In 2003, the Council of Europe, the highest political organ of the European Union, resolved to adopt the European Security Strategy. This document outlined three fundamental objectives for the EU: stability and good governance in the area of the EU's closest neighbors; creating an international order that would be based not only on bilateral relations, but primarily on efficient multilateral relations; and preventing threats, whether new or traditional. The Strategy assumed that the EU would take the responsibility for international security both in the realm of 'peace keeping' (peace and defensive missions) and 'peace-making' (peace and offensive missions). Defining the threats that the European Union needs to defy, the Strategy enumerates local conflicts, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their potential use against the territory of the EU and its member states, collapsing states, and conflicts breaking out in such states and their neighborhood, as well as organized crime. The assessment of numerous threats to internal and external security, presented in the European Security Strategy, remains up-to-date. There have also emerged new threats for Europe that result from the need to ensure energy security, primarily with respect to the diversification of energy sources. The significance of climate change to international security has increased. The same applies to IT security or piracy. The EU has been rather anxious about the intensification of frozen conflicts, in particular the outbreak of war between Russia and Georgia. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has indicated that the enlargement process is a significant stabilizing factor in the EU neighborhood. Fundamental importance is also attached to the review of cooperation principles with the USA, the crucial role of the UN in the international system, and cooperation with regional organizations, such as the African Union. There is also the need to develop a strategic partnership with NATO, in particular in terms of operational cooperation. Another key factor in the strengthening of the EU's global position is the development of a civil and military crisis response system.
An American model of peace in the Middle East, which evolved from Kissinger's 'little steps' to the separatist agreements of Camp David, was to serve the purpose of regulating the Arab-Israeli conflict and strengthening Washington's influence. In the address delivered on January 23, 1980 (that provided the foundation for the so called 'J. Carter doctrine') the US President said that every "attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America" and thus it "will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force". The abandonment of the Nasserian tradition did not help A. Sadat to win supporters in internal matters. The protest of Nasserists and the Association of Muslim Brothers against the reconciliation with Israel resulted in a tragic attack against the Egyptian president. A. Sadat's death on October 6, 1981 was a blow for the advocates of the peace process. Whether to continue the separatist policy towards Israel or not was up to the will of the new political authorities in Egypt. ; An American model of peace in the Middle East, which evolved from Kissinger's 'little steps' to the separatist agreements of Camp David, was to serve the purpose of regulating the Arab-Israeli conflict and strengthening Washington's influence. In the address delivered on January 23, 1980 (that provided the foundation for the so called 'J. Carter doctrine') the US President said that every "attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America" and thus it "will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force". The abandonment of the Nasserian tradition did not help A. Sadat to win supporters in internal matters. The protest of Nasserists and the Association of Muslim Brothers against the reconciliation with Israel resulted in a tragic attack against the Egyptian president. A. Sadat's death on October 6, 1981 was a blow for the advocates of the peace process. Whether to continue the separatist policy towards Israel or not was up to the will of the new political authorities in Egypt.
It seemed that after the end of the Cold War the democratization process would spread freely ensuring world peace. However, a number of worrying events occurring in international relations have not confirmed these hopes. Robert Kagan asserts that the announcement about world peace in the early nineties of the twentieth century did not come true. In fact, the states have never stopped competing each other just like before the fall of communism. Kagan emphasizes that the characteristic feature in international relations is a rivalry between democratic and authoritarian states. He fears the growing importance of autocracy, especially in China and Russia. Therefore, he urges to promote of democracy and even to build a league of democratic nations as a forum where international disputes could be resolved. On the other hand, there are opinions saying that the importunate promotion of democracy, especially in the form of the "preventive war" in the region reluctant to adopt Western values, such as the countries of the Middle East, may cause more conflicts and no less. Democratic system is a hallmark of the West and not a universal truth. The success of the stabilization of democracy in countries with different culture can't be the results of "preventive war" but a long process. Benjamin R. Barber proposes a noninvasive method to disseminate democracy. He believes that the best way to stabilize democracy in non-Western countries is a civic education. Development of education can eliminate those who may in the future become terrorists. Education reduces the strength of prejudice and moderates hate. Moreover, Barber stresses that support for local democracy through teaching is less costly than the force of arms. When Barack Obama took over power in the United States, it seemed that the strategy of "preventive war", supported by neoconservatives, would be rejected. But the new president's actions indicate that he doesn't intend to negotiate with the enemies of freedom. It has turned out that Obama continues the tradition of American "democratic imperialism". The implementation of neoconservative strategy ignoring the principle of "preventive democracy" portends a permanent conflict, which dismisses the prospect of world peace.
