Suchergebnisse

Legal and non-legal norm -- Les limites des pouvoirs du Conseil de Sécurité -- Security Council's targeted sanctions against presumed terrorists : the need to comply with human rights standards -- Limits to the use of force imposed by international law current problems -- Will current international crises result in structural shifts in international law? -- Terrorism and the legality of pre-emptive force -- Peacekeeping and international humanitarian law friends or foes? -- Obligations and protection of individuals -- Verification of disarmament treaties -- Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction treaty regimes between efficiency and discrimination -- Le droit de la guerre et les nations unies a propos des incidents armés au Congo -- The historical evolution of international humanitarian law, international human rights law, refugee law and international criminal law -- Multiculturalism and the development of international humanitarian law -- Setting the scene new technologies - new challenges for IHL? -- De facto control of land or sea areas its relevance under the law of armed conflict, in particular air and missile warfare -- The international committee of the red cross and the additional protocols of 1977 -- Protection of the environment in times of armed conflict -- Legal restraints on targeting protection of civilian population and the changing faces of modern conflict -- The ethics, principles and objectives of protection of the environment in times of armed conflict.

Reform of the UN, by Maurice Bertrand
The 1993 General Assembly will very likely debate the possibility of enlarging the Security Council to include Germany and Japan. Traditional concepts of UN reform are not favourable towards Charter revision. However the fact that the United States has declared itself in favour of an expansion of the Council and that the other permanent members are not fundamentally opposed could lead to the adoption of a limited amendment creating, for example, five new permanent members. However the more or less total failure of Council initiatives in Yugoslavia, Somalia and Angola show that serious questions must be posed concerning the functions and strategies of the organi zation, the value of collective security system and peacekeeping forces. The relation between global economic integration and social disintegration and the adaptation of the structure of the United Nations system to deal with world-wide problems must also be examined. A revision of the Charter could be an opportunity to reflect upon these problems.

On December 2, 2004, the European Union took over from NATO the main peacekeeping forces that had been deployed in Bosnia-and-Herzegovina since the signature of the Dayton Accords. The launch of EU military operation Althea was presented by its supporters as a major test for the ESDP, especially as it pertained to a wider Europeanization of post-conflict management in Bosnia. Against this background, Althea provides a fruitful locus to assess one of the EU's most frequent claims - that it possesses a specific know-how when it comes to combining the military and the civilian aspects of post-conflict management. In this study, Althea is primarily approached through the way it is viewed by both its participants and by Bosnians. Several issues are addressed: First, how do historical legacies of the international presence in Bosnia weigh upon the very definition of mission Althea, its implementation and its local receptions? Second, coordination of the various European actors present on the field has emerged as one of the major challenges the EU needs to face. Third, the study draws attention to the possible discrepancy between various understandings (among Althea personnel and Bosnian people) of what a European military mission entails. Last but not least, the study highlights complex rationalities at work when phasing out an operation like Althea. EU exit strategies seem to derive rather from bureaucratic logic than objective assessment of stability in Bosnia ; Le 2 décembre 2004, dans le cadre de l'opération militaire multinationale Althea, l'Union européenne a pris la relève des forces déployées en Bosnie-Herzégovine par l'OTAN après la signature des Accords de Dayton. Ce déploiement militaire européen, présenté par ses initiateurs comme un test majeur pour la PESD, s'inscrit dans une dynamique d'européanisation des dispositifs internationaux déployés dans le pays. A travers l'analyse d'Althea, il s'agit de réfléchir ici à l'émergence de savoir-faire européens en matière de gestion militaire et civile des sorties ...

