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Preliminary Material -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. Peacekeeping In Perspective -- Chapter 2. Origins Of Peacekeeping -- Chapter 3. Peacekeeping As Provisional Measure -- Chapter 4. Legal Force And Effects Of Peacekeeping Measures -- Chapter 5. Impartiality Of Peacekeeping Measures -- Chapter 6. Enforcement Of Peacekeeping Measures -- Chapter 7. Regulatory Framework For Peacekeeping -- Chapter 8. Regulatory Control Of Peacekeeping -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index.

The failure of the United Nations and other regional organizations to effectively "keep the peace" is more often than not attributable to a lack of commitment to true collective security on the part of the international community than to flaws in the organizations themselves. Kegley argues that the former dominance of political realism is finally being challenged and offers prescriptions for effective multilateral peacekeeping activities. The greatest obstacle to the creation of a mechanism for multilateral peacekeeping is an absence of a moral consensus in a world where the nature of rapidly changing threats to global peace make it difficult to share a common vision.

Examines various ethical dilemmas including disproportionate power of the US.

The mixed record on civil war termination shows that it is a difficult task, one fraught with uncertainty and risk. Gaining consent for peacekeeping is one strategy policymakers and scholars forward to reduce these concerns. Formal and informal work argues that allowing peacekeeping serves as a costly signal of peaceful intentions; however, these models treat peacekeeping costs as exogenous. I argue that peacekeeping costs have an endogenous element and use consent for peacekeeping missions as a proxy measure. Three conclusions are evident. It is difficult to determine whether belligerents are insincere actors in a peace process or merely distrustful, but consent can tell us whether a ceasefire is precarious and therefore more likely to fail; peacekeeping is difficult but meaningful under some conditions, and reliable information can be taken from negotiating, not just war-fighting. These results qualify the extent to which peacekeeping, with its changing emphasis on consent, can improve its outcomes.

This article studies how when post-conflict justice works alongside a peacekeeping operation following a civil conflict, a two-pronged pacifying effect is activated. While justice mechanisms deal with the factors underlying the conflict, peacekeepers increase the costs for the potential spoilers of the peace while also supporting the justice processes. The findings in this study have important implications for conflict-ridden states attempting to escape the 'conflict trap'.

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The United Nations responded to the failure of some past peacekeeping operations by developing a strategy to help peacekeeping operations move a country from conflict to sustainable peace. It has attempted to apply this strategy to the large and costly peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 2001. As a contributor of over 25 percent of the cost of U.N. operations, the United States has a stake in the successful application of this strategy. The strategy also has implications for the conduct of international peace operations in other post-conflict countries. GAO was asked to (1) identify the elements of the U.N. transition strategy; (2) assess the extent to which the United Nations has applied the strategy to operations; and (3) assess the challenges to implementing the strategy in these three countries."