Suchergebnisse

At the "Shamrock Summit" on March 18, 1985, President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney exchanged instruments of ratification bringing the United States-Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty into force. The event ended 14 years of bilateral negotiations, culminating in a treaty that represents a balance of the fishing and conservation interests of four U.S. states, 24 U.S. treaty Indian tribes, one province and one territory.

Abstract
This paper studies the optimal design of the Pacific Salmon Treaty, which was signed by the U.S. and Canada in 1999 to share salmon on the Pacific coast. Moral hazard exists because countries may steal from each other. If a country's observed output is suspiciously too high, the treaty either reduces the country's future share, or asks the country to make a monetary transfer to its opponent. A calibrated version of our model shows that it is optimal for the U.S. to pay Canada $328.93 million every 30.78 years. Switching to the optimal contract improves the total welfare by 1.55%.

This bibliography supplements the Long-term Research and Monitoring Plan (LRMP; see Special Publication No. 1) by listing literature associated with climate and ocean change impacts on Pacific salmon. The bibliography covers literatures published up to 2009 most of them with abstracts.

The 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty was heralded as an end to the ongoing international dispute between the United States and Canada over Pacific salmon fishing rights. The Treaty, however, failed to define adequately the principles and processes for allocating salmon harvests between the two countries. The parties to the Treaty have been unable to reach consensus on annual salmon harvests since 1992, fueling a growing conflict which has threatened to spill over to issues beyond the fishery dispute. This Article examines the historical context of the "salmon war," highlighting changes in international law and domestic politics that affected the formation of the Treaty. The Pacific Salmon Treaty established a framework for the parties to cooperate in the management of salmon stocks, but did not define several key principles and created a cumbersome voting mechanism. These deficiencies have resulted in annual negotiations that are fraught with conflict, leading to a breakdown in the Treaty process. This Article analyzes several alternatives for solving this current crisis. The parties could submit the annual allocation decisions to an international arbitration board that would have the power to bind both sides. Each country could agree to compensate the other country monetarily for interceptions of the other's salmon stocks. The Treaty could also be revised to provide for a default allocation scheme if the parties fail to reach agreement on annual fishery regulations. Finally, the United States and Canada could create an international market of individual salmon quotas. As this Article was being revised for publication, the United States and Canada entered into an historic agreement designed to end the Pacific salmon war. The Epilogue at Part VI of this Article discusses the new agreement and its future implications for Pacific salmon.

This book addresses the problems of dealing with the biology, economics, and public policy of conserving and managing Pacific salmon. Heightening the concern has been the recent dwindling of the salmon that once teemed in coastal waters. This book deals with the problems of the stressed and nearly extinct stocks of the Pacific salmon

Since the mid‐1970s, changes in the marine environment along the west coast of North America and in the Northeastern Pacific appear to have greatly enhanced the productivity of Alaskan salmon runs while contributing to declining runs of some salmon spawning in Washington, Oregon, and California. These inverse fluctuations in northern and southern salmon stocks may have aggravated a recent break‐down in cooperation between the United States and Canada in setting harvest allocations under the Pacific Salmon Treaty. This paper examines the establishment of fishing regimes by the Pacific Salmon Commission. A game theoretic model is used to analyze the possible contribution of stock variability to the current conflict. Shifts in the parties' incentives to manage the fishery cooperatively, together with significant transaction costs, explain much of the recent difficulty in negotiating mutually acceptable fishing regimes. The paper concludes by addressing the question of whether the regime‐setting process can be made more resilient to such stresses.

The political agreement over management of transboundary pacific salmon reached in 1999 should be supplemented with economic incentives to help maintain cooperation between the U.S. and Canada.