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מגב כריכת ההוצאה הראשונה, 1961 הספר סוקר את התפתחות יחסי ישראל-ערב בשנים 1961-1948 כפי שהשתקפו בעיתונות הישראלית ומעל במת הכנסת. דעות כל החוגים בישראל -- מ"חרות" עד מק"י – מובאות בהרחבה מפי דובריהם המוסמכים ביותר. רבים ימצאו כאן לראשונה תאור מפורט של עובדות נשכחות. המעטים היודעים את העובדות יופתעו להיווכח באיזו מידה מסוגל מנגנון תעמולה ממלכתי לעצב לא רק את השקפתו של האזרח אלא גם את זכרונו מההקדמה להוצאה השניה, 1999 למהדורה זו צורפו נספחים הכוללים מידע שהיה חסוי בשעתו ונחשף רק עשרות שנים לאחר שכתבנו את הספר. שיערנו שניתוחינו יקבלו לימים אישור נוסף. ואכן, העובדות שנחשפו מאז, שאחדות מהן הפתיעו גם אותנו, מאשרות את ניתוחנו. אין פירוש הדבר שכל המידע החסוי מאותה תקופה כבר נחשף

Peace is not an absence, but rather a visibly identifiable set of norms. This visualization can take place through internationally recognized signs such as the white flag and the blue helmet. These representations of norms are united in their ability to be distinguished from similar objects or signs through their use of colors. The identificatory use of color avoids confusion between parties embroiled in a conflict, making an organization or envoy stand out and creat- ing the expectation that they are encompassed by the specific norms of war- fare, which these colors make visible. Through establishing such "dumb signs" of peace, as Grotius put it, the colors of peace have, we argue, played a notable part in establishing customary international law. The aim of our con- tribution is to offer an illustrative chromatological analysis of how peace and its norms are made visible through objects and symbols which are not con- nected with peace beyond their coloring (e.g., emblems, flags, helmets, or war- zone vehicles). We show how certain colors, in their situated use, come to both symbolize and enact peace in terms of international politics.

Making War and Building Peace examines how well United Nations peacekeeping missions work after civil war. Statistically analyzing all civil wars since 1945, the book compares peace processes that had UN involvement to those that didn't. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis argue that each mission must be designed to fit the conflict, with the right authority and adequate resources. UN missions can be effective by supporting new actors committed to the peace, building governing institutions, and monitoring and policing implementation of peace settlements. But the UN is not good at intervening in ongoing wars. If the conflict is controlled by spoilers or if the parties are not ready to make peace, the UN cannot play an effective enforcement role. It can, however, offer its technical expertise in multidimensional peacekeeping operations that follow enforcement missions undertaken by states or regional organizations such as NATO. Finding that UN missions are most effective in the first few years after the end of war, and that economic development is the best way to decrease the risk of new fighting in the long run, the authors also argue that the UN's role in launching development projects after civil war should be expanded. ; https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1259/thumbnail.jpg

This article discusses the way in which the national celebration of peace, held in the summer of 1919, was manifested locally. It begins by pointing out that 1919 itself was a year of major tensions and political dangers, and that in some places the celebrations themselves saw scenes of violence and rioting. Although peace celebrations were intended as, and usually portrayed as, a focus for national and local unity and harmony, the reality was more complex and they could 'unmask conflicting perspectives and values in communities up and down Britain'. The bulk of the article looks at the experience of Lancashire, and Michael Hughes observes that it 'is striking, and in some ways surprising, that most disorders . occurred in such places as Luton and Coventry rather than in the older industrial settlements of the north of England' with their tradition of radical politics.Extensive use is made of newspaper reporting of the Armistice, its aftermath, and the peace celebrations themselves, with close attention to the often wide discrepancies between what the government was proposing and what was acceptable to local authorities in Lancashire. A particular source of disagreement was the question of expenditure, with some councils taking the initiative, setting up special committees to plan and manage events, and voting significant sums for the funding of celebrations, but others being condemned for not spending enough. There were arguments about whether the money would be better spent on, for example, demobilised and disabled soldiers, a conflict illustrated by a vocal and passionate disagreement in the borough of Haslingden.The article shows how the celebrations took different forms in different places – for example, whether there was a military parade or a war veterans' parade as the centrepiece – and how in some places, such as Manchester and Liverpool, the mood was notably subdued in comparison with the joy which had greeted the November armistice. In contrast, in Bacup, St Annes and Clitheroe, among others, there ...

