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Politics of the EU frequently use referendums to legitimise fundamental decisions. Naturally, attention is usually focused on those that end in a NO vote. Historically, governments have always had ways to circumvent such decisions by calling another referendum on a slightly reworded question, e.g. the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark or the Treaty of Nice and the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland. The qualitative comparative analysis showed that these pairs of referendums are distinct and comparable to study the result inversion phenomenon. Hence, the research aim was widened: employing the theoretical approaches of rational choice and new institutionalism, to explore the behaviour of actors participating in campaigns of European pairs of referendums within a changing structural environment. Paired referendums pose new challenges to actors of the institutional level (governments, parties and stakeholder groups). It was observed that governments tend to manipulate formal rules of referendums and aim to influence the process of second referendums. Next to the rational choice aided by the new institutionalism, the change in positions of YES and NO camps was registered by reconstructing constantly changing political discourses for each specific moment. This revealed that during second referendums and despite the participation of same actors, the voting is no longer on the same issue but on a differently presented and perceived treaty, i.e. the structural environment is essentially changed.

Politics of the EU frequently use referendums to legitimise fundamental decisions. Naturally, attention is usually focused on those that end in a NO vote. Historically, governments have always had ways to circumvent such decisions by calling another referendum on a slightly reworded question, e.g. the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark or the Treaty of Nice and the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland. The qualitative comparative analysis showed that these pairs of referendums are distinct and comparable to study the result inversion phenomenon. Hence, the research aim was widened: employing the theoretical approaches of rational choice and new institutionalism, to explore the behaviour of actors participating in campaigns of European pairs of referendums within a changing structural environment. Paired referendums pose new challenges to actors of the institutional level (governments, parties and stakeholder groups). It was observed that governments tend to manipulate formal rules of referendums and aim to influence the process of second referendums. Next to the rational choice aided by the new institutionalism, the change in positions of YES and NO camps was registered by reconstructing constantly changing political discourses for each specific moment. This revealed that during second referendums and despite the participation of same actors, the voting is no longer on the same issue but on a differently presented and perceived treaty, i.e. the structural environment is essentially changed.

Politics of the EU frequently use referendums to legitimise fundamental decisions. Naturally, attention is usually focused on those that end in a NO vote. Historically, governments have always had ways to circumvent such decisions by calling another referendum on a slightly reworded question, e.g. the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark or the Treaty of Nice and the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland. The qualitative comparative analysis showed that these pairs of referendums are distinct and comparable to study the result inversion phenomenon. Hence, the research aim was widened: employing the theoretical approaches of rational choice and new institutionalism, to explore the behaviour of actors participating in campaigns of European pairs of referendums within a changing structural environment. Paired referendums pose new challenges to actors of the institutional level (governments, parties and stakeholder groups). It was observed that governments tend to manipulate formal rules of referendums and aim to influence the process of second referendums. Next to the rational choice aided by the new institutionalism, the change in positions of YES and NO camps was registered by reconstructing constantly changing political discourses for each specific moment. This revealed that during second referendums and despite the participation of same actors, the voting is no longer on the same issue but on a differently presented and perceived treaty, i.e. the structural environment is essentially changed.

Politics of the EU frequently use referendums to legitimise fundamental decisions. Naturally, attention is usually focused on those that end in a NO vote. Historically, governments have always had ways to circumvent such decisions by calling another referendum on a slightly reworded question, e.g. the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark or the Treaty of Nice and the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland. The qualitative comparative analysis showed that these pairs of referendums are distinct and comparable to study the result inversion phenomenon. Hence, the research aim was widened: employing the theoretical approaches of rational choice and new institutionalism, to explore the behaviour of actors participating in campaigns of European pairs of referendums within a changing structural environment. Paired referendums pose new challenges to actors of the institutional level (governments, parties and stakeholder groups). It was observed that governments tend to manipulate formal rules of referendums and aim to influence the process of second referendums. Next to the rational choice aided by the new institutionalism, the change in positions of YES and NO camps was registered by reconstructing constantly changing political discourses for each specific moment. This revealed that during second referendums and despite the participation of same actors, the voting is no longer on the same issue but on a differently presented and perceived treaty, i.e. the structural environment is essentially changed.

