Suchergebnisse

Indijski vladar Aśoka (273/269.–232. pr. Khr.) ostavio je znatan korpus natpisa na širokome prostoru svojega carstva o načelima svoje vladavine. Njegovi su pretci osvojili gotovo čitavu Indiju i područja današnjega Afghanistana i dijela Irana. On je vodio samo jedan rat u Kaliṅgi za istočnu obalu Indije. Strašne posljedice toga rata jasno je opisao na vlastitim natpisima. Potom je obustavio ratovanje i odlučio osvajati svijet načelima (buddhističke) pravednosti. Održavao je diplomatske odnose sa susjednim državama i imao poklisare u svim helenističkim kraljevstvima. Četrdesetak godina gradio je drugačiju Indiju i slao misionare da grade drugačiji svijet. Njegove su misli o ratu, miru, pravednosti i brizi za sva bića jedinstvene u povijesti politike. Loza je Aśokina vladala još pedesetak godina poslije njega, otprilike do 185. g. pr. Khr. Potom je na vlast u dijelu carstva došla brahmanistička loza Śunga (185.–73. pr. Khr.), a sjeverozapad su stali osvajati grčki vladari iz Baktrije, a zatim i neki iranski i drugi narodi. Śunge su vjerojatno zaslužni za neku vrst brahmanističkoga preporoda i vjerojatno je da je za njihova vladanja zaokružen narativni dio velikoga ratničkoga epa Mahābhārata. Možda je u to vrijeme ispjevan i bitan dio misaonoga spjeva Bhagavadgītā u okviru toga epa. U njem se raspravlja koliko je rat grijeh, i u kojem slučaju je dužnost, a nije grijeh ratovati. Tu se brahmanistički nazor prepoznatljivo upušta u polemiku s buddhističkim (ne spominjući ga imenom). U kontekstu takve polemike između buddhizma i brahmanizma (a i jinizma) formulirale su se neke od najznatnijih ljudskih dilema u odnosu na rat, nasilje, pravdu i nenasilnost, i stvorili su se obrisi etičkih pogleda na ljudsko djelovanje i život uopće, koji nas i danas jednako mogu potaći na razmišljanje i zauzimanje stava prema životu i drugim ljudima i živim bićima. I buddhizam i brahmanizam razvili su svoje temeljne pojmove o ljudskoj obvezi da se djeluje iz dužnosti bez obzira na vlastitu korist, s krajnjom svrhom da se ostvari opće dobro i održi svijet. Na taj su način izrazili svojevrstan kategorički imperativ da se djeluje u skladu s idealnim općim zakonodavstvom (dharmom, bilo u buddhističkome ili brahmanisičkome smislu), a indijski su ga mislioci izrazili na takav način dvije tisuće godina prije Kanta. Razlika između brahmanističkoga i buddhističkoga shvaćanja ipak je u tome što po brahmanističkome shvaćanju treba toj svrsi težiti djelujući samozatajno iz dužnosti, bez obzira na moguće nanošenje patnje drugima, dok po buddhističkome shvaćanju tu svrhu treba ozbiljiti upravo iz milosrđa koje nas navodi na najveće napore da bismo ljude i druga osje- ćajuća bića spasili od patnje i tjelesne i duševne propasti. Mnogi buddhistički i jinistički nazori i vrijednosti bili su ipak s vremenom prihvaćeni i u hinduizmu. ; The Indian emperor Aśoka Maurya (273/269 – 232 BC) left behind him an important corpus of inscriptions, describing the leading principles of his rule, which were disseminated over the vast territory of his empire. His ancestors conquered almost the whole of India and of contemporary Afghanistan, as well as parts of Iran. He waged only one war in Kaliṅga in order to incorporate the eastern coast of India into his realm. He described the horrible consequences of this war very openly in his inscriptions. He decided to stop waging wars therafter, and to "conquer" the world by means of righteousness in accordance with Buddhist principles. He cultivated diplomatic relations with neighbouring countries and had ambassadors in all the Hellenistic kingdoms. He invested fourty years of his rule in efforts to shape a different India, and sent missionaries to shape a different world. His thoughts on war and peace, on righteousness and care for all sentient beings are unique in human political history. The dynasty of Aśoka, the Mauryas, ruled some fifty years after his death, until 185 BC. After this, the Brahman dynasty of the Śuṅgas (185 – 73 BC) rose to power in the eastern part of the former empire. The northwestern part of the empire was conquered by the Greek rulers of Bactria, and later by Iranian peoples like the Parthians and the Scythians, and other invaders. It is very likely that we have to thank the Śuṅgas for a Brahmanist revival, and the narrative part of the great heroic epic the Mahābhārata was most probably completed during their rule. It is also possible that an essential portion of the famous philosophical and religous poem Bhagavadgītā, which was incorporated into this epic, was composed during the same period. The poem discusses under which circumstances war is a sin, and under which circumstances it is a duty to fight. The Brahmanical or Hindu world¬view here polemically opposes the Buddhist one without naming it explicitly. Some of the most salient dilemmas concerning war and peace, violence and non¬violence, duty and compassion found their expression within the context of the polemics between Brahmanism or Hinduism and Buddhism (and Jinism as well), and ethical views concerning human activity and life in general, which emerged on these grounds, can incite us even today to take our stand with regard to life and to other people and sentient beings. Both the Buddhists and the Hindus formulated their basic concepts of human obligation to act out of duty without regard to personal utility with the ultimate aim of promoting universal good and maintaining further existence of the world. This amonuts to the categorical imperative to act in accordance with what would be an ideal universal legislation (dharma, either in the Buddhist or in the Brahmanist sense), as it found its expression in India two thousand years before Kant in Europe. However, the difference between the Brahmanical and Buddhist conception is that, in the Brahmanical world¬view, this aim should be attained through the self¬denying fulfilment of our duty, irrespectively of the potential pain inflicted on others, while in the Buddhist view, this aim should be achieved through compassion that urges us to invest the greatest efforts to protect other people and sentient beings from pain and physical and spiritual ruin. However, many Buddhist and Jinist views and values were, through the course of time, also incorporated into the Hindu world¬view.

U radu autorica progovara o uspješnosti provedbe demilitarizacije unutar uspostavljenih mirovnih operacija Ujedinjenih naroda na okupiranom području istočne Slavonije u razdoblju od 1992. do 1995. Analizom neobjavljene arhivske dokumentacije, objavljenih arhivskih izvora, onodobne periodike i recentne znanstvene literature možemo zaključiti kako najvažnija mandatna zadaća dogovorena Vanceovim planom nije uspješno provedena. Kao glavni razlozi konačne ocjene o neuspješnosti demilitarizacije izdvajaju se opetovana nesuradnja i provođenje politike opstrukcije krajinskih Srba, nepripremljenost i nemoć razmještenih mirovnih snaga te stalno kršenje vojne nepristranosti i političke neutralnosti, prvenstveno ruskog bataljuna. Okupirano istočnoslavonsko područje 1992. ulazi u sastav Zaštićenih zona Ujedinjenih naroda pod nazivom Sektor Istok, a nadzor sektora i provođenje dogovorenih zadaća pripao je ruskom i belgijsko – luksemburškom bataljunu mirovnih snaga Ujedinjenih naroda. Mandatna zadaća demilitarizacije bila je prvi i najvažniji preduvjet za stabilizaciju stanja na navedenom području te za ispunjenje ostalih dogovorenih zadaća, drugim riječima, za konačnu uspješnost cjelokupne mirovne misije. Međutim, već sam pokušaj provedbe demilitarizacije razotkrio je svu nemoć mirovnih snaga kao i krajnji cilj krajinskih Srba uz potporu snaga Jugoslavenske narodne armije – izigravanje postignutog dogovora o demilitarizaciji. Uslijedio je neuspjeh mirovnih snaga u izvršenju prve i najvažnije zadaće što je rezultiralo kaotičnom sigurnosnom situacijom u istočnom sektoru u promatranom razdoblju te nepromijenjenim stanjem na okupiranom području, a na kraju i konačnim neuspjehom mirovnih operacija u istočnoj Slavoniji. ; In this paper the author speaks of how successfully the demilitarization was implemented within the peace operations of the United Nations in the occupied territory of Eastern Slavonia in the period from 1992 into 1995. From a consideration of the analysis of unpublished archival documents, published archival sources, the newspapers of the time and recent scholarly literature, the conclusion can be drawn that implementation of the most significant mandatory assignment stipulated by the Vance plan was not successful. The main reasons why the demilitarisation can be considered unsuccessful were perpetual lack of cooperation, the obstruction policy of the Krajina Serbs, the unpreparedness and the incapacity of the peacekeeping forces deployed as well as the constant violation of military impartiality and political neutrality, particularly that of the Russian Battalion. The occupied Eastern Slavonian area became part of the United Nations Safe Areas in 1992 as Sector East; the Russian and the Belgian-Luxemburg Battalion of the United Nations peacekeeping forces were charged with the supervision of the sector and the implementation of the agreed assignments. The mandatory assignment to demilitarize was the first and most significant precondition for the stabilization of the area and the fulfilment of other assignments agreed upon, in other words, for the success of the entire peacekeeping mission. However, the attempt to implement the demilitarization revealed the incapacity of the peacekeeping forces as well as the main objective of the Krajina Serbs supported by the Yugoslav People's Army – to circumvent the demilitarization agreement. The peacekeeping forces failed to fulfil their main and most important assignment; the result was a chaotic safety situation in the Eastern Sector during the time of observance, no changes in the occupied territory and eventually the failure of the peacekeeping actions in Eastern Slavonia.

