Suchergebnisse

Last weekend saw tens of thousands of Australians rally in support of a referendum on an Indigenous Voice to Parliament. The Voice would be a representative body comprised of Indigenous Australians empowered to make representations to Parliament and the federal government on matters that relate to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. Its animating objective is to guarantee that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples can have a say in the development of law and policy that affects them. The Voice is not a silver bullet. But if the referendum fails, basic problems concerning the relationship of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and the State will remain unaddressed. Indigenous Australians will also continue to struggle to have their interests considered in the processes of governance.

Supreme or constitutional courts regularly step in to protect the democratic process by deciding election disputes. It is remarkable that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has so far barely been engaged concerning the European Parliament (EP) elections. Using Hungary as an example, I will argue in the following that the CJEU is institutionally well-positioned to help protect the integrity of the 2024 EP elections via preliminary ruling procedures. Hungarian democracy has been in decline, according to the EP, the Commission and various democracy indices. The problems include the lack of a level playing field, targeted action by authorities against opposition parties, overlaps between the activities of the government and the governing party, state funding of campaigning and party financing in general, lack of media pluralism, and the different means of voting for citizens living abroad (postal vote for some and not for others). I argue that the CJEU could and should be engaged to protect the fairness of the EP elections in Hungary.

A phrase like "Parliament decisions on its own behalf" has not been codified in Spanish legal and political discourse. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that there are certain issues where political parties within parliament possess distinct interests that may influence their legislative choices. To counter the potential hazards involved, various elements have demonstrated varying degrees of efficiency in ensuring that decision are being made for the common good, despite the influence of party-specific concerns.

First the election victory, then the grab for the highest office in parliament: the AfD could put democracy in Thuringia to a very serious test in the coming year. But the worst could be avoided – for now.

When Rodrigo Duterte assumed the presidency of the Philippines in 2016, he pushed a campaign against illegal drugs that resulted in thousands of suspects being killed by law enforcers. Parliament appeared entirely ineffective in opposing the extensive human rights abuses during the Presidents anti-drug campaign. This Spotlight examines the wider working logic of Philippine democracy that makes Philippine parliament into a subservient accomplice of any determined administration of the day, even if this means going along with severe human rights violations.
Author information





Peter Kreuzer



Dr. Peter Kreuzer ist Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter und Projektleiter am PRIF. Sein Fokus liegt auf politischer Gewalt in den Philippinen und maritimen Konflikten im Südchinesischen Meer. // Dr Peter Kreuzer is a Senior Researcher at PRIF. He focuses on political violence in the Philippines and maritime conflicts in the South China Sea.

|



Der Beitrag Failing in Control. Legislative weakness in the face of a strongman president in the Philippines erschien zuerst auf PRIF BLOG.

The platform work directive proposal presents important implications for the implementation of social security schemes (e.g. those relating to unemployment or incapacity). In particular, it required digital labour platforms to declare and inform social protection authorities of the work performed through the platform and to share with them relevant data, among other aspects. It is important that these implications are maintained in a final instrument, as suggested by the Parliament in its position for trilogue negotiations.

On September 13th, co-rapporteurs Guy Verhofstadt (Renew, BE), Sven Simon (EPP, DE), Gabriele Bischoff (S&D, DE), Daniel Freund (Greens/EFA, DE) and Helmut Scholz (The Left, DE) presented in the Committee on Constitutional Affairs of the European Parliament (AFCO) a wide and ambitious project of Treaty change. This short contribution will highlight and evaluate the most important proposals of AFCO's project and argue that, if adopted, the reform would further the Union's federalisation, thus potentially changing its legal nature.

It is never a good sign when Viktor Orbán celebrates the election results of another country. Last Wednesday was one of those days. For the first time in the history of Dutch politics, a far-right party became by far the biggest party in the Dutch parliament. It is bad news in many respects, and even more, because the Dutch constitutional system knows a lack of formal rule of law safeguards. In contrast to countries such as Italy or Germany, the Dutch constitutional system is not prepared for a democratic move to the anti-liberal far right.

From 2002 to the present day, hundreds of constitutional bills have been proposed by delegates in Parliament, with forty of them being introduced within a year following the renewal of the Assemblée Nationale after the 2022 legislative elections. Each bill contains unique and far-reaching provisions. The proposals illustrate a shift within secondary constituent power, which no longer perceives the Constitution as a sacred text, the supreme standard of the French legal order, but as a wish list, and as an object of political communication subject to trivial media considerations.

On 15 June, the Bundestag approved a minimum percentage threshold for elections to the European Parliament (EP). Shortly before the summer break, the Bundesrat (Federal Council) also agreed to the clause. German lawmakers already failed twice in this endeavour before the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, short BVerfG). This time, the German legislator can refer to a binding EU legal act backing its reform efforts. This means the electoral threshold must now be treated (also by the constitutional court) as determined by EU law – with all consequences. However, even a 2% hurdle is not 100% safe from the BVerfG.

On 23 August 2023, the German government published a bill on Gender Self-Determination (hereinafter also referred to as SBGG-E). The bill is currently under debate before the German parliament (Bundestag) and is subject to heated socio-political debate. Its primary objective consists of deregulating the conditions for altering and deleting the gender entry provided by the German Civil Status Act. Aside from a strong commitment to deregulating legal gender (Section 1 SBGG-E), the bill sets boundaries and conditions for gender recognition. While some appear self-explanatory, others are infused by what I will hereinafter refer to as the 'logic of social ascription'.

The war in Gaza serves, this blog post argues, as the final nail in the coffin of Netanyahu's judicial overhaul. The Israeli political climate, relentless opposition and the political fallout after Hamas' surprise attack on Israel and the current war thwarted the judicial overhaul. However, populism is far from overcome. Therefore, the current failed judicial overhaul remains a warning sign for the democracy-seeking public in Israel and should raise demand for constitutional entrenchment of the democratic values of the Israeli state. As the judicial overhaul of 2023 has shown us – democracy is not safe if it hangs by the thread of a simple majority in parliament.

For years, there has been a debate about making the Polish Prosecutor's Office an authority that is arguably located between the classic uniformed services (the police), public administration (tax offices), and the judiciary. In Polish scholarly discourse, two positions prevail regarding the place of the prosecutor's office in the system of state organs - subordination to the executive, or quasi-independence based on an organic statute with the strong influence of parliament. In this blog, I will explain how PiS has exploited Poland's adoption of the former model, and evaluate the promise and perils of a proposal to cure the current defects by rendering Poland's prosecutor's office (more) independent.

The topic of the next elections to the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine unexpectedly surfaced in public discourse towards the end of spring this year. Julia Kyrychenko and Olha Ivasiuk's recent article on Verfassungsblog outlines major legal and practical obstacles to holding wartime elections in Ukraine. In their illuminating analysis, the authors make a strong case against wartime elections, a viewpoint largely shared by civil society. My argument is a bit different. I will argue that (1) wartime parliamentary elections are expressis verbis inconsistent with the Ukrainian Constitution, and (2) wartime elections would undermine the legitimacy of democratic institutions and potentially lead to democratic backsliding.

Media freedom has many dimensions. Whereas the EMFA deals directly with media oversight bodies and the likes, the proposed anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public participation) directive weighs into a more niche but crucially important topic: the silencing of journalists through bogus litigation. Such bogus litigation - or SLAPPS - does not intend to "win" cases but to slowly but steadily dry out journalists financially, emotionally, and socially. Currently, the Council of the European Union and the European Union Parliament are working on their proposals of the directive. It is crucial that the Commission's proposal will not be watered down.