Rozwiązywanie konfliktów i dążenie do ustanowienia trwałego pokoju jest jednym z nadrzędnych celów Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych. Przez lata angażowała się ona w działalność na rzecz budowania pokoju. Do chwili powstania Komisji Budowania Pokoju w 2006 r. żadna część systemu ONZ nie była bezpośrednio odpowiedzialna za pomoc krajom w okresie pokonfliktowym i w dążeniach do budowania trwałego pokoju. Komisja Budowania Pokoju pozwoliła wypełnić tę lukę przez zapewnienie instytucjonalnego i systematycznego połączenia między utrzymywaniem pokoju, operacjami pokonfliktowymi oraz międzynarodową siecią pomocy i działaniami darczyńców, w tym Banku Światowego. Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie funkcjonowania Komisji Budowania Pokoju: zasady jej działania, skład oraz zadania jej postawione. Po przedstawieniu strony normatywnej pokrótce opisano konkretne przypadki zaangażowania Komisji. Podjęto też próbę odpowiedzi na tytułowe pytanie – czy działalność Komisji to sukces czy porażka oraz jakie czynniki mają wpływ na sprawne i skuteczne działanie Komisji Budowania Pokoju. ; Resolving conflicts and achieving durable peace is one of the main goals of the United Nations (UN). For many years the UN has been engaged in peace building efforts. Until the creation of the Peace Building Commission in 2006, however, no part of the UN system had been directly responsible for assistance to States in the post-conflict reality or in the efforts aimed at achieving durable peace. The Peace Building Commission managed to fill in this vacuum through systematic and institutional links between peace keeping, post-conflict operations and international network of assistance as well as activities undertaken by donors, including the World Bank. The aim of this article is to present the functioning of the UN Peace Building Commission: its rules of procedure, composition and the tasks is has been given. First, the normative aspect will be delineated, followed by brief characteristics of concrete cases in which the Commission has been engaged. Based on that analysis, the question whether the work of the Commission has been a success of a failure will be examined and an attempt will be made to determine factors that condition effective work of the Peace Building Commission.
The author describes several social and peace-making initiatives which were undertaken in the last decades by the Catholic organizations active within the diocese of Mendi in Papua New Guinea. The country gained independence in 1975, but remained culturally diversified. The basic identity for most of the citizens is still related to the tribal level. Political conflicts, corruption, abuse of alcohol and narcotics resulted in the past decades in several outbursts of violence among tribes of the Southern Highlands Province. Since the central government was unable to answer this challenge, the Catholic organizations of the Mendi diocese became very much involved in the peace-making process and other social initiatives. Activities of two Catholic organizations are described in more detail, namely the Diocesan Development Secretariat and the Justice and Peace Group, which have succeeded in mediations among several tribes. ; The author describes several social and peace-making initiatives which were undertaken in the last decades by the Catholic organizations active within the diocese of Mendi in Papua New Guinea. The country gained independence in 1975, but remained culturally diversified. The basic identity for most of the citizens is still related to the tribal level. Political conflicts, corruption, abuse of alcohol and narcotics resulted in the past decades in several outbursts of violence among tribes of the Southern Highlands Province. Since the central government was unable to answer this challenge, the Catholic organizations of the Mendi diocese became very much involved in the peace-making process and other social initiatives. Activities of two Catholic organizations are described in more detail, namely the Diocesan Development Secretariat and the Justice and Peace Group, which have succeeded in mediations among several tribes.