Danas je turizam jedna od najbrže rastućih industrija svijeta i mnogi krajevi i naselja d i¬ljem svijeta pronalaze priliku za svoj napredak upravo u razvoju turizma. Današnji moderni turist sve više se distancira od masovnog turizma i svoj odmor i razonodu traži u mjestima koja još nisu toliko poznata na globalnom tržištu, a odišu mirom, čistoćom i sigurnošću. Međimurje kao turistička destinacija još uvijek je nepoznato na globalnoj turističkoj karti Europske Unije, budući da većina turista koja dolazi u Republiku Hrvatsku pretežno svoj godišnji odmor koristi na jadranskoj obali i jadranskim otocima. Unutrašnjost Hrvatske, a pogotovo sjeverozapadni kraj, još uvijek se slabo promovira i ogroman broj turista nikada nije ni čuo za Međimurje. Međimurje je danas jedna od najrazvijenih županija u Republici Hrvatskoj, a ono po čemu je među najpoznatijima upravo je uređenost infrastrukture. Me-đimurci su poznati kao vrijedni, marljivi, pedantni i uredni ljudi. Njihove kuće, dvorišta, vrto¬vi pa i parkovi oduvijek su bili primjer ostalim krajevima u Hrvatskoj kako i na koji način tre¬ba održavati i voljeti svoj kraj i svoje mjesto. Zbog toga mnogi nazivaju ovaj sjeverozapadni dio Hrvatske "Horvatskim cvetnjakom". Upravo zbog dobrog planiranja i suradnje lokalnih i županijskih vlasti, Međimurje je primjer kako se može dobro organizirati određena regija da bi bile zadovoljne sve strukture društva: gospodarstvenici, turistički djelatnici, lokalna vlast, lokalno stanovništvo, turisti, a da time nije narušen održivi razvoj regije. ; Tourism today is one of the fastest growing industries of the world and many places or parts of the world search for their development in tourism sector. Modern tourist today is more distanced from mass toursim and searches for vacation and holidays in places which are not yet that famous on the global market, but are characterized by peace, cleanleness, and security. Međimurje as a tourism destination is still not known on the global map of Eu-ropean Union, considering that most of the tourists visiting Croatia spend their vacation at the Adriatic coast and Croatian islands. Continental Croatia, especially northwestern part, is still less promoted and most of the tourists have never heard of its beauty and attracti¬ons. Međimurje is one of the most developed Counties in Croatia and is well known for its developed infrastructure. Local population of Međimurje are known as hard working, neet and percise people. Their houses, gardens and parks were always famous as examples of how people should take care of their neighbourhood and how to maintain and love their place and origin. Therefore many people call this part of Croatia Horvatski cvetnjak which can be translated as Croatian flower garden. Precisely due to good planning and good co¬operation beteween people and the local county government, Međimurje can be seen as an example of how a county can be well organized in order to satisfy all social structures: entrepreneurs, tourism employees, local government and citizens as well as tourists. At the same time it shows the possibility to maintain sustainable development of nature without endangering society, nature and economic development.

The author analyzes recent Habermas' writings on the process of European integration & the new international political order. Having for a long time ignored the issues of foreign policy, in his recent works & speeches Habermas has increasingly turned to these topics. The supranational level is becoming important both due to the more severe limitations to state sovereignty in the process of globalization, & because of the development of new mechanisms of international cooperation & the new regional economic-political integrations. In his theory of democracy at the national level, he emphasizes its deliberative character & shows public communication as the central sphere of mediation between the informal (private) opinions & the institutions of the formation of political will. However, today it is necessary to go beyond the boundaries of the nation-state & establish the parallel mechanisms of political deliberation & decision-making at the international level. The most important step in that direction are regional integrations (in Europe, naturally, it is the European Union). The regional integrations must supplement the UN institutions to compensate for the loss of the ability to govern at the national level & to create a counterbalance to global capitalism. In this context it is important to get the answers to a certain crisis of the EU identity. The European Union today is often seen as a mechanism of bureaucratic management & restrictive regulation, instead of as a guarantor of good life. Habermas thinks that Europe should focus on the guarantees of fundamental rights & values such as the right to education, social justice, autonomy & participation. For that purpose, the European Union should develop into a federal state. To the Euro-skeptical objection that Europe lacks a state-building nation i.e a unified nation as the foundation of political community, Habermas responds that the European civil sodety, European public & the common political culture -- if, indeed, they can be built -- are sufficient for Europe's political unity. The process of designing & adopting the European Constitution has strengthened all three components. The Constitution also helps to explain the objectives of the European integration (boundaries of EU's expansion, interrelationship among levels of goverment) & to enhance legitimacy by creating a fundamental legal act, its the design of which European citizens are involved. For Habermas, the crisis of European unity caused by the disunity of the member-countries' governments over the American war in Iraq is an opportunity. The mobilization of the European civil society against that war (as demonstrated by the pan-European peace demonstrations of 15 February 2003) & the creation of the model of the procedurally well-ordered international politics & cooperation which boosts economic development & social security serve as the counterbalance to the American unilateralism & the aspiration for domination. Habermas supports the model of "multispeed Europe" & thinks that it will not cause a rift in the EU, but can as a matter of fact dynamize the process of European integration. The author concludes that Habermas' political views of the European integration & international politics contain a remarkable dose of utopism. However, the attempt to see beyond the limitations of the existing political reality is a must if these limitations are to be overcome. 12 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author analyzes recent Habermas' writings on the process of European integration & the new international political order. Having for a long time ignored the issues of foreign policy, in his recent works & speeches Habermas has increasingly turned to these topics. The supranational level is becoming important both due to the more severe limitations to state sovereignty in the process of globalization, & because of the development of new mechanisms of international cooperation & the new regional economic-political integrations. In his theory of democracy at the national level, he emphasizes its deliberative character & shows public communication as the central sphere of mediation between the informal (private) opinions & the institutions of the formation of political will. However, today it is necessary to go beyond the boundaries of the nation-state & establish the parallel mechanisms of political deliberation & decision-making at the international level. The most important step in that direction are regional integrations (in Europe, naturally, it is the European Union). The regional integrations must supplement the UN institutions to compensate for the loss of the ability to govern at the national level & to create a counterbalance to global capitalism. In this context it is important to get the answers to a certain crisis of the EU identity. The European Union today is often seen as a mechanism of bureaucratic management & restrictive regulation, instead of as a guarantor of good life. Habermas thinks that Europe should focus on the guarantees of fundamental rights & values such as the right to education, social justice, autonomy & participation. For that purpose, the European Union should develop into a federal state. To the Euro-skeptical objection that Europe lacks a state-building nation i.e a unified nation as the foundation of political community, Habermas responds that the European civil sodety, European public & the common political culture -- if, indeed, they can be built -- are sufficient for Europe's political unity. The process of designing & adopting the European Constitution has strengthened all three components. The Constitution also helps to explain the objectives of the European integration (boundaries of EU's expansion, interrelationship among levels of goverment) & to enhance legitimacy by creating a fundamental legal act, its the design of which European citizens are involved. For Habermas, the crisis of European unity caused by the disunity of the member-countries' governments over the American war in Iraq is an opportunity. The mobilization of the European civil society against that war (as demonstrated by the pan-European peace demonstrations of 15 February 2003) & the creation of the model of the procedurally well-ordered international politics & cooperation which boosts economic development & social security serve as the counterbalance to the American unilateralism & the aspiration for domination. Habermas supports the model of "multispeed Europe" & thinks that it will not cause a rift in the EU, but can as a matter of fact dynamize the process of European integration. The author concludes that Habermas' political views of the European integration & international politics contain a remarkable dose of utopism. However, the attempt to see beyond the limitations of the existing political reality is a must if these limitations are to be overcome. 12 References. Adapted from the source document.

