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Decisions of national importance are made by Parliamentary voting. Yet Indian Members of Parliament (MPs) vote with a remarkable lack of freedom and accountability. The introduction of the Tenth Schedule in the Constitution has crippled free expression, since it provides that MPs voting against 'any direction' of their Party are liable to disqualification from the legislature In addition, except for Constitutional amendments, Indian Parliamentary Procedure Rules do not require votes of MPs to be recorded unless the Speaker's decision is contested in the House. The result is that voting in the House has become mechanical, controlled by Party politics and devoid of responsibility. This paper comments on a general theory of democratic accountability through the lens of Parliamentary voting. It suggests that the voting system adopted in the Parliament is an effective indicator to measure the level of accountability of its Members. In the context of India, this paper argues that the level of accountability will increase to a desirable extent only when there is adoption of a recorded system for every important House vote. Upon examination of India's record thus far (through the sample of the 14th Lok Sabha) it becomes evident that the level of divisions (recorded votes) is substantially lower than other countries. This leads the paper to probe, as to why that might be the case. Part II of the paper answers that question by examining the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. The paper scrutinizes the disproportionate influence of the Party in decision making in the Parliament. Apart from dealing with the inherent problem of the Tenth Schedule, this paper suggests two procedural changes to make parliamentary expression more meaningful. Firstly, the recording of all important votes within the Parliament and secondly, registering Party whips with the Minister of Parliamentary Affairs so that the voter knows the clear stand of every Parliamentary continuum. The focus of the paper is thus to bring back the attention of the legislators to their central function, which is deliberation on and the passage of legislation. ; Decisions of national importance are made by Parliamentary voting. Yet Indian Members of Parliament (MPs) vote with a remarkable lack of freedom and accountability. The introduction of the Tenth Schedule in the Constitution has crippled free expression, since it provides that MPs voting against 'any direction' of their Party are liable to disqualification from the legislature. In addition, except for Constitutional amendments, Indian Parliamentary Procedure Rules do not require votes of MPs to be recorded unless the Speaker's decision is contested in the House. The result is that voting in the House has become mechanical, controlled by Party politics and devoid of responsibility. This paper comments on a general theory of democratic accountability through the lens of Parliamentary voting. It suggests that the voting system adopted in the Parliament is an effective indicator to measure the level of accountability of its Members. In the context of India, this paper argues that the level of accountability will increase to a desirable extent only when there is adoption of a recorded system for every important House vote. Upon examination of India's record thus far (through the sample of the 14th Lok Sabha) it becomes evident that the level of divisions (recorded votes) is substantially lower than other countries. This leads the paper to probe, as to why that might be the case. Part II of the paper answers that question by examining the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution.The paper scrutinizes the disproportionate influence of the Party in decision making in the Parliament. Apart from dealing with the inherent problem of the Tenth Schedule, this paper suggests two procedural changes to make parliamentary expression more meaningful. Firstly, the recording of all important votes within the Parliament and secondly, registering Party whips with the Minister of Parliamentary Affairs so that the voter knows the clear stand of every Parliamentary continuum. The focus of the paper is thus to bring back the attention of the legislators to their central function, which is deliberation on and the passage of legislation.

Este artículo pone de manifiesto la contradicción existente entre un sistema de listas bloqueadas para las elecciones al Congreso de los Diputados, como el que aún rige en España, y la prohibición del mandato imperativo recogida en la Constitución. Analiza, además, la práctica parlamentaria española (casos de ejercicio libre o indisciplinado del voto parlamentario) y las propuestas de la doctrina para superar dicha contradicción, decantándose por abrir las listas electorales para permitir una relación más representativa entre la ciudadanía y los parlamentarios. ; This article highlights the contradiction between a system of blocked lists for elections to the Congress of Deputies, as we still have in Spain, and the prohibition of imperative mandate in the Constitution. It analyzes also the Spanish parliamentary practice (free or undisciplined parliamentary vote cases) and the proposals of the doctrine to overcome this contradiction, preferring open electoral lists to allow a more representative relationship between citizens and parliamentarians.

Decisions of national importance are made by Parliamentary voting. Yet Indian Members of Parliament (MPs) vote with a remarkable lack of freedom and accountability. The introduction of the Tenth Schedule in the Constitution has crippled free expression, since it provides that MPs voting against 'any direction' of their Party are liable to disqualification from the legislature. In addition, except for Constitutional amendments, Indian Parliamentary Procedure Rules do not require votes of MPs to be recorded unless the Speaker's decision is contested in the House. The result is that voting in the House has become mechanical, controlled by Party politics and devoid of responsibility. This paper comments on a general theory of democratic accountability through the lens of Parliamentary voting. It suggests that the voting system adopted in the Parliament is an effective indicator to measure the level of accountability of its Members. In the context of India, this paper argues that the level of accountability will increase to a desirable extent only when there is adoption of a recorded system for every important House vote. Upon examination of India's record thus far (through the sample of the 14th Lok Sabha) it becomes evident that the level of divisions (recorded votes) is substantially lower than other countries. This leads the paper to probe, as to why that might be the case. Part II of the paper answers that question by examining the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution.The paper scrutinizes the disproportionate influence of the Party in decision making in the Parliament. Apart from dealing with the inherent problem of the Tenth Schedule, this paper suggests two procedural changes to make parliamentary expression more meaningful. Firstly, the recording of all important votes within the Parliament and secondly, registering Party whips with the Minister of Parliamentary Affairs so that the voter knows the clear stand of every Parliamentary continuum. The focus of the paper is thus to bring back the attention of the legislators to their central function, which is deliberation on and the passage of legislation.

This article argues in favour of a re-definition of Parliament's role in Peru. In the contemporary world, public affairs change too fast or are too complexes to name Parliament the direct responsible of ordering them through legislation. Thus, the main duty of this institution should be not to legislate but to elect and control the Executive Branch of government. ; En este artículo se argumenta en favor de redefinir el rol del Parlamento en el Perú. En el mundo contemporáneo, los asuntos públicos cambian demasiado rápido o son demasiado complejos como para que el Parlamento sea el responsable directo de ordenarlos a través de la legislación. Por tanto, la responsabilidad principal de esta institución debe ser no la labor legislativa sino el nombramiento y el control del Poder Ejecutivo.

Palonen, Kari, Rosales, José María & Turkka, Tapani. The politics of dissensus: parliament in debate. Santander: Cantabria University Press; McGraw-Hill, 2014, 521 pp. ; Palonen, Kari, Rosales, José María y Turkka, Tapani. The politics of dissensus: parliament in debate. Santander: Cantabria University Press; McGraw-Hill, 2014, 521 pp.

Abstract: This article focuses on the demonstrations before the Parliament. This issue demands to guarantee both the excercise of a fundamental right as well as the normal activity of this institution. It is commented the regulation existing in the United Kingdom and briefly the solution adopted in other Europenan countries. Then the Spanish situation is analyzed. At this point, the outcome is that both the proposed and existing legislation are clearly insufficient to reconcile these two requirements. What is needed more than safeguard the public order general is to protect the functioning of a key institution for democracy such as Parliament. And that may require more precise provisions. ; Summary:1. Justification of the present commentary. 2. The importance of the right of pubblic assembly and demonstration before the parliamentary headquarters. 3.Reference to the solution adopted in other countries. 4. The right of demonstration in front of the British Parliament. 5. The right of demonstration before the Congress of Deputies, the Senate and territorial parliaments. ADDENDA. The decision 31/2014, of 7 July, of the Audiencia Nacional, on the demonstration violent before the catalan Parliament.Resumen:Se expone la problemática de las manifestaciones ante el Parlamento, cuestión en la que se hace necesario garantizar tanto el ejercicio de un derecho fundamental como la normal actividad de esta institución. Se estudia la regulación vigente en el Reino Unido y, tras una breve referencia a la situación de otros países, se analiza la situación española. En este punto se comprueba que tanto la legislación vigente como la proyectada resultan claramente insuficientes para compatibilizar estas dos exigencias. Más que de salvaguardar el orden público general se trata aquí de proteger el funcionamiento de una institución clave para la democracia como es el Parlamento. Y esto puede requerir normas más precisas. Abstract: This article focuses on the demonstrations before the Parliament. This issue demands to guarantee both the excercise of a fundamental right as well as the normal activity of this institution. It is commented the regulation existing in the United Kingdom and briefly the solution adopted in other Europenan countries. Then the Spanish situation is analyzed. At this point, the outcome is that both the proposed and existing legislation are clearly insufficient to reconcile these two requirements. What is needed more than safeguard the public order general is to protect the functioning of a key institution for democracy such as Parliament. And that may require more precise provisions.

