Suchergebnisse

After Germany introduced the unrestricted submarine warfare at the beginning of February 1917, the United States declared war on 6th April 1917 on Berlin and joined the First World War beside the Allied countries. In response to the declaration of war the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy broke off its diplomatic relations with Washington on the 9th April 1917. The martial law between the two states came into force on the 7th December 1917 with the US's declaration of war. The First World War ended with the victory of the Entente and the peace was dictated by the victors. US President Woodrow Wilson achieved that the victorious powers adopted the League of Nations Covenant in April 1919, which became part of the Paris peace treaties. The US domestic politics was divided over the League of Nations, and as a result of that the US Senate has not ratified neither Germany's nor Austria's and Hungary's peace treaties. The US concluded a separate peace treaty with the losing countries on the basis of the Knox-Porter-resolution. In the history of diplomacy the Knox-Porter-resolution became known as a peace resolution that abolished the state of war between the parties, but the United States has assured all the rights guaranteed by the ceasefire agreement and the peace treaty. The study deals with the preliminaries, the parliamentary debate, details of the ratification, and also describes the most important points of the peace treaty between the United States and Hungary signed on 29th August 1921.

This study is a continuation of the previously published paper in the Central European Publications No. 35, which presented the political controversies about the codifing of the Trianon Peace Treaty and that massive pressure exerted on Hungary by the great powers for the purpose of making it. The antecedents of the ratification process and the entry into force of the peace treaty were the result of more than one year's process. The study describes the period from 4th June 1920, the signing of the peace treaty, till 26th October 1920, the referral of the peace treaty to the National Assembly. The paper presents in details the content of the ratification bill and its justification. It analyzes the content of the letter in which the Hungarian party informed the ambassadors' commission on the submission of the bill. At the same time, asking the great powers to call on the governments of neighboring countries to respect the minority rights of millions of Hungarians, who were attached to them as a result of the peace treaty. The study describes the French Prime Minister's response to the Hungarian letter, and follows up with the further developments of the ratification of the Trianon Peace Treaty, presents the leading political opinions and the decisions of the National Assembly that determined the Hungarian political life and affected the public's everydays, until the beginning of the ratification debate of the National Assembly, from 13rd November 1920.

The peace treaty that was signed by the representatives of the Hungarian government at the Grand Trianon Palace in Versailles on the 4th June 1920, closed the hostilities between the warring parties, and with its 364 articles, it recorded the severe conditions of peace, striking on the defeated Hungary. The peace agreement has not yet become effective with the signing ceremony. The enactment, ratification and sanction of the signed treaty were just ahead. Since the peace treaty was among the international agreements that came in force only after the ratification – and the implementation could also be demanded after the act – the Hungarian party done all to ensure that the ratification take place as late as possible. They wanted to achieve their limited revisionist goals during this period. However, the victorious powers urged the prompt ratification. It was more than a year process from the beginning of the ratification till the peace agreement entered into force which period can be divided into two major clearly separable phases. The first phase lasted from the signing of the peace treaty on 4 June 1920 till 26 October 1920 with its submission to the National Assembly. The second phase includes parliamentary debates and the ratification itself lasting until 26 July 1921, the exchanging of the ratification documents. The size of the subject made it necessary to present the events of the two periods in two separate studies. Thus, the present study describes and analyzes the events of the first period. The essay gives full details of the ratification as an international norm, covering the codification position of Hungary and the Little Entente states and, relating to the victorious powers efforts. The document gives a detailed analyzes of the great powers's policy which finally forced the Hungarian government to submit the ratification of the Trianon Peace Treaty to the National Assembly.

This study is a continuation of the previously published paper in the Central European Publications No. 35, and No. 43. The study is a continuation of the previously published paper in the Central European Publications No. 35, which presented the political controversies about the codifing of the Trianon Peace Treaty and that massive pressure exerted on Hungary by the great powers for the purpose of making it. The antecedents of the ratification process and the entry into force of the Peace Treaty were the result of more than one year's process. The first study describes the period from 4th June 1920, the signing of the peace treaty, till 26th October 1920, the referral of the peace treaty to the National Assembly. The second study detailed the content of the ratification bill and its justification. Described further developments regarding the ratification of the Trianon Peace Treaty, opinions of leading Hungarian politicians and the decisions of the National Assembly Committee, which determined Hungarian political life and influenced the daily life of the public until the commencement of the National Assembly ratification debate. This study continues the previous one and presents the details of the ratification debate, on 13 November 1920. Details the pre-debate press news, the expectations of the public, statements by the chairmen of the National Assembly Committees. Than it describes and analyzes the detailed discussion, the arguments of the opposing politicians who did not support ratification. These speeches point to the fatal flaws of the peace treaty, the measures that have befallen the Hungarians for a century in its brutality.

