Suchergebnisse

Auf die Politik Gorbatschows, die Perestroika, antwortet Castro mit einer sozialistischen Variante, der Rectificacion. Ob Kuba eine Chance hat, einen eigenen Weg der sozialistischen Entwicklung zu gehen, bleibt aufgrund seiner wirtschaftlichen Abhängigkeit fraglich

Based on residence in Moscow, USSR, during 1988/89, the multiple aims of perestroika (restructuring) are stressed, ranging from moral regeneration, through an attempted economic miracle, to political transformation, & to establishment of a civil society & the rule of law. The success in the transformation of the moral & intellectual climate & the failures of attempts at economic transformation are detailed. The political implications of the fact that, while the economy is doing badly, it is nevertheless better in comparison with the remembered past, are also discussed. The ethnic situation in the new society & its implications are reviewed in terms of a transformation of the political system, & the overall significance of perestroika in a comparative context is analyzed. AA

In its broadest sense, perestroika may encompass economic reforms or restructuring, openness to criticism, and democratization. One may attribute perestroika significantly to low performance, if not failure, in the Soviet system—notably, the need to modernize and to rectify lagging growth rates. The economic content of perestroika embodies fairly radical and comprehensive changes—notably, expanding enterprise autonomy and price mechanisms, reducing the scope and intensity of centralized planning, and allowing a larger role for individual and cooperative enterprise. Soviet experience supports the view that economic and political reforms are connected. Glasnost (openness) and democratization have expanded, partly as means to foster public support for economic restructuring. Such support is crucial, due to competing factions within the Communist Party and to the Party's opposition to more radical or democratizing reforms. Mikhail Gorbachev, after rejecting both Stalinism and post‐Stalinism, has turned to pre‐Stalinist sources—the Bolshevik Revolution, Lenin, Bukharin—for intellectual inspirations. Obstacles to reforms are substantial, and one may identify several alternative scenarios.

THE ARTICLE EXAMINES MIKHAIL GORBACHEV'S REFORM POLICIES, THEIR IMPLICATIONS, AND THE BEST U.S. REACTION TO IT. IT OUTLINES THREE SCENARIOS FOR GORBACHEV: THE FAILURE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE EMERGENCE OF GORCBACHEV AS A GENUINE REFORMER; ATTEMPTS AT TIGHTLY MANAGED AND LIMITED CHANGE THAT UNLEASHES FORCES THAT DON'T FOLLOW HIS PLANS; OR GORBACHEV MAINTAINS THE REPRESSIVE COMMUNIST SYSTEM UNTIL THE NEXT CRISIS EMERGES. THE ARTICLE WARNS OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL REFORM AND COSMETIC CHANGE DESIGNED TO DECEIVE THE WEST AND LULL THEM INTO A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY.