Suchergebnisse

This thesis is a result of a careful thought on what peace is and what its essential features, aims and necessary conditions are. I have proposed a notion that inner peace of individuals making up a given community (especially of leadership elites) is conducive to collective safety, while significant disturbance of the inner peace of a certain group of individuals results in a global unrest, often on an international scale. In an attempt to approach the subject in a comprehensive manner I justified that inner peace of individuals leads to global inner and outer peace. I also conducted lexical analyses aimed at identifying identical, synonymous and antonymous terms with the word, "peace". I indicated the main reasons for war and the conditions for keeping peace, emphasizing the significance of pedagogics in the prophylaxis of war and in the spreading of the culture of peace. I also proposed a classification of philosophical and pedagogical attitudes of intellectuals devoting their efforts to the concept of peace throughout the history of humankind and in the world of today. I presented argumentation confirming the assumption that the culture of peace results from a certain upbringing process based on a democratic existence of parents with their child. My praxeological propositions include the educational and prophylactic function of biographies of individuals commonly recognized as promoters of peace. I also provided an outline of the upbringing programs aimed at children and the youth, and serving the role of strengthening peace and public safety.

Africa is subject of special interest for member states of the European Union. Since the beginning of the European Community, economical relations with African countries have been part of organization's functioning. Political aspect of those relations was a result of treaty amendments. During the summit of December 15–16, 2005, the EU Strategy for Africa was adopted by the European Council. The document was an example of comprehensive position of the European Union towards the African continent and served as a basis for the future strategic partnership between the European Union and Africa, confirmed during the second and the third summit of 2007 and 2010. The aim of this paper is to analise mechanisms of implementation of the EU Strategy for Africa. Attention will be paid to indicate the possibility and conditions of effective implementation and to evaluate effects of strategic partnership with Africa. ; Africa is subject of special interest for member states of the European Union. Since the beginning of the European Community, economical relations with African countries have been part of organization's functioning. Political aspect of those relations was a result of treaty amendments. During the summit of December 15–16, 2005, the EU Strategy for Africa was adopted by the European Council. The document was an example of comprehensive position of the European Union towards the African continent and served as a basis for the future strategic partnership between the European Union and Africa, confirmed during the second and the third summit of 2007 and 2010. The aim of this paper is to analise mechanisms of implementation of the EU Strategy for Africa. Attention will be paid to indicate the possibility and conditions of effective implementation and to evaluate effects of strategic partnership with Africa.

Klep, Christ, Somalië, Rwanda, Srebrenica. De nasleep van drie ontspoorde vredesmissies (Dissertatie Utrecht 2008; Amsterdam: Boom, 2008, 385 blz., ISBN 978 90 8506 668 2)When the Home Front meets Foreign Parts. The Aftermath of Commissions of Inquiry into derailed Peace MissionsPeace Missions take place in difficult and volatile circumstances. It is therefore hardly surprising that some peace missions become 'derailed'. Christ Klep zooms in on three 'derailed' missions in his book and focuses on the value of Commissions of Inquiry which are subsequently set up as a result of public and political pressure. Do they succeed in revealing the 'how' and the 'why' of such derailments and – above all – identifying those who are responsible? Based on a broad spectrum of questions and extensive source materials, Klep concludes that 'the number of escape routes from the labyrinth of responsibility is practically infinite'; a clear message for all those taking part in international and domestic politics. It is here that the author skillfully and expertly succeeds: exposing the complex entanglement of domestic and foreign policy, even concerning events that sometimes happen away from the capital city.

Klep, Christ, Somalië, Rwanda, Srebrenica. De nasleep van drie ontspoorde vredesmissies (Dissertatie Utrecht 2008; Amsterdam: Boom, 2008, 385 blz., ISBN 978 90 8506 668 2).ResponseThe validity of my comparative approach (Somalia-Rwanda-Srebrenica) still stands, in my opinion. At the level of political responsibility and the process of coming to terms with events, the similarities are stronger than the differences. My estimation that the Inquiry reports were 'hijacked' by almost all of the stakeholders involved (especially the Canadian, Belgian and Dutch governments) is more of a matter of fact and a political reality than a reproach that ought to have legal implications. Finally, the question of how far the three governments that were involved learned lessons from the three affairs is difficult to answer. Was it not also the wider developments (for example, the switch from the 'blue' missions to the more robust 'green' missions) that compelled the lessons to be drawn out?