Politics of the EU frequently use referendums to legitimise fundamental decisions. Naturally, attention is usually focused on those that end in a NO vote. Historically, governments have always had ways to circumvent such decisions by calling another referendum on a slightly reworded question, e.g. the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark or the Treaty of Nice and the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland. The qualitative comparative analysis showed that these pairs of referendums are distinct and comparable to study the result inversion phenomenon. Hence, the research aim was widened: employing the theoretical approaches of rational choice and new institutionalism, to explore the behaviour of actors participating in campaigns of European pairs of referendums within a changing structural environment. Paired referendums pose new challenges to actors of the institutional level (governments, parties and stakeholder groups). It was observed that governments tend to manipulate formal rules of referendums and aim to influence the process of second referendums. Next to the rational choice aided by the new institutionalism, the change in positions of YES and NO camps was registered by reconstructing constantly changing political discourses for each specific moment. This revealed that during second referendums and despite the participation of same actors, the voting is no longer on the same issue but on a differently presented and perceived treaty, i.e. the structural environment is essentially changed.

Politics of the EU frequently use referendums to legitimise fundamental decisions. Naturally, attention is usually focused on those that end in a NO vote. Historically, governments have always had ways to circumvent such decisions by calling another referendum on a slightly reworded question, e.g. the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark or the Treaty of Nice and the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland. The qualitative comparative analysis showed that these pairs of referendums are distinct and comparable to study the result inversion phenomenon. Hence, the research aim was widened: employing the theoretical approaches of rational choice and new institutionalism, to explore the behaviour of actors participating in campaigns of European pairs of referendums within a changing structural environment. Paired referendums pose new challenges to actors of the institutional level (governments, parties and stakeholder groups). It was observed that governments tend to manipulate formal rules of referendums and aim to influence the process of second referendums. Next to the rational choice aided by the new institutionalism, the change in positions of YES and NO camps was registered by reconstructing constantly changing political discourses for each specific moment. This revealed that during second referendums and despite the participation of same actors, the voting is no longer on the same issue but on a differently presented and perceived treaty, i.e. the structural environment is essentially changed.

"Referendums in the European Union" published on by Oxford University Press.

This paper describes the phenomenon Brexit or Britain Exit on the future of EU regionalism and its impact on Indonesia. This paper will explain in detail the reason for the emergence of a number of policies Brexit. Brexit event caused much speculation related to Brexit in the European Union. The policy is considered full controversial, some experts say that Brexit in the European Union (EU) showed the independence of Britain as an independent state. Other hand, that Britain is the "ancestor" of the Europeans was struck with the release of the policy, meaning European history can not be separated from the history of Britain. In fact the above reasons that Britain came out associated with independence as an independent state related to EU policies that are too large, as a result of the policy model is very holistic policy while Britain desire is wholistic policy, especially in the economic, political, social and cultural. In addition, the geopolitical location of the EU headquarters in Brussels who also became the dominant actor in a union policy that demands as EU countries have been involved in the formulation of development policy, including controversial is related to the ration immigrants. Other reason is the prestige associated with the currency. Although long since Britain does not fully adopt the EU rules but there is the possibility in the EU currency union can only occur with the assumption that the creation of functional perfect integration.

1. Introduction -- 2. Referendums and Democratic Theory -- 3. History -- 4. The Rules of Referendums -- 5. Referendums and Parliaments -- 6. The Shifting Will of the People: The Case of EU Referendums -- 7. Two Hundred Years of Direct Democracy: The Referendum in Europe 1793-2018 -- 8. The King versus the People: Lessons from a Belgian Referendum -- 9. The Referendum Experience in France -- 10. The Referendum Experience in Switzerland -- 11. The Scottish and Welsh Devolution Referendums of 1979 and 1997 -- 12. The 1998 Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement referendums in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland -- 13. The United Kingdom parliamentary voting system referendum of 2011 -- 14. The Scottish Independence Referendum of 2014 -- 15. The 2017 Catalan Referendum in Comparative Perspective -- 16. The Irish Referendums on Marriage Equality and Abortion -- 17. Referendums, Institutional and Constitutional Change in Italy: The Very 'Crooked Timber' of the Italian Experience -- 18. Luxembourg: The 2015 Referendum on Voting Rights for Foreign Residents -- 19. Turkey's Constitutional Referendum: The 16 April 2017 Referendum in Historical Perspective -- 20. The Irish and Danish 1972 referendums on EC Accession -- 21. Referendums: Norway 1972 & 1994 -- 22. In or Out of 'Europe'? The 1975 and 2016 UK Referendums on Membership -- 23. The EFTA Enlargement -- 24. EU Accession Referendums -- 25. 'If You Can't Join Them…' – Explaining No Votes in Danish EU Referendums -- 26. The 2003 Swedish Euro Referendum -- 27. Referendums on EU Treaty Reform: Revisiting the Result in Second Referendums -- 28. The French and Dutch Block the Constitutional Treaty -- 29. Swiss Votes on Europe -- 30. The Greek Referendum on Bailouts 2015 -- 31. Hungary's EU Refugee Relocation Quota Referendum: 'Let's Send a Message to Brussels' -- 32. The Dutch Referendum on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement -- 33. Issue Voting in Danish EU Referendums.