Kolaps reda i rasprostranjeno nasilje u Albaniji 1997. godine prouzročilo je pad Vlade i smrt oko 2.000 osoba. Neredi 1997. godine bili su posljedica propasti špekulativnih financijskih piramidalnih shema koje su nalikovale ratnoj ekonomskoj strukturi. Tijekom događaja 1997. godine došlo je do konfiskacije i krađe državne imovine velikih razmjera. Tranzicijsko razdoblje Albanije iz komunističkog u demokratski sustav, započeto 1990. godine, dovelo je do uspostave novih struktura za profitiranje od resursa te zemlje. Neke od tih političkih i ekonomskih struktura nestale su kao posljedica događaja 1997. godine, a druge, uključujući njihove strukturalne posljedice, i dalje su prisutne i imaju utjecaj na političku stabilnost i ekonomski napredak zemlje. Danas možemo ocijeniti uspjehe i neuspjehe Albanije na temelju napretka te zemlje od događaja 1997. godine. U članku se analiziraju događaji 1997. godine kao i transformacija albanskih političkih i ekonomskih struktura između 1997. i 2016. godine, uzimajući u obzir postignuća i neuspjehe. Iz perspektive uspješnosti sagledava se način na koji se zemlja nosila s izgradnjom mira i razvojnom agendom nakon 1997. godine. Razmatraju se čimbenici koji su doveli do neuspješnosti države 1997. godine, kao i oni nakon toga, a koji su pridonijeli povijesnoj uvjetovanosti do trenutnog političkog konteksta države. Premda se mnogo pisalo o 1997. godini, vrlo je malo provedenih analiza iz perspektive istraživanja neuspješnih država. U tom kontekstu u članku se pokušava ponuditi Albanija kao primjer studije slučaja transformativnog procesa od ustanka do sadašnje situacije obilježene kao mješavina uspjeha i neuspjeha. U ovom se članku ukazuje na nekoliko pouka koje bi mogle biti od koristi za strategije usmjerene prema procesu transformacije. ; In 1997 Albania experienced a collapse of order and widespread violence, which resulted in a situation where the government was overthrown and some 2,000 people were killed. The 1997 disorder came as a result of the collapse of fraudulent financial pyramid schemes that had all the features of a war-like economic structure. During the 1997 events, large-scale confiscation and stealing of state assets occurred. Albania's transitional period from communism to democracy, which began in 1990, led to the establishment of new structures for profiting from the country's resources. Some of these political and economic structures, in the aftermath of the 1997 events, disappeared and others, including their structural effects, persist and have had an impact on the country's political stability and economic progress. Today, both the successes and failures of the country are assessed based on the progress that the country has made since the 1997 events. The paper analyses the 1997 events and the transformation of Albania's political and economic structures between 1997 and 2016, considering both achievements and failures. It looks at how the country has dealt with the post-1997 peace-building and development agenda from the perspective of it being a success. It looks at the factors that led to state failure in 1997 and at the factors that continue and have generated a path dependency to the current political context of the country. Although a lot has been written concerning the 1997 events, very little analysis has been conducted concerning what it means from the perspective of research on state failure. In this context, the proposed paper seeks to offer Albania as a case study example of a transformation process, from the uprising to the current situation, which is characterized as a mixture of successes and failures. The belief is that the proposed paper will point to some lessons learned for the strategies directed at the transformation processes.

The regional powerhouse, South Africa, has since the introduction of the nonracial democratic dispensation in 1994, played a central and important role in the formation of both the regional and continental security architecture. With the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, one of the central areas of collaboration for the community was envisioned to be security, understood within a broadened human security framework. Security was therefore from the outset one of the cornerstones of integration in the SADC. It was believed that the formation of a security community would help dismantle the enmities that had plagued regional relations during the apartheid era. For some parties, institutionalisation of relations pointed to a means of stabilising and disseminating a particular order. Such institutions depict the power relations prevailing at the time of their establishment, which, however, can change over time (Cox 1981:136). The integration ambition surrounding security correlated with the ambitions of South Africa, the new democratic government in the regional powerhouse. South Africa and its overall foreign policy ambitions desired the pursuit of peace, democracy and stability for economic growth and development in the region and within South Africa itself. Since South Africa's acceptance into the SADC in 1994, the organisation has attempted to set up the required institutional framework to enable co-operation on security, both in terms of narrow military co-operation and regarding designated 2 softer security issues, such as migration and cross-border crime. The military cooperation moved forward in the early years after 1994 with the 1996 decision of creating an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC)1 and later the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) in 2003, and eventually the creation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) in 2004, which operationalised the OPDSC (SADC 2004). However, the actual military cooperation, e.g. military exercises, came close to a standstill. Several developments obstructed military co-operation of which the evolving crisis in Zimbabwe and the subsequent withdrawal of donor support to, for instance, the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare are but two examples. The RPTC constituted the backbone of the co-operation, but political differences between member states illustrated during the Zimbabwean crisis and following the mandate of the interventions in especially the DR Congo and partly Lesotho in 1998 all contributed to regional tensions.2 Despite the crisis, SADC members, and in particular South Africa, declared that the organisation would be able to form a regional stand-by brigade for the use of the African Union (AU) as part of its wider security architecture. On 17 August 2007, the SADC declared its stand-by-force operational at a large parade in Lusaka, Zambia and at the same occasion signed a memorandum of understanding on the SADCBRIG (SADC 2007). According to the timeline provided by the AU, the brigade should be fully operational by June 2010. Former South African deputy foreign minister Aziz Pahad stated after the launch that this was an important step, but that now there was much to be done securing joint levels and types of training, interoperability, etc. (Pahad 2007). The question that continues to linger is to what extent this brigade is operational and for what purpose. Is this new regional military formation in its present form just a paper tiger, or is it "real progress" and an example of "successful" regional cooperation and integration? This article scrutinises the security co-operation and integration in SADC and asks whether an apparent lack of common values between SADC member states are blocking the security integration process, the creation of a security community, and thereby the establishment of an effective stand-by brigade, the so-called SADCBRIG. The article furthermore attempts to scrutinise the role played by South Africa in establishing the SADCBRIG.

Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "capturing", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization-focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they collaborate in peace and friendliness. So far, the IR liberalism discourse has set the trend of the Russian policy carried out in relation to the Arctic. Thus, it has primarily been the Russian Foreign Ministry and, above all, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that have drawn the overall lines of the Arctic policy, well aided by the Transport Ministry and the Energy Ministry. On the other side are the Russian national Security Council led by Nikolai Patrushev and the Russian Defence Ministry headed by Sergey Shoygu, which both have embedded their visions of Russia and the Arctic in the IR realism/geopolitical discourse. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, does the same. Nevertheless, he has primarily chosen to let the Foreign Ministry set the line for the Arctic policy carried out, presumably out of a pragmatic acknowledgement of the means that have, so far, served the Russian interests best. Moreover, it is worth noting that both wings, even though they can disagree about the means, in fact are more or less in agreement about the goal of Russia's Arctic policy: namely, to utilize the expected wealth of oil and natural gas resources in the underground to ensure the continuation of the restoration of Russia's position as a Great Power when the capacity of the energy fields in Siberia slowly diminishes – which the Russian Energy Ministry expects to happen sometime between 2015 and 2030. In addition to that, Russia sees – as the polar ice slowly melts – great potential for opening an ice-free northern sea route between Europe and Asia across the Russian Arctic, with the hope that the international shipping industry can see the common sense of saving up to nearly 4,000 nautical miles on a voyage from Ulsan, Korea, to Rotterdam, Holland, so Russia can earn money by servicing the ships and issuing permissions for passage through what Russia regards as Russian territorial water. The question is whether Russia will be able to realize its ambitious goals. First, the Russian state energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft lack the technology, know-how and experience to extract oil and gas under the exceedingly difficult environment in the Arctic, where the most significant deposits are believed to be in very deep water in areas that are very difficult to access due to bad weather conditions. The Western sanctions mean that the Russian energy companies cannot, as planned, obtain this technology and know-how via the already entered-into partnerships with Western energy companies. The sanctions limit loan opportunities in Western banks, which hit the profitability of the most cost-heavy projects in the Arctic. However, what hits hardest are the low oil prices – at present 50 dollars per barrel (Brent). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the fields in the Arctic are not profitable as long as the oil price is under 120 dollars per barrel. Whether Russia chooses to suspend the projects until the energy prices rise again – and until it has again entered into partnerships that can deliver the desired technology and know-how – or whether the Russian state will continuously pump money into the projects is uncertain. The hard-pressed Russian economy, with the prospects of recession, increasing inflation, increasing flight of capital, rising interest rates and a continuously low oil price, provides a market economic incentive for suspending the projects until further notice. Whether the Kremlin will think in a market economic way or a long-term strategic way is uncertain – but, historically, there has been a penchant for the latter. One of the Kremlin's hopes is that Chinese-Russian cooperation can take over where the Western-Russian cooperation has shut down. Russia has long wanted to diversify its energy markets to reduce its dependence on sales to Europe. At the same time, those in the Kremlin have had a deeply-rooted fear of ending up as a "resource appendix" to the onrushing Chinese economy, which so far has been a strong contributing reason for keeping the Russian-Chinese overtures in check. The question now is whether the Western sanctions can be the catalyst that can make Russia overcome this fear and thus, in the long term, support the efforts to enter into a real, strategic partnership with China. ; Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, Russia have an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "exploring", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization- focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully.

