Suchergebnisse

This article deals with the consequences of an increased number of levels of political decision making on the way in which political careers are built. In the traditional bottom-up perspective, political careers started at the municipal level. The best were chosen to represent the party in regional assemblies, first, & eventually in the national parliament. In this perspective, a mandate of Member of European Parliament was the highest obtainable office. Evidence from the 1979-99 period shows that the importance of local political experience in recruiting MPs is decreasing. However, the Belgian figure remains high in comparative perspective: in 1999 no fewer than 70% of the members of the federal House of Representatives & of the regional Flemish Parliament had previously been local councillors. Moreover, still 60% combine a mandate as local councillor with their parliamentary mandate. Only a limited number of previously regional Flemish MPs became federal MPs in 1999, so that one could not speak of frequent level hopping, or of a hierarchy among these offices. 8 Tables, 2 Figures. Adapted from the source document.

Discusses voting as a paradoxical, cyclical social preference, reflecting a common method of social choice used in democratic political decisions, ie, majority rule. An example of the voting paradox is analyzed. In Nov 1994, the Dutch Parliament discussed the modernization of the nuclear power plant in Borssele, offering parliament members three distinct options. Development of the options is reconstructed, & it is shown that subsequent application of majority rule through voting would have led to a top cycle in social preferences. This example illustrates how the voting paradox can occur in Dutch politics. 5 Tables, 25 References. Adapted from the source document.

Using data on fathers & parental grandfathers from a largescale survey held among all members of either House of the Dutch Parliament sitting in 1968, the soc background of members of Parliament is traced both re occup & soc stratification. The data show very little stability over 3 generations in occup'al background, & considerable verticle mobility. For the larger parties & for the 2 Houses as a whole, an index is constructed showing the average ranking of fathers & grandfathers on a prestige status scale. It appears that members of the Lower House come from higher soc milieus as measured by the ranking of fathers than members of the Upper House. This is particularly true of socialist members in the Lower House who score higher than either socialist Upper House members, or Lower House members of the 2 larger religious parties. Extensive data on the denomination of parents, grandparents & husbands or wives of members allow some insight into the extent to which traditional religious cleavage lines continue to determine pol'al recruitment. A diagram is presented to show the degree of traditional congruence between pol'al choice & religious denomination (or sub-denomination) & the extent to which 2 new anti-system parties (Democrats '66 & Farmer's Party) have successfully challenged the traditional divisions. On the whole, the close alignment between religious adherence & pol'al choice persists, both when measured by formal church association & actual church attendance. But liberals come from circles which are more traditionally identified with secular poi than members of the socialist party. In the latter case, the pot of 'breaking through' traditional religious boundaries materialized in some deliberate recruitment of orthodox-Protestant & Catholic members. But the traditional left-right division remains evident even when measured by the faith of parents & grandparents; a process of secularization is more characteristic for members of the non-confessional parties than a deliberate crossing of traditional pol'al boundaries by Catholics or orthodox-Protestants. IPSA.

On 13 June 1999, elections for the regional Parliaments, the federal Parliament (both House of Representatives & Senate), & the European Parliament were held in Belgium. The % of voters casting a preferential vote at these elections was the highest ever in Belgian history. On average, 60.9% of the electorate expressed their preference for one or more candidates. Although voters have the possibility to cast a multiple preferential vote (ie, a vote for several candidates figuring on the same party list), this possibility is not used very much: a voter who cast a preferential vote only voted on average for 1.73 candidates. The further increase in preferential votes was a little surprising since strong limitations were imposed on campaign expenditures & on commercial support. Political & social factors, eg, individualism, antiparty feelings, & mediatization, seem to have had a stronger impact on preferential voting than these material limitations. The use of the preferential vote varies from one constituency to another, from Flemings to Walloons, & from one party to another. There were some notable changes: the gap between the voters of the extreme-Right Vlaams Blok & the green parties Agalev & Ecolo, who traditionally cast less preferential votes, & voters of other parties, has diminished. Another important change is the decrease of preferential voting in some constituencies in Wallonia. As for the Senate & the European Parliament, more Flemings than Walloons now cast a preferential vote. The large constituencies used for these elections seem to attract very well-known politicians & as a consequence also many preferential votes in Flanders. Despite the increase in preferential voting, the order of the list composed by the party remained in most cases decisive whether or not a candidate was elected. 20 Tables, 1 Figure. Adapted from the source document.

