal justice, Band 48, Heft 3, S. 222-223
ISSN: 1741-3079
In: The Howard journal of criminal justice, Band 51, Heft 3, S. 261-273
ISSN: 1468-2311
Abstract: UK public sector financial cuts of up to 25% over the next four years threaten service delivery in a number of areas and it is likely that public protection agencies will not be immune. This article explores ways in which a 'world leading' public protection process can continue to effectively manage a consistently growing 'problem' whilst its component parts struggle to set new operational priorities in the face of severe financial restraints. It also suggests that nascent coalition government efforts, although creditable, are still not immune from the punitive rhetoric of its predecessor and remain vulnerable to media constructions of dangerousness. The suggestion here is that in addition to modifications to legislation and practice, and, indeed, an attempt to reinvent professional discretion, a major philosophical shift and public education programme are necessary. By reducing the size of the public protection caseload it may be that savings are made in terms of lives and serious harm as well as money.
Public protection has become an increasingly central theme in the work of the criminal justice agencies in many parts of the world in recent years. Its high public profile and consequent political sensitivity means that growing numbers of criminal justice professionals find their daily workload dominated by the assessment and management of high risk of harm offenders. Developments such as sex offender registers and (in the UK) Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements (Mappa) have made this issue not only a core activity for police, probation and prison services, but to a range of other orga.
In: Bulletin of the Military University of Technology, Band 66, Heft 1, S. 139-152
The paper presents the analysis of the present situation in the concern of the public protection against modern toxics by using the light type of shelters. The object of laboratory tests in the chemical agents' environment is the complete light shelter (tent), called No-1 which is designed for the military purpose as the mobile command post at the brigade level. The point of concern is given to characteristics of the tent construction and its tactical-technical parameters. After the tests, there was discovered that the light type shelter provides the personnel protection against chemical or biological agents that could be find in the air as the BC agents or industrial toxics. The air inside the tent shelter is pressurized and decontaminated by the special NBC filters and the device is called UFW-900-2C. This filter set is equipped with adequate electronic controller and parts which provide an effective air cleaning and sufficient flow across the tent, and finally this composition works as the efficient, complete set.
Keywords: construction, public protection, light type protection, NBC filtration
In: Economics & politics, Band 20, Heft 1, S. 1-32
ISSN: 1468-0343
We analyze the strategic interaction between a firm, an extortionary mafia, and a potentially corrupt government. The model identifies several results. First, government spending is not monotonic in revenues. Second, although the firm wants the government to challenge the mafia (it uses the threat of electoral sanctions to induce the government to do so), in equilibrium, the firm does not directly appeal to the government for protection even though it is extorted. The more likely the government is to uncover mafia extortion independent of an appeal from the firm, the more effective the firm's threat of electoral sanction is at motivating the government to invest in law enforcement. This is because the electoral threat to punish failure on the government's part is only a compelling reason to invest in law enforcement when the government actually expects to confront the mafia. This same logic also implies that the relationship between mafia strength and government corruption is somewhat counterintuitive. When the mafia is strong in equilibrium (i.e. pervasive and extorting large fees), the government is not very corrupt. When the mafia is weak, the government is highly corrupt. Finally, an extension shows that if the mafia and government can collude, then the harsher the threatened sanctions against the mafia, the less likely the government is to challenge the mafia because the mafia is more willing to bribe the government. Adapted from the source document.
In: Economics & politics, Band 20, Heft 1, S. 1-32
ISSN: 1468-0343
We analyze the strategic interaction between a firm, an extortionary mafia, and a potentially corrupt government. The model identifies several results. First, government spending is not monotonic in revenues. Second, although the firm wants the government to challenge the mafia (it uses the threat of electoral sanctions to induce the government to do so), in equilibrium, the firm does not directly appeal to the government for protection even though it is extorted. The more likely the government is to uncover mafia extortion independent of an appeal from the firm, the more effective the firm's threat of electoral sanction is at motivating the government to invest in law enforcement. This is because the electoral threat to punish failure on the government's part is only a compelling reason to invest in law enforcement when the government actually expects to confront the mafia. This same logic also implies that the relationship between mafia strength and government corruption is somewhat counterintuitive. When the mafia is strong in equilibrium (i.e. pervasive and extorting large fees), the government is not very corrupt. When the mafia is weak, the government is highly corrupt. Finally, an extension shows that if the mafia and government can collude, then the harsher the threatened sanctions against the mafia, the less likely the government is to challenge the mafia because the mafia is more willing to bribe the government.
In: Economics & politics, Band 20, Heft 1, S. 1-32
ISSN: 0954-1985
In: Probation journal: the journal of community and criminal justice, Band 53, Heft 2, S. 170-171
ISSN: 1741-3079
In: Jane's Intelligence review: the magazine of IHS Jane's Military and Security Assessments Intelligence centre, Band 21, Heft 9, S. 42-47
ISSN: 1350-6226
World Affairs Online
In: Probation journal: the journal of community and criminal justice, Band 43, Heft 2, S. 89-91
ISSN: 1741-3079
Having recently spent four months in the United States, with the opportunity to visit a number of correctional agencies, primarily the Westchester County Probation Department, Christine Sheppard, a probation officer with Norfolk Family Court Welfare Service, reports a number of innovations over there which may indicate the shape of things to come over here.
In: Probation journal: the journal of community and criminal justice, Band 65, Heft 1, S. 102-104
ISSN: 1741-3079
In: Probation journal: the journal of community and criminal justice, Band 59, Heft 2, S. 166-167
ISSN: 1741-3079
In: Researching criminal justice series