This article argues in favour of a re-definition of Parliament's role in Peru. In the contemporary world, public affairs change too fast or are too complexes to name Parliament the direct responsible of ordering them through legislation. Thus, the main duty of this institution should be not to legislate but to elect and control the Executive Branch of government. ; En este artículo se argumenta en favor de redefinir el rol del Parlamento en el Perú. En el mundo contemporáneo, los asuntos públicos cambian demasiado rápido o son demasiado complejos como para que el Parlamento sea el responsable directo de ordenarlos a través de la legislación. Por tanto, la responsabilidad principal de esta institución debe ser no la labor legislativa sino el nombramiento y el control del Poder Ejecutivo.

The Indigenous Parliament of America (IPA) celebrated, in Managua, its thirteen plenary session and the international seminar "Alimentary Sovereignty". Among the topics discussed in this session were: alimentary security, commercial extraction activities, previous and legislative consultation; peoples and nationalities and mother land. One of the results of this event, which affects favorably the cause of the Nicaraguan indigenous community, was the resolution to install the permanent seat of the Technical Secretary of this parliament in Nicaragua. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5377/wani.v67i0.1893 ; El Parlamento Indígena de América (PIA) celebró, en Managua, su décima tercera sesión plenaria y el seminario internacional "Soberanía Alimentaria". En dicha sesión se discutió sobre seguridad alimentaria; extractivismo comercial; consulta previa y legislativa; autonomía de comunidades, pueblos y nacionalidades, y madre tierra. Uno de los resultados de este evento, que afecta positivamente las posibilidades reivindicatorias de la comunidad indígena nicaragüense, fue la resolución por la cual se instaura en Nicaragua la Sede Permanente de la Secretaría Técnica de este Parlamento. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5377/wani.v67i0.1893

La idea de que las Asambleas parlamentarias son órganos máximos del poder del Estado forma parte de la justificación teórica del Estado democrático de Derecho. Pero la existencia de una o varias Cámaras legislativas no implica que nos encontremos ante un Estado democrático, ni ante un Estado de Derecho. Un caso ejemplar es el de las Cortes puestas en marcha durante la dictadura de Franco, que no pueden ser consideradas como un verdadero Parlamento, aunque cumpliesen algunos cometidos de los mismos. No fueron una instancia de representación política, ni un Legislativo exclusivo y excluyente, ni un órgano del que emanase el Gobierno, ni un medio de control de la actuación gubernamental, y tampoco se constituyeron como una institución independiente, ya que en su funcionamiento dependía del Ejecutivo. ¿Qué fueron entonces las Cortes durante el franquismo? A esta pregunta trata de responder el presente artículo mediante la aplicación de una metodología multidisciplinar que combina la exégesis de los textos jurídicos, el análisis de la documentación archivística y el contraste con las aportaciones doctrinales. ; The idea that parliamentary assemblies are supreme organs of state power is part of the theoretical justification of the democratic rule of law. But the existence on one or several legislative chambers does not imply that we are in the presence of a democratic state. A good example is the so-called Cortes implemented during Franco's dictatorship, which can not be considered as a true Parliament, although they accomplished some of their commitments. They were not a stage of political representation, or an exclusive legislative, or an organ from which the government originated, or a mean of control of the government action, and they were neither an independent institution, because its functioning depended on the executive. What was the significance of the Cortes during francoism? The present article tries to answer this question by means of applying a multidisciplinary methodology that combines the exegesis of legal texts, the analysis of archive documents and the contrast with doctrinal contributions.

