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"Peace is a phrase that is often used but vaguely understood. Conventional thought considers peace as a condition that shares a dialectical relationship with war, albeit devoid of a separate nature of its own. Upon closer examination, peace has a pragmatic quality and the potential to be a separate element of statecraft, not simply the absence, termination, or continuation of war. This paper examines peace at the individual, collective, and inter-collective levels. It does so by addressing three central questions: First, how is peace defined and what is its nature? Is it a natural condition or an artificially constructed one? Second, does it differ at the individual, collective, and inter-collective levels? And third, can peace stand on its own as a means of policy relative to diplomacy and war? In essence, can peace be waged? Research reveals that a complex paradigmatic change in statecraft must occur in order to employ peace as a "shaping" and sustaining action. Further inquiry is required to fully understand its potential as a tool, one similar to "soft power." This paper contains recommendations for the continued development of this concept."--P. v. ; "June 2009." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 11-13) ; "Peace is a phrase that is often used but vaguely understood. Conventional thought considers peace as a condition that shares a dialectical relationship with war, albeit devoid of a separate nature of its own. Upon closer examination, peace has a pragmatic quality and the potential to be a separate element of statecraft, not simply the absence, termination, or continuation of war. This paper examines peace at the individual, collective, and inter-collective levels. It does so by addressing three central questions: First, how is peace defined and what is its nature? Is it a natural condition or an artificially constructed one? Second, does it differ at the individual, collective, and inter-collective levels? And third, can peace stand on its own as a means of policy relative to diplomacy and war? In essence, can peace be waged? Research reveals that a complex paradigmatic change in statecraft must occur in order to employ peace as a "shaping" and sustaining action. Further inquiry is required to fully understand its potential as a tool, one similar to "soft power." This paper contains recommendations for the continued development of this concept."--P. v. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Welcome to Peace Games, where Second Life and First Life converge in a bizarre peace talks charade that reflects the absurd face of global politics. Peace Games by Paul Sermon, exhibited at: GAMES: Kunst und Politik der Spiele Concept and Organisation: Mathias Fuchs, Ernst Strouhal, Florian Bettel Kunsthalle Wien (project space karlsplatz) 28 May - 6 July 2008, Daily 16.00 - 22.00.

In Latin America, environmental conflicts have their very own nature, characteristics and dynamics, hence the reason why we need to develop management processes and resolutions that are set within a framework of peace, i.e., a 'social peace' (Gaia). This, in turn, enables the right elements of justice to be put into place. The peace process is, as a result of this action, both solid and long-lasting. Conversely, we have seen how many environmental conflict resolutions have failed in their final objective in the past, i.e., in not achieving peace. A peacebuilding model for the environment (Gaia) should therefore contain elements of foundational support and action in environmental conflict resolution processes, so that they become sustainable over time, benefit all the parties involved, and provide access to natural resources in a sustainable manner. ; En América Latina, los conflictos ambientales tienen su propia naturaleza, características y dinámicas, las cuales nos deben llevar a plantear procesos de manejo y resolución enmarcados en un concepto definido de paz: una paz social (Gaia) que, a su vez, brinde los suficientes elementos de juicio para que esa construcción sea sólida y perdurable. Debemos reconocer que muchos procesos de resolución de conflictos ambientales han fracasado en su objetivo final: la paz. Un modelo de construcción de paz ambiental (Gaia) debe brindar elementos de fundamentación y actuación en procesos de resolución de conflictos ambientales, de forma que esos procesos sean sostenibles en el tiempo, beneficien a los actores involucrados y garanticen el acceso a los recursos naturales de forma sostenible. ; A Amèrica Llatina, els conflictes ambientals tenen la seva pròpia naturalesa, característiques i dinàmiques, les quals ens han de portar a plantejar processos de maneig i resolució emmarcats en un concepte definit de pau: una pau social (Gaia) que, a la vegada brindi els suficients elements de judici perquè aquesta construcció sigui sòlida i perdurable. Hem de reconèixer que molts processos de resolució de conflictes ambientals han fracassat en el seu objectiu final: la pau. Un model de construcció de pau ambiental (Gaia) ha d'oferir elements de fonamentació i actuació en processos de resolució de conflictes ambientals, de manera que aquests processos siguin sostenibles en el temps, beneficiïn els actors involucrats i garanteixin l'accés als recursos naturals de forma sostenible.

This study sets out to examine what lessons can be learned from Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 2005, with particular relevance to power-sharing. The author went to on a field-trip to Khartoum, Juba and Nairobi in July 2009 to complement his previous knowledge the Sudan conflict. The report draws ten lessons learned, and these are divided into the three aspects of process, provisions and implementation. In terms of the process, the report suggests that negotiators should strive to involve both regional actors and actors from the international community, focus on the functioning of the agreement, and seek to enhance the capacity-building of the parties. In relation to the key provision, power-sharing, the report calls for mediators to be wary of including exit options in power-sharing deals. The effects of exclusion and inclusion of various actors should be scrutinized and it is important that the message of the agreement is conveyed to various constituencies. Also, it is important to bring peace dividends for the people to increase the legitimacy of the agreement. Regarding the implementation phase, three key lessons are learned. First, for a successful implementation it is essential to keep the momentum of the signing. Secondly, the signing of an agreement is the start, not the end, of building a durable peace. Finally, the research findings demonstrate the importance of maintaining the moment ripe for implementation after the agreement is signed. One way of facilitating this is by keeping the same parties involved during the implementation process as during the negotiations.

