Suchergebnisse

© by De Gruyter 2015. This article presents a model of political insulation of bureaucracies. Political influence can harm competence because it lowers the incentives of bureaucrats to invest in competence. Politicians then want to adopt institutions that insulate the bureaucracy because this establishes a commitment to reward competence. Political leaders insulate the bureaucracy if public good provision is important compared to rent extraction or when political competition forces the political elite to internalize the welfare loss caused by patronage. Through this channel political reforms can lead to reforms of the bureaucracy. The theoretical findings are illustrated with existing empirical studies and data on central bank independence. ; I acknowledge Önancial support from the Ramon y Cajal programme and Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075) ; Peer Reviewed

Abstract
This article presents a model of political insulation of bureaucracies. Political influence can harm competence because it lowers the incentives of bureaucrats to invest in competence. Politicians then want to adopt institutions that insulate the bureaucracy because this establishes a commitment to reward competence. Political leaders insulate the bureaucracy if public good provision is important compared to rent extraction or when political competition forces the political elite to internalize the welfare loss caused by patronage. Through this channel political reforms can lead to reforms of the bureaucracy. The theoretical findings are illustrated with existing empirical studies and data on central bank independence.

Latin American parties have been regularly plagued by factional disputes. Such rivalries are puzzling given the traditional importance of state largesse for building support; in most countries patronage has kept politicians loyal & factionalism at bay. The article uses a game-theoretic model to examine intra-party politics & political careers. It argues that ensuring successful careers requires rising within parties & thus cultivating the support of party colleagues with patronage promises & policy appeals. In Latin America, however, where state resources dominate policy goods when building support, maximizing patronage requires politicians to build minimum-winning coalitions inside parties, leading to predictable patterns of factionalism. The model also shows how the effect of state largesse on factional disputes is moderated in some contexts, particularly where the relative strength of politicians is weak. Weak politicians prefer to cooperate, even if this means reduced private rewards. Figures, Appendixes, References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2007.]

Latin American parties have been regularly plagued by factional disputes. Such rivalries are puzzling given the traditional importance of state largesse for building support; in most countries patronage has kept politicians loyal and factionalism at bay. The article uses a game-theoretic model to examine intra-party politics and political careers. It argues that ensuring successful careers requires rising within parties and thus cultivating the support of party colleagues with patronage promises and policy appeals. In Latin America, however, where state resources dominate policy goods when building support, maximizing patronage requires politicians to build minimum-winning coalitions inside parties, leading to predictable patterns of factionalism. The model also shows how the effect of state largesse on factional disputes is moderated in some contexts, particularly where the relative strength of politicians is weak. Weak politicians prefer to cooperate, even if this means reduced private rewards.

This book provides a theoretical and empirical examination of constituency service in developing countries. The predominant view of distributive politics in "patronage democracies" emphasizes the partisan targeting of pork and clientelism. In contrast, this book demonstrates that high-level legislators in India and other contexts often provide direct, non-partisan assistance to individual constituents.

Patronage Politics Divides Us: A Study of Poverty, Patronage and Inequality in South Africa is the culmination of a research project that forms part of MISTRA's first suite of eight priority research projects. The research explores the relationship between patronage, poverty, and inequality with a particular focus on its impact on the conduct of local politics. The overall aim of the study was to explore the possibility of constituting public institutions in a manner that enables them to become legitimate arbiters between the various interests, rather than as instruments that are captured by c

Political patronage is defined as political actors appointing individuals at their discretion to key positions in the public sector. The book examines this practice in the bureaucracies of 11 Asian countries through the use of a typological framework of patronage types. The framework is based on two key criteria: basis of trust and the major role of political appointees. Several countries with well-developed civil service systems showed minimal levels of patronage (Japan, Singapore and South Korea). Two countries with a weak civil service showed very high levels of patronage appointments (Bangladesh and India). Sandwiched between those extremes are countries with formal civil service systems that are heavily influenced by political parties and by social ties to society (Vietnam, Kazakhstan, and China). The book concludes that not all patronage is the same and what is important is the tasks being performed by appointees and the nature of the trust relationship.

AbstractThis paper empirically investigates the link between political patronage and bank performance for Ukraine during 2003Q3–2005Q2. We find significant differences between politically affiliated and non‐affiliated banks. The data suggest that affiliated banks have significantly lower interest rate margins and increase their capitalization. Furthermore, we show that the level of activity of affiliated deputies in parliament has a positive (negative) impact on banks' capitalization ratio (interest rate margin). Our findings imply, in line with the related literature, that political affiliation has important effects on banks' behaviour.

Political conflict across Africa is often linked to the pervasive use of patronage in retaining control of the state. However, few sources of data have been available to systematically examine the relationship between a leader's patronage strategies and the likelihood of an extraconstitutional change in power. This article employs ministerial appointments to the cabinet as a proxy for changes in the size of a leader's patronage coalition. With time-series cross-section data on 40 African countries, this study shows that the size of cabinets varies systematically according to regime type, resource constraints, ethnic fractionalization, and total population. It then shows that African leaders extend their tenure in office by expanding their patronage coalition through cabinet appointments. A proportional hazards model of regime duration indicates that cabinet expansion lowers the probability of a leader's being deposed through a coup. The appointment of one additional minister to the cabinet lowers a leader's coup risk by a greater extent than does a 1-percentage-point increase in economic growth.