This thesis describes the parliamentary scrutiny system of the Dutch Government in the European decision-making process. More specifically, this study concerns the instruments of the British parliamentary scrutiny reserve and the Danish and Austrian mandating systems, and the added value that such instruments might have for the Netherlands. The main lesson to be learned from the British scrutiny reserve is that both the Government and Parliament are encouraged to become actively involved at an early stage of the European decision-making process. The system also ensures structural provision of information throughout the European decision-making process. In the Netherlands such structural information agreements between Parliament and the Government do not exist. The introduction of a parliamentary scrutiny reserve would solve this problem. The instrument of the parliamentary reserve that was introduced in the Netherlands when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force is much more limited than the British scrutiny reserve. The Dutch parliamentary reserve lacks the most essential aspect that makes the scrutiny reserve a valuable instrument. It is not linked to Government information and therefore does not stimulate as much dialogue between the Government and Parliament from the earliest stages of the European decision-making process as the British scrutiny reserve does. The Danish mandating system adds little to the Dutch Parliament's existing instruments to scrutinize the Government in the EU decision-making process. It may be doubted whether a mandating system would be suitable in a bicameral system such as the Dutch one. The Tweede Kamer (the Dutch House of Representatives) and the Eerste Kamer (the Dutch Senate) may occasionally give contradictory instructions. Furthermore, the fact that the presentation of the mandates often takes place at a later stage of the European decision-making process can be seen as a major drawback of the Danish mandating system. Despite the fact that the system ensures that Parliament is ...

Main political events of 1999 in Flanders (Belgium) are discussed. Following a description of the formalities, notably budget control issues, leading up to the June 13 elections, the results of the elections & the formation of the new Flemish parliament are described. Although the Christian democratic party CVP emerged as the largest party, it forfeited its governing rights; instead, a socialist/environmentalist coalition consisting of VLD, SP, Agalev, & VU-ID was formed. The development of budgetary agreements is summarized, & main elements of discussions & agreements in the following policy fields are addressed: economy & labor, infrastructure, environment, welfare, education, media, & state reformation. Since the Flemish parliament, established in 1995, is a relatively new institution, organizational & structural aspects of its departments are highlighted & explained, & the developmental processes of each department & office are emphasized. S. Paul

Downs (1957) has proposed that new political parties may be formed in order to change the policy positions of established parties. Rather than seeking to implement their own manifestos directly from government office, some new parties may seek to influence the manifestos of established parties in order to see their policy goals realized. While the notion is old, it has not been studied extensively. This paper seeks to find out under what conditions established parties take over policy positions specific to new parties. It looks at two points in time when an established party can do so: in anticipation, ie, before a new party enters parliament, & in reaction, ie, after a new party has entered parliament. To this end, the paper will study the anticipatory behavior & reactions of all established parties to all new parties entering the Dutch political system since 1946. Adapted from the source document.

A profile of the careers of Belgian ministers since WWII is presented, drawing on data from various studies. The ministers are predominantly French-speaking, M, U-educated, & of UMc or Mc origin. The most frequent professional occupations are lawyer, U professor, & business executive. The political career leading to a ministerial post is most likely to go through the legislative bodies (city council, county council, & parliament); a secondary route is via the political parties (district & then national party leader). After their ministerial careers ended, 39% of the ex-ministers continued to play a prominent part in parliament. These findings are compared with those for the Netherlands, West Germany, & France. The main difference is the importance of the bureaucratic component in the structure of the ministerial elite in those three countries; in Belgium this is not very important. 10 Tables. Modified HA

TYPICAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE NETHERLANDS IS THAT CONFLICTS ARE QUICKLY POLITICIZED. EITHER AN EXISTING POLITICAL PARTY MAKES ITSELF A MOUTH-PIECE OF ONE OF THE GROUPS INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT, OR ONE OF THESE GROUPS FORMS A NEW PARTY. THE LATTER SOLUTION IS FAVORED BY THE EXISTING ELECTORAL SYSTEM, THAT GUARANTEES EASY ACCESS FOR NEW PARTIES TO PARLIAMENT. VARIOUS NEW PARTIES HAVE EMERGED IN THIS WAY, HAVE ATTRACTED MANY VOTERS, BUT HAVE LOST THEM AFTER A RELATIVELY SHORT PERIOD WITHOUT HAVING REACHED THE GOAL AT WHICH THEY AIMED. OPINION-RESEARCH MAKES IT CLEAR THAT THE SHARPNESS OF A NUMBER OF CONTROVERSIES HAS INCREASED IN THE COURSE OF TIME. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE IN THE PERCEPTION OF THE OPPOSITION OF EMPLOYEES TO EMPLOYERS. THE DUTCH POLITICAL SYSTEM CANNOT BE DENIED FLEXIBILITY IN THE HANDLING OF CONFLICTS. WITH AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF CONFLICTS, THIS FLEXIBILITY MAY BE LOST IF THE INFLUENCE OF PARLIAMENT ON THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT INCREASED AT THE SAME TIME & IF NO STRUCTURAL CHANGES ARE INTRODUCED INTO THE RELATIONS BETWEEN EMPLOYERS & EMPLOYEES. HA.