On December 2, 2004, the European Union took over from NATO the main peacekeeping forces that had been deployed in Bosnia-and-Herzegovina since the signature of the Dayton Accords. The launch of EU military operation Althea was presented by its supporters as a major test for the ESDP, especially as it pertained to a wider Europeanization of post-conflict management in Bosnia. Against this background, Althea provides a fruitful locus to assess one of the EU's most frequent claims - that it possesses a specific know-how when it comes to combining the military and the civilian aspects of post-conflict management. In this study, Althea is primarily approached through the way it is viewed by both its participants and by Bosnians. Several issues are addressed: First, how do historical legacies of the international presence in Bosnia weigh upon the very definition of mission Althea, its implementation and its local receptions? Second, coordination of the various European actors present on the field has emerged as one of the major challenges the EU needs to face. Third, the study draws attention to the possible discrepancy between various understandings (among Althea personnel and Bosnian people) of what a European military mission entails. Last but not least, the study highlights complex rationalities at work when phasing out an operation like Althea. EU exit strategies seem to derive rather from bureaucratic logic than objective assessment of stability in Bosnia ; Le 2 décembre 2004, dans le cadre de l'opération militaire multinationale Althea, l'Union européenne a pris la relève des forces déployées en Bosnie-Herzégovine par l'OTAN après la signature des Accords de Dayton. Ce déploiement militaire européen, présenté par ses initiateurs comme un test majeur pour la PESD, s'inscrit dans une dynamique d'européanisation des dispositifs internationaux déployés dans le pays. A travers l'analyse d'Althea, il s'agit de réfléchir ici à l'émergence de savoir-faire européens en matière de gestion militaire et civile des sorties ...

On December 2, 2004, the European Union took over from NATO the main peacekeeping forces that had been deployed in Bosnia-and-Herzegovina since the signature of the Dayton Accords. The launch of EU military operation Althea was presented by its supporters as a major test for the ESDP, especially as it pertained to a wider Europeanization of post-conflict management in Bosnia. Against this background, Althea provides a fruitful locus to assess one of the EU's most frequent claims - that it possesses a specific know-how when it comes to combining the military and the civilian aspects of post-conflict management. In this study, Althea is primarily approached through the way it is viewed by both its participants and by Bosnians. Several issues are addressed: First, how do historical legacies of the international presence in Bosnia weigh upon the very definition of mission Althea, its implementation and its local receptions? Second, coordination of the various European actors present on the field has emerged as one of the major challenges the EU needs to face. Third, the study draws attention to the possible discrepancy between various understandings (among Althea personnel and Bosnian people) of what a European military mission entails. Last but not least, the study highlights complex rationalities at work when phasing out an operation like Althea. EU exit strategies seem to derive rather from bureaucratic logic than objective assessment of stability in Bosnia ; Le 2 décembre 2004, dans le cadre de l'opération militaire multinationale Althea, l'Union européenne a pris la relève des forces déployées en Bosnie-Herzégovine par l'OTAN après la signature des Accords de Dayton. Ce déploiement militaire européen, présenté par ses initiateurs comme un test majeur pour la PESD, s'inscrit dans une dynamique d'européanisation des dispositifs internationaux déployés dans le pays. A travers l'analyse d'Althea, il s'agit de réfléchir ici à l'émergence de savoir-faire européens en matière de gestion militaire et civile des sorties ...

The criminalization of aggression and the establishment of the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction over this crime make it necessary to provide a definition for this crime, and to determine the conditions under which the Court shall exercise its jurisdiction over this crime. However, this task is not an easy one given the ''particular nature'' of the crime of aggression. The major challenge we are faced with lies in the difficulty to define and circumscribe the crime of aggression while abiding by the cardinal rules of international criminal law on the one hand, and the requirements of the law of the Charter or the law of the international Peacekeeping on the other. Due to the legal nature of the aggression, more precisely the atypical positioning characteristic of the crime of aggression, a crime which is halfway between the law of the international peacekeeping and the international criminal law, not forgetting the fact that this crime targets exclusively individuals who are '' actually able to control or lead the political or military action of a State,'' the legal regime of the crime of aggression is going to be fairly peculiar, in comparison with that of the other international crimes provided for by the Rome Statute ; La criminalisation de l'agression et l'établissement de la compétence de la Cour pénale internationale sur ce crime obligent à donner une définition de ce crime, de même qu'à déterminer les conditions dans lesquelles la Cour exercera sa compétence sur ce crime. Cette tâche n'est cependant pas aisée en raison de la « nature particulière » du crime d'agression. Le problème majeur qui se pose est celui de la difficulté à définir et à encadrer le crime d'agression tout en respectant les règles cardinales du droit international pénal d'un côté et les exigences du droit de la Charte ou du droit international du maintien de la paix de l'autre côté.En raison de la nature juridique de l'agression et plus précisément du positionnement atypique qui caractérise le crime d'agression, crime à la ...