It is assumed that on 16 February 2001, Albanians started fighting for their rights in Macedonia with the use of force. On that day armed groups attacked Macedonian police stations in the village of Tanuševci near Tetov. The clashes of various intensity lasted until major amendments to Macedonian constitution were adopted in November 2001.In the first stage of fighting (until May 2001), the Macedonians attempted to disarm the Albanian rebels and destroy the weapons which they had accumulated. This proved difficult because of the support which the latter had in Kosovo and the Prešev Valley, and the guerrilla strategy that they had developed earlier in Kosovo and now adopted. What is more, the Macedonian military actions were slowed down by Americans with the intention of limiting the number of casualties. In April, EU members and the US managed to establish a wide coalition.The major political parties of the country, both governing and oppositional (Macedonian and Albanian) decided to start negotiations concerning the conditions of the future peace treaty - that is, concessions for Albanians living in Macedonia and awarding them more rights. At the same time, the US and members of the EU states opposed the introduction of martial law in the country in order to deal with Albanian rebels by force.The leaders of Albanian parties in Macedonia and the main leaders of the Albanian revolution signed the Prizren Agreement, which was to provide a new plain for the future peace negotiations. Boris Trajkovski, the President of Macedonia, largely agreed with US and UE politics, but for the Prime Minister, his environment and most prominent Macedonian intellectuals - with Georgi Efremov, the President of MANU - the only solution was the division of the Macedonian territory and exchange of their minority groups. The representatives of the EU and US opposed such actions and emphasised that preserving the territorial integrity of Macedonia was absolutely crucial. ; It is assumed that on 16 February 2001, Albanians started fighting for their rights in Macedonia with the use of force. On that day armed groups attacked Macedonian police stations in the village of Tanuševci near Tetov. The clashes of various intensity lasted until major amendments to Macedonian constitution were adopted in November 2001.In the first stage of fighting (until May 2001), the Macedonians attempted to disarm the Albanian rebels and destroy the weapons which they had accumulated. This proved difficult because of the support which the latter had in Kosovo and the Prešev Valley, and the guerrilla strategy that they had developed earlier in Kosovo and now adopted. What is more, the Macedonian military actions were slowed down by Americans with the intention of limiting the number of casualties. In April, EU members and the US managed to establish a wide coalition.The major political parties of the country, both governing and oppositional (Macedonian and Albanian) decided to start negotiations concerning the conditions of the future peace treaty - that is, concessions for Albanians living in Macedonia and awarding them more rights. At the same time, the US and members of the EU states opposed the introduction of martial law in the country in order to deal with Albanian rebels by force.The leaders of Albanian parties in Macedonia and the main leaders of the Albanian revolution signed the Prizren Agreement, which was to provide a new plain for the future peace negotiations. Boris Trajkovski, the President of Macedonia, largely agreed with US and UE politics, but for the Prime Minister, his environment and most prominent Macedonian intellectuals - with Georgi Efremov, the President of MANU - the only solution was the division of the Macedonian territory and exchange of their minority groups. The representatives of the EU and US opposed such actions and emphasised that preserving the territorial integrity of Macedonia was absolutely crucial.
Peacekeeping operations are nowadays an important phenomenon in international relations and especially in conflict-ridden regions. The concept and framework of such operations has been constantly evolving in the past and one of the milestones of this evolution was the fall of the communist system and the end of the cold war. In Europe, this historic moment coincided with establishment by the Maastricht Treaty of the new organism within the process of western Europe's integration: the European Union. Both these facts triggered a reaction of the somewhat passive and hardly visible European defence organisation of the Western European Union. Its Petersberg Declaration of 1992 redefined security and sought to change peace obligations of the member states of WEU, as they accepted a broader responsibility and a broader concept of security in the European region. This was an important first step in making defence integration a part of the mainstream integration process. On the legal basis of the Petersberg Declaration, six operations were carried out. The paper discusses them, showing striking similarities, which actually comprise a special philosophy of intervention by WEU. This philosophy reflects both strengths and weaknesses of WEU's role in the European integration.
Peacekeeping operations are nowadays an important phenomenon in international relations and especially in conflict-ridden regions. The concept and framework of such operations has been constantly evolving in the past and one of the milestones of this evolution was the fall of the communist system and the end of the cold war. In Europe, this historic moment coincided with establishment by the Maastricht Treaty of the new organism within the process of western Europe's integration: the European Union. Both these facts triggered a reaction of the somewhat passive and hardly visible European defence organisation of the Western European Union. Its Petersberg Declaration of 1992 redefined security and sought to change peace obligations of the member states of WEU, as they accepted a broader responsibility and a broader concept of security in the European region. This was an important first step in making defence integration a part of the mainstream integration process. On the legal basis of the Petersberg Declaration, six operations were carried out. The paper discusses them, showing striking similarities, which actually comprise a special philosophy of intervention by WEU. This philosophy reflects both strengths and weaknesses of WEU's role in the European integration.