It is intuitive to view peace and war as inherently opposite categories. Peace is routinely defined as the freedom from organised collective violence, or as the 'absence of war'. Conversely, war is generally conceived either in Clausewitzian terms as organised violence to achieve political ends or as a moral or legal condition defining the permissible limits of organised violence. And yet, one of the founding tenets of contemporary peace and conflict studies has been to reject this binary 'negative' concept of peace as merely the 'absence of war' by asserting a positive concept of peace that refers to consensual values and the 'integration of human society'. The enduring aspiration of how to achieve peace can be summed up with the phrase 'peace through peaceful means'. While the field has remained normatively grounded on sustaining a prohibition on the resort to violence—peace through peaceful means—it has also grappled with questions of how, how much or in what way, military force ought to be deployed in contemporary challenges such as humanitarian interventions, complex emergencies and stabilising postconflict societies. Strategic and security studies have also been grappling with a widening (issues) and deepening (agency) security agenda which has opened up questions about the utility of force to respond to so-called non-conventional threats and in responding to non-state actors. Both fields of scholarship have utilised the concept of hybridity in their efforts to understand the blurred lines between peace, war and across a range of challenges in contemporary world politics.

This paper develops a simple sequential-move game to characterize the endogeneity of third-party intervention in conflict. We show how a third party's "intervention technology" interacts with the canonical "conflict technologies" of two rival parties in affecting the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome. From the perspective of deterrence strategy, we find that it is more costly for a third party to support an ally to deter a challenger from attacking (i.e., to maintain peace or acquiescence), as compared to the alternative case when the third party supports the ally to gain a disputed territory by attacking (i.e., to create war), ceteris paribus. However, an optimally intervening third party can be either "peace-making", "peace-breaking", or neither depending on the characteristics of the conflict and the stakes the third party holds with each of the rival parties.

This paper develops a simple sequential-move game to characterize the endogeneity of third-party intervention in conflict. We show how a third party's "intervention technology" interacts with the canonical "conflict technologies" of two rival parties in affecting the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome. From the perspective of deterrence strategy, we find that it is more costly for a third party to support an ally to deter a challenger from attacking (i.e., to maintain peace or acquiescence), as compared to the alternative case when the third party supports the ally to gain a disputed territory by attacking (i.e., to create war), ceteris paribus. However, an optimally intervening third party can be either "peace-making", "peace-breaking", or neither depending on the characteristics of the conflict and the stakes the third party holds with each of the rival parties.

The Taliban is one of the Islamic fundamentalist movements formed in the early 1990s by an Afghan faction of Mujahedeen, the Islamist fighters who had fought against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan which took place in December 1979 and continued up to February 1989. The Taliban regime ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 and it collapsed as a result of the US attack on this country after the September 11 attacks. Since the establishment of the new Afghan government (2001), the Taliban has been involved in an armed conflict with it. The Taliban has also been labeled as an international terrorist group mostly functioning in Afghanistan and Pakistan.The gradual proliferation of the Islamic extremist groups and their expansion seem to be concerning for the international community. Thus, some countries such as the United States, Russia, China, and Qatar are currently engaged in an international partnership, trying to boost the ongoing Intra-Afghan Peace Talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government after eighteen years of war and bloodshed in Afghanistan. The Intra-Afghan Peace Talks are a series of international negotiations aiming for the consolidation of peace between the Taliban and the Afghan government. This research paper aims to explore and analyze the Intra-Afghan Peace Talks.

