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The two-party system has long characterized American politics, but partisanship as it is understood today is a relatively recent phenomenon. Today, partisanship is not simply based on one's voting record but a totalizing sense of identification with one party over the other. Consequently, the American political climate is more polarized than ever before. Though this fact is often reported with alarm, it may be too soon to determine whether partisanship actually damages democracy. This volume examines what partisanship means today, how this differs from historical partisanship, its contributing factors, and the effect it has on the country.

This research examines the partisan inclinations of American Indians, a minority population with a complicated history with the U.S. government and American society. The empirical analyses identify Native Americans as preferring the Democratic Party over the Republican Party. The impact of being Native American on identification with the Democratic Party is sizable, equivalent to the effect for being Hispanic, Asian, or female. In addition, American Indians demonstrate a pronounced tendency to not affiliate with a major American political party. The higher incidence of non-identification among Native Americans likely results from the importance of their claims for sovereignty and, relatedly, living separate from much of American society. Unlike other broad-based social groups in American politics, Native Americans disseminate cues that reduce the tendency of their members to affiliate with a major political party.

This article compares partisanship across East Asian nations, with four indicators reflecting different dimensions of the concept. Across these indicators, partisanship in East Asian nations was found to be relatively weak compared with most Western democracies, reflecting the less institutionalized nature of their party systems. This could be caused by insufficient time to develop partisanship through mechanisms such as electoral experience and parental socialization. Further breakdowns of income, gender, age groups, and educational levels of partisans showed that more advanced democracies share a relatively uniform pattern across demographics, while young democracies in East Asia showed a more skewed distribution of partisan identifiers, unevenly distributed across income and gender groups. This pattern suggests partisanship is likely to start its development from certain segments of the population and then spread into other segments of the society as a party system becomes more institutionalized.

How do attachments to political parties among the mass publics of East Asia affect the process of democratization in the region? Analyses of the East Asia Barometer surveys reveal that partisanship motivates East Asians to endorse the democratic performance of their political system and embrace democracy as the best possible system of government. These findings accord, by and large, with the socialization, cognitive dissonance, and rational choice theories of partisanship.

Recent work on partisanship has highlighted the role of political parties in rendering democracy and justice widely accessible to citizens. In these recent works, a distinction is drawn between a contemporary conception of partisanship that focuses on fidelity to political parties and a classic conception that emphasises the importance of a civic ethos of active political engagement. I argue that these two conceptions of partisanship are not so disparate if we focus on the role of political parties in promoting civic commitment and contestation. More specifically, I show how a normative account of partisanship can contribute to a defence of a civic ethos of political commitment. I then argue that commitment leads to contestation among both partisans and non-partisans, and that polities lacking active contestation of political commitments are in one significant respect less well off than those societies where there is such contestation.

No factor appears more powerful in explaining how individuals evaluate political information and form political preferences than partisanship. Yet, virtually all work on the effects of partisanship on preference formation neglects the crucial role of social settings. In this study, I examine how social settings can fundamentally change the influence of partisanship on preferences. I demonstrate that, in fact, social settings exert an independent influence over preference formation—one that is even larger than the influence of partisan ambivalence. The central implication of these findings is that, going forward, we cannot fully explore how citizens apply their partisanship in evaluating political information without also accounting for the social settings in which individuals find themselves.

Political parties have generally been disregarded in the literature on political obligation. In this article I argue that, regardless of whether ordinary citizens or residents of a polity have any political obligations, partisanship generates its own kind of political obligations. Participating in party politics qua party members, supporters, activists or even mere voters produces benefits that generate corresponding and proportionate political obligations for those who enjoy them. The political obligations of partisans are easier to justify than those of ordinary citizens as the conditions under which the benefits of partisanship can be rendered excludable are easier to obtain.

Partisanship structures mass politics by shaping the votes, policy views, and political perceptions of ordinary people. Even so, substantial shifts in partisanship can occur when elites signal clear differences on a political issue and attentive citizens update their views of party reputations. Mismatched partisans who strongly care about the issue respond by changing parties in a process of "issue evolution" when writ large. Others simply update their views to match their party in a "conflict extension" process. We build on these models by integrating the largely separate research strands of party issue ownership. Using sexual misconduct as a critical case study, we argue that partisan change can occur rapidly when party elites move strategically to take ownership of an issue, thereby clarifying differences between the parties. Using a quasi-experiment, a survey experiment, and data from dozens of national surveys, we find recent, rapid shifts in party reputations on #MeToo, views of the issue, party votes, and broader party support.