Unia Europejska odgrywa na arenie międzynarodowej wiele ról, a jednym z priorytetowych kierunków w jej polityce zagranicznej jest region śródziemnomorski. Od połowy lat 90. XX wieku UE stara się odgrywać jednocześnie kilka ról wobec państw w nim położonych. Najważniejszymi z nich są role: aktywnego aktora w rozwiązywaniu konfliktu arabsko-izraelskiego; promotora środków budowy zaufania, partnerstwa, bezpieczeństwa i rozbrojenia; promotora reform rynkowych i zrównoważonego rozwoju; propagatora demokracji i praw człowieka oraz dialogu międzykulturowego.Efektywność ról międzynarodowych, analizowana na przykładzie unijnej polityki śródziemnomorskiej, jest jednak niska, ze względu na konflikt między rolami deklarowanymi, rzeczywistymi i oczekiwanymi. W konsekwencji region śródziemnomorski nie został przekształcony w obszar pokoju, stabilności, dobrobytu i porozumienia międzykulturowego, co od 1995 roku było deklarowanym przez Unię Europejską celem. ; The European Union acts in numerous capacities on the international arena, and one of its priorities in foreign policy involves the Mediterranean. Since the mid-1990s, the EU has been trying to play several roles in its relations with countries in this region, the most significant being: an active participant in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict; a promoter of measures to build trust, partnership, security and disarmament; a promoter of market reforms and sustainable development; an advocate of democracy and human rights as well as cross-cultural dialogue.Assessed on the basis of its Mediterranean policy, the efficiency of the EU's international roles, however, is poor, on account of the conflict between the roles the EU declares to be playing, and its actual and expected roles. As a consequence, the Mediterranean has not transformed into the area of peace, stability, welfare and cross-cultural understanding which has been declared as the EU's objective since 1995.
Unia Europejska odgrywa na arenie międzynarodowej wiele ról, a jednym z priorytetowych kierunków w jej polityce zagranicznej jest region śródziemnomorski. Od połowy lat 90. XX wieku UE stara się odgrywać jednocześnie kilka ról wobec państw w nim położonych. Najważniejszymi z nich są role: aktywnego aktora w rozwiązywaniu konfliktu arabsko-izraelskiego; promotora środków budowy zaufania, partnerstwa, bezpieczeństwa i rozbrojenia; promotora reform rynkowych i zrównoważonego rozwoju; propagatora demokracji i praw człowieka oraz dialogu międzykulturowego. Efektywność ról międzynarodowych, analizowana na przykładzie unijnej polityki śródziemnomorskiej, jest jednak niska, ze względu na konflikt między rolami deklarowanymi, rzeczywistymi i oczekiwanymi. W konsekwencji region śródziemnomorski nie został przekształcony w obszar pokoju, stabilności, dobrobytu i porozumienia międzykulturowego, co od 1995 roku było deklarowanym przez Unię Europejską celem. ; The European Union acts in numerous capacities on the international arena, and one of its priorities in foreign policy involves the Mediterranean. Since the mid-1990s, the EU has been trying to play several roles in its relations with countries in this region, the most significant being: an active participant in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict; a promoter of measures to build trust, partnership, security and disarmament; a promoter of market reforms and sustainable development; an advocate of democracy and human rights as well as cross-cultural dialogue. Assessed on the basis of its Mediterranean policy, the efficiency of the EU's international roles, however, is poor, on account of the conflict between the roles the EU declares to be playing, and its actual and expected roles. As a consequence, the Mediterranean has not transformed into the area of peace, stability, welfare and cross-cultural understanding which has been declared as the EU's objective since 1995. ; 8 ; 49 ; 61 ; 4 ; Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej
The US — Jordan relations, both during and after the Cold War, can be described as close, based on the pursuit of common goals and mutual respect. Although the United States of America and the Kingdom of Jordan have never concluded a formal treaty with each other, they cooperated on many levels, in the Middle‑Eastern region and internationally, both during the second half of the 20th century and in the first two decades of the 21st century. Despite the complex geopolitical situation in the Middle East, re‑occurring threats and challenges that may have weakened the bilateral relations between the two states, the informal alliance between the US and Jordan have survived, which is indicative of the importance of these relations and the strength of the partnership. The place and role of Amman in the foreign policy of Washington have many aspects and dimensions. One can observe certain evolution of the position that consecutive American governments attributed to Jordan depending on conditions that have been both extra‑regional (the Cold War rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union) and intra‑regional (the three Gulf Wars, the Middle‑Eastern peace process). It is also important to emphasize that after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, the mutual relations have gained a different, more strategic dimension. Hence, it can be argued that Jordan's importance in the US foreign policy has only reached its pinnacle during the post‑Cold War era. The present article seeks to pinpoint the place and role of the Kingdom of Jordan in the US policy towards the Middle East after the Cold War and to define the character of the relationship between the two states. Its main goal is to identify and describe both positive and negative factors determining the US — Jordan relations. The article will also attempt to answer the questions about the extent to which the Arab Spring has influenced the shape of the mutual links between Washington and Amman.