It seemed that after the end of the Cold War the democratization process would spread freely ensuring world peace. However, a number of worrying events occurring in international relations have not confirmed these hopes. Robert Kagan asserts that the announcement about world peace in the early nineties of the twentieth century did not come true. In fact, the states have never stopped competing each other just like before the fall of communism. Kagan emphasizes that the characteristic feature in international relations is a rivalry between democratic and authoritarian states. He fears the growing importance of autocracy, especially in China and Russia. Therefore, he urges to promote of democracy and even to build a league of democratic nations as a forum where international disputes could be resolved. On the other hand, there are opinions saying that the importunate promotion of democracy, especially in the form of the "preventive war" in the region reluctant to adopt Western values, such as the countries of the Middle East, may cause more conflicts and no less. Democratic system is a hallmark of the West and not a universal truth. The success of the stabilization of democracy in countries with different culture can't be the results of "preventive war" but a long process. Benjamin R. Barber proposes a noninvasive method to disseminate democracy. He believes that the best way to stabilize democracy in non-Western countries is a civic education. Development of education can eliminate those who may in the future become terrorists. Education reduces the strength of prejudice and moderates hate. Moreover, Barber stresses that support for local democracy through teaching is less costly than the force of arms. When Barack Obama took over power in the United States, it seemed that the strategy of "preventive war", supported by neoconservatives, would be rejected. But the new president's actions indicate that he doesn't intend to negotiate with the enemies of freedom. It has turned out that Obama continues the tradition of American "democratic imperialism". The implementation of neoconservative strategy ignoring the principle of "preventive democracy" portends a permanent conflict, which dismisses the prospect of world peace.
Differences between countries are the immanent feature of social growth but these days that situation had been complicated by globalization. The benefits of globalization are not so obvious because the new opportunities like: faster growth, higher living standards, promotion of democratic values aren't equally distributed and the global market is not yet underpinned by rules based on shared social objectives. That realities cause serious consequences for safety and peace in world. Those issues are the main challenge for international community. They determinate live standard of people and future of our planet. For that reasons author analyse what United Nations are making to find a solution to that problems and where are both - the main difficulties and weaknesses of international act system. Only that kind of Organizations have a legitimation to create an international forum which is necessary to find a solution for international issue. That is why autor is indicated those problems of inequality as a priority over national interests.
After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities. ; After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities.
After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities. ; After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities.
After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities. ; After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities.
Dynamism and complexity of international environment is reflected in Incessant rotation of values. Experience and knowledge from disaster of Two Enormous World Wars, grounded in complicated structure of contemporary world - democratic values, which have dominated circle of principles. The main role in this process was plaid by United Nations, that became promoter of peace and regard for otherness. The author analyze how international community had been changed. The awareness of circulation of values determines the way of human thinking and proclaimed such important factors in global system. Disproportions in development in different parts of the World are escalated by increasing economic cooperation between international actors, and Hitech achievements. Singular nation cannot solve this issue by itself. Challenges of globalization like: poverty and hunger, pollution, or gender unequal, demand transnational activity. Most of those disadvantages has argued how necessary global social movements are to neutralize global disproportions. The author notices that social activities in global assessment created new attitude for global citizens. Members of this new global community identify world as a common place. That project has been creating and in authors opinion belongs to one of the most important challenge in the future.
