This dissertation addresses party-culture in political parties represented in the Swedish parliament. Party-culture is investigated by studying collective self-images and norms in Swedish parliamentary party-groups (PPG). The aim of this investigation is to contribute to understanding of the conditions under which parliamentary work is carried out. In order to expand our understanding of these conditions this dissertation looks beyond the formal processes by which party-groups deliver their political message and make decisions, and instead highlights the cultural aspects of these party organizations in the parliament. The method of analysis is qualitative and the material for the study consists of 53 interviews with members of parliament from all represented parties. The parties studied are thus the Social Democratic, Moderate, Liberal, Christian Democrats, Left, Centre, and Green. In addition, some participant observation for the 1998-2002 mandate period in used. The empirical investigation shows that party-culture is revealed via four basic themes: political ability, feelings of political responsibility, the importance social fellowship, and the party's strength in relation to individual party members. The party's culture based on the four themes noted above provides a theoretical structure for interpretation that combines an Aristotelian idea about basic knowledge types, sophia and phronesis, with cultural theorists Mary Douglas' grid-group-analysis. Based on this interpretation method it is shown that party-cultures distinguish themselves from each other in a way that diverges from the left-right spectrum that dominates Swedish politics. At the same time as the parties demonstrate differences in party-culture, there are also some similarities between the parties, and these similarities suggest that the parties have adjusted themselves to a more general culture within the parliament, most visibly the focus on factual knowledge and a certain requirement for modesty from party members. ; Konverterat ISBN: 978-91-554-5882-9
During much of the 20th century, the national party systems of Western Europe remained largely unchanged. However, beginning in the 1970s, these frozen party systems slowly started to melt. As the number of parties has increased, the question of what explains new party entrance has also attracted more scholarly interest. Despite this increased attention, the study of new political parties still suffers from a structuralist bias. The implication is that the fates of new parties are decided almost exclusively by external factors. Some scholars focus on the institutional environment; others emphasize sociological explanations, such as the formation of new cleavages in society. Yet such non-actor-centred perspectives risk being excessively deterministic. They also struggle to explain why some parties succeed in gaining entrance to legislatures while others, seemingly under the same external circumstances, fail. In this thesis, therefore, a new way to study parties and their path to parliament is proposed. Starting with the notion that external conditions alone cannot explain new party entrance, the thesis takes an agency-based perspective. Three sets of strategies are identified as being important means for a party to influence its chances of getting into parliament. They concern the party's resources, its political project and its external relations. In what ways can supply and management of resources, policies and relations with other parties affect the potential for becoming a parliamentary party? Through four in-depth case studies of new entrants into the Swedish national parliament, the Riksdag, the thesis concludes that there are some important commonalities in their paths to parliament. Especially with regard to their resources and their political project, the empirical evidence supports the initial premise: new party entrance is unthinkable without successful strategic behaviour.
During much of the 20th century, the national party systems of Western Europe remained largely unchanged. However, beginning in the 1970s, these frozen party systems slowly started to melt. As the number of parties has increased, the question of what explains new party entrance has also attracted more scholarly interest. Despite this increased attention, the study of new political parties still suffers from a structuralist bias. The implication is that the fates of new parties are decided almost exclusively by external factors. Some scholars focus on the institutional environment; others emphasize sociological explanations, such as the formation of new cleavages in society. Yet such non-actor-centred perspectives risk being excessively deterministic. They also struggle to explain why some parties succeed in gaining entrance to legislatures while others, seemingly under the same external circumstances, fail. In this thesis, therefore, a new way to study parties and their path to parliament is proposed. Starting with the notion that external conditions alone cannot explain new party entrance, the thesis takes an agency-based perspective. Three sets of strategies are identified as being important means for a party to influence its chances of getting into parliament. They concern the party's resources, its political project and its external relations. In what ways can supply and management of resources, policies and relations with other parties affect the potential for becoming a parliamentary party? Through four in-depth case studies of new entrants into the Swedish national parliament, the Riksdag, the thesis concludes that there are some important commonalities in their paths to parliament. Especially with regard to their resources and their political project, the empirical evidence supports the initial premise: new party entrance is unthinkable without successful strategic behaviour.