In the early hours of April 22, 1914, American President Woodrow Wilson sent Marines to seize the port of Veracruz in an attempt to alter the course of the Mexican Revolution. As a result, the United States seemed on the brink of war with Mexico. An international uproar ensued. The governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile offered to mediate a peaceful resolution to the crisis. Surprisingly, both the United States and Mexico accepted their offer and all parties agreed to meet at an international peace conference in Niagara Falls, Ontario. For Canadians, the conference provided an unexpected spectacle on their doorstep, combining high diplomacy and low intrigue around the gardens and cataracts of Canada's most famous natural attraction. For the diplomats involved, it proved to be an ephemeral high point in the nascent pan-American movement. After it ended, the conference dropped out of historical memory. This is the first full account of the Niagara Falls Peace Conference to be published in North America since 1914. The author carefully reconstructs what happened at Niagara Falls, examining its historical significance for Canada's relationship with the Americas. From this almost forgotten event he draws important lessons on the conduct of international mediation and the perils of middle-power diplomacy.

This paper brings mechanism design to the study of conflict resolution in international relations. We determine when and how unmediated communication and mediation reduce the ex ante probability of conflict, in a simple game where conflict is due to asymmetric information. Unmediated communication helps reducing the chance of conflict as it allows conflicting parties to reveal their types and establish type-dependent transfers to avoid conflict. Mediation improves upon unmediated communication when the intensity of conflict is high, or when asymmetric information is large. The mediator improves upon unmediated communication by not precisely reporting information to conflicting parties, and precisely, by not revealing to a player with probability one that the opponent is weak. Surprisingly, in our set up, arbitrators who can enforce settlements are no more effective in reducing the probability of conflict than mediators who can only make non-binding recommendations.

Introduction: Since 1991 the people of Somaliland have successfully established a peaceful and relatively stable state and community. They have managed a process of reconciliation, demobilized the local militias, restored law and order, and held three rounds of peaceful elections. Much of the urban infrastructure and basic social services destroyed during the war (1988-1991) have been re-established. Peace and stability allowed normal patterns of trade and other economic activities to resume, and thousands of refugees came back from neighbouring countries. However, despite being the most stable polity within the territory of the former Somali Republic, Somaliland has not been recognized internationally as a state, and thus it has not received the kind of international support given to many other post-conflict countries. In the early 1990s few international organizations were willing to support internal reconciliation, establish security through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, or promote democratization and development. Instead, peace building has been achieved by Somalis themselves, supported in part by the Somaliland diaspora,1 which has sent remittances, undertaken business and social investment, and helped to re-establish or rehabilitate basic services. [Continues]

The terms justice and peace have long been the focus of much debate as well as numerous attempts of conceptualization. Just peace however, has been very little studied despite being widely used together in everyday language. The terms justice and peace are therefore insufficiently conceptualized together and surprisingly little interest has been given to how a just peace can be realized. This paper looks into how the European Union has conceptualized just peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict over the past 40 years and identifies five phases of different conceptualizations of just peace in the narrative of the EU: the first three phases evolved in the 1970s when the EC approved of Security Council Resolution 242 and recognized the Palestinians as a party to the conflict with "legitimate rights" including a "homeland". The last two phases evolved in the 1980s and 1990s when the EC/EU endorsed the Palestinians rights to "exercise fully its right to self-determination" and ultimately a "Palestinian state". At the same time, despite its economic power, the EU has had great difficulties to go beyond the issuing of declarations to actually implement what it conceives as a just peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Scholars and practitioners generally agree that one of the keys to effective implementation of peace settlements is the provision of strong third party security guarantees. The United Nations (UN) has been largely ineffective at this task and great powers who could be effective are often reluctant to act when national interests are not at stake. This paper argues that Private Military Companies (PMCs) may be able to do the job more effectively than the traditional blue helmets. This paper addresses two important questions about the potential role of Private Military Companies in peace implementation. First, how can third parties more effectively deliver security guarantees in order to enforce peace settlements in the aftermath of violent conflict? And second, are United Nations military forces the optimum source for strong security guarantees in peace enforcement operations or could PMCs do a better job? I argue that third parties can more effectively deliver security guarantees to enforce peace settlements in the aftermath of violent conflict if they possess the structure and interests to provide three military capabilities necessary to deliver strong guarantees: the ability to project force against belligerents, the ability to rapidly transport elements of an intervention force into and within conflict zones, and a commitment to the success of a military operation.