Pravo na samoodređenje naroda jedno je od najspornijih pojmova u međunarodnome javnom pravu. Jednako tako, taj je pojam ne samo pravni već i filozofski, politološki, sociološki i povlači za sobom razna pitanja i reperkusije. Zbog toga se njegovoj analizi treba pristupiti detaljno, postupno i interdisciplinarno kako bi se sagledali razni važni aspekti toga pojma koji dovode do odgovora na pitanje je li samoodređenje naroda princip ili pravo i koga se tiče, je li to pravo jus cogens de facto i de iure ili je uvjetovano i ograničeno drugim pravilima suvremenoga međunarodnopravog poretka. Tu se prije svega misli na kogentnu zabranu narušavanja teritorijalnoga integriteta postojećih država te ugrožavanja međunarodnoga mira i stabilnosti proklamiranih još u Povelji Ujedinjenih naroda. To povlači za sobom razmatranje načela uti possidetis i njegovih korijena i obveznosti primjene, jednako kao i secesije kao najčešće posljedice afirmativnoga ostvarivanja prava na samoodređenje naroda. Također se na to nadovezuje i pitanje disolucije država, najčešće federalnih, za koju se treba proanalizirati ima li ona materijalne razlike s obzirom na secesiju koja također nije izrijekom ni dopuštena ni zabranjena. Autor sve te povezane pojave i pojmove interpretira kroz nama najbliže poznat slučaj, i dalje nedavnoga, raspada bivše Jugoslavije koja je bila moderni presedan za federalne države, a ima odjeka i u aktualnim zbivanjima poput onih u Ukrajini i Španjolskoj. Da bi se imao još potpuniji dojam o povezanosti prava, politike i raznih interesa, progovara se i o konstitutivnosti naroda, manjinama i njihovim pravima na osnovi raznih dokumenata i mišljenja teoretičara te i o državotvornosti i državnom priznanju za koje jednako tako nema konsenzusa o tome je li ono konstitutivni ili deklaratorni akt trećih država i međunarodne zajednice. Da bi se izbjegao najgori mogući scenarij, a to je onaj prihvaćanja pravnoga "statusa quo", treba kroz otvoreno raspravljanje i davanje prijedloga de lege ferenda precizirati pravnu problematiku kako se ne bi političkim i javnim diverzijama ili distrakcijama prikrivali interesi koji su ili suprotni duhu Ujedinjenih naroda ili su, s druge strane, legitimno suprotstavljeni jedni drugima. ; The right to self-determination of peoples is one of the most controversial concepts in public international law. Also, this concept is not only legal, but also philosophical, and also pertains to political science, sociology and entails various issues and repercussions. Therefore, its analysis should be approached in detail, gradually and with an interdisciplinary approach in order to comprehend the various important aspects of the concept that leads toward the answer to the following question - Is the self- determination of peoples a principle or a right and what else in involved here? Is this right jus cogens de facto and de jure or is it conditioned by the organic other rules of contemporary international order? This primarily refers to the cogent ban of breaching the territorial integrity of existing states and jeopardizing international peace and stability as proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations. This entails a consideration of the principle of uti possidetis and its roots, as well as secession, the most common consequence of the affirmative exercising of the right to self-determination of peoples. Also on the continuation and dissolution of states, mostly federal, which is necessary for an analysis whether or not there are any material differences in relation to secession, which is also neither permitted nor prohibited. The author here will interpret our closest known case (one still recent) the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, which was a modern precedent for a federal state and has reverberation in current events like those in the Ukraine. In order to have a more complete impression of law, policy and various interests will also make mention of the constitutionality of peoples, minorities and their rights through a variety of documents and the opinions of scholars and also concepts concerning the nation and state recognition. There is no consensus whether it is a constitutive or declaratory act by third countries and the international community. In order to avoid a worst case scenario, the acceptance of the legal "status quo", it should be openly debated in order to avoid political and public diversions or distractions that hide interests which are either contrary to the spirit of the United Nations or, on the other hand, legitimately opposed to each other. ; Il diritto di autodeterminazione dei popoli è uno dei termini più discussi del diritto internazionale pubblico. Inoltre, questo termine non è soltanto giuridico, ma anche filosofico, politico, sociologico e lega a sé varie polemiche e ripercussioni. È per questo che l'approccio all'analisi del termine dev'essere dettagliato, graduale ed interdisciplinare affinché si possano osservare i vari aspetti del termine che portano alla risposta del quesito se l'autodeterminazione nazionale è un principio o un diritto e relativo a chi, se è un diritto jus cogens de facto e de iure o se è condizionato e limitato da altre norme del diritto internazionale contemporaneo. Qui si parla in primis del divieto cogente di lesione dell'integrità territoriale e della pace internazionale e della stabilità proclamati persino nella Dichiarazione delle Nazioni Unite. Il tutto suppone l'osservazione del principio uti possidetis, delle sue radici e dell'obbligo d'implementazione, come anche della secessione, conseguenza più frequente della realizzazione affermativa del diritto di autodeterminazione dei popoli. Inoltre, ciò è relativo al fenomeno della dissoluzione degli stati, soprattutto federali, per i quali è doveroso analizzare la presenza di distinzioni materiali riguardanti la secessione, la quale di per sé non è esplicitamente né opzionale né vietata. L'autore interpreta i relativi fenomeni e termini per mezzo del caso a noi più vicino e più familiare, la dissoluzione dell'ex Jugoslavia, la quale è stata un precedente moderno per gli stati federali, e che ha ripercussioni anche nei casi attuali dell'Ucraina e della Catalonia in Spagna. Con lo scopo di cristalizzare il legame fra il diritto, la politica e i vari interessi, si parla anche della costitutività dei popoli, delle minoranze e dei loro diritti in base ai molti documenti e alle opinioni degli analitici, ed infine della creazione e del riconoscimento di uno stato, per i quali nemmeno prevale un consenso se si tratta di un atto costituente o declaratorio da parte di terzi e della comunità internazionale. Al fine di evitare degli esiti catastrofici, ossia l'interiorizzazione dello "status quo" a livello giuridico, è opportuno discutere in maniera aperta per precisare la problematica legislativa ed evidenziare gli interessi contrari allo spirito delle Nazione Unite o semplicemente giustificatamente opposti.