1. Introduction -- 2. Referendums and Democratic Theory -- 3. History -- 4. The Rules of Referendums -- 5. Referendums and Parliaments -- 6. The Shifting Will of the People: The Case of EU Referendums -- 7. Two Hundred Years of Direct Democracy: The Referendum in Europe 1793-2018 -- 8. The King versus the People: Lessons from a Belgian Referendum -- 9. The Referendum Experience in France -- 10. The Referendum Experience in Switzerland -- 11. The Scottish and Welsh Devolution Referendums of 1979 and 1997 -- 12. The 1998 Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement referendums in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland -- 13. The United Kingdom parliamentary voting system referendum of 2011 -- 14. The Scottish Independence Referendum of 2014 -- 15. The 2017 Catalan Referendum in Comparative Perspective -- 16. The Irish Referendums on Marriage Equality and Abortion -- 17. Referendums, Institutional and Constitutional Change in Italy: The Very 'Crooked Timber' of the Italian Experience -- 18. Luxembourg: The 2015 Referendum on Voting Rights for Foreign Residents -- 19. Turkey's Constitutional Referendum: The 16 April 2017 Referendum in Historical Perspective -- 20. The Irish and Danish 1972 referendums on EC Accession -- 21. Referendums: Norway 1972 & 1994 -- 22. In or Out of 'Europe'? The 1975 and 2016 UK Referendums on Membership -- 23. The EFTA Enlargement -- 24. EU Accession Referendums -- 25. 'If You Can't Join Them…' – Explaining No Votes in Danish EU Referendums -- 26. The 2003 Swedish Euro Referendum -- 27. Referendums on EU Treaty Reform: Revisiting the Result in Second Referendums -- 28. The French and Dutch Block the Constitutional Treaty -- 29. Swiss Votes on Europe -- 30. The Greek Referendum on Bailouts 2015 -- 31. Hungary's EU Refugee Relocation Quota Referendum: 'Let's Send a Message to Brussels' -- 32. The Dutch Referendum on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement -- 33. Issue Voting in Danish EU Referendums.

Intro -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Introduction: The Politics of Referendum Use in Europe -- 1.1 The Use of Referendums in European Democracies -- 1.2 A Direct Democracy Shift: Frequency and Form? -- 1.3 Referendums and the Crisis of Representative Democracy -- 1.4 A Framework for Analyzing Referendum Use -- 1.5 Research Design and Strategy -- Frequent Referendum Users: France and Denmark -- Sporadic Referendum Users: The UK and Sweden -- No Constitutional Referendum Provisions: The Netherlands -- 1.6 Plan of the Book -- Bibliography -- Chapter 2: Referendums and Democratic Theory -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Four Ideal Types of Democracy -- 2.3 Direct Citizens' Participation Versus Political Representation -- 2.4 Preference Aggregation Versus Preference Integration -- 2.5 A Classification of Referendums -- Legislative Majority Referendum -- Presidential Referendum -- Legislative Minority Referendum -- Citizen-Initiated Referendum -- Mandatory Referendum -- Bibliography -- Chapter 3: Referendums and Institutional Theory -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Classical Institutionalism -- 3.3 Historical Institutionalism -- 3.4 Sociological Institutionalism -- 3.5 Rational Choice Institutionalism -- 3.6 Defining Referendum Practice -- 3.7 Six Factors to Explain Referendum Practice -- Type of Democracy -- Veto Players -- Past Referendum Experience -- Public Demands -- Political Values -- Strategic Interests -- Bibliography -- Chapter 4: Referendum Provisions and Use in 28 Countries -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Referendum Institutionalization in 28 European Countries -- 4.3 Nature of Referendum Provisions in 28 European Countries -- Legislative Majority Referendums -- Presidential Referendums -- Legislative Minority Referendums -- Citizen-Initiated Referendums -- Mandatory Referendums.

1 Introduction: The Politics of Referendum Use in Europe -- 2 Referendums and Democratic Theory -- 3 Referendums and Institutional Theory -- 4 Referendum Provisions and Use in 28 Countries -- 5 Referendum Practice in France -- 6 Referendum Practice in Denmark -- 7 Referendum Practice in the United Kingdom -- 8 Referendum Practice in Sweden -- 9 Referendum Practice in the Netherlands -- 10 Conclusions: The Drivers of Referendum Use in Europe

This title explains how voters decide in referendums on European integration. It presents a comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding voting behaviour in referendums and a thorough comparative analysis of EU referendums from 1972 to 2008.