Suchergebnisse

Maritime paramilitary forces are being expanded and increasingly used as foreign-policy tools in East Asia. Such forces are less likely to be involved in significant military clashes and any incidents that arise from their activities are usually containable. However, their use also means diplomatic crises are more common, as maritime paramilitaries are more likely to use force or come under attack themselves. Events such as the detention of a Chinese trawler captain for one month, the arrest of a Vietnamese fisherman for a similar length of time and the death of a Chinese fisherman in a clash with the South Korean coast guard have underlined this trend. The use of these paramilitaries also suggests an ongoing desire among regional countries to unequivocally enforce their claims to disputed maritime areas. While they may suggest a 'demilitarised' policy to deal with these disputes, they do not suggest any political will to resolve them through negotiations. Although it may mean less chance of a military clash, the danger remains that such paramilitary activities will only escalate in future, and could be used as an excuse for military action, in a sort of Asian War of Jenkins' Ear. (Survival / SWP)

Maritime paramilitary forces are being expanded and increasingly used as foreign-policy tools in East Asia. Such forces are less likely to be involved in significant military clashes and any incidents that arise from their activities are usually containable. However, their use also means diplomatic crises are more common, as maritime paramilitaries are more likely to use force or come under attack themselves. Events such as the detention of a Chinese trawler captain for one month, the arrest of a Vietnamese fisherman for a similar length of time and the death of a Chinese fisherman in a clash with the South Korean coast guard have underlined this trend. The use of these paramilitaries also suggests an ongoing desire among regional countries to unequivocally enforce their claims to disputed maritime areas. While they may suggest a "demilitarised" policy to deal with these disputes, they do not suggest any political will to resolve them through negotiations. Although it may mean less chance of a military clash, the danger remains that such paramilitary activities will only escalate in future, and could be used as an excuse for military action, in a sort of Asian War of Jenkins' Ear. Adapted from the source document.

Staying put -- The Loyalist prison experience -- Class matters -- Fighting with history instead of guns -- Loyalism and the voluntary sector -- Loyalist feuds -- Immigrants, paramilitaries, and turf -- What to do with the paramilitaries?

Although the Good Friday Agreement signed in 1998 by the main actors of the Northern Ireland conflict clearly mentioned the issue of the reintegration of members of armed groups who were imprisoned, the problems generated by this reconversion remain unresolved and are still a taboo subject. In the eyes of much of the population, these (former) members of armed groups can be placed in the same category as common criminals, and many of them have indeed turned to criminal activities such as racketeering and drug trafficking. The media attention that these activities attract nevertheless overshadows the considerable investment they make in other sectors so as to make the best of their integration into the political, economic, and social fabric. Many of them work in peace‐building programmes funded by the UK or the European Union, while others are especially active in political, voluntary or cultural fields. While these various itineraries of reconversion seem insufficient for perpetuating or even renewing their collective identity, they nevertheless allow them to put their own war into words and into perspective, as well as to re‐examine the meaning of a combat that they sometimes waged over several decades.

Although the Good Friday Agreement signed in 1998 by the main actors of the Northern Ireland conflict clearly mentioned the issue of the reintegration of members of armed groups who were imprisoned, the problems generated by this reconversion remain unresolved and are still a taboo subject. In the eyes of much of the population, these (former) members of armed groups can be placed in the same category as common criminals, and many of them have indeed turned to criminal activities such as racketeering and drug trafficking. The media attention that these activities attract nevertheless overshadows the considerable investment they make in other sectors so as to make the best of their integration into the political, economic, and social fabric. Many of them work in peace-building programmes funded by the UK or the European Union, while others are especially active in political, voluntary or cultural fields. While these various itineraries of reconversion seem insufficient for perpetuating or even renewing their collective identity, they nevertheless allow them to put their own war into words and into perspective, as well as to re-examine the meaning of a combat that they sometimes waged over several decades. Adapted from the source document.

The effort to build a political economy of war without politics is finding its limits. The question now is what comes next. How to put politics back in? This article compares systematically two non-state armed groups that participate in the Colombian conflict, the main guerrilla (FARC) and the paramilitary. It shows that despite their similar financial bases, they appear to exhibit systematic differences— regarding both their social composition and their internal/external behavior—and claims that the key to understanding them is the set of organizational devices that each group crafts in its process of survival and growth. All this suggests that a main tenet of the early political economy of war, that all non-state armed groups can be understood as being strategically identical, is flawed. It also poses a classificatory challenge.