Leurdijk, D.: CIMIC: a priority policy issue. - S. 1-9. Schoups, J.: Experiences and lessons learned from previous operations. The United Nation's administration of Eastern Slavonia. - S. 11-19. Montravel, G.: Disaster Relief Branch Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs Geneva. - S. 21-31. Krasznai, J.: How to optimize the co-ordination between peace keeping forces and civilian actors during the preparation, planning and conduct of peace-keeping and/or humanitarian operations. - S. 33-36. Viriot, J.-M.: Le point de vue de l'UEO sur la cooperation civilo-militaire. - S. 37-44. Rollins, ...: NATO (SHAPE) CIMIC. - S. 45-52. Geleyn, M.: Crisisbeheer. - S. 53-57

In 2003, the Council of Europe, the highest political organ of the European Union, resolved to adopt the European Security Strategy. This document outlined three fundamental objectives for the EU: stability and good governance in the area of the EU's closest neighbors; creating an international order that would be based not only on bilateral relations, but primarily on efficient multilateral relations; and preventing threats, whether new or traditional. The Strategy assumed that the EU would take the responsibility for international security both in the realm of 'peace keeping' (peace and defensive missions) and 'peace-making' (peace and offensive missions). Defining the threats that the European Union needs to defy, the Strategy enumerates local conflicts, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their potential use against the territory of the EU and its member states, collapsing states, and conflicts breaking out in such states and their neighborhood, as well as organized crime. The assessment of numerous threats to internal and external security, presented in the European Security Strategy, remains up-to-date. There have also emerged new threats for Europe that result from the need to ensure energy security, primarily with respect to the diversification of energy sources. The significance of climate change to international security has increased. The same applies to IT security or piracy. The EU has been rather anxious about the intensification of frozen conflicts, in particular the outbreak of war between Russia and Georgia. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has indicated that the enlargement process is a significant stabilizing factor in the EU neighborhood. Fundamental importance is also attached to the review of cooperation principles with the USA, the crucial role of the UN in the international system, and cooperation with regional organizations, such as the African Union. There is also the need to develop a strategic partnership with NATO, in particular in terms of operational cooperation. Another key factor in the strengthening of the EU's global position is the development of a civil and military crisis response system.

An American model of peace in the Middle East, which evolved from Kissinger's 'little steps' to the separatist agreements of Camp David, was to serve the purpose of regulating the Arab-Israeli conflict and strengthening Washington's influence. In the address delivered on January 23, 1980 (that provided the foundation for the so called 'J. Carter doctrine') the US President said that every "attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America" and thus it "will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force". The abandonment of the Nasserian tradition did not help A. Sadat to win supporters in internal matters. The protest of Nasserists and the Association of Muslim Brothers against the reconciliation with Israel resulted in a tragic attack against the Egyptian president. A. Sadat's death on October 6, 1981 was a blow for the advocates of the peace process. Whether to continue the separatist policy towards Israel or not was up to the will of the new political authorities in Egypt. ; An American model of peace in the Middle East, which evolved from Kissinger's 'little steps' to the separatist agreements of Camp David, was to serve the purpose of regulating the Arab-Israeli conflict and strengthening Washington's influence. In the address delivered on January 23, 1980 (that provided the foundation for the so called 'J. Carter doctrine') the US President said that every "attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America" and thus it "will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force". The abandonment of the Nasserian tradition did not help A. Sadat to win supporters in internal matters. The protest of Nasserists and the Association of Muslim Brothers against the reconciliation with Israel resulted in a tragic attack against the Egyptian president. A. Sadat's death on October 6, 1981 was a blow for the advocates of the peace process. Whether to continue the separatist policy towards Israel or not was up to the will of the new political authorities in Egypt.