Focusing on national election campaigns in Sweden, this study examines how candidates' political networks may influence who becomes member of Parliament in a flexible list system. Flexible list systems enable candidates placed on a non-eligible seat during the nomination process within the party organization, to still get elected via the voters' optional preferential votes. The data used is derived from a unique survey including a total sample of candidates elected to the Swedish Parliament 1998–2014 via preferential votes after being placed on a non-eligible seat during the nomination process. The data also includes acquaintances to these candidates defined as their political networks. The method used to track down the network members, was to ask the candidates for acquaintances who helped them during the nomination process and the election campaign. The motivation, resources and recruiting networks amongst these respondents are compared to those of candidates, and their political networks, who, despite being placed on an eligible seat during the nomination process ended up losing a seat in Parliament as a consequence of the flexible list system. The analysis shows how dissatisfaction with the nomination process creates a motivation to use the preferential voting system in order to overrule the decisions made by the party. The result also indicates that the elected candidates and their political networks are more active within voluntary associations than their opponents. Furthermore, important differences in temporal resources are shown. Elected candidates can participate in the election campaign full-time and are able to take leave of absence from their ordinary jobs, while the opposite applies for the political networks. The political networks supporting elected candidates do not work full-time within the party to the same extent as networks supporting non-elected candidates. A suggestion for future research is to examine the importance of voluntary associations in relation to the use of preferential votes in flexible list systems.
The Swedish Sami Parliament is both a representative body elected by the Indigenous Sami people and a government agency under the Swedish state. Since its inception, this construction has been critiqued by the Sami people and Swedish governmental commissions alike: the Sami Parliaments dual roles are seen to be in fundamental conflict with one another. This article provides the first empirical study of the political and practical consequences of these conflicting roles. Using in-depth interviews with politicians and civil servants at the Sami Parliament, representatives of Sami organisations, and civil servants at the Swedish ministries, we analyse the extent to which the Sami Parliament is able to perform its role as a government agency. We argue that the dual roles of the Sami Parliament create problems not only for the decision making powers of the Parliament as a government agency, but also constitute a structural obstacle to Sami self-determination. Adapted from the source document.
Ukraine has repeatedly shifted between the two sub-types of semi-presidentialism, i.e. between premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism. The aim of this article is to discuss to what extent theoretical arguments against premier-presidential and president-parliamentary systems are relevant for understanding the shifting directions of the Ukrainian regime. As a point of departure, I formulate three main claims from the literature: 1) "President-parliamentarism is less conducive to democratization than premier-presidentialism."; 2) "Semi-presidentialism in both its variants have built-in incitements for intra-executive conflict between the president and the prime minister."; 3) "Semi-presidentialism in general, and president-parliamentarism in particular, encourages presidentialization of political parties." I conclude from the study's empirical overview that the president-parliamentary system– the constitutional arrangement with the most dismal record of democratization – has been instrumental in strengthening presidential dominance and authoritarian tendencies. The premier-presidential period 2006–2010 was by no means smooth and stable, but the presidential dominance weakened and the survival of the government was firmly anchored in the parliament. During this period, there were also indications of a gradual strengthening of institutional capacity among the main political parties and the parliament began to emerge as a significant political arena.
Tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli selvittää poliittisen eliitin toimintaa ja työmoraalia Suomen eduskunnassa. Tutkimus tehtiin kvantitatiivisen ja kvalitatiivisen aineiston pohjalta ja soveltamalla yhteiskuntatieteen ja oikeustieteen tutkimusmetodeja. Tilastotietoa kerättiin kahdeksientoista (18) valtiopäivien täysistunnoista vuosien 1970-1998 väliltä. Valiokunnista kohteena oli vaalikausi 1991-1994. Yhteensä aineistoon sisältyi 6 078 pöytäkirjaa ja näiden 520 869 läsnä- ja poissaolomerkintää. Lisäksi tarkasteltiin valtiopäivien historiaa, sekä lobbausta eli valiokuntien kestityksiä. Tärkeimmät säädökset olivat valtiopäiväjärjestys, Suomen perustuslaki ja eduskunnan työjärjestys. Tutkimustuloksena todettiin mm. seuraavaa. Kansanedustajan toimi ei ole enää perinteinen luottamustehtävä. Kansanedustaja on ammattipoliitikko, ja hänen toimensa nimikkeeksi sopisi käsite 'luottamusvirka'. 'Edustajanpalkkiokaan' ei ole 'palkkio' vaan kuukausitulo, ja siihen voisi soveltaa vanhaa virkamiespalkan elatusteoriaa. Kansanedustaja saa elatusta siitä, että hän antaa työvoimansa valtion, puolueen ja kansan käytettäväksi. Eduskuntatyö kaipaisi perusteellista remonttia. Tulisi pohtia ainakin välikysymyksen tarpeellisuutta, täysistuntojen päätösvaltaisuusrajaa, varamiesjärjestelmää ja valiokuntien asiantuntijakuulemisia. Asiantuntijat ovat liian usein samoja henkilöitä, he edustavat julkista valtaa, ay-liikettä ja erilaisia etujärjestöjä. Puhemiesneuvoston valtaa - ja henkilöön perustuvaa auktoritatiivista valtaa - voisi rajoittaa asettamalla puhemiehen (ja varapuhemiesten) toimikaudelle määräaika. Eduskunnan kollektiivinen moraali muodostuu majoriteetti- ja senioriteettiperiaatteen pohjalta ja ilmentää usein kokeneempien edustajien käsitystä oikeasta ja väärästä. Taustajoukoista ja puolueensa tuesta riippuvainen ammattipoliitikko menettää herkästi yhteyden äänestäjiensä arkipäivään. Tällöin "oikea" voi hämärtyä ja edustajan etu nousee tärkeimmäksi. Esimerkiksi valiokuntien kestitysten suhteen on tulevan korruptiolain aikana syytä olla takavuosia varovaisempi. Kollektiivinen työmoraali näkyy edustajien tekemistä päätöksistä ja siitä, miten eduskunta tulkitsee, toteuttaa ja uudistaa instituutiota itseään koskevaa lainsäädäntöä. Yhtenä trendinä ilmenee eduskuntatyöhön kohdistuvien kontrollinormien lieventäminen, toisena demokratian vaatima mutta käytännössä paikoin näennäiseksi jäävä avoimuus. Eduskunnan sisäisten sääntömuutosten yhtenä funktiona voi olla jopa tarkoitus antaa suojaa kansalaiskontrollia vastaan. Poissaoloja on ollut eduskunnan alkuvuosista lähtien. Kaikki edustajat eivät saavu ajoissa valtiopäiville eivätkä kaikki osallistu äänestyksiin, vaikka ilmoittautuvat läsnäoleviksi. Salista poistumisen yhtenä syynä voi olla halu välttyä poliittiselta kannanotolta. Suuria poissaoloja ovat aiheuttaneet yöistunnot, maanantaipäivät, istuntokausien loppumiskiireet ja välikysymysten ministerivastaukset. Runsaita henkilöpoissaoloja ovat aiheuttaneet sairaus, virka- ja ministerintehtävät, 1990-luvun alussa myös loikkaukset ja ristiriidat puoleen kanssa. Aineiston valiokuntakokouksista päätösvaltaisena oli alkanut noin 70 % ja loppunut noin 65 %. Suurin vajaavaltaisuuden aiheuttaja oli asiantuntijakuuleminen. Ratkaiseva hallituksen esityksen toinen käsittely oli tehty päätösvaltaisesti, mutta muuten asioita oli viety eteenpäin vajaavaltaisena. Jos päätösvalta-vaatimus olisi ollut ehdoton, asia olisi voinut jumiutua valiokuntaan ja hidastaa eduskuntatyötä. Poikkeuksena päätösvaltaongelmiin oli toimintatavoiltaan erilainen, edustajia ministeristöön nostava valtiovarainvaliokunta. Eduskunnassa on hiljaisia puurtajia eli lainsäädäntötyön tekijöitä, mutta myös poissaolijoita. Poissaolijat jakautuvat puolueensa hyväksi työtä tekeviin poliitikkoihin ja edustajiin, joiden poissaoloihin löytyy ehkä selitys mutta ei puolustusta. Hiljaisen puurtajan työpanos jää usein näkymättä, ja julkinen kuva muodostuu tunnetuista poliitikoista. Ajan mittaan hiljainen puurtaja voi kuitenkin tulla palkituksi arvostetulla eduskunta- tai ministeritehtävällä. Eduskunnassa on korkeaa kollektiivista ja korkeaa yksilöllistä työmoraalia, mutta myös päinvastaisia ilmentymiä. Työmoraalilla ei ole keskimäärää, sillä on kasvot. Poliittiseen eliittiin kuuluu henkilöitä, jotka käyttäytyvät epäeettisesti jos heitä ei valvota - mutta niin heitä kuuluu kaikkialle yhteiskuntaan, äänestäjiinkin. Yleistää ei pidä; jokaista on kohdeltava omana henkilönään. 1980-luvun alkupuolella keskimääräinen poissaolo täysistunnon nimenhuudosta oli noin 20 henkilöä (10 %). Vuonna 1989 työjärjestykseen lisättiin mahdollisuus ilmoittautua läsnäolevaksi nimenhuudon jälkeen. Samana vuonna keskimääräinen poissaolo oli jo 31 henkilöä (15 %). Valtiopäiviin 1994 vaikutti mm. liittyminen Euroopan unioniin, ja silloin nimenhuudosta oli poissa keskimäärin 36 henkilöä (18 %). Sama 36 henkilöä toistui vuonna 1997, jolloin yhtenä syynä olivat äitiyslomat. Vuonna 1998 eduskunta muutti tilastonsa julkisiksi ja syksyn poissaolot lähtivät jyrkkään laskuun. Vuoden keskimääräinen poissaolo nimenhuudosta oli 29 edustajaa (14 %). ; The purpose of the research was to examine the operation of the political elite in the Finnish Parliament.The study is based on both quantitative and qualitative data, and the research methods used are derived from jurisprudence and the social sciences. The statistical data of plenary sessions were collected from 18 parliaments in years 1970-1998, and the data of parliamentary committees from the legislative period of 1991-1994. In all, the data consisted of 6,078 recorded minutes and 520,869 registrations of attendance and non-attendance. The qualitative data consisted of historical surveys of parliament's early years and of surveys of lobbying parliamentary committees. The most important statutes in the normative examination were Parliament Act, the Finnish Constitution and the Parliamentary Order of the Day. The actual work of a parliament member is no longer based on the position of trust. The position has now a more professional character, and the representative has in a way become a professional