Wars cause unconscionable damage and are universally condemned as a scourge of humanity. Yet most of the philosophical literature, in a tradition stretching back at least to Augustine, focuses on its justification, either as a form of national defense or as a means of securing a future peace. And this tradition, which has now crystallized into just war theory, continues to dominate our thinking about war and peace. Because we use the concepts and principles of just war theory, we are very limited in the range of questions we ask. The dominant concerns have to do with whether there is just cause for war, and what kinds of violence it is permissible for soldiers to use, both against each other and against civilians. Questions of peace rarely enter into the frame, and when they do, it is only in the context of ending or preventing a war. In this dissertation, I bring peace to the forefront. I argue that war cannot be justified either as a form of national defense or as a means of pursuing peace. Rather than understanding peace primarily in contrast to war, I offer an independent account of peace, as a kind of trusting relationship between political communities. Since peace is a relationship of trust, it cannot be secured by force or threat of force. And so if we seek to live together in peace with our adversaries, under conditions of justice and goodwill, war will be an impossible means. I conclude by considering the question of how, in a world that is marked by so much violence, suspicion, and fear, we can turn away from war and towards peace, and suggest that the answer lies in hope.

"Peace is a phrase that is often used but vaguely understood. Conventional thought considers peace as a condition that shares a dialectical relationship with war, albeit devoid of a separate nature of its own. Upon closer examination, peace has a pragmatic quality and the potential to be a separate element of statecraft, not simply the absence, termination, or continuation of war. This paper examines peace at the individual, collective, and inter-collective levels. It does so by addressing three central questions: First, how is peace defined and what is its nature? Is it a natural condition or an artificially constructed one? Second, does it differ at the individual, collective, and inter-collective levels? And third, can peace stand on its own as a means of policy relative to diplomacy and war? In essence, can peace be waged? Research reveals that a complex paradigmatic change in statecraft must occur in order to employ peace as a "shaping" and sustaining action. Further inquiry is required to fully understand its potential as a tool, one similar to "soft power." This paper contains recommendations for the continued development of this concept."--P. v. ; "June 2009." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 11-13) ; "Peace is a phrase that is often used but vaguely understood. Conventional thought considers peace as a condition that shares a dialectical relationship with war, albeit devoid of a separate nature of its own. Upon closer examination, peace has a pragmatic quality and the potential to be a separate element of statecraft, not simply the absence, termination, or continuation of war. This paper examines peace at the individual, collective, and inter-collective levels. It does so by addressing three central questions: First, how is peace defined and what is its nature? Is it a natural condition or an artificially constructed one? Second, does it differ at the individual, collective, and inter-collective levels? And third, can peace stand on its own as a means of policy relative to diplomacy and war? In essence, can peace be waged? Research reveals that a complex paradigmatic change in statecraft must occur in order to employ peace as a "shaping" and sustaining action. Further inquiry is required to fully understand its potential as a tool, one similar to "soft power." This paper contains recommendations for the continued development of this concept."--P. v. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The article of record as published may be located at http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1548512913477258 ; We present a modeling and simulation approach that clearly increases the efficacy of training and education efforts for peace support operations. Our discussion involves how a computer simulation, the Peace Support Operations Model, is integrated into a training and education venue in Kyrgyzstan for a ''Game for Peace.'' On September 12–23, 2011 members of NATO's Partnership for Peace Training and Education Centers collaborated to instruct a United Nations' Peacekeeping Operations course at the Kyrgyz Separate Rifle Battalion in Bujum, Kyrgyzstan. Phase II of the course was also conducted on October 17–21, 2011 for members of the Peacekeeping Brigade of the Kazakhstan Army (KAZBRIG) in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Although such courses are a mainstay in NATO support in preparing member nations for peace support operations, the application of a computer simulation is unique.We relate the decision to use a computer simulation to support the training event and provide an overview of the methodology for planning and executing the game. Insights from the game about training and educating future peacekeepers and lessons for using computer simulations are instructive for future efforts and mark the way to leverage the advantages of computer simulations. Keyword

This article seeks to reimagine peace against the backdrop of a Foucauldian understanding of politics. Most conventional accounts are based. on a sharp distinction between war and peace and alternate between two broad positions; namely, peace as absence, the absence of war, and peace as presence, as an essential condition. These two visions of peace are often assumed to have found their classical statements in, respectively, Hobbes and Spinoza. The article resists such a binary treatment, bringing Hobbes and Spinoza close together through Spinoza's view of peace as potentia and Hobbes's view of war as process. The result is one that seems to vindicate Foucault: peace is war.