Utemeljen na polazištima kritički orijentiranih sigurnosnih studija i studija terorizma, rad propituje metodološke, epistemološke pa i ontološke aspekte fenomena državnog terorizma. Tvrdi se kako je državni terorizam sustavno zanemareno područje znanja o terorizmu, iako je empirijski vrlo evidentan fenomen. U prvom dijelu rada propituje se klasična i suvremena politološka, sociološka, pravna i filozofska misao važna za razumijevanje države, sigurnosti, terorizma i državnog terorizma. Počevši od Weberove definicije države kao nositeljice monopola na nasilje i njegova koncepta razlikovanja vladavine (Herrschaft) i sile (Macht) tvrdi se da monopol na silu ne podrazumijeva korištenje svakog oblika sile i da država ne može biti ekskulpirana u situacijama kada koristi silu koja ima sva obilježja terorizma. Upravo za ključnim obilježjima terorizma traga se u drugom dijelu rada gdje se analizira postojeće znanje o terorizmu i državnom terorizmu. Na temelju postojećih definicija koje čine bazu od ukupno 373 definicije, sadržajnom i frekvencijskom analizom, dolazi se do operacionalne definicije terorizma i državnog terorizma. Izlučenih šest konstitutivnih elemenata terorizma ukazali su da je državni terorizam organizirana upotreba sile i nasilja ili prijetnja upotrebom nasilja kojom se posredstvom intencionalnog širenja straha odnosno terora, a na temelju anticipiranih reakcija širih psiholoških učinaka, nastoje ostvariti politički ciljevi, a kojega provodi i/ili sponzorira država. U fokusiranoj studiji s mnogo slučajeva u trećem dijelu analizira se državni terorizam na empirijskim primjerima dvadeset i jedne države (N=21). Slučajevi su selektirani na stogodišnjem dijakronijskom kontinuumu, počevši od 1914. godine i sarajevskog atentata na austro-ugarskog prijestolonasljednika Franju Ferdinanda pa do recentnih primjera protuterorističkih politika. Kroz povijesnu perspektivu, komparativnom metodom uz primjenu dizajna najrazličitijih slučajeva, potvrđena je polazna pretpostavka: terorizam jest ciljno racionalno sredstvo za postizanje političkih ciljeva država i njegova je pojavnost neovisna o tipu političkog režima. Kvalitativna i kvantitativna obilježja državnog terorizma nerijetko se razlikuju kako između tako i unutar triju poduzoraka (režima), no usprkos kontekstualnim razlikama, može se utvrditi da je u totalitarnim režimima državni terorizmu ekstremnih razmjera i predstavlja važnu polugu vladavine, dok je u autoritarnima, a napose u demokratskima riječ o fokusiranijem državnom nasilju, najčešće sa specifičnim oblicima djelovanja. ; The basis of this doctoral work rests on the fact that the state terrorism is ignored in the context of mainstream security and terrorism knowledge. Security studies as well as rapidly growing terrorism studies are predominantly focused on non-state terrorism. Critical voices which indicating the importance of the state terrorism phenomenon have emerged in the mid-1990s. Based on the starting points of critically oriented security studies and terrorism studies, this work analyzes the methodological, epistemological and even ontological aspects of the phenomenon of state terrorism. It is argued that the state terrorism is systematically neglected area of knowledge, although it is very evident phenomenon. In the first part of this doctoral work the classical and the contemporary political, social, philosophical thought and jurisprudence important for the understanding of the state security, terrorism and state terrorism have been examined. Max Weber's concept of the state and difference between legitimate domination (Herrschaft) and coercive power (Macht) in the exercise of sovereign state functions is at the center of theoretical discussions. We claim that this distinction remained outside of much Western scholarship. Their concepts are based on logic of what the state and its relations to society should be not what it is. In contrast to this mainstream normative oriented model we examine the empirical reality which is laden of state terrorism examples. Therefore, the second part of this work is dedicated to analysis of existing knowledge about terrorism and state terrorism. The emphasis is on the definitions of terrorism, so for this purpose the database of 373 terrorism definitions was constructed. Definitions collected from the scientific and academic sources, the expert sources, the available official sources of various institutions and organizations, news, etc. were subjected to content and frequency analysis. Those analyses indicated six key elements used for defining state terrorism, which is relevant to the selection of empirical cases. It is found that the state terrorism is the use of organized force and violence or threat to use violence as a means of intentional spreading fear and terror based on the anticipated reactions of broader psychological effects which seeks to achieve political objectives and which is conducted and/or sponsored by the state. It is not an ideology, but the strategy and tactic that can be used by all, including the states. Despite the fact that the most of the definitios are actor-neutral and that their contents coincide, there is no unified definition. According to such understanding, the third part is a focused study with a lot of cases (N=21) where the unit of analysis was state terrorism and analytical sub-units were states (cases) selected from the one century time span (1914th-2014th) complemented with the most recent cases (until the end of 2016th). Thus, it is a diachronic analysis (cross-historical analysis). Since the selected cases differ in several relevant independent variables (social, economic, geographic, cultural) the comparative analysis is based on the most different systems research designs. The basic criterion of comparison was the regime (totalitarian, authoritarian and democratic) in accordance with the tipology of Juan Linz. The main aim of such typology and case selection was to test the general thesis: terrorism is an integral instrument of state action that occurs in all types of political regimes and which states used/use as a form of rational choice to achieve their goals. The third part includes political and sociological analysis of primary and secondary sources for each case (state). The analysis of state terrorism included Italy during Mussolini, Nazi Germany, Lenin and Stalin Russia/Soviet Union, communist Poland, Mao Zednog's China, North Korea regime and Idi Amin's Uganda as a totalitarian regimes. The second group of states are, according to Linz proposal, authoritarian regimes. Here is a Serbian example of state sponsored terrorism in Sarajevo 1914 and assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Another example is Yugoslavia from the mid of 1960 even if it is not purely clear is it predominantly totalitarian or authoritarian regime. Other examples are the rule of Francisco Franco in Spain, death squad in Argentina, Gaddafi's Libya, the rule of Shah Reza Pahlavi in Iran and Suadi Arabia sponsoring of terrorism. Within a democratic cluster the United States of America, Israel, United Kingdom, France, Russian Federation, modern Turkey and Macedonia were analysed. The main findings in turn suggest that the state terrorism was/is practiced in totalitarian, authoritarian and democratic systems, was/is used in war or peace, was/is used by the rich and the poor countries of different cultural, political, economic, geographic and other features. In other words, terrorism is an universal form of state action, but the specific context of each of the analyzed cases does not provide the right to generalize or compare countries according to the basic independent variables - the type of regime. Divided societies and various social cleavages like political (ideological), ethnic, cultural, language, religious, economic and other are evident in the most of the internal state terrorism cases. Although the contexts of countries are quite heterogeneous, in each case analyzed rationality is a common feature of state terrorism. Statet are trying to achieve political goals in the most effective way, what is decisively for using a specific form of violence or threats of violence that we call terrorism. Although it is one of the most frequently used terms in the social sciences, it is evident that terrorism is not conceptually cleared. It is deeply socially constructed concept which depends on a variety of interests. This also affects the contemporary counterterrorism policy. Within the science and policy, terrorism is predominantly viewed as a war and/or criminal. Terrorism is not treated as a phenomenon that is generated from the political area and counterterrorism policies do not target the real causes of terrorism. The perspective of terrorism as a war and crime which is imposed by politics that cooperates with science, leads to a spiral of violence. Illegal and immoral state counterterrorism actions lead to the even more brutal reactions of non-state groups. This trend is especially noticeable from September 9/11 when the "war on terror" started. From this moment it is especially evident that in the name of national security, the degradation of democratic values and endangering human rights and civil liberties have begun. This is best reflected in the new security policies, counterterrorism laws and the state of emergency institute. Also, the democratic deficits are obvious in the examples of interventions in other countries. Illegal character of the war in Iraq shows that international law is not a guarantee nor law nor justice. Those are some contemporary examples of state illegal actions which could be classified as state terrorism in democratic states, but the history is full of state terrorism evidence. Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes in the 20th century, as well as some actual examples, suggesting that the scientific community is biased and ignores the important historical facts as well as contemporary trends. By securitization of terrorism concept, the state harnessed science to its own interest – first of all creating counterterrorism policies. Instrumented science can act only within the limits defined by the state. The main characteristic of the joint state and scientific activity is hypocrisy where identical phenomena do not have identical names. State and science are taking a morally superior position, so state terrorist actions are called "necessary security measures", and terrorism as a pejorative term is reserved only for non-state actors. Further scientific and political ignoring of state terrorism topic, denying a unique definition of terrorism, refusing the recognition of state crimes that fall into the category of terrorism and insistence on counterterrorism as war strategy only feeds the modern evil of non-state terrorism. As long as there is not a change of paradigm in which the force will be firmly under the auspices of the law and policy of double standards will not exist, it is not realistic to expect that the state will eliminate the problem of contemporary non-state terrorism.

