After the Vienna Congress in 1815, the Allied ministers did not return home, but continued their negotiations in Paris. They deliberated on the measure of reparation payments and arrear payments that France owed to the other European states. The new peace also rested on financial securities. The United Kingdom of the Netherlands assumed a large part in these conferences, since through the mass of private claims it was France's largest creditor. In this article we demonstrate how, as one of the essentials of the new concert diplomacy of 1815, smaller powers such as the Netherlands were allowed to weigh in on the Four Powers' deliberations in Paris. The political conundrums regarding these financial securities and reparationshave not been charted and analysed before. Through previously unstudied sources,such as the minutes of the Paris Ministerial Conference, we discuss the influence a secondary power could exert provided they deployed smart financial experts. Under that condition large political and financial gains could be made.
19 pages. --Acta del coloquio: "Conflictivitat i vies de solució a la Mediterrània Medieval" ; [CT] Aquest treball té com a finalitat estudiar els diferents sistemes utilitzats en els segles XIII i XIV pels sobirans catalanoaragonesos per tal d'evitar el desencadenament de les temudes cartes de marca o de represalia que els governs de les nacions concedien a un dels seus súbdits per a confiscar els béns dels ciutadans de l'estat estranger del qual havia sofert un greuge. Els sobirans catalanoaragonesos tractaren d'impedir que les marques que els rei de França decretaren contra la Corona d'Aragó fossin evitades. Per això utilitzaren tres vies: 1. Les negociacions diplomàtiques amb la cort francesa. 2. La instauració d'un impost sobre les mercaderies, amb la recaptació del qual poder compensar els perjudicats. 3. La indemnització dels perjudicats utilitzant els recursos de la propia Corona catalanoaragonesa. ; [EN] This paper has as its aim the study of the different systems used in the XIII and XIV centuries by the Catalano- Aragonese sovereigns to avoid the dreaded letters of warrant or reprisal issued by the governments of various nations. These were granted to one of their subjects to allow him to confiscate property belonging to the citizens from the foreign state which had suffered the wrong. The Catalano- Aragonese sovereigns tried to avoid the letters of warrant decreed against the Crown of Aragon by the kings of France. They used three ways to achieve this: 1. By diplomatic negotiations with the French Court. 2. By the institution of a tax on the merchandise, with which they could compensate those who had been wronged. 3. By the indemnification of the person wronged through the recourses available to the Catalano-Aragonese crown itself. ; El present estudi s'insereix dins del Projecte d'Investigació "La Corona de Aragón en el Mediterráneo medieval: puente entre culturas, mediadora entre Cristiandad e Islam" (Ref. HUM2007-61131), subvencionat pel Ministeri de Ciència i Innovació ; Peer reviewed
Klep, Christ, Somalië, Rwanda, Srebrenica. De nasleep van drie ontspoorde vredesmissies (Dissertatie Utrecht 2008; Amsterdam: Boom, 2008, 385 blz., ISBN 978 90 8506 668 2)When the Home Front meets Foreign Parts. The Aftermath of Commissions of Inquiry into derailed Peace MissionsPeace Missions take place in difficult and volatile circumstances. It is therefore hardly surprising that some peace missions become 'derailed'. Christ Klep zooms in on three 'derailed' missions in his book and focuses on the value of Commissions of Inquiry which are subsequently set up as a result of public and political pressure. Do they succeed in revealing the 'how' and the 'why' of such derailments and – above all – identifying those who are responsible? Based on a broad spectrum of questions and extensive source materials, Klep concludes that 'the number of escape routes from the labyrinth of responsibility is practically infinite'; a clear message for all those taking part in international and domestic politics. It is here that the author skillfully and expertly succeeds: exposing the complex entanglement of domestic and foreign policy, even concerning events that sometimes happen away from the capital city.
Klep, Christ, Somalië, Rwanda, Srebrenica. De nasleep van drie ontspoorde vredesmissies (Dissertatie Utrecht 2008; Amsterdam: Boom, 2008, 385 blz., ISBN 978 90 8506 668 2).ResponseThe validity of my comparative approach (Somalia-Rwanda-Srebrenica) still stands, in my opinion. At the level of political responsibility and the process of coming to terms with events, the similarities are stronger than the differences. My estimation that the Inquiry reports were 'hijacked' by almost all of the stakeholders involved (especially the Canadian, Belgian and Dutch governments) is more of a matter of fact and a political reality than a reproach that ought to have legal implications. Finally, the question of how far the three governments that were involved learned lessons from the three affairs is difficult to answer. Was it not also the wider developments (for example, the switch from the 'blue' missions to the more robust 'green' missions) that compelled the lessons to be drawn out?