Welcome to Peace Games, where Second Life and First Life converge in a bizarre peace talks charade that reflects the absurd face of global politics. Peace Games by Paul Sermon, exhibited at: GAMES: Kunst und Politik der Spiele Concept and Organisation: Mathias Fuchs, Ernst Strouhal, Florian Bettel Kunsthalle Wien (project space karlsplatz) 28 May - 6 July 2008, Daily 16.00 - 22.00.

The origin of peace movements can be traced back to the early nineteenth century, with the foundation of the first peace societies in the Anglo-Saxon world. Issues addressed by the movements include the general fight against war and promotion of peace (including internationalism), antiwar mobilization, nuclear disarmament (including nuclear test ban), mobilization against military infrastructures, and for civil service. Different phases can be discerned in the Western context: the rise of pacifism as a collective and public issue during the nineteenth and early twentieth century; the Cold War era; peace movements as part of the new social movements from the late 1960s to the late 1980s; and the post-Cold War era. The strength and specific features of peace movements vary both across time and across space depending on the specific features of each national context. Today, peace movements are seen as part of the broader family of the new social movements. Scholarly works have characterized the profile of participants in these movements as being rooted in the new middle class, displaying left-libertarian values, and sharing a common concern over social issues, but have also stressed important difference across countries in their social bases. Peace movements find their most important effects at the societal and cultural level rather than at the political level.

The island of Sri Lanka has suffered from a long history of conflict. In May 2009, a 26-year civil war was ended by military defeat of the separatist group the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by the Government of Sri Lanka. Human rights organizations have accused the GOSL of committing war crimes at the end of the war and of violating human rights violations in the post-war context. The GOSL refuted all claims and declared there is peace now that the war ended. The main question has been: Where is the peace? The aim of this thesis is to identify what was preventing Sri Lanka from transitioning from a state of negative peace to positive peace as it was defined in Johan Galtung's peace theory. The study of the historical background of Sri Lanka and the Pillars of Positive Peace developed by the Institute for Peace & Economics have aided in determining how positive peace was undermined during President Rajapaksa's postwar presidency. The thesis found that negative peace was sustained due to a lack of accountability, restrictions placed on civil society and identity politics. The thesis concluded that there were three main blockages to positive peace. ; Sri Lanka adasi uzun yillar boyunca agir savaslar gecirmistir. 2009 Mayis'inda, ayrilikci grup Tamil Eelam Ozgurluk Kaplanlari'nin (LTTE) Sri Lanka hukumeti tarafindan yenilgiye ugratilmasiyla 26 yil suren sivil savas sona ermistir. Insan haklari organizasyonlari, savas sonunda Sri Lanka hukumetini savas sucu ve savas sonrasi sartlarinda insan haklari ihlali ile suclamistir. Sri Lanka hukumeti tum bu suclamalari reddetmis ve savas sonrasi baris sartlarinin olustugunu beyan etmistir. Asil soru ise barisin nerede oldugudur. Bu tezin amaci Sri Lanka'nin, Johan Galtung'un baris teorisinde tanimlandigi sekilde negatif baristan pozitif barisa gecis surecini engelleyen etmenlerin belirlenmesidir. Sri Lanka tarihi ve Institute for Peace & Economics tarafindan belirlenen "Pillars of Positive Peace", Baskan Rajapaksa'nin savas sonrasi hukumdarligi esnasinda pozitif barisin nasil bozulduguna isik tutar. Bu tez; denetim eksikligi, sivil topluma getirilen kisitlamalar ve kimlik politikalari sonucunda negatif barisin surduruldugunu ortaya koyar.