Ethnic and religious fractionalization have important effects on economic growth and development, but their role in internal violent conflicts has been found to be negligible and statistically insignificant. These findings have been invoked in refutation of the Huntington hypothesis, according to which differences of ethnic, religious and cultural identities are the ultimate determinants of conflict. However, fractionalization in all its demographic forms is endogenous in the long run. In this paper, we empirically investigate the impact of violent conflicts on ethno-religious fractionalization. The data involve 953 conflicts that took place in 52 countries in Europe, Africa and the Middle East between 1400 CE and 1900 CE. Besides a variety of violent confrontations ranging from riots, revolts and power wars between secular sovereigns, the data cover religiously motivated confrontations. We document that countries in which Muslim on Christian wars unfolded more frequently are significantly more religiously homogenous today. In contrast, those places where Protestant versus Catholic confrontations occurred or Jewish pogroms took place are more fractionalized, both ethnically and religiously. And the longer were the duration of all such conflicts and violence, the less fractionalized countries are today. These results reveal that the demographic structure of countries in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa still bear the traces of a multitude of ecclesiastical and cultural clashes that occurred throughout the course of history. They also suggest that endogeneity could render the relationship between fractionalization and the propensity of internal conflict statistically insignificant. Finally, instrumenting for conflicts with some geographic attributes and accounting for the endogeneity of fractionalization with respect to ecclesiastical conflicts shows that religous fractionalization likely has negative effects on economic growth.

In this paper we present a model of war between two rational and completely informed players. We show that in the absence of binding agreements war can be avoided in many cases by one player transferring money to the other player. In most cases, the "rich" country transfers part of its money to the "poor" country. But when the military proficiency of the "rich" country is sufficiently high the "poor" country stops the war by transferring part of its resources to the "rich" country. War cannot be avoided by transfers when inequality of resources is very large or the cost of war is sufficiently low. ; Publicado

In this paper we present a model of war between two rational and completely informed players. We show that in the absence of binding agreements war can be avoided in many cases by one player transferring money to the other player. In most cases, the "rich" country transfers part of her money to the "poor" country. Only when the military proficiency of the "rich" country is sufficiently great, it could be that the "poor" country can stop the war by transfering part of its resources to the "rich" country.

One of the few stylized facts in international relations is that democracies, unlike autoc- racies, very rarely fight each other. We examine the sustainability of international peace between democracies and autocracies, where the crucial difference between these two po- litical regimes is whether or not policymakers are subject to periodic elections. We show that the fear of losing office can deter democratic leaders from engaging in military con- flicts. Crucially, this discipline effect can only be at work if incumbent leaders can be re-elected, implying that democracies in which the executives are subject to term limits should be more conflict prone. To assess the validity of our predictions, we construct a large dataset on countries with executive term limits. Our analysis of inter-state conflicts for the 1816-2001 period suggests that electoral incentives are indeed behind the democratic peace phenomenon: while democratic dyads are in general less likely to be involved in conflicts than any other dyads, this result does not hold for democracies in which the executive faces binding term limits; moreover, the dispute patterns of democracies with term limits depend on whether the executive is in the last or penultimate mandate. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the increasing role of transitional justice in world politics and on-going peace processes. The indisputable increase in such procedures has certainly encouraged a vigorous debate on their suitability to politically stabilise the countries, which have suffered a belligerent period. The theoretical framework of my work is based on the constructivist idea that international organizations have the capability to emancipate themselves from their origin of power, the states, and to define themselves as an independent actor in international politics, also helped by the intrinsic nature of bureaucracy. Thus, I develop a game theory model of the belief that behaviour of international and internal criminals is based on a principle of rational choice. I defend the concept of rational choice, which is affected by the environment where it is implemented. In particular, an environment, which is more aware of international and human rights, can positively affect peace talks. Uganda is the central case for various reasons. Above all else, Uganda is the first instance ever of a transitional justice – represented by the International Criminal Court – issuing warrants before the end of the conflict. Furthermore, Uganda has not been seriously influenced by world top powers and it lies in the Central Africa, where the most recent cases of transitional justice took place. As is evident from my studies, I see a clear change in Uganda situation widely thanks to the sensitizing role of the International Criminal Court. Unfortunately, at the moment of writing (April 2009), lasting peace seems still a long way off, but the situation has clearly improved since the involvement of the ICC in the conflict. Asiasanat:Transitional Justice Game Bayes ICC Uganda LRA Museveni Kony Acholi Ajwaki

This paper models the instability of peace agreements, motivated by the empirical regularity with which peace agreements tend to break down following civil war. When war provides opportunities for profit to one side, or when other difficulties such as historical grievances exist, peace may become incentive incompatible. The party that has something to gain from surprise warfare may agree to peace, but will later renege on it. It is shown that the levels of conflict chosen by this group are an increasing function of both grievance and greed, but decreasing in the direct costs of war. Peace is achievable via externally devised mechanisms that enhance commitment to peace. Aid and direct military peacekeeping intervention (sanctions) can reduce or eliminate conflict. These sanctions, however, need to be credible. Finally, the independent provision and finance of international sanctions are considered. When these arrangements yield little benefit to financial sponsors, or are very costly to them, the bite of the sanctions can become ineffective.