politician. In fact, the term "office of trust" might most appropriately describe an elected representative's work at present. Even today representatives are paid a "reward" for their services. The use of the term "subsistence" could better refer to the total sum of a monthly income and various other benefits. Subsistence, it also could imply that the representatives contribute their work for the use of the state, of the party and the people. Parliamentary regulations still need a fundamental restructuring. More widely it should be discussed the usefulness of interpellation, the quorum of plenary sessions, the system of deputy members and the system of hearing outside experts at the committee work. The power of the Speakers could be reduced by limiting the office years of the Speaker (and Deputy Speakers). In a parliament, collective morale is moulded by the principle of majority and seniority. Members with fewer years of service have to accept the decisions taken by the more experienced colleagues. Therefore, the collective morale mainly reflects the senior representative's perceptions of right and wrong. A professional politician, depending on political background and party, lost readily genuine contact with the everyday life of voters. Therefore the meaning of the word "right" can be obscured. For example, in committee work they should be more careful with lobbyism in future, when parliament pass a law for representative's corruption. The collective work morale of parliament manifests in the decisions taken. It is also visible in how the members interpret, implement and reform legislation concerning parliament institution. One trend seems to be moderating the norms used in controlling parliamentary work. Another trend is the requirement of openness, demanded by democracy, which, however, often remains quite superficial. It actually seems some times that the internal reforms of parliamentary regulations have been made to protect parliament against its control by citizens. Absences have always been there and they have been discussed since early days of parliament. All the representatives do not turn up in time when parliament begins its work, and some representatives leave the main auditorium as soon as the roll call is over. One reason for an early departure may be try to avoid taking political stand. In the years examined major non-attendance have been caused by night sessions, Monday sessions, ending of term of parliamentary sessions and interpellations debates during Cabinet minister's respond. As to individual representatives non-attendance have been increased by illness, ministerial and official duties or official journeys. In the early 1990s some non-attendance were caused by representatives who went over to another party or had conflicts with their own party. In research material some 70% of committee meetings had started with the presence of a quorum, but when they were adjourned the quorum had dropped to 65%. Hearing outside experts was the major reason for non-quorum meetings. In the decisive second reading of a government proposal there was always the presence of a quorum. If the demand for a quorum had been applied faithfully in all cases, the matter under discussion would probably have delayed the work of parliament as a whole. In this respect, the state financial committee was an exception, because it operates different and helps parliament members in their political career by promoting them to ministerial positions. In parliament work some of the members can be clearly identified as the quiet hard workers. On the other hand, the degree of non-attendance can be high. The conscientious representatives who attend meetings actively are "legislators", while the absent could be divided into "professional politicians" working for their own party or representatives whose absence can be explained but not really defended. The input of a single, hard- working representative often remains invisible. The public image of parliament is primarily created by the well-known professional politicians. A quiet hard-working can, however, in the long run be rewarded with visible parliamentary or ministerial duties. High collective and individual work morale is still to be seen in parliament, but just the opposite may also manifest itself. Morale is something that cannot be expressed in terms of an average, since morale has a face. There will always be members of the political elite who, if uncontrolled, will act unethically. But the same holds true for the rest of society, including the voters. Therefore we should avoid making generalisations and, instead, we should regard each member of parliament as an individual person with his or her own human characteristics. As the early 1980s the average number of absentees in the roll call of plenary sessions was 20 members (10%). In 1989, after an order reform, it became possible to register as present even after the roll call of plenary sessions. In that year 31 members on average (15%) were absent during the roll call. In 1994, when Finland was negotiating its membership in the European Union, on average 36 members (18%) were absent during the roll call. In 1997 the same 36 was caused by a large number of maternity leaves. In 1998 when parliamentary statistics were made public, the average number of absentees was 29 members (14%).