W roku 25-lecia przemian w wolności i demokracji chcę ogłosić: W Polsce zakończyła się właśnie transformacja systemowa! Dokonaliśmy gruntownych zmian, zmieniliśmy nawet epokę. Dlatego powinniśmy oficjalnie zamknąć okres transformacji i ogłosić czas państwa dojrzałej demokracji oraz okrzepłej gospodarki. Niech ten rok jubileuszowy będzie symboliczną cezurą pomiędzy etapem burzenia i budowania a etapem urządzania i rozwoju. Niech to będzie nowy złoty wiek Rzeczypospolitej! ; In the year of the 25th anniversary of the transformation of the political system and of the struggle for freedom and democracy in Poland I wish to announce the end of systemic change in our country! The transformation that we undertook and implemented has been thorough and radical, even epoch-making. Therefore, the time has now come to close the period of change officially and to present the Polish State as a mature democracy and with a fully-fledged economy. Let this jubilee year be a symbolic watershed between the previous phase of destruction and construction, and the current phase of establishment and development. Let it be from now on a golden age of the Republic of Poland!Today, twenty five years on, I would like us to look back at the road we have travelled and draw some conclusions; but first and foremost, I want us to look at the present and to look ahead to the future. From a historical perspective it must be recognised that we have achieved a lot in this time of transformation. There have been errors too, sometimes leading to injustice and social inequality. The overall outcome is nevertheless positive, even more so considering where and with what we started. I must admit that 25 year ago, the only wish I had was to open the door to freedom. I did not think what the first day after victory would bring. Maybe I was hoping our freedom would have drawers full of programmes. As it turned out later, we had to build everything from scratch. We were learning democracy and the free market at a practical level, and I must say we have succeeded quite well.Talking about transformations, the path to freedom, or the road we are taking now in a free Poland, we should not only recall the year 1989 and see it as the only cause of our present democracy and free market. The events of 1989 were important, but were neither the first nor the last element in the chain of events that had their origin much earlier. One cannot forget the dramatic events in Poznań in June 1956, December 1970 in Poland and other bids for freedom. These painful experiences instilled in us a strong conviction that the only way to follow was a wisely managed and peaceful struggle. This conviction was subsequently reinforced by the words of encouragement we received from Pope John Paul II and which we managed to turn into reality. These were the foundations on which both the Polish August of 80 and the Solidarity movement grew, not only as a trade union or a freedom movement, but as a philosophy underpinning our actions. This philosophy helped us to survive through the difficult times of the 1980s, a time whichshook the nation, and when Solidarity was greatly weakened. In 1988 and 1989 Solidarity had lost some of its momentum and no longer had the support of so many millions; yet it managed to bring us freedom when we eventually sat down at the Round Table. We achieved much more than the concessions won in the Round Table agreement foresaw – our prime minister in 1989 and our president elected in free elections in 1990 were the two elements that sealed the peaceful revolution. Therefore we must now, twenty five years later as we celebrate the Anniversary of 1989, remember every link in the chain of events that lead to freedom.I would like to see in this logic of the actual causes and effects, another phase of the historic battle for a better future, this time on a global scale. The first calls that Solidarity made for unity, consensus and collaboration in building a fair, safe and prosperous global world take on a particular dimension today, and the Polish experience of solidarity and dreams of freedom may now become a guideline for nations and peoples who in the contemporary world must still cope with enslavement and hopelessness, and here I mean, also our brother Ukrainians and many other nations. Further, it may also show the direction in which global civilisation should develop, and serve as lasting points of reference. This is what the world today lacks most. Neither we, as a civilisation, nor as a global world or individual nations, have so far been successful in identifying those values that would be universal for the whole of humanity, and to which we could refer irrespective of nationality, race or faith. Consequently, we stand helpless in the face of global crises or local conflicts, or even tend to forget that in this global world our neighbour's problems become our problems, too.What our civilisation needs is a catalogue of unquestionable values accepted by all, without exception, on which to build a world of peace and safety. It is important that we agree to build our world on universal values, among which I include solidarity as the foundation of social life in many areas: economy, work, global collaboration, social inequalities. Solidarity and wisely used freedom should be the values from which universal respect for human dignity, the freedom of speech and religion, or the right to justice and equality of opportunity should derive. And we must make sure that these rights are wisely and efficiently exercised in a spirit of solidarity, locally and globally.Let this Anniversary discussion on history be at the same time a call for a debate on the shape of the future. This is the responsibility of the generation of those who have fought for and won freedom, and those who now want to use it wisely. It is our common task to make sure that these historical and democratic achievements, and in particular the potential which we, Poles, still have, is not squandered. It is a task to make the best of the chance Poland has today to build a new golden age. We should also remember that historically it has been a very long time since Poland's geographical and political situation was so stable in terms of lasting security partnerships, economy and development, if it ever was. This is a foundation on which certainly much can be built today. And I shall always be there too, to welcome all who are interested and ready to join. Like twenty five years ago … Or even earlier.