This study describes the Habsburg officials and commission members appointed to conclude a peace treaty between the Habsburgs and Ottomans between 1627 and 1629 at Szőny (Hungary). Furthermore, by relying on a database of about 2,000 records drawn from diplomatic and administrative sources and utilizing a quantitative approach, it outlines the channels and focal points for communication between the Habsburg appointees, as well as the direction and intensity of the exchange of information. The analysis of the database leads to the conclusion that the Hungarian palatine, Miklós Esterházy had a major role in the negotiations and that the Imperial Court and War Council played an intermediary role between the palatine and the members of the treaty commission. Furthermore, it points out that the palatine maintained contact with the beylerbeyi of Buda, Murteza pasha, which may have had an impact on the negotiations at Szőny.

The Trianon Peace Treaty had a profound effect on the social and governmental structure of Hungary. These changes, of course, also influenced the field of corrections and actually altered some of its key aspects as well. The author will recall several key penological concepts and ideas from the era to provide an introduction to the philosophical foundations of the establishment of correctional legislation and the resulting substantive changes that occurred. Moreover, a detailed analysis will be provided on the system of enhanced severity workhouses, an emblematic punitive measure that addressed the unfavourable criminological tendencies of the 1920s, which emerged as consequences to the Trianon Peace Treaty. The essay will conclude with deducing the generalized historical, legal, and moral lessons and conclusions pertaining to this peculiar period of Hungary.

The representative of the Hungarian peace delegation took over the final regulations of the peace conference that closed the I. World War, in the beginning of May 1920. The peace treaty dislocated Hungary and with the disannexed territories millions of Hungarians were forced to live in the neighbouring countries. The Hungarian government could react for this dramatic and significant event in two ways: on one hand accept and undersign, on the other side refuse its signatory. After a long debate, the government and the assembly –notwithstanding the public"s dismissal –were under the necessity of the pressure of the victorious powers, and made up their mind of signature. This study leads on this decisionmaking progress, on the strength of the elaboration and analysis of the reports of the government meetings in May 1920. The first part of the study shows debates in the meetings of the cabinet council and the political circumstances of the decision. The second part, in turn, shows the dramatic progress of the decisionmaking, as a result of which they pointed the representatives, whose task was the signature on the 4th June 1920 in the Castle of Grand Trianon. As a part of this, the study examines the personal decisions, the possible signatories, the ones who previously undertook the task. The study furnishes an answer for the controversial question, that why Dr. Ágost Benárd, welfare and labour minister and Alfréd Drasche-Lázár, extraordinary delegate were chosen by the government for the signature.

A magyar politikai és katonai vezetés és 1920-ban még reális lehetőséget látott az békefeltételek, módosítására. Az elképzelés részben a csehszlovák állam komoly belső problémáira épített. Másrészt szovjet-orosz Vörös Hadsereg Közép-Európát veszélyeztető sikerei teremthettek a régióban válsághelyzetet. Mindkét esetben számítani lehetetett arra, hogy a nyugati hatalmak kedvezően fogadnák a Magyar Nemzeti Hadsereg fellépését, a szovjetek által fenyegetett Lengyelország megsegítésére, a térség stabilizálására, a bolsevik veszély elhárítására. Ehhez azonban a magyar csapatoknak be kellett volna vonulniuk a Felvidékre. A magyar kormány titkos tárgyalásokat folytatott francia személyiségekkel, melyek hajlottak volna arra, hogy a magyar segítségért cserébe Felvidék, vagy annak legalább a keleti része ismét magyar fennhatóság alá kerülhessen. A katonai tervek (Ébredés, Pirkadás, Árpád) végül a politikai feltételek hiánya miatt nem valósulhattak meg. A szovjet előretörést a lengyelek megállították, Csehszlovákiában pedig nem került sor bolsevik fordulatra. In 1920, the Hungarian political and military leadership still saw a realistic opportunity to modify the peace conditions. The idea was partly built on the serious interior problems of the Czecho-Slovakian. On the other hand, a crisis situation might have been created in the region by the success of the Soviet-Russian Red Army that was pushing forward towards the West. In both cases, it could have been possible to count on the Western powers' favourable receipt of the act of the Hungarian National Army in order to help Poland that was threatened by the Soviets, to stabilise the region, and to eliminate Bolshevik threat. However, in order to do that, the Hungarian troops had had to march in the Highlands. The Hungarian Government held confidential negotiations with French personalities who would have propended to accept that in turn of Hungarian help, Highland or at least its Eastern part could belong again under Hungarian control. Eventually, the military plans (Awakening, Dawn, Arpad) could not be implemented because of the lack of political conditions. The Polish stopped the Soviets' sudden attack, while in Czecho-Slovakia no Bolshevik turn took place.