This dissertation studies power and the production of the democratic subject in the context of democratic debate. It is important to understand the role of power in democratic debate. Even more important is to understand how power underpins the construction of the democratic subject in this context. Is it possible for just anybody to be a convincing democratic subject? Or does democratic debate assume a particular kind of body – a democratic "super-body"? This thesis argues that in order to answer such questions it is not sufficient to study the intellectual and verbal aspects of democratic debate. The situation needs to be examined in its material enactment. Since previous research does not offer a coherent way of analysing how power underpins the material construction of the democratic subject, this dissertation develops such an analytical perspective, which it terms a feminist theatrical perspective. The perspective is "theatrical" because it studies democratic debate as intra-active enactment, which assumes stage, costume and stage direction. The perspective is inspired by Foucault and Butler as well as by feminist performance, architectural and design research. The feminist theatrical perspective, and the methodological framework that it offers, constitutes the main contribution of the thesis. The dissertation focuses on democratic debate in the specific form of the parliamentary debate. It identifies three key parliamentary ideals about democratic debate that are materially enacted as "dramas" during the debate: the idea that democratic debate is built on equality, that it is important as representing the people, and that it is importantly rendered in combative struggle. Empirically, the thesis is based on an ethnographic field-study of the Riksdag, the Swedish parliament, conducted in 2008/2009, and an in-depth study of two debates between party leaders that took place in the Riksdag in 2010. The main finding is that power is necessarily ambivalent in the production of the democratic subject in this context. The thesis identifies frameworks for how the democratic subject should move, behave, sound and look. However, these frameworks are contradictory. No actual physical body could, as a "super-body", fully correspond to the physical characteristics that are assumed about the democratic subject.
The purpose of this dissertation is to map and analyze the spatial and temporal variation in women's political representation at both the national and local level. In the dissertation it is argued that women's political representation is the outcome of the interplay between structures, institutions and actors. The perspective is a comparative one, in which quantitative analyses and more qualitative case-studies complement each other. When analysing spatial variation a mainly quantitative approach is taken, while the case-study approach is applied to the temporal variation. The first empirical chapter examines whether female representation in the lower houses of the world's parliaments co-varies with other indicators of the political situation of women in order to ensure the validity of the analysis. In the second empirical chapter female representation in parliaments of the world during the post-war period is analyzed. In the third empirical chapter the focus narrows down to women's political representation in Western Europe during the post-war period, where both the national and local level is analysed. The fourth empirical chapter consists of case studies of six countries. Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands feature high female representation; France, Greece and Ireland low female representation. In the fifth empirical chapter women's political representation at the local level in Norway and Sweden is analysed during the post-war period. In the sixth empirical chapter the temporal variation in female representation in a number of Swedish municipalities is analysed, from the introduction of female suffrage in 1921 until 2002. The result is that both structures, institutions and actors are necessary to explain the spatial and temporal variation in female representation. There is no direct link between structures and female representation. The structure does affect the actors and co-varies with the institutions, but successful actors as entrepreneurs might boost female representation. Actors are important. The increase in female representation cannot be seen as an automatic process taking care of itself. Conscious actors are necessary both to affect and to monitor the development. An unfavourable structural context might be compensated for by actors and institutions which favour female representation.
During the last few decade., it has become increasingly common to characterize modern politics as mediated & mediatized. Problematic, though, is that both concepts are referred to more often than they are properly defined, & that there is a deficit in systematic empirical studies on the degree to which politics has become mediatized. Against this background, the purpose of this article is to analyze the concepts of "mediated" & "mediatized" politics, & to empirically investigate how Swedish members of parliament & political journalists perceive the media's political influence. The theoretical analysis suggests that the mediatization of politics should be understood as a multidimensional concept, whereas the empirical results show that both members of parliament & political journalists believe that the media do have extensive influence over politics as well as the general public. Adapted from the source document.