U prošlome smo se dvobroju Šumarskoga lista, obilježavajući 250. obljetnicu hrvatskoga šumarstva, osvrnuli na tekstove iz prvih godina njegovog tiskanja, povlačeći paralelu s današnjicom. Zbog uvida u povijesni slijed šumarske struke i interesantnost, pa i aktualnost tekstova, u ovome se dvobroju osvrćemo na tri teksta iz 1880. i 1881. god. vezana uz naslov. Prvi tekst odnosi se na "Naredbu c. k. ministarstva za poljodjelstvo od 13. veljače 1875, B 129/A. M., R.-G.-Bl. Br. 9, koja se odnosi na ispit za tehničko službovanje u državnoj šumskoj upravi" (po toj su Naredbi državni ispit polagali državni službenici u resornim ministarstvima u Pešti i Beču, da bi bili osposobljeni za rad u državnoj službi). Drugi tekst odnosi se na "Dopis od 3. studena 1880. Br. 24509, kojim poziva Visoka kralj. Zemaljska vlada ravnateljstvo Kralj. šumarskoga i gospodarskog učilišta u Križevcih, da sastavi posebno povjerenstvo koje bi imalo čim prije izraditi osnovu za preustrojstvo vladine naredbe od 10. siečnja god. 1850. tičuće se šumarskih državnih ispita u obće". Tako je Osnovu nove naredbe o polaganju državnog ispita za samostalnu šumarsku upravu u Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji, sačinilo povjerenstvo u sastavu: F. Ž. Kesterčanek, Dragutin Hlava i Vladimir Kiseljak, a ona se kao i naredba iz 1875. ponajprije temelji na spomenutoj Naredbi od 16. siječnja iz 1850. god. I iskustvima susjednih zemalja. Ispit se održava svake godine u svibnju. Kandidat mora imati završen odgovarajući studij šumarstva, s dobrim ocjenama iz glavnih predmeta i najmanje trogodišnju praksu. Ispit je pismeni i usmeni, a provjerava se znanje iz predmeta: a) Šumogojstvo, b) Zaštita šuma i šumsko redarstvo, c) Šumska tehnologija i uporaba, d) Geodezija, e) Ustanovljivanje šumskih obhodnja, gospodarskih osnova . . . , f) Šumarska taksacija……s osobitim obzirom na proračunanje vriednosti šuma, šumarsko-financijsko gospodarenje…, g) Šumarsko graditeljstvo (šumski putovi i prometila kao i po šumarstvo važne gradjevine……h) Državno šumarsko upravoslovlje (šumski zakon, naredbe), i sl.), i) Odnošaj privatnog prava prema šumarstvu i lovstvu, j) Temeljna načela neposrednog oporezovanja, k) Obća načela lovstva, l) Obći pregled ratarstva". Nakon 8-satnog pismenog, drugi dan je dvosatni javni usmeni ispit za svakog kandidata, a potom nakon nekoliko dana slijedi konačni "u obližnjoj kojoj šumariji ili šumi". Kandidat se nakon ispita "može proglasiti "odlično" ili pako samo "jednostavno osposobljenim", a nesposobnim pronadjeni kandidat može ispit ponoviti u roku , što mu ga ispitno povjerenstvo (od tri člana) ustanovi". U Naredbi iz 1875. posebno smo uočili dio paragrafa u kojemu se kaže: "Ispitni povjerenik, koji je s kojim kandidatom u rodu ili u tastbinstvu, ne smije kod izpita istoga kandidata prisutan biti", a interesantno je napomenuti da se za prijavu ispita, uz diplomu i potvrdu o radnom stažu u struci, traže i stručne primjedbe i zabilješke koje je kandidat vodio tijekom radnoga staža. U ova dva teksta cilj nam je bio prikazati već tadašnju potrebu, propis, način polaganja i obujam materije za polaganje državnog ispita, a u trećemu (vežući ga usputno za današnje političko kadroviranje), nalazimo odgovor na pitanje naslovljeno u članku:"Usposobljuje li položeni drž. šumarski ispit za samostalno vodjenje službe i za najviše šumarske službe?" Ako ga sami sebi postavimo, odgovor bi bio "da", no ako stavimo ruku na srce i budemo iskreni "pa ćemo morati priznati, da je ipak velika razlika biti šumarskim upraviteljem ili ravnajućim visokim činovnikom. Tko vidi, što se dan na dan zbiva, naći će, da ima vrlo mnogo šumara, koji su pod nadzorom vrstnoga i svjesnoga nadčinovnika ne samo najbolji upravni činovnici, već kadkad upravo odlično postupaju u poslovanju; nu ako se oni odmaknu od svoje svere ili im se obzirom na dosadanje poslovanje predaje vrhovna uprava, pokazuju ovi inače toli vješti činovnici toliku nespretnost i počimaju obično tako naopako gospodariti, te se mora i proti volji pomisliti, da su potpuno nevješti. Ne ima svatko sposobnosti, da ono bude, što hoće, i uz najbolju volju može se dogoditi, da komu njegove vlastite naravne sposobnosti reknu: dovde i ne dalje. Ne treba tumačenja, da uslied ovakovih pogriešaka trpi ponajprije šuma". U daljnjem tekstu sugerira se umjerenost, spoznaja vlastitih sposobnosti i napredovanje pojedinca kroz praksu, korak po korak "do one časti, kojoj može po svojih sposobnostih najbolje zadovoljavati". Glede stanja nakon položenog državnog ispita i cijeloživotnog obrazovanja, kritički se osvrće na "izpitane šumare. Većina njih, osvjedočena, da je "svoju svrhu postigla", ne radi ništa, knjige bacila na stranu, na slavohlepnost je zaboravila, svi su postali prosti i dobroćudni građani, koji u miru sade svoj kupus, i samo nuzgredno obavljaju svoju službu kao šumari, što već davno i nisu. Drugi su opet nemirne glave, puni ideja, od kojih se pako ni jedna ne obistinjuje, jer kakove imadu hire, tako im se mijenjaju i osnove; . progutaju sve knjige, ali malo od toga čestita zapamte, .njihov je rad kadkad izvrstan, nu nikad trajan. i rietko kad komu koristi. Baš od ovih polaze naši, toli slabo "cienjeni veleumi!" Treći dio napokon, i to najmanji, jest cviet šumogojaca. Ugled njihova zvanja, koje su odabrali, im je prvo. Oni ne ostaju na stepenu časti, koju su postigli položivši državni ispit, već znajući, da sad tek počima pravi študij njihove struke, i da se u životu ništa ne uči, da se vremenom opet zaboravi, pomnožuju svoje znanje i izobrazuju se kao muževi, svjestni si svoje svrhe. No, i među tom elitom šumarske struke nisu svi jednaki, i oni imaju svaki svoj limit, pa "gdjekoji obnašaju časti, koje im ne pripadaju, niti bi ih postigli da se je gledalo njihovo znanje." Želeći dobro šumarskoj struci, "kad napokon neće biti kod naše struke prepoznanih veleuma, već gdje će svaki pripadnik šumarske struke sam si stvoriti službu, dokle već sižu njegove sposobnosti. To vrieme bit će zora sjajnoj budućnosti šumoznanstva!" Uredništvo ; In the last double issue of Forestry Journal, which was dedicated to the 250th anniversary of Croatian forestry, we reviewed the texts from the first years of its printing and drew a parallel with the present. In order to gain an insight into the historical sequence of the forestry profession and the interesting and contemporary nature of the texts, this double issue will focus on three texts from 1880 and 1881 dealing with the subject title. The first text refers to the "Instruction of the Ministry of Agriculture of February 13, 1875, B 129/A. M., R.-G.-Bl.No.9, dealing with the exam for technical service in the state forestry administration (according to this Instruction, state exams were taken by civil servants in the competent ministries in Budapest and Vienna, which qualified them for work in the public service). The second text refers to the "Letter of November 3, 1880, No. 24509, in which the High Royal Government invites the Administration of the Royal Forestry and Agriculture College in Križevci to form a special commission for the purpose of drawing up a basis for the reformation of the governmental instruction of January 10, 1850, relating to forestry state exams in general". The Basis of the new instruction for state exams for independent forestry administration in Croatia and Slavonia was drawn up by a commission consisting of F. Ž. Kesterčanek, Dragutin Hlava and Vladimir Kiseljak. Like the instruction of 1875, the new instruction was also primarily based on the already mentioned Instruction of January 16, 1850, as well as on the experience from neighbouring countries. The exam was held in May every year. A candidate had to have completed a study of forestry and received good grades in the main subjects, and had to have at least three years of working experience. The exam was in written and oral form, and the subjects included: a) Silviculture, B) Forest protection and forest service, c) Forest technology and use, d) Geodesy, e) Establishment of forest control, Management plans, ., f) Forest inventory . with particular reference to the calculation of forest value, forest-financial management ., g) Forest civil engineering (forest roads and vehicles, as well as forest structures ., h) State forest legislation (forest laws, instructions), and similar), i) Relationship between private rights on forestry and hunting, j) Basic principles of direct taxation, k) General principles of hunting management, and l) General review of farming". The 8-hour written part of the exam was followed by a two-hour public oral exam for each candidate. Several days later the final exam was taken in a "nearby forest office or a forest". After the exam, the candidate might receive the following grades: "excellent" or "just competent", while those found incompetent could retake the exam on a date set by a three- member examining board". The Instruction of 1875 contains a part of the paragraph stating the following: "An examiner who is a candidate´s blood relative or a relative-in-law must not be present at the exam of the said candidate". It is interesting to note that in order to take the exam, the candidates had to submit not only their diploma and a document confirming their work in the profession, but also professional comments and notes they kept in the course of work.These two texts show that the method of taking state exams and the amount of the matter examined were regulated very early. The third text (related to the present politically-based appointments) gives an answer to the question raised in the article:"Does passing the state forestry exam qualify a candidate for an independent running of the highest forestry service?" If we answer the question ourselves, the answer is "yes", but if we are honest, "we must admit that there is a great difference between being a forest manager and a managing high servant. Those who are aware of what is happening day by day will find that there are very many foresters who, supervised by a competent and conscientious superior servant, become not only the best managing servants but also the best workers; however, if removed from their sphere or if