Jakub of Szadek is one of the many people from this small town (now in Central Poland), who in XV century came to Cracow to study, and played a significant role in the life of both the Jagiellonian University and the country. He is chiefly known for his diplomatic activity – being an eminent lawyer, he took part in many diplomatic missions during the 13-year war with the Teutonic Knights. He had a major part in the preparation of foundations for the signing of the peace treaty in Toru in 1466. In the years 1474–1476 he performed the function of Rector of Cracow Academy, contributing greatly to the extension of Collegium Minor. In 1476 he was appointed to the high position of vicar general in Cracow diocese. Jakub of Szadek is the co-author of a new approach to the theory of the rights of nations, and human rights, with reference to natural rights, the Gospel and the teachings of Popes and oecumenical councils. He is also one of Polish creators of international law, whose intensive development falls in Poland on XV century. In addition, he deserves the credit for invoking the nationality principle in international negotiations (the principle acknowledging the fact that particular regions are inhabited by people of Polish origin and speaking Polish language, who gave Polish names to cities, mountains, rivers and settlements). At least two texts of his speeches has been preserved until today thanks to J. Długosz, who was his friend. Jakub of Szadek died in 1487.
The aim of this article is to study the place of Ukraine within the most important ideas of the Polish Eastern Policy (PEP). In order to systematize the following presentation we must begin with strategies created in the times of the People's Republic of Poland and conclude by depicting the latest conceptions, introduced within the external policy of the European Union. The first who used this term was Juliusz Mieroszewski. In 1972 in the article entitled "Polish Ostpolitik", he presented a set of his opinions about the policy against the Soviet Empire. Since then, the territorial range of the notion has evolved (nowadays it concerns relations between Poland and Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia) but its characteristics remain quite the same. Among them we can mention: treating the eastern neighborhood of the RP like a multifaceted area, which needs a different approach; traditional accusations of its anti-Russian attitude and making the Ukraine the most important part of each single idea and action taken within the PEP. The last feature of Polish Eastern Policy is a constant struggle between the followers of the "promethean idea" of Józef Piłsudski and the supporters of the "realistic concept" of Roman Dmowski. The article presents fundamental assumptions of the conception of Mieroszewski and Giedroyć, who believed that only rank-and-file initiatives were able to destroy the communistic system, so the nations which depended on Moscow should unite their strives against the "older brother". Mieroszewski encouraged the Poles to struggle with the system but not with the Russian society. From his point of view, the key to peaceful relations in our region was the reconciliation and the abandonment of territorial requests among neighbours. On the opposite, realists claimed that there was no need to waste time on rearranging the proper relations between the Poles and the small east-european nations because only Moscow counted in world politics. Another notion connected with neo-realist idea is the concept of making the economic issues the priority of the foreign policy and making the Polish-Ukrainian relation base on a rational calculation of profits. Another concept of the Polish Eastern Policy is the idea of a strategic partnership between Warsaw and Kiev. Its essential presumptions - the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation and cooperation as the key to our safety and welfare - derive from "The Culture" conception. As the supplement to the above-mentioned concept, politicians of III RP have introduced the idea of creation the Eastern Dimension of the EU's external policy. The followers of this concept believe that by supporting euroatlantic aspiration of Ukraine, Moldova and the Caucasian states Warsaw would gain not only a guarantee of peace in the region but also an improvement of its image and status inside the Community. ; Artykuł ma na celu zbadanie miejsca Ukrainy w ramach najważniejszych