The subject of this study is the strategic cooperation of the permanent members in the Security Council in the period 1946 2000. Because of their right of veto the cooperation of the permanent members has a significant influence on the functioning of the Council. The most important aspects of the cooperation that were investigated are the intensity of the cooperation and the ef-fectiveness of this cooperation in preventing and ending wars. To investigate these aspects, for both the intensity and the effectiveness measuring instruments were constructed. These measuring instruments were based on comprehensive sets of so-called 'leading indicators' and statistical methods and techniques. The intensity of the cooperation increased gradually from 1946 until 1990 (the end of the Cold War). Then it started to increase rapidly until 1996. From 1996 a slight decrease can be discer-ned. The strong increase in the strategic cooperation of the permanent members in the security Council can be established in all the majors forms of cooperation in the Council: the numbers of adopted strategic resolutions and presidential statements, the numbers of employed means (like peacekeeping missions and enforcement actions) and the amounts of money that were spent on peacekeeping activities. Further it was established that the response times of the Council regarding potential and waged wars dropped significantly since the end of the Cold War. The effectiveness of the cooperation of the permanent members in the Council was, insofar this was measurable with the applied method, not good for many years, but after the Cold War a clear improvement can be discerned. This goes for the prevention of wars, as well as for post war peacebuilding and the ending of wars. Also the numbers of potential and waged wars in which the Council not intervened dropped significantly since the end of the Cold War, as well as the use of vetoes. The large number of potential and waged wars in which the Council did not intervene during the Cold War was nearly exclusively caused by 'non decisions' (the non placing of wars on the agenda), and not by the use of vetoes by permanent members, as is often assumed in literature. Further, a comparison of two phase classifications of the Cold War showed that the great powers, even when there are great tensions among them, are prepared to cooperate in the Security Council to resolve strategic matters, if they consider this in their interest. Analyses of the adopted strategic resolutions during the Cold War revealed that cooperation here was nearly exclusively limited to issues that were not core issues of the Cold War. From this it can be concluded that cooperation against third party states was a basis of cooperation of the great powers in the Security Council. Finally, the results of this study show clearly that the Security Council was regarded and used to a large extent by the permanent members in the period 1946 2000 as an instrument of foreign policy to pursue their national interests, and not as an instrument of the world community to prevent and end wars.
Hans Schippers surveys the position of Hezbollah in Lebanese politics and its relations with Iran and Syria. Hezbollah is an organisation with two faces. Together with Amal it represents the Shia in Lebanon. It participates in elections and the government. However, in the Southern part of the country Hezbollah constitutes a state within a state, with a militia and a social and medical network of its own. Most of the costs of this structure are paid for by Iran. The Shia leadership of Iran also played a vital role in the establishment of the organisation in 1982. Syria acted as the protector of Hezbollah in its agitation against Israel. With the departure of Syrian troops following the Cedar Revolution in the spring of 2005 most non-Shia Lebanese wanted to see the Hezbollah militia, seen as a pro-Syrian force, dissolved. However, this was refused by leader Nasrallah. The militia protected Lebanon against Israeli aggression, he declared. It is unclear what motivated Hezbollah to kidnap the Israeli soldiers. This action seemed to be co-ordinated with Iran and Syria to divert attention from the Iranian troubles with the United Nations about Iran's uranium enrichment programme. However, also solidarity with Hamas and the personality of Nasrallah may have played a role. The War of Summer 2006 made it clear once more that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict maybe exploited by forces not directly involved, like Iran. The strong presence of European soldiers in the new peace force presents an opportunity for the EU to take the initiative for a restart of the peace process in the region. A new Madrid type conference may offer away out of the deadlock.
Entre agosto y septiembre de 1991, los Países Bálticos forzaron su ruptura con la Unión Soviética, pocos meses antes de que ésta se desintegrara totalmente. A partir de ese momento, la recuperación de su independencia y soberanía nacional -fraguada por primera vez en la época de entreguerras y frustrada por el pacto germano-soviético de 1939-, así como la consolidación de la democracia y el Estado de Derecho y la economía social de mercado, fue de la mano de su aspiración de integración en la Unión Europea y en la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte. Después de más de una década de grandes transformaciones, tanto políticas como socioeconómicas, los tres Países Bálticos -Lituania, Estonia y Letonia- han logrado cumplir con éxito aquellos dos objetivos fundamentales para su futuro en paz, libertad, prosperidad y seguridad en el siglo XXI: el «retorno a Europa» en el marco de la Unión Europea y su vinculazión a la alianza militar euroatlántica dentro de la OTAN. ; Between August and September 1991, the Baltic States forced their break with the USSR, just a few months before the latter disintegrated. From that moment on, the recovery of national independence and sovereignty – first established during the inter-war period only to be thwarted by the pact between Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939 – as well as the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and a market economy, were given impetus by their desire to join the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. After more than a decade of major transformations, both political and socio-economic in nature, the three Baltic States – Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia – have successfully achieved the two fundamental prerequisites for a future of peace, liberty, prosperity and security in the twenty-first century: their «return to Europe» as members of the European Union and their link with the Euro-Atlantic military alliance as members of NATO. ; El presente trabajo se inscribe en un proyecto de investigación (realizado conjuntamente con el prof. Dr. Ricardo Martín de la Guardia) sobre el ideal europeísta y su influencia en los países de la antigua Europa del Este en el camino de éstos hacia su integración en la Unión Europea. Dicho proyecto de investigación ha sido apoyado por el Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte mediante la vinculación del autor como «Salvador de Madariaga Fellow» al Instituto Universitario Europeo de Florencia en los años 1999 y 2003 (para este último año: Resolución de 28 de marzo de 2003, BOE 15 de abril de 2003).