At the end of 1918, the Romanian Army overran Transylvania in the context of the Hungarian state crisis. Before the peace treaty conclusion, in 1919, it took over the judiciary in the occupied territories: the courts and the bar of attorneys. This article examines the course and legal context of this takeover: the problem of legality and the actual course of the takeover.

The Treaty of Trianon, signed on June 4, 1920, affected Hungary is several ways. The country lost almost two-thirds of its population and territory. The peace treaty not only had territorial, national, economic and military consequences, but several Hungarian higher education institutions were also affected disadvantageously. After 1919 there was no education at most Hungarian universities and as a result of the new borders, the country's network of higher education institutions changed significantly. Universities in the detached territories were forced to leave. The study presents the operating conditions of the universities (Kolozsvári Magyar Királyi Ferenc József Tudományegyetem, Magyar Királyi Erzsébet Tudományegyetem, Bányászati és Erdészeti Főiskola) and certain faculties involved following the Trianon Peace Treaty. The study also shows how the Treaty changed the Hungarian higher education, and how it changed the Hungarian higher education map. Kuno Klebelsberg realised that the cultural differences caused by the change in the landscape of higher education couldn't be sustained for a long time, so he implemented a number of actions in order to lessen the predominance of Budapest. The study covers the most important actions in the field of higher education. It examines the change in the number of students as well as the rate of those with university degree after the new borders were defined. Changes in the institutional network and the history of the universities are based on secondary literature analysis. The presentation of the student statistics is based on the analysis of data published in the Statistical Yearbooks of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office. Az 1920. június 4-én aláírt trianoni békeszerződés több szempontból is sújtotta hazánkat. Az ország elvesztette lakosságának és területének csaknem kétharmadát. A békeszerződésnek nemcsak területi, nemzetiségi, gazdasági és katonai hatásai voltak, hanem számos magyar felsőoktatási intézményt is hátrányosan érintett. 1919-től már a legtöbb hazai egyetemen nem folyt oktatás, és a történelmi Magyarország összeomlásának következményeként az ország felsőoktatási intézményhálózata is számottevően megváltozott. Az elcsatolt részeken ragadt egyetemek többségének nem volt maradása. A tanulmány bemutatja a trianoni békeszerződést követően az érintett egyetemeknek (Kolozsvári Magyar Királyi Ferenc József Tudományegyetem, pozsonyi Erzsébet Tudományegyetem és selmecbányai Bányászati és Erdészeti Főiskola) és egyes egyetemi karoknak a működési feltételét. Értékeli továbbá, hogy a békekötés következtében a magyar felsőoktatás milyen intézményhálózati változáson ment keresztül, és hogyan változott meg az ország felsőoktatási intézménytérképe. Klebelsberg Kunó felismerte, hogy a felsőoktatási térszerkezet változása miatt kialakult kulturális egyenlőtlenség nem tartható fent sokáig ezért számos olyan intézkedést hozott, amely Budapest túlsúlyát próbálta enyhíteni. A tanulmány a legfontosabb, felsőoktatást érintő intézkedésekre is kitér. Megvizsgálja, hogy milyen mértékben változott meg a hallgatók száma, illetve a felsőfokú végzettségűek aránya az új országhatárok kijelölését követően. Az intézményhálózati változások, illetve az egyetemek történeténetek bemutatása szakirodalmi másodelemzés alapján készült. A hallgatói statisztikák bemutatása a Központi Statisztikai Hivatal által kiadott Statisztikai Évkönyvekben közölt adatok elemzésén alapul.