koncepcji polskiej polityki wschodniej. Aby usystematyzować ich prezentację, rozpocząć należy od strategii powstałych jeszcze w epoce Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej, a mających wymierny wpływ na sytuację w III RP, a zakończyć na koncepcjach najnowszych, stworzonych już w ramach polityki zewnętrznej Unii Europejskiej. Pierwszym, który użył terminu "polska polityka wschodnia" był Juliusz Mieroszewski. W 1972 roku w artykule zatytułowanym "Polska Ostpolitik" przedstawił on zestaw swoich opinii na temat polityki wobec sowieckiego imperium. Od tego czasu, zasięg terytorialny pojęcia ewoluował (obecnie dotyczy ono stosunków między Polską a Ukrainą, Białorusią, Rosją, Mołdawią, Gruzją, Azerbejdżanem i Armenią), niemniej jego cechy charakterystyczne pozostały co do zasady niezmienne. Wśród nich można wymienić: traktowanie wschodniego sąsiedztwa RP jako zróżnicowanego obszaru, który wymaga różnorodnego podejścia, oskarżenia o antyrosyjski wydźwięk PPW oraz czynienie Ukrainy najważniejszą częścią praktycznie każdej idei czy działań podjętych w jej ramach. Ostatnią cechą polskiej polityki wschodniej jest ciągła walka między zwolennikami "idei prometejskiej" Józefa Piłsudskiego i zwolenników "koncepcji realistycznej" Romana Dmowskiego. W artykule przedstawiono podstawowe założenia koncepcji Mieroszewskiego i Giedroycia, którzy uważali, że tylko oddolne inicjatywy są w stanie zniszczyć system komunistyczny, więc narody będące zależne od Moskwy powinny zjednoczyć swoje starania przeciwko "starszemu bratu". Mieroszewski zachęcał Polaków do walki z systemem, ale nie z rosyjskim społeczeństwem. Z jego punktu widzenia, kluczem do pokojowych stosunków w naszym regionie było pojednanie i rezygnacja z żądań terytorialnych. W przeciwieństwie do niego, realiści twierdzili, że nie powinno się tracić czasu na ustanawianie właściwych stosunków między Polakami a małymi narodami Europy Wschodniej, ponieważ tylko Moskwa liczy w polityce światowej. Innym pojęciem związanym z myśleniem neorealistycznym jest koncepcja ekonomizacji polityki zagranicznej i uczynienia podstawą relacji polsko-ukraińskich czystej kalkulacji zysków i strat. Rozwinięciem linii myślenia paryskiej "Kultury" jest koncepcja partnerstwa strategicznego między Warszawą a Kijowem. Jej zasadniczym założeniem jest polsko-ukraińskie pojednanie i współpraca, jako klucz do bezpieczeństwa i dobrobytu obu państw. Jej uzupełnieniem jest z kolei idea stworzenia wschodniego wymiaru polityki zewnętrznej UE. Zwolennicy tej koncepcji uważają, że poprzez wspieranie euroatlantyckich aspiracji Ukrainy, Mołdawii i państw kaukaskich Warszawa zyska nie tylko gwarancję pokoju w regionie, ale także poprawę wizerunku i statusu wewnątrz Unii Europejskiej.
Po upadku komunizmu i zakończeniu zimnej wojny wydawało się, że świat na trwałe wchodzi w okres stabilizacji, pokoju i współpracy. Szybko jednak okazało się, że świat narastającej globalizacji ma różne oblicza, także negatywne, co rzutuje na prawie każdą sferę życia, także na bezpieczeństwo. Spadło co prawda zagrożenie nuklearne, ale pojawiły się nowe zagrożenia oraz nasiliły te, które przedtem przesłonięte były rywalizacją Wschód – Zachód. Chodzi głównie o konfl ikty etniczno- -religijne, kulturowe i cywilizacyjne, w tym rozlewające się konfl ikty wewnętrzne w państwach słabych i upadłych, proliferację broni masowego rażenia, niebezpieczne ambicje państw dyktatorskich. Ogromny wpływ na ład międzynarodowy i bezpieczeństwo miały zamachy 11 września 2001. Zmieniły one percepcję zagrożeń dla bezpieczeństwa. Terroryzm uznany został za największe zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa, a ogłoszona przez prezydenta Busha walka z terroryzmem doprowadziła Stany Zjednoczone i prawie cały Zachód do zaangażowania w dwie wojny: w Iraku i w Afganistanie. O ile interwencję w Afganistanie i obalenie reżimu Talibów można uznać za swoiste prawo do samoobrony Stanów Zjednoczonych (a właściwie po uruchomieniu art. 5 traktatu waszyngtońskiego za sprawę całego NATO), bo Al-Kaida, która była organizatorem zamachów 11 września, za przyzwoleniem tego reżimu była na stałe zainstalowana w tym kraju, to już interwencja w Iraku miała wątpliwe podstawy prawne, a właściwie była ona jednostronną decyzją USA, podjętą mimo protestów połowy sojuszników NATO. To co nastąpiło potem, w ramach wojny z terroryzmem, przekształciło się w totalny chaos, przypominający wojnę domową, w Iraku obecnie wygasającą, w