Johannes Henricus van der Palm (1763-1840) was the most famous orator of his age in the Netherlands. He was educated as a Protestant minister, but the revolutionary movements of the 1780s and 1790s launched him into politics and he became Minister of National Education. His extreme tendency to shy away from public conflicts made him less fit for politics and he returned to academia as a professor of oriental languages and sacred rhetoric, after which he reached the pinnacle of fame by speaking about the virtues of peace and harmony at almost every important public occasion. He personified the virtues of the Restoration (1813-1840) and his magnificent voice added to his attraction. Studying the extreme popularity of his oratory and the reasons why he was praised so much helps to better understand this period which was much more devoted to (classical) eloquence than the time after his death. Only if we understand the importance contemporaries attached to oral instead of just written presentation, can historians begin to reevaluate the Restoration that has always been criticised for being dull, superficial and obsessed with reconciling the polarised society after the revolutionary age.Johannes Henricus van der Palm (1763-1840) was de beroemdste redenaar van zijn tijd in Nederland. Hij werd opgeleid als predikant, maar de revolutionaire verwikkelingen van de jaren 1780 en 1790 wierpen hem in de politiek en hij werd agent van Nationale Opvoeding. Zijn extreme neiging openbare conflicten te vermijden maakte hem minder geschikt voor de politiek en hij keerde terug naar de universiteit als hoogleraar in oosterse talen en gewijde welsprekendheid en bereikte toen het hoogtepunt van zijn roem als spreker over vrede en verzoening bij vrijwel ieder belangrijk publiek evenement. Hij verpersoonlijkte de deugden van de Restauratie (1813-1840) en zijn prachtige stem versterkte zijn aantrekkingskracht. Bestudering van de enorme populariteit van zijn welsprekendheid en van de redenen waarom hij zo hoog werd geprezen, helpt om deze periode te begrijpen die zoveel meer gehecht en gewijd was aan (klassieke) welsprekendheid dan de tijd na zijn dood. Alleen als we het belang doorgronden dat in die tijd werd gehecht aan orale in plaats van alleen schriftelijke presentatie, kunnen historici de tijd van Restauratie gaan herwaarderen die altijd bekritiseerd is als saai, oppervlakkig en geobsedeerd door de verzoening van de maatschappij na de revolutionaire tijd.ActualiteitsparagraafSpeeches in crisistijd. Verzoening met woorden in de negentiende eeuw De uitzonderlijke speech van Mark Rutte over het coronavirus staat niet in een Nederlandse traditie van spreken door gezagsdragers. Die was er echter wel aan het begin van de negentiende eeuw, toen de beroemde redenaar, minister, predikant en hoogleraar Johannes Henricus van der Palm bij grote nationale gebeurtenissen het woord nam. Hij behoorde tot de laatste generatie die de welsprekendheid leerde volgens de principes van de klassieke oudheid. In zijn artikel voor BMGN – Low Countries Historical Review (135-1) toont Henk te Velde aan dat Van der Palm door zijn redenaarstalent onvoorstelbaar populair werd. Zijn geruststellende en opbeurende toon paste helemaal in de sfeer van verzoening na de crisis van de Franse Revolutie en oorlog rond 1800. Ook zijn heldere en emotionerende stemgeluid droeg daaraan bij. In de vele beschrijvingen van zijn redes kunnen we hem bijna horen spreken. De volgende generatie keerde zich echter tegen zijn postrevolutionaire harmonie en consensus. Thorbecke nam afscheid van Van der Palms verzoenende crisisretorica: geen holle woorden, maar wetenschappelijke precisie! Hardhandig kwam er een einde aan deze traditie; de nadruk op harmonisch overleg zou telkens terugkeren, maar sinds Van der Palm kent Nederland geen traditie meer van ministeriële speeches.
