Parliamentary Systems
In: Comparative Constitutional Engineering, S. 101-119
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In: Comparative Constitutional Engineering, S. 101-119
In: Australian journal of political science: journal of the Australasian Political Studies Association, Band 28, Heft 3, S. 443-457
ISSN: 1363-030X
In: Australian journal of political science: journal of the Australasian Political Studies Association, Band 28, Heft 3, S. 443
ISSN: 1036-1146
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 42, Heft 3, S. 327-359
ISSN: 1552-3829
The institutional differences between presidential and parliamentary rule are well known, yet the practical effects of these divergent constitutional arrangements within democratic policies have received scant attention. This article employs a global data set to test the relationship between a historical measure of parliamentary rule and 14 indicators ranging across three policy areas: political development, economic development, and human development. The study revealed a strong relationship between parliamentarism and good governance, particularly in the latter two policy areas. To the extent that these institutions influence the quality of governance, parliamentary systems may offer advantages over presidential systems of democratic rule. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright.]
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 42, Heft 3, S. 327-359
ISSN: 1552-3829
The institutional differences between presidential and parliamentary rule are well known, yet the practical effects of these divergent constitutional arrangements within democratic polities have received scant attention. This article employs a global data set to test the relationship between a historical measure of parliamentary rule and 14 indicators ranging across three policy areas: political development, economic development, and human development. The study revealed a strong relationship between parliamentarism and good governance, particularly in the latter two policy areas. To the extent that these institutions influence the quality of governance, parliamentary systems may offer advantages over presidential systems of democratic rule.
In: Comparative Constitutional Engineering, S. 183-194
In: The Brookings review, Band 3, Heft 4, S. 16
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 42, Heft 3, S. 327-359
ISSN: 0010-4140
World Affairs Online
In: APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: Economics & politics, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 85-110
ISSN: 0954-1985
In: Economics & politics, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 85-110
ISSN: 1468-0343
The election date is an endogenous choice in many parliamentary systems. This paper explores when governments call elections and how the timing of an election influences the electoral result. Governments have an incentive to behave opportunistically, calling elections at a time when they are performing well. However, the choice of election date reveals information about the government. Specifically, early elections indicate that a government has little faith in its ability to perform well in the future. The analysis is expanded to consider changes in government composition, political business cycles, informational asymmetries and the role of opposition campaigning.
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 38, Heft 1, S. 37-61
ISSN: 1475-6765
Abstract This paper investigates the hypothesis that coalition behaviour in West European parliamentary systems is conditioned by the existence of 'policy horizons' that delimit the extent to which parties can compromise on policy positions in order to participate in government. The first part of the paper demonstrates that policy horizons are implied by certain conceptions of party utility and that their existence would entail important constraints on the coalition game; in particular, they would produce equilibrium outcomes in some situations where voting cycles would normally be expected and they would tend to confine possible outcomes to central locations in the policy space in the absence of equilibria. The paper then develops a method of estimating policy horizons empirically in order to show that they account to a substantial extent for both the size and party composition of governing coalitions in these systems.
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 38, Heft 1, S. 37-61
ISSN: 0304-4130
This paper investigates the hypothesis that coalition behaviour in West European parliamentary systems is conditioned by the existence of 'policy horizons' that delimit the extent to which parties can compromise on policy positions in order to participate in government. The first part of the paper demonstrates that policy horizons are implied by certain conceptions of party utility and that their existence would entail important constraints on the coalition game; in particular, they would produce equilibrium outcomes in some situations where voting cycles would normally be expected and they would tend to confine possible outcomes to central locations in the policy space in the absence of equilibria. The paper then develops a method of estimating policy horizons empirically in order to show that they account to a substantial extent for both the size and party composition of governing coalitions in these systems. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)
World Affairs Online
In: The Parliamentarian: journal of the parliaments of the Commonwealth, Band 86, Heft 4, S. 357-360
ISSN: 0031-2282
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 13, Heft 2, S. 235-263
ISSN: 0010-4140
IN AN EXAMINATION OF INSTABILITY IN PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENTS, A MODEL IS PRESENTED SHOWING THAT WHEN THE POLITICAL SITUATION IS CHARACTERIZED BY THE EXISTENCE OF A PRINCIPAL DIMENSION SUCH AS SOCIALISM-CONSERVATISM, THE COALITION THAT OCCUPIES THE MIDMOST POSITION HAS A REASONABLE CHANCE OF DEFEATING ALL CONTENDERS IN SIMPLE MAJORITY VOTING. THE MODEL EMPLOYS GAME THEORY.