appointed to run the highest administration, those otherwise competent servants display such ineptitude and begin to manage in such an inappropriate manner that one cannot help but conclude that they are utterly incompetent. Not everybody is capable of being what he wants to be; try as hard as one might, one´s own natural abilities tell you: you can get no further than this. Needless to say, it is the forest that suffers most in the aftermath of such errors". The text goes on to recommend moderation, an awareness of one´s own abilities and individual advancement through practical work, step by step, "up to that honourable position which can be best fulfilled by one´s abilities". As for the status after passing the state exam and lifelong learning, the text critically reviews "foresters that have passed the state exam. The majority of them, satisfied with the fact that "they have achieved their purpose", do nothing, throw away the books, forget ambition and turn into simple and well-meaning citizens who plant their cabbage in peace and only carry out their service as foresters in passing. Others, on the other hand, are restless and full of ideas, of which none are realized; their whims are followed by their changing priorities; . they avidly read all the books but remember hardly anything, . their work is sometimes excellent but never of long lasting . and is rarely useful for anybody. This is where the majority of our, so badly "appreciated geniuses" originate. The third part, the smallest one, is the crown of forest managers. The reputation of the profession which they have chosen is their utmost priority. They do not bask in the glory of passing the state exam, but, knowing that this is where the true study begins and that the things learned at one time are usually forgotten later on, broaden their knowledge and educate themselves as men with a purpose firmly in mind". Yet, there are differences even among this elite of the forestry profession. Each of them has their own limit, so "some are in honourable positions that do not rightfully belong to them, nor would they achieve them if their knowledge was the foremost criterion." Our profession will advance and benefit "when we finally do away with the geniuses of the profession, and when every member of the forestry profession creates the service himself according to their abilities. This moment will mark the dawn of a splendid future of the forestry science!" Editorial Board

Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastala je u početcima otvorene velikosrpske agresije na Hrvatsku, ali i usred krize strateško-obrambene koncepcije. Tuđmanova politika čekanja i kupovanja vremena te izbjegavanja frontalnog i općeg sukoba s JNA, doveli su do javnog kritiziranja njegove obrambene politike od strane oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. U okolnostima sveobuhvatne agresije i, prema nekim navodima, očekivanja raskola u hrvatskoj politici, sredinom srpnja počela je rekonstrukcija postojeće Vlade. Novi mandatar Franjo Gregurić okupljao je kadrove za sastavljanje Vlade, a u tom razdoblju javila se ideja o potrebi proširenja Vlade i nekim nestranačkim kandidatima pa i predstavnicima oporbe. U samo dva-tri dana pregovora postignut je nacionalni konsenzus i potpisan Sporazum saborskih stranaka, čime je stvorena Vlada demokratskog jedinstva. Vlada se sastojala od devet parlamentarnih stranaka, od kojih je osam imalo svoje predstavnike u Vladi. Unatoč činjenici da je 1990-ih godina u Hrvatskoj na snazi bio polupredsjednički sustav koji je predsjedniku Republike davao prilično široke ovlasti, Vlada je na području obrambene i vanjske politike pokazivala određeni stupanj samostalnosti. Prema nekim tvrdnjama Vrhovno državno vijeće je ograničavalo slobodu djelovanja Vlade tako da se za svog jednogodišnjeg mandata Vlada trebala često boriti za veću samostalnost i slobodu djelovanja. S druge strane, Vlada je imala potpunu slobodu u unutarnjim poslovima, primjerice u njezinoj politici prema prognanicima i izbjeglicama, kao i u gospodarskoj politici. Unatoč tvrdnjama o "nestanku" oporbe u vrijeme te višestranačke vlade, s obzirom na to da su potpisivanjem Sporazuma o Vladi demokratskog jedinstva saborske stranke od oporbenih formalno postale koalicijske, dostupni izvori navode na drukčiji zaključak. Naime, predstavnici pojedinih oporbenih i ujedno koalicijskih stranaka od listopada 1991. godine često su kritizirali neke odluke vlasti, koje su se posebno odnosile na vanjsku politiku. Predmet njihovih kritika bile su ujedno Vladine i Tuđmanove uredbe sa zakonskom snagom. Vlada je posljednjih šest mjeseci svog mandata bila izložena pritiscima oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. Međunarodno priznanje Hrvatske i priprema za nove parlamentarne i predsjedničke izbore uzrokovali su pritiske na Vladu demokratskog jedinstva, što se prije svega očitovalo u odlascima određenih nestranačkih i oporbenih ministara, a kasnije dovelo i do velike travanjske rekonstrukcije Vlade u kojoj je u znatnoj mjeri promijenjen njezin sastav u korist HDZ-a. Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastavila je djelovati do kolovoza, kad je nakon novih parlamentarnih izbora formirana nova, jednostranačka HDZ-ova vlada. ; After the democratic elections in Croatia in the spring of 1990 and the victory of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the new Croatian Government faced the Serbian insurgency which expressed approval for the Milošević's Greater-Serbian policy. The insurgency was supported by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) that had disarmed Croatia just after the elections in May 1990. In the summer of 1991, the Yugoslav crisis aggravated. Previous occasional and sporadic conflicts between Croatian police forces and the Serbian insurgents escalated into the open aggression of Serbia, Montenegro and JNA against Croatia. In such conditions, Croatian leadership was conflicted about the defense policy. The disagreement caused the appearance of some fractions in the parliament parties, especially in HDZ. Some participants of Croatian politics in the early 1990s today assert that there were at least two main fractions in HDZ – the "moderate" one that supported Tuđman's policy based on avoiding head-on conflict with JNA, and the "radical" one that wanted to declare JNA and Serbia the aggressors on Croatia and to fight back. Some claim that the "radical" fraction even wanted to bring down Tuđman and replace him with someone else. There isn't enough evidence to verify such statements. It probably was the case of dissatisfaction with the situation on the battlefield. Some write about wide discontent and criticism of Tuđman regarding his defense policy, which was evident at the meetings of the main Board of HDZ in the middle of July, Supreme State Council in the end of July and parliamentary session in the beginning of August 1991. Regarding the attitude towards Tuđman, there is a widespread and simplified opinion that his party turned its back on him and that the opposition expressed him support. Exactly the opposite, the opposition, especially heads of the parties Croatian Social-Liberal Party (HSLS), Croatian democratic party (HDS), and Croatian People's party (HNS) expressed equal, or even more severe, criticism of Tuđman's defense policy. In that kind of atmosphere, the reconstruction of the Government resulted in the national consensus – Democratic Unity Government was formed. It was the third democratic Government and the first multiparty Government after the democratic elections. It is an example of a Grand coalition formed during the war in many countries. The main goal of the new Government was to create more effective defense policy that would gather all the necessary political and military structures and establish the unified command structure. That resulted in entering of the Crisis Staff into the Government and forming of the General Staff of the Croatian Army. In the first two months of its mandate, the Government proposed and adopted measures for emergency readiness in order to organize life in the crisis areas. One of those measures included the blockade of the JNA barracks which Tuđman approved September 13 1991. With the blockade, the previous measured and careful attitude of the Croatian leadership towards JNA shifted from passive to active. One part of the research discussed the role of the Government in defense of the cities of Vukovar and Dubrovnik. Regarding Vukovar, there are some controversies embodied in widespread claims that Croatian leadership "betrayed" and "sacrificed" Vukovar by not sending enough weaponry and ammunition. However, available sources, primarily transcripts and records of the Government sessions, suggest that Vukovar was the priority in the supply of weaponry and ammunition. Furthermore, some members of the Government and other representatives of the Croatian leadership visited Vukovar and Eastern-Slavonian battlefield. In the context of all the crisis areas on the Croatian battlefield, Vukovar was the most dominant topic at the Government sessions. At the session held November 17, the Government adopted a series of decisions pertaining to the protection of Vukovar civilians. In the appeals to the international organizations, Vukovar and Dubrovnik were the two most mentioned cities. As was the case with Vukovar, the Government sent weaponry and other military equipment, transported humanitarian aid to Dubrovnik and appealed for help. It is worth mentioning convoy "Libertas" which supplied humanitarian aid to the surrounded Dubrovnik and broke the naval blockade. Also, some Government members came by the convoy to Dubrovnik to show their support. At the end of November 1991, Government sent three of its ministers to Dubrovnik where they had to represent the Government and facilitate its operation in Southern Dalmatia, maintain contacts with the international organizations, negotiate with the JNA representatives and maintain communication with the Croatian Army. The three ministers Davorin Rudolf, Petar Kriste and Ivan Cifrić were situated in Dubrovnik during its heaviest attack