Afganistanie zaś, już w warunkach obecności tam Międzynarodowych Sił Wsparcia Bezpieczeństwa (ISAF), coraz bardziej nasilającą się. W ostatnich dwóch latach warunki bezpieczeństwa w Afganistanie, za które w praktyce, w ramach ISAF, odpowiedzialne jest NATO, gwałtownie się pogorszyły. Gwałtownie wzrosła liczba zamachów terrorystycznych, a talibowie odzyskują pozycje, kontrolując już prawie 40% obszaru Afganistanu. Sytuacja w Afganistanie i odpowiedzialność NATO za bezpieczeństwo tego kraju budzi ogromne zaniepokojenie przywódców państw natowskich oraz kierownictwa sojuszu. Staje się to również jednym z centralnych problemów nowej administracji waszyngtońskiej. Trwające już siedem lat i rosnące zaangażowanie NATO i sił koalicyjnych w Afganistanie, pionierskie w ramach misji out of area, mimo zaangażowania ok. 64 tysięcy żołnierzy, sprzętu i idących w miliardy dolarów kosztów operacji nie przynosi jak dotąd, oczekiwanych rezultatów. Dlatego też przygotowana i realizowana jest nowa strategia obecności USA i NATO w Afganistanie. Zaangażowanie NATO w Afganistanie często interpretowane jest jako swoisty test dla Sojuszu, jako wyraz rosnącej odpowiedzialności za bezpieczeństwo globalne, w tym za zwalczanie nowych zagrożeń, takich jak terroryzm, których eskalacja jest także ubocznym skutkiem globalizacji. Autor nie w pełni podziela te opinie, choć niewątpliwie obecność NATO w Afganistanie jest ważną i trudną próbą dla Sojuszu, w tym także dla Polski ze względu na rosnące zaangażowanie sił zbrojnych naszego kraju w tę operację. Sprawa udziału NATO jednak rzutuje na stan bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego, eskaluje napięcia i budzi negatywne emocje cywilizacyjno-kulturowe, utrudnia walkę z terroryzmem, kładzie się cieniem na i tak niejasny obraz sytuacji na Bliskim i Środkowym Wschodzie. Na wiele spraw z zakresu bezpieczeństwa globalnego i regionalnego, w tym narodowego poszczególnych krajów (choćby USA), patrzy się przez pryzmat Afganistanu. ; When the cold war ended, after the collapse of communism and when fi nally the Soviet Union disintegrated, there was a widespread feeling through the world that at long last universal peace had descended on earth. The fear of war in which weapons of mass destruction would be used had vanished. Today's world is a vastly different place. It is a world of globalization, which has both good and bad sides. This inexorable process has extended the opportunities of worldwide interchange. But this same globalization process and associated technology have also brought major new threats and intensifi ed existing ones. The threats we face are seamless, running across the boundaries of defence, foreign affairs, domestic and social life. It has left nations and peoples ever more vulnerable to phenomena ranging from international crime and terrorism through to cyber-attacks, health pandemics, energy politics, resource shortages and fi nancial crisis. We are facing the problem of failed states, WMD proliferations, rough countries challenges. We all have to agree that it was a great impact of 9/11 terrorist hijackers and attacks on security. The perception of international security threats has changed. Terrorism has been recognized as the biggest threat for security. The war on terrorism, declared by George W. Bush, has engaged United States and almost the whole West in two wars: in Iraq and in Afghanistan. As far as Afghanistan case is concerned, one has to recognize the legitimacy of American intervention (as did the UN Security Council), as U.S. had the right to self-defence after Al-Qaeda attacks, operating from Afghan territory. In the case of intervention in Iraq there are far going doubts about its legitimacy. The result was not only the overthrow of both regimes, of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Taliban in Afghanistan, but a real mess – if not a civil war – in Iraq. Today, after seven years, the security situation in Iraq has much improved, but in Afghanistan there is ongoing process of violence escalation. In the last years the conditions of security in Afghanistan, for keeping which responsible is ISAF (and practically NATO, being a core of ISAF), has dramatically deteriorated. The number of terrorist attacks has enormously increased and Taliban have regained the control over 40% of Afghan territory. The security situation in Afghanistan and NATO's responsibility for that is the reason of deep concern for