This paper provides a critical analysis of the scope of the powers of the regional parliament on budgetary stability. To do this, we study the Opinion 803/2012, the State Council on the Catalan Parliament Act 6/2012, of 17 May, budgetary stability, which provides a review of the adequacy of the Catalan act constitutional framework of responsibility for budgetary stability, under the Constitution and developed by organic legislator. ; El presente trabajo aborda desde una perspectiva crítica el alcance de las facultades del legislador autonómico en materia de estabilidad presupuestaria a partir de los argumentos expuestos en el Dictamen 803/2012, del Consejo de Estado sobre la Ley del Parlamento de Cataluña 6/2012, de 17 de mayo, de estabilidad presupuestaria. Para ello, se estudian las principales cuestiones objeto del examen de constitucionalidad de la ley catalana dirigido a verificar su adecuación al marco competencial en materia de estabilidad presupuestaria definido constitucionalmente y desarrollado por el legislador orgánico.This paper provides a critical analysis of the scope of the powers of the regional parliament on budgetary stability. To do this, we study the Opinion 803/2012, the State Council on the Catalan Parliament Act 6/2012, of 17 May, budgetary stability, which provides a review of the adequacy of the Catalan act constitutional framework of responsibility for budgetary stability, under the Constitution and developed by organic legislator.

This article is the transcription of the Lectio Magistralis that professor Oreste Massari pronounced on the occasion of his retirement as a university professor and that was held in Rome on October 31, 2017. Throughout his intellectual and academic life he has analyzed the evolution of Italian parties and its party system as well as the evolution of the British parties, especially the Labor Party, the Westminster model and, in a more general way, the relevance of political leadership, the evolution of party models and the relationship of parties with democracy. His intellectual trajectory shows us how the Italian political system has changed in the last 40 years as well as the evolution and conceptual development of the analysis of parties and party systems, the development of the Italian and European political science and, finally, the challenges that parties and democracy face in the coming years. ; Este artículo es la transcripción de la Lectio Magistralis que pronunció el profesor Oreste Massari con motivo de su jubilación como profesor de universidad y que se celebró el 31 de octubre de 2017 en Roma. A lo largo de su vida intelectual y académica ha analizado en profundidad la evolución de los partidos y el sistema de partidos italiano así como la experiencia de los partidos británicos, especialmente el partido laborista, el modelo Westminster y consideraciones generales sobre el liderazgo político, los modelos de partido y la relación de los partidos con la democracia. Su trayectoria intelectual nos muestra cómo ha cambiado el sistema político italiano en los últimos 40 años así como la evolución y el desarrollo conceptual del análisis de los partidos y sistemas de partidos en general, el desarrollo de la ciencia política italiana y europea y, finalmente, los retos a los que se enfrentan los partidos y la democracia en los próximos años.

Esta experiencia ha recibido el 2º premio en el IV Concurso de Experiencias Educativas de la revista Pulso. ; Bajo la premisa del «aprender haciendo» se ha planteado el proyecto Creamos un Parlamento a alumnos y alumnas de quinto curso de Educación Primaria. La idea era conseguir que el alumnado se implicara de forma activa en un proceso electoral, desde sus inicios, para acabar constituyendo un Parlamento que llevara a cabo alguna de las funciones que competen a esta institución, al mismo tiempo que se conseguía la interiorización, desde un enfoque competencial, de unos contenidos del currículo de Educación Primaria, ya de por si complicados de entender para niños de estas edades. La experiencia ha resultado un éxito, llevando a los niños/as a una mejor comprensión de las instituciones de nuestra sociedad y a desarrollar actitudes de colaboración en el trabajo, así como al conocimiento y desempeño con determinadas herramientas informáticas. ; Under the premise of «learning through doing» the project «Creating a Parliament» has been proposed for children in the 5th year of primary education. The idea was to get pupils actively involved in the electoral process, from its beginnings, to the final establishment of a parliament which would carry out some of the functions for which such an institution is responsible. At the same time it would allow pupils to internalise, from a competence approach, some of the contents of the primary curriculum, which are by nature, difficult for children of this age to understand. The experience has been a complete success, allowing our children to a better understanding of our social institutions, developing teamworking skills and use and knowledge of specific computer skills as well.