The criminalization of aggression and the establishment of the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction over this crime make it necessary to provide a definition for this crime, and to determine the conditions under which the Court shall exercise its jurisdiction over this crime. However, this task is not an easy one given the ''particular nature'' of the crime of aggression. The major challenge we are faced with lies in the difficulty to define and circumscribe the crime of aggression while abiding by the cardinal rules of international criminal law on the one hand, and the requirements of the law of the Charter or the law of the international Peacekeeping on the other. Due to the legal nature of the aggression, more precisely the atypical positioning characteristic of the crime of aggression, a crime which is halfway between the law of the international peacekeeping and the international criminal law, not forgetting the fact that this crime targets exclusively individuals who are '' actually able to control or lead the political or military action of a State,'' the legal regime of the crime of aggression is going to be fairly peculiar, in comparison with that of the other international crimes provided for by the Rome Statute ; La criminalisation de l'agression et l'établissement de la compétence de la Cour pénale internationale sur ce crime obligent à donner une définition de ce crime, de même qu'à déterminer les conditions dans lesquelles la Cour exercera sa compétence sur ce crime. Cette tâche n'est cependant pas aisée en raison de la « nature particulière » du crime d'agression. Le problème majeur qui se pose est celui de la difficulté à définir et à encadrer le crime d'agression tout en respectant les règles cardinales du droit international pénal d'un côté et les exigences du droit de la Charte ou du droit international du maintien de la paix de l'autre côté.En raison de la nature juridique de l'agression et plus précisément du positionnement atypique qui caractérise le crime d'agression, crime à la croisée du droit international du maintien de la paix et du droit international pénal, sans oublier le fait que ce crime vise exclusivement les personnes « effectivement en mesure de contrôler ou de diriger l'action politique ou militaire d'un État », le régime juridique du crime d'agression va être assez particulier, ceci en comparaison de celui des autres crimes internationaux contenus dans le Statut de Rome.

The Moldovan civil conflict between 1989 and 1992 left the country and the people permanently divided between the banks to the Dniestr/Nistru River. Despite Pridnestrovia's (PMR) victory in its war of independence, it would not achieve its goal of being a recognized state. The ceasefire agreement of 1992 officially put an end to the war and solidified Prinestrovia's separation through the creation of a security zone and the establishement of peacekeeping forces. Furthermore, the resolution of the conflict and the end of the new status quo had to be synchronized with the accordance of a new political status for the PMR. As an official status was never determined, the conflict has remained frozen. During the post-war period, the balance of power favored the PMR from an economic, energy and security perspective, providing it with major leverage over Moldova. However, given that the PMR was never attributed statehood meant that it inherited a symbolic deficit because only Moldova could provide it with recognition. Moldova's policy of recognition towards the PMR between 1994 and 1998 would be the determing factor in the transformation of the conflict, leading to the signing of three "major accords". The historic Moscow Memorandum of 1997 highlighted this transformative process by which the two "opponants" considered eachother as "partners" within the negociation process. By 1998, Chisinau and Tiraspol embarked upon the path of confidence building and security measures with the Odessa Accord of 1998 ; Le conflit civil moldave entre 1989 et 1992 a laissé un pays et une population divisés entre le fleuve Dniestr/Nistru. Malgré la victoire de la Pridnestrovie (RMP) dans sa guerre d'indépendance, elle n'a pas atteint son objectif de devenir un Etat reconnu. L'Accord de cessez-le-feu de 1992 qui a mis officiellement fin à la guerre a renforcé la séparation de la RMP par la création d'une zone tampon et l'établissement des forces de maintien de la paix. Comme convenu dans cet accord, la fin du nouveau statu quo et donc la ...