both the leaders of NATO member states and Alliance itself. The new American administration has made the confl ict a policy priority. President Obama announced a new strategy for Afghanistan, including the decision to commit an additional 30 000 U.S. military forces to address the confl ict. NATO's engagement in Afghanistan is treated as a kind of test for Alliance and a confi rmation of NATO's rising responsibility for global security, opening new out of area alliance missions. It is also important for Poland, taking in consideration the rising number of Polish troops in Afghanistan. Many questions of global and regional [Middle East] security are treated in the framework of Afghanistan case. ; Многие считали, что после падения коммунизма и окончания холодной войны, мир входит в период стабилизации, мира и сотрудничества. Однако вскоре ока- залось, что в эпоху глобализации мир имеет разные обличия, в том числе нега- тивные, что отражается почти на каждой сфере жизни, в том числе и на безопас- ности. Хотя и уменьшилась ядерная угроза, но появились новые угрозы, а также усилились те, которые ранее, в связи с соперничеством Востока и Запада, на- ходились на втором плане. Главным образом здесь необходимо иметь ввиду эт- ническо-религиозные, культурные и цивилизационные конфликты, в том числе, внутренние конфликты в слабых и распавшихся государствах, распространение оружия массового уничтожения, опасные шаги диктаторских государств. Огромное влияние на международный порядок и безопасность оказали террористические акты 11 сентября 2001 года. Они полностью изменили вос- приятие угроз безопасности. Терроризм был признан самой большой угрозой безопасности, а провозглашенная президентом Бушем война с терроризмом вовлекла Соединённые Штаты и почти весь Запад в ведение двух войн: в Ира- ке и в Афганистане. Если интервенцию в Афганистане и свержение режима та- либов еще можно признать своеобразным правом на самозащиту Соединённых Штатов (а имея ввиду 5 статью Вашингтонского договора делом всего НАТО), поскольку Аль-Каида, ответственная за организацию терактов 11 сентября, с согласия режима талибов имела постоянные базы в этой стране, то интер- венция в Ираке имела очень слабые юридические основания и в действитель- ности она была односторонним решением США, принятым вопреки протестам половины союзников НАТО. То, что произошло в рамках войны с терроризмом, позже превратилось в тотальный хаос, приведший к ослабевающей гражданс- кой войне в Ираке, и усиливающейся войне в Афганистане, происходящей в ус- ловиях присутствия там Международных сил содействия безопасности (ISAF). В последние два года безопасность в Афганистане, за которую в действитель- ности в рамках ISAF, несет ответственность НАТО, сильно ухудшилась. Возрос- ло количество террористических актов, а талибы контролируют уже почти 40% территории Афганистана. Ситуация в Афганистане и ответственность НАТО за безопасность этой стра- ны, вызывает огромное беспокойство глав государств членов НАТО, руководс- тва союза, а также становиться одной из главных проблем новой вашингтон- ской администрации. Продолжающееся уже семь лет и растущее присутствие НАТО и коалиционных сил в Афганистане, не взирая на контингент численностью около 64 тысяч солдат, современную технику и исчисляющуюся в миллиар- дах долларов стоимость операции, пока не принесло ожидаемых результатов. В связи с чем, подготавливается и реализуется новая стратегия присутствия США и НАТО в Афганистане. Действия НАТО в Афганистане часто интерпретированы как своеобразный тест для союза, как проявление растущей ответственности за глобальную бе- зопасность, в том числе за борьбу с новыми угрозами, такими как терроризм, эскалация которого в какой-то степени является побочным следствием глоба- лизации. Автор не полностью разделяет такое мнение, хотя, несомненно, при- сутствие НАТО в Афганистане – это важное и тяжелое испытание для союза, в том числе также для Польши, ввиду возрастающего присутствия вооружён- ных сил Польши в этой операции. Вопрос участия в операции НАТО, хотим мы этого или нет, отражается на состоянии международной безопасности, вызыва- ет напряжения и отрицательные цивилизационно-культурные эмоции, затруд- няет борьбу с терроризмом, оказывает влияние на и так непростую ситуацию на Ближнем и Среднем Востоке. На многие вопросы в сфере глобальной и ре- гиональной безопасности, в том числе и национальной, отдельных стран (даже США), нужно смотреть сквозь призму Афганистана.