and the day after they agreed to a truce with the JNA representatives. The Government supported the negotiations between the city military and civil representatives and JNA because it wanted to procrastinate with the attacks and buy some time to strengthen the military and international position of Croatia. On the other hand, the Government and Tuđman strongly opposed to intentions of "demilitarization" of Dubrovnik which would surrender its arms to the JNA under the supervision of representatives of the international community, i.e. surrender of the city to the aggressor. Second most important task of the Government was the struggle for international recognition. The establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed all the problems of the political structures that young democratic state had to face. Such problems refer to lack of experience as well as technical and financial resources. The Government cooperated with the European Community and the United Nations. Although, Tuđman was the designer of the Forreign Affairs and the Government often had to put into action his decisions, during the Conference of peace in Hague it showed some differentiation, such as declaring it would abort the attending of the Conference unless JNA left Croatia. After the arms embargo in September 1991, the Croatian Government deprived of the right of representation of Croatia in the UN Budimir Lončar and Darko Šilović, due to their role in instigating the decision of the UN regarding embargo. The Government Memorandum, addressed to ministerial Council of the EC in November 22, stated that economic sanctions of the Roman declaration of November 8 would affect mostly Croatia. Such view showed a certain degree of independence of the Democratic Unity Government. The Government accepted the Vance plan but argued the methods of its implementation. The activity of the Government in Forreign Affairs reflects in numerous official and unofficial meetings and encounters with various politicians and statesmen. The main task of the Government members was to appeal to stop the war and recognize Croatia, but they also had to struggle against Serbian propaganda which spread lies about rehabilitation of Ustasha and Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and portrayed president Tuđman and the Croatian Government as anti-Semitic. In that context, some think that the Croatian Government and leadership in general, provided insufficient to the international public. In this research, I also analyzed social politics of the Democratic Unity Government, that is, politics towards Croatian displaced persons and refugees as well as Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees during 1991 and 1992. At the very beginning of the aggression against Croatia, new Croatian Government had to face refugee crisis. Forcible relocations of the Croatian civilians, among which some moved into safe areas in Croatia, while others left the country, induced Government to, with the term "refugee", which refers to those persons who had to emigrate their own country, introduce another one – "displaced persons", which referred to those civilians who hadn't left Croatia, only were displaced to some other territory within the country. Government also adopted some measures to secure accommodation for the displaced persons and refugees by emptying hotels and resorts and founding of the Office for the displaced persons and refugees in November 1991. Funds for the displaced persons and refugees Government secured mostly from the state budget, while all requests for financial help from the international community were unsuccessful. Consequently, in that period Croatia funded also Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees from its budget, while the international community helped only with humanitarian help. In this chapter the Government activity in prevention of persecution of the civilian population was discussed through several examples. In that aspect, its activities were mostly limited to addressing the international community. In the case of Ilok, from where in October 1991 approximately 10.000 people were banished, Government founded the Commission of the Parliament and Government to try to stop the persecution, but it failed to achieve its goal, since the persecution had already begun. After the fall and occupation of Vukovar in November 1991, the Government organized evacuation of approximately 15.000 people, but it was carried out only partially. The Government didn't have control over the war zone, which means that its opportunities for safe and efficient evacuation were highly limited. One of the main plans for the displaced persons and refugees was Government's Return Program, which began its realization only after the end of the war and peaceful reintegration of Podunavlje in 1998. Economic politics of the Democratic Unity Government was reflected in its independence from Serbia. Following measures and decisions of the previous Croatian Government, on the day of its establishment, Democratic Unity Government broke off economic relations with Serbia, however only partially. Those companies with strong business ties with some companies in Serbia, had liberty to continue their cooperation. The export to Serbia and Montenegro was limited only to some "strategic" raw materials and products, such as petroleum. The Government also introduced its own currency, hrvatski dinar (HRD). One of the main achievements of the Government was that it avoided the transit to "war economy", in spite of the increased military spending. Since priority of the Croatian Government was determined by war, its activities gravitated towards repair of the enormous war damage in transport, utility and residential infrastructure. In the end of 1991 the Government established the Ministry of Reconstruction, while in the first half of 1992 the Government composed the Reconstruction Program and its Financial Plan that was adopted by the Croatian Parliament in June 1992. Nevertheless, because of the status quo imposed by the UNPROFOR, located on the occupied territories in Croatia, the reconstruction of the country began after the war had ended in 1995. Analyzed activities of the Government in the Defense policy, Foreign Affairs, as well as its Social and Economic policy raise the question of the Government's independence regarding Tuđman and Croatian Parliament. Considering the semi-presidential system, the Government was the executive authority of the president of the Republic and Croatian Parliament. Government also had legislative powers authorized by the Parliament, because in the wartime a great number of important decisions had to be made in a very short amount of time. The Government was not only the executive body of the President, but it also functioned as his close associate. That manifests mostly through the measures for emergency readiness in August and September 1991. Sometimes, the Government had to step out of its Constitutional powers if developments on the battlefield required it to, for example regarding the decisions about Vukovar, November 17 1991. Regarding activities of the Government in the researched areas, it can be concluded that Democratic Unity Government had a high level of autonomy, taking into account the existing semi-presidential system. Nevertheless, the powers of the Government were limited in the Defense policy and Forregin Affairs, while on the other hand, it had complete autonomy in Internal Affairs, in this case, in its Social and Economic politics. An issue that requires special consideration in this research regards the opposition in Croatia during the mandate of the Democratic Unity Government. Some claim that with forming of the multiparty Government, the opposition in Croatia "disappeared". The remark is understandable considering that all the parliament parties signed the Agreement of Democratic Unity Government, which marked their transition from the opposition to coalition partners. But, did the opposition really "disappeared" form Croatian political life? Numerous public appearances of various representatives of opposition parties and parties in general, indicate otherwise. Activity of the opposition at the Parliament sessions from October 1991 to May and June 1992 shows agility of the opposition life in Croatia. From the beginning of the Democratic Unity Government in August till October, the opposition parties didn't raise any questions in public about some decisions of the Croatian leadership, but from October began severe criticism towards Tuđman and the Government. Discontent was expressed primarily to the acceptance of the Carrington's arrangement in Hague. Criticism of Foreign Affairs arose also after the acceptance of the Vance plan. In the last six months of its mandate, the Government was exposed to various pressures from the opposition and from one part of the HDZ, which reinforced especially after the international recognition at the beginning of 1992. Some opposition and nonpartisan ministers left the Government, whereas in April 1992 there was the reconstruction of the Government which changed significantly the personnel composition of the Government, resulting in the increase of the HDZ members. It was obvious that it was not the exact same Government from the beginning of August 1991 and that its end was near. In the new elections held August 2 1992, the HDZ defeated its opponents and ten days later, new, One-party Government was formed. Establishment and presented activities of the Democratic Unity Government is the proof of the democratic system in Republic of Croatia at the beginning of 1990s and counter-argument for theses about Tuđman's authoritarian style of rule. A multiparty Government, whose prominent members were opposition representatives, couldn't have been formed in an undemocratic or authoritarian system. Forming of the Grand Coalition merely one year after HDZ had won the elections, provides a valuable contribution to the study of Tuđman's policy, shows larger picture of the Croatian leadership and opens the door for further research of Croatian political life in the early 1990s.