Suchergebnisse

India is a complex political system within which national integration cannot be taken for granted. Paramilitary forces have expanded over the past decade, & are not under the control of the central government's Ministry of Defense. These forces are generally assumed to be under the control of the central government but available to the states in cooperation with state police forces. During the emergency period they were widely used by the national government as instruments of coercion, together with military & police forces. This met with widespread criticism. Despite parallels with paramilitary forces in Third World nations with authoritarian governments, India remains one of the few functioning democracies in the Third World, & its paramilitary forces have provided valuable services to Indian democracy. 2 Tables. W. H. Stoddard.

ESSAY DESCRIBES AND DISCUSSES THE CENTRAL PARAMILITARY FORCES IN INDIA, WHICH UNDERWENT A RAPID EXPANSION IN THE 1960S AND '70S. THE CONSITITUTIONAL DIMENSION TO THE SUBJECT IS EXPLORED: THE INDIAN FEDERATION MAKES LAW & ORDER THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATES, WHILE THE MILITARY IS MAINTAINED BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. GANDHI'S USE OF THE PARAMILITARY DURING THE 'EMERGENCY' IS ALSO EXAMINED.

Aus indischer Sicht

Keiner der drei transkaukasischen Staaten, die seit dem Zerfall der UdSSR Schauplätze ständiger kriegerischer interethnischer Auseinandersetzungen waren, hat bislang reale Fortschritte beim Aufbau eigener Streitkräfte gemacht. Das Vorhandensein informeller paramilitärischer Kräfte, die verschiedenen, einander feindlich gesinnten politischen Gruppierungen unterstehen, sowie die Tatsache, daß infolge der Unterrepräsentanz nichtslawischer Offiziere im Offizierskorps ein Stamm gut ausgebildeter Kader zum Aufbau neuer Armeen fehlt, haben nicht unerheblich zu diesem Zustand beigetragen. Die noch in der Region befindlichen russischen Truppen sollen innerhalb von zwei Jahren abgezogen werden. (BIOst-Srt)

Governments often supplement the regular military with paramilitaries and progovernment militias (PGMs). However, it is unclear what determines states' selection of these auxiliary forces, and our understanding of how auxiliary force structures develop remains limited. The crucial difference between the two auxiliary types is their embeddedness in official structures. Paramilitaries are organized under the government to support/replace the regular military, whereas PGMs exist outside the state apparatus. Within a principal–agent framework, we argue that a state's investment in a particular auxiliary force structure is shaped by available resources and capacity, accountability/deniability, and domestic threats. Our results based on quantitative analysis from 1981 to 2007 find that (a) state capacity is crucial for sustaining paramilitaries, but not PGMs; (b) PGMs, unlike paramilitaries, are more common in states involved in civil conflict; and (c) although both paramilitaries and PGMs are associated with regime instability, there is no significant difference between them in that context.