The Moldovan civil conflict between 1989 and 1992 left the country and the people permanently divided between the banks to the Dniestr/Nistru River. Despite Pridnestrovia's (PMR) victory in its war of independence, it would not achieve its goal of being a recognized state. The ceasefire agreement of 1992 officially put an end to the war and solidified Prinestrovia's separation through the creation of a security zone and the establishement of peacekeeping forces. Furthermore, the resolution of the conflict and the end of the new status quo had to be synchronized with the accordance of a new political status for the PMR. As an official status was never determined, the conflict has remained frozen. During the post-war period, the balance of power favored the PMR from an economic, energy and security perspective, providing it with major leverage over Moldova. However, given that the PMR was never attributed statehood meant that it inherited a symbolic deficit because only Moldova could provide it with recognition. Moldova's policy of recognition towards the PMR between 1994 and 1998 would be the determing factor in the transformation of the conflict, leading to the signing of three "major accords". The historic Moscow Memorandum of 1997 highlighted this transformative process by which the two "opponants" considered eachother as "partners" within the negociation process. By 1998, Chisinau and Tiraspol embarked upon the path of confidence building and security measures with the Odessa Accord of 1998 ; Le conflit civil moldave entre 1989 et 1992 a laissé un pays et une population divisés entre le fleuve Dniestr/Nistru. Malgré la victoire de la Pridnestrovie (RMP) dans sa guerre d'indépendance, elle n'a pas atteint son objectif de devenir un Etat reconnu. L'Accord de cessez-le-feu de 1992 qui a mis officiellement fin à la guerre a renforcé la séparation de la RMP par la création d'une zone tampon et l'établissement des forces de maintien de la paix. Comme convenu dans cet accord, la fin du nouveau statu quo et donc la résolution finale du conflit devraient passer obligatoirement par la détermination d'un nouveau statut politique pour la RMP. Faute d'avoir réussi à déterminer un statut officiel, le conflit est resté gelé. Lors de la période d'après-guerre, l'équilibre des pouvoirs a favorisé la RMP sur le plan économique, énergétique et sécuritaire, la plaçant dans une position de force vis-à-vis de la Moldavie. Cependant, puisqu'une reconnaissance étatique n'a jamais été accordée à la RMP, cette dernière a donc hérité d'un déficit symbolique que seule la Moldavie pouvait lui octroyer par la reconnaissance. Une politique active de reconnaissance envers la RMP entre 1994 et 1998 a été le facteur déterminant dans la transformation du conflit, conduisant à la signature de trois « grands accords ». Le célèbre Mémorandum de Moscou de 1997 a souligné ce processus transformatif au travers duquel les deux « opposants » se sont dès lors considérés comme « partenaires » au sein des négociations. Au cours de l'année 1998, Chisinau et Tiraspol se sont engagées sur le chemin de la paix en adoptant des mesures de confiance et de sécurité avec l'Accord d'Odessa

The monitoring and reporting of grave violations against children in situations of armed conflict is at the core of the Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) normative and institutional architecture as outlined in twelve United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions since 1999. The child protection mandate in United Nations peacekeeping operations is the key pillar underpinning this architecture.While the role of civilian Child Protection Advisers (CPAs) in identifying and reporting on these violations through the Security Council-mandated Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Children and Armed Conflict (MRM) is by now well established and largely codified, the contribution of uniformed peacekeepers to this critical function has been generally overlooked. However, in recent years, a series of UN and non-UN legal and policy instruments have placed increasing emphasis on the role of the UN Military and Police in the MRM. ; La surveillance et la communication de l'information sur les violations graves commises à l'encontre d'enfants en situation de conflit armé1 se trouvent au coeur de l'architecture normative et institutionnelle du programme des enfants et des conflits armés, comme le soulignent douze résolutions du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies depuis 1999. Le mandat de protection desenfants dans les opérations de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies est le pilier clé qui sous-tend cette architecture. Si le rôle des conseillers civils pour la protection de l'enfance dans la détection et la communication de ces violations par le biais du mécanisme de surveillance et de communication de l'information (MRM) sur les enfants et les conflits armés mandaté par le Conseil de sécurité est désormais bien établi et largement codifié, la contribution des soldats de la paix en uniforme à cette fonction essentielle a été généralement négligée. Toutefois, ces dernières années, une série d'instruments juridiques et politiques, onusiens et non onusiens, ont mis de plus en plus l'accent sur le rôle des forces militaires et de la police des Nations Unies dans le MRM.

Résumé L'ONU est indispensable, mais son destin dépend de la règle du jeu fixée entre États, et entre les États-Unis, puissance exceptionnelle, et les autres États. Les opérations de maintien de la paix doivent être repensées, dans les procédures de mise sur pied (information du Conseil, participations aux forces...), et sans doute dans une logique d'allègement du poids de l'ONU : cette dernière ne peut ni gérer les pays, ni ignorer le rôle nécessaire des populations et expertises locales.

The Gulf War has put Japan's Constitutional Pacifism to the Test, by Eric Seizelet
The difficulties which have been encountered since Autumn 1990 concerning Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping operations have provoked wide controversy over the modification of the Japanese constitution to respond to changes in the international order. Although the Gulf War brought the question very much into the open, it was in fact a problem of long standing and had figured in many debates during the eighties on Japan's « international contribution ». The possibility of sending military forces abroad is a highly charged and divisive issue for both political and public opinion. These differences of opinion have put heavy constraints on achieving passage of the new act, and demonstrate clearly the weakness of Japanese machinery for political décision making when faced with situations of crisis.

Economic integration among West African member states was the original mandate of ECOWAS. Threats to development, peace and security led the community to expand its mandate to include conflict management. ECOWAS has established a commendable record in peacekeeping. Its intervention in Liberia ended the conflict. In Sierra Leone, it provided the necessary support to the legitimate government, but in Guinea Bissau, it failed to stop the violence. In 2004, ECOMOG was replaced by the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), made up of military, police and civilian personnel. As part of its missions, ECOWAS has implemented conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms outlined in its Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF). However, the organisation relies on its member states to achieve its objectives. Unfortunately, the latter is mostly characterised by a lack of political and financial commitment. In recent years, ECOWAS has focused on counter-terrorism strategies. However, these too have been hampered by capacity constraints, the persistence of a socioeconomic environment increasingly conducive to religious fundamentalism and extremism, and varying levels of political will and commitment. The ECOWAS institution's conflict prevention tools are currently stronger than its conflict management tools. At present, the ESF lacks the logistical and financial capacity for military deployment. Nigeria, the main troop and financial contributor, was supposed to provide more than half of the pledged ESF troops. But it has internal security challenges of its own. It is therefore doubtful that it could spare its pledged troops for an ESF mission. All this suggests that ECOWAS, once a force to be reckoned with in West Africa, has been reduced to a paper tiger. It's warning to intervene, by military force if necessary, in the current conflict in Niger, where a coup has overthrown the legitimate government, was reckoned as an empty threat. Especially since the coup leaders in Mali, Niger and Guinea have been backed by Russia.

The Fiji Military have long-lasting political roles. Their ancestors, the Chiefs' warriors, were determining in making or maintaining the leaders. During the early colonial days, constituted in an Armed Native Constabulary, some of them were employed for the « pacification » of tribes resisting the British and missionary presence. In 1914, subjects of the Crown, they wanted to fight for the Queen, but the British Command refused these coloured men. The famous Ratu Sukuna enlisted in the French Foreign Legion. He later convinced the colonial authority to send a Labour Detachment of about one hundred Fijians to Europe. During the Second World War, thousands of Fijians fought in Bougainville and the Solomons. Despite the perilous situation, the Fijian losses were scarce, because of their skills and aptitudes. The impression they left was enduring: in the 1950s, London asked for a Fijian Battalion for the Malayan Campaign. In 1970, the new sovereign State turned the Fiji Defence Force into the Royal Fiji Military Forces, soon to participate in peacekeeping missions, becoming a powerful instrument of international policy. Since the beginning of the Fiji history, the Military Forces have been the strong support of the long-established customary leaders and Methodist Church, including by conducting the coup of 1987 with Sitiveni Rabuka to protect the traditional Melanesian interest. From the year 2000, behind Commodore Bainimarama, the Army reinforced its political role but completely changed its position, declaring to want equal rights and duties for all the citizens, and contesting the archaic customary power, until conducting the 2006 Coup that led to the current military regime. ; L'État fidjien est fortement marqué par le fait militaire et le militarisme. La société précoloniale était largement fondée sur la guerre et l'art de la faire. L'administration britannique et les missions chrétiennes ont fait cesser les conflits armés mais les Fidjiens, héritiers d'une